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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. BACKGROUND 
1.1. BASIC DEFINITIONS 
1.1.1. Medical Disputes 
In recent years, what often dominates the headlines in China is the phrase 
“medical disputes” (医疗纠纷). Broadly speaking, medical disputes refer to all 
conflicts or controversies between the doctor/hospital and the patient over 
medical bills, medical ethics, and medical malpractice claims.1  
The first type of medical disputes is concerned with controversies 
surrounding medical bills. For instance, patients often complain about ever-
increasing medical expenses,2 roughly 40% of which cannot be covered by 
public health insurance schemes.3 In China, although the government 
regulates medical service prices and sets medical charges relatively low, 
anecdotal evidence shows that many, if not most, hospitals overcharge 
patients in various illegal ways.4 There will be this kind of disputes if patients 
realise that they have been overcharged. However, this kind of medical 
disputes is often irrelevant to iatrogenic injuries. 
 
1 See generally Yang 2002. 
2 See infra Chapter 2, Section 3.2. 
3 See infra Chapter 2, Section 3.3. 
4 For instance, hospitals may increase charges by conducting excessive and repetitive 
examinations and prescribing expensive pharmaceuticals (because hospitals are also sellers 
of medicine), engaging in medical services that are beyond the scope of their licenses. See 
e.g. Liu 2012, p. 184. There is much sensational news. For example, a hospital overcharged 
a patient outrageously and stated that the patient had been given oxygen 72 hours a day. 
See e.g. Jilin Workers’ Daily 2015. 
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Controversies over medical ethics are the second type of medical 
disputes. The unique and most notorious one is bribery under the cover of a 
cash gift, the so-called “Hongbao” (红包). Some evidence shows that it 
becomes common practice that patients have to offer a “Hongbao” to their 
doctors.5 If patients forget to provide their doctors with a “Hongbao,” the 
doctors will openly demand the “Hongbao.”6 Some anecdotal evidence even 
suggests that if patients refuse to pay a “Hongbao,” they may receive a lower 
quality of care or may experience more “accidents” during surgeries.7 
The preceding two types of medical disputes are normally not resolved 
by tort law.8 Patients may complain to the government about these disputes 
and administrative punishments (fines or revocation of the license) or 
disciplinary sanctions (e.g. a warning or reprimand) will be imposed on those 
hospitals or practitioners who contravene laws, regulations, or codes of 
ethics.9 Nonetheless, these may help to explain why the trust between 
Chinese doctors and patients is so fragile that a conflict may easily arise. 
What is more pertinent to the topic under discussion in this thesis is 
the third type of medical disputes, which specifically refer to the cases where 
patients believe that the injuries they suffered were attributable to medical 
interventions and thus they claim compensation from providers for the 
injuries.10 In China, this narrowly defined notion of medical disputes over 
liability and compensation is widely used in the Chinese literature and will be 
employed throughout this thesis, unless otherwise indicated. Medical disputes 
 
5 Liu 2012, p. 43. Bandao.cn conducted a survey of 684 patients, 66.81% of which said they 
had offered their doctors a Hongbao, and 77.19% said their doctors had openly or 
implicitly demanded the Hongbao. See Bandao.cn 2014. 
6 Id. 
7 For example, South China Metropolis Daily reported a case where before an operation, the 
two surgeons making preparations for the surgery said to the patient, “If you do not 
provide us with a Hongbao, there will be more ‘accidents’ during the surgery.” The 
patient, who was poor and borrowed all the surgical expenses (2,400 yuan) from his 
relatives, finally paid the surgeons a Hongbao of 400 yuan for fear of suffering “accidents.” 
See South China Metropolis Daily 2006. Another sensational example is the so-called 
“Sewed Anus Incident” (膖肛门). A midwife allegedly took revenge on a woman by 
sewing the woman’s anus after the childbirth because the woman and her husband refused 
to pay a Hongbao before the childbirth when the midwife urged them to pay several 
times. See e.g. Xi'an Daily 2010. 
8 An exception is that, according to art. 63 of the Tort Law 2009, patients may claim any 
overcharged expense back from the hospital if they can establish that the staff members of 
the hospital have conducted “unnecessary examinations in violation of the procedures and 
standards for diagnosis and treatment.” 
9 For instance, in 2006 in the Anhui Province, a total of 60 doctors had been subject to 
disciplinary sanctions because of taking the Hongbao. See Jiang 2015. 
10 Yang 2002, p. 123. 
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are primarily dealt with by the tort litigation system or alternative dispute 
resolution (hereinafter ADR), which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
1.1.2. Iatrogenic/Treatment Injuries 
A medical dispute normally arises from an “accident” where a patient suffers 
some injury. In the literature, different types of damage suffered by patients 
in the health care sector are carefully distinguished. Unlike victims of a traffic 
accident whose personal injuries are generally caused only by the accident, 
most patients are already out of condition before they see a doctor,11 which is 
often termed an underlying or pre-existing/prior illness/condition/disease.12 
During diagnoses and treatment, patients may suffer injuries due to 
“accidents” that may or may not be related to medical interventions. As 
Shavell pointed out, the “accidents of special interest are iatrogenic, those 
which may be imputed to medical treatment itself rather than to a prior 
medical condition.”13 Shavell further framed the concept of “medical 
accident,” which means “any adverse medical event, whether or not it is in 
some sense ‘accidental’ in nature.”14 
However, it is the notion of an “iatrogenic injury” that is more often 
adopted in the literature than “medical accidents.” According to the Harvard 
Medical Practices Study (hereinafter Harvard Study), an iatrogenic injury is 
“any adverse condition in a patient resulting from treatment by a physician or 
surgeon.”15 It seems that the notion of iatrogenic injury is almost identical 
 
11 Not all patients are out of condition before going to hospital. For example, pregnant 
women who choose to deliver at a hospital can be very healthy beforehand. 
12 There is a minor difference between a pre-existing condition and an underlying condition. 
A pre-existing condition is usually defined as an “on-going condition that is symptomatic 
and has required treatment.” See Winthers 2016. Pre-existing conditions are obvious ones 
which immediately impel patients to see a doctor. In contrast, an underlying illness is “an 
asymptomatic condition that leaves a party in a weakened state” or makes him/her likely 
to suffer from another disease. See Winthers 2016. Examples of underlying conditions 
include: obesity, compromised immune system, diabetes, malabsorption, etc. 
Schnakenberg 2015. An underlying illness may be a hidden condition that is believed to 
have caused the pre-existing symptomatic condition, or may not be present with the pre-
existing condition at all. Right Diagnosis 2016. However, as far as the malpractice law is 
concerned, both pre-existing and underlying conditions are non-tortious factors that are 
believed to be within the scope of responsibility of patients themselves, and that are in 
marked contrast to torts committed by medical providers. Hence, these two terms will be 
used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
13 Shavell 1978, p. 35. 
14 Id. However, it is worth noting that under Chinese law, “medical accidents” (医疗事故) 
specifically denotes those events with obvious personal injury due to negligence on the 
part of health care providers. 
15 Harvard Medical Practices Study 1990, Glossary. 
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with that of treatment injury currently employed by the New Zealand 
Accident Compensation Act 2001.16 A necessary part of the treatment (e.g. 
cutting the skull in a brain surgery) should not be regarded as an iatrogenic 
injury; otherwise, it could be counter-productive – no intrusive medical 
interventions should be conducted in order to avoid iatrogenic injuries 
entirely.  
Iatrogenic injuries may occur in cases where the pre-existing condition 
is not deteriorating or where it is even improving. Modern medical 
interventions are usually aggressive and risky in and of themselves, which 
may generate “therapeutic risks” that are additional to the pre-existing 
disease.17 For instance, there is a small probability that a selected treatment 
will occasionally cause fatal complications to the patient and there is a large 
probability that the treatment will cause minor injuries or discomfort to her.18 
Moreover, few drugs are free from negative side effects. To provide a third 
example, an underlying condition, which is not present with the pre-existing 
condition, may combine with the medical intervention to cause new 
complications in an unpredictable way. In this sense, medical interventions 
are just the lesser of two “evils.” Thus, there is often a trade-off between the 
benefit of curing a disease under treatment and the cost of suffering an 
additional iatrogenic injury. Patients should be informed of the benefits and 
risks of treatment plans and give consent to the treatment. Sometimes this 
additional harm can be avoided by the treatment, but sometimes it is 
unavoidable by any treatment in the present state of the art.19 
 
16 Section 32(1)-(2) of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 (N.Z.). defines treatment injury 
as personal injury that is (a) suffered by a person, (b) caused by treatment; and (c) not a 
necessary part, or ordinary consequence, of the treatment, which does not include (a) 
personal injury that is wholly or substantially caused by a person’s underlying health 
condition …  
17 Khoury 2006, pp. 51-52. 
18 Inman 1986, pp. 44-45. 
19 Note that “avoidability” is understood differently in different systems. In legal systems 
where the negligence rule applies to medical liability, it is only meaningful to establish the 
causal link between the breach of the standard of care (negligence) and the injury. An 
injury would be said to be compensable if it could be reasonably or properly avoided by a 
treatment. Providers ought to exercise due care (the reasonable man standard) but not the 
best care medically possible (the best man standard). An injury that could be avoided by 
the best physician but not by the reasonable physician would not be compensable under 
the fault-based malpractice system. In contrast, in systems where no-fault compensation 
schemes are employed, an injury that could be avoided by the best physician would 
nonetheless be compensable. See infra Chapter 11. Since the notion of the iatrogenic 
injury only implies its connection with medical interventions, but does not suggest any 
reference to negligence, the avoidability requirement of iatrogenicity will be based on the 
best doctor standard. 
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Iatrogenic injuries may also be the unnatural aggravation of the pre-
existing condition or failure to stop the medically avoidable natural 
progression of the pre-existing condition. Errors or omissions during 
treatment may exacerbate or fail to prevent the natural progression that can 
be avoided by a proper or best treatment so that the patient’s expectations of 
the amelioration of their pre-existing disease are frustrated. Stauch contended 
that the failure of a medical intervention could legitimately be counted as 
harm because the patient’s health has not been improved to the expected 
state.20 For instance, the death of a patient who died of rabies due to his/her 
doctor’s delay in injecting Rabies Vaccine falls into the category of an 
iatrogenic injury in that the patient can be medically cured. However, if this 
harm cannot be avoided by any treatment, it should be better interpreted as a 
non-iatrogenic injury. 
The opposite to an iatrogenic injury is a non-iatrogenic injury, which 
is the natural progression of the patient’s pre-existing conditions. Because of 
lacking a causal link with medical interventions, non-iatrogenic injuries are 
particular risks that are considered to be the patient’s own responsibility and 
that can be dealt with by the patient via the use of insurance, disease 
prevention or other measures.21 Given that quality uncertainty and risks are 
characteristic of the healthcare market,22 it is comprehensible that even a 
properly administered treatment may sometimes fail to cure the patient’s 
illness due to the limits of modern medicine. Therefore, the “fact that the 
treatment did not achieve a desired result does not, of itself” constitute 
iatrogenic injury.23 As far as many critical diseases are concerned, failure to 
cure may be the highly foreseeable or ordinary consequences given the then 
available medical knowledge. These ordinary consequences of the treatment 
are non-iatrogenic injuries. 
1.1.3. Adverse Events 
A notion similar to or identical with the iatrogenic injury is the adverse event 
(hereinafter AE).24 The Harvard Study defined an adverse event as “an 
unintended injury caused by medical management rather than by the disease 
process” where the “injury is sufficiently serious to lead to prolongation of 
 
20 Stauch 2008, p. 1. 
21 Vaughan & Vaughan 2008, p. 6. 
22 See generally Arrow 1963. 
23 NZ-ACA 2001, Section 32(3). 
24 Sometimes, scholars use other similar terms such as “medical adversity,” see generally 
Havighurst & Tancredi, 1973; Havighurst 1975, or “medical mal-occurrence,” see generally 
Pollack 1987; 1988. 
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hospitalisation or temporary or permanent impairment or disability in the 
patient.”25 It seems that the Harvard Study intended to equate the “iatrogenic 
injury” with the AE,26 or at least the AE is a subset of the iatrogenic injury – 
the serious iatrogenic injury. Note that an event usually denotes “a thing that 
happens or takes place,”27 which has nearly the same meaning as an incident 
or accident. In contrast, an injury normally refers to “any harm or damage” 
done to a person in an accident.28 Hence, it sounds somewhat weird to treat 
the AE and the iatrogenic injury as synonymous. It may be more appropriate 
to redefine an AE as an accident where an iatrogenic injury was caused by 
medical treatment or procedures.29 
1.1.4. Iatrogenic Injuries, Errors, and Negligence 
Iatrogenic injuries may trigger legal interventions. Under traditional private 
law, only damage caused by medical malpractice (or clinical/medical 
negligence)30 is compensable. Medical malpractice normally denotes a health 
care provider’s failure to exercise the due care (proper medical interventions) 
which a reasonable provider would exercise in similar circumstances.31 
However, it should be noted that not all iatrogenic injuries can be prevented 
by a properly given treatment. An iatrogenic injury can be caused by a 
properly preventable medical error or by a properly non-preventable medical 
mishap.32  
Interestingly, a notion of “medical misadventure” was adopted in New 
Zealand before 2005. Medical misadventure consists of medical error and 
medical mishap.33 The medical error was defined as “the failure of a registered 
health professional to observe a standard of care and skill reasonably to be 
 
25 Id. 
26 Cascão and Hendrickx argued that the notion of an adverse event “coincides with the 
notion of iatrogenic injury.” Cascão & Hendrickx 2007, p. 117, note 10. 
27 Stevenson 2010. 
28 Garner 2014. 
29 This definition is conceptually sound, since it makes a clear distinction between an 
accident (AE) and the consequence of the accident (iatrogenic injury). However, this 
distinction is trivial in terms of practical significance, because, by this definition, one AE 
precisely corresponds to one iatrogenic injury. Hence, these two terms are often used 
interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
30 While “clinical/medical negligence” is often used under the UK tort law, “medical 
malpractice” is a particularly predominant terminology under the US tort law. Since these 
two terms are essentially synonymous, they will often be used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. 
31 Garner 2014. 
32 Boccara 2009, p. 341. 
33 NZ-IPRCAA 2001, Section 32(1). 
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expected in the circumstances.”34 In the light of liability law, a medical error 
is roughly equivalent to the notion of clinical negligence.  
In contrast, medical mishap means a “severe” (at least suffering a 
temporary disability more than 28 days) and “rare” (less than 1%) adverse 
consequence of treatment which is given properly.35A medical mishap occurs 
so rarely that even the reasonably qualified medical expert cannot (but the 
most qualified expert can) anticipate or prevent it. Nevertheless, an injury 
resulting from a medical mishap is still iatrogenic in that it is associated with 
a treatment intervention rather than the pre-existing condition. Thus, a 
medical mishap is somewhere in between a medical error and a pre-existing 
condition.  
Weiler et al. also defined a medical error resulting from an iatrogenic 
injury as a negligent AE, and thus a medical mishap as a non-negligent AE.36 
It ought to be noted that a negligent AE is not equivalent to but only a 
limited subset of a medical error, since the “vast majority of errors do not 
result in injury to patients because the error was identified in time and 
mitigated; because the patient was resilient; or because of simple good luck.”37 
Medical errors that do not lead to iatrogenic injury are also called “near 
misses, close calls, potential adverse events or warning events.”38 
Likewise, we can divide iatrogenic injuries into negligent iatrogenic 
injuries and non-negligent iatrogenic injuries. Under the fault-based 
malpractice system, only negligent iatrogenic injuries are compensable. 
However, under no-fault plans, both negligent and non-negligent iatrogenic 
injuries may be recoverable.39 
The relationship among all the preceding concepts is summarised in 
Figure 1.1 as follows. 
Figure 1.1: The Relationship among Basic Concepts 
 
 
34 NZ-IPRCAA 2001, Section 33(1). 
35 NZ-IPRCAA 2001, Section 34. 
36 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 35. 
37 Grober & Bohnen 2005, p. 41. 
38 Id. 
39 Weiler et al. 1993, pp. 19-25. See also infra Chapter 11. 
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1.2. DOCTOR-PATIENT CONFLICTS IN CHINA 
1.2.1. The Frequency of Medical Disputes and Iatrogenic Injuries 
Scattered empirical studies in the past decade suggest that medical disputes 
are prevalent and becoming more and more frequent in China.  
First, there is an increasing trend nationwide. As early as in 2002, 
Zheng et al. conducted a questionnaire survey of 326 hospitals in several 
provinces and found that 321 (98.47%) of all these hospitals had suffered from 
serious medical disputes.40 In September 2002, the Chinese Hospital 
Association carried out a questionnaire survey of 200 hospitals and pointed 
out that the number of medical disputes occurring in Level 3 hospitals had 
risen by 17.98%, in Level 2 hospitals by 34.71% and in Level 1 hospitals by 
40% compared to the data in January 2002.41  
Second, the same growing trend can be detected at the municipal level. 
For example, Yang et al. reported that the number of medical disputes had 
risen from 77 in 2003 to 110 in 2004 to 126 in 2005 in Huangshi City of Hubei 
Province.42  
Third, this upward trend can also be identified by studying individual 
hospitals. For instance, Wang and Yang reported an increasing trend in a 
large hospital: from 89 medical disputes in 2004 to 111 in 2005, to 115 in 
2006.43 Consistently, Liu and Feng (2013) pointed out that the number of 
medical disputes in 9 public hospitals in Chancheng District of Foshan City of 
Guangdong Province had gone up from 17 in 2008 to 33 in 2011.44 
One may wonder whether this growing trend may also have been 
caused by a better registration of medical disputes rather than to actual rises 
in the number of medical disputes. However, this is unlikely to be the case, 
since there is often little incentive for hospitals to improve registration. As we 
will see later, some disputes that are resolved behind the scenes are seldom 
recorded or reported to the authorities by hospitals.45 
A medical dispute arises from an identified AE. However, some 
unobservable AEs may never be detected and disputed by patients. That is to 
say, medical disputes are a subset of AEs. Hence, although data on the 
 
40 See generally Zheng, Deng & Chen 2002. 
41 See generally Chinese Hospital Association 2004. 
42 See generally Yang, Zhao & Bao 2006. 
43 See generally Wang & Yang 2007. 
44 See generally Liu & Feng 2013. 
45 See infra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.3.1. See also Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 211. 
 Introduction 
Intersentia 9 
incidence of AEs are currently unavailable, a plausible inference is that AEs 
may be prevalent as well.  
1.2.2. Violence against Doctors 
In China, there are often “incidents of violence or protest arising from 
medical disputes.”46 Parts of these incidents are “spontaneous outbursts of 
anger and frustration because of poor care, medical errors, or exorbitant 
costs,” but in recent years a significant proportion of them are Yi Nao 
incidents.47 
“Yi Nao” (医闹) is an equivocal concept, which has not been defined 
by any law or regulation yet. On the one hand, it may denote a social 
phenomenon where a victimised patient, his/her family members or a mob of 
hired trouble makers attempt to claim damages from the healthcare provider 
involved for the injury the patient has suffered by various coercive measures. 
Some of these coercive measures are extremely violent, such as assault and 
battery, false imprisonment48 and vandalism.49 Less violent examples include 
burning joss paper of the nether world,50 setting up a mourning hall, laying 
funeral wreaths, displaying the dead body of the deceased patient, mobbing,51 
picking a quarrel and making trouble52 in the medical institution concerned. 
Some measures without violence are also reported. For instance, a trouble 
maker may sit quietly as a form of protest in the hospital manager’s office day 
after day.53 In this sense, Yi Nao can be termed “hospital disturbance” or “Yi 
Nao incidents”. 
On the other hand, Yi Nao can also refer to a mob of people, namely 
the “professional hospital trouble makers” (职业医闹), who are hired by the 
victimised patient or his/her family members. These trouble makers pretend 
to be relatives of the patient and help to carry out the aforesaid coercive 
measures. Moreover, the patient or his/her family members promise to share 
the obtained “damages” with them. Normally, trouble makers can get as high 
as 40-50% of total “damages.”54 In an exceptional case, the hospital paid 
 
46 Liebman 2013. 
47 Hesketh et al. 2012, pp. 1-2. 
48 DR-Maintaining Order in Medical Institutions 2012 (China), art. 7, sub-para. 4. 
49 DR-Maintaining Order in Medical Institutions 2012 (China), art. 7, sub-para. 5. 
50 Chinese burn joss paper in order to ensure that the spirit of the deceased has lots of good 
things in the afterlife. 
51 DR-Maintaining Order in Medical Institutions 2012 (China), art. 7, sub-para. 1. 
52 DR-Maintaining Order in Medical Institutions 2012 (China), art. 7, sub-para. 2. 
53 Signorili 2007. 
54 Id. 
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“damages” totalling 300,000 yuan, of which 270,000 yuan (90%) was actually 
obtained by the trouble makers.55 
The basic information on professional Yi Nao in China is summarised 
in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: What Is Professional Yi Nao?56 
Definition Yi Nao means medical or hospital disturbance (it can also refer to the 
gangs or individuals who create the disturbance) 
Purpose Use of Yi Nao to obtain compensation for perceived or actual medical 
malpractice has developed in many parts of China over the past 5-10 
years 
Benefits Yi Nao receive a substantial cut of any compensation received 
Coercive 
means 
Yi Nao gangs consist largely of unemployed people with a designated 
leader. They threaten and assault hospital personnel, damage 
facilities and equipment, and prevent the normal activities of the 
hospital 
Initiation Although some people approach Yi Nao to deal with medical 
disputes, Yi Nao also solicit business by wandering around hospitals, 
looking for potential “malpractice” cases and encouraging individuals 
to pursue them 
Consequences Yi Nao disturbances, many of which have been very serious with 
fatal consequences, have been widely reported in the Chinese press 
 
In the past decade, the surge in protests and violence pertaining to medical 
disputes has been widely reported in the media in China. In 2002, Zheng 
Xuqian et al. reported that of all the 326 hospitals, 73.5% had encountered 
patients who disturbed the order inside the hospital, 43.86% had experienced 
beating and smashing inside the hospital, 35.58% had suffered from facilities 
damage and 113 medical staff members in 34.66% of all the 326 hospitals had 
been injured.57 In 2006, Wang et al. reported that as high as 56.1% of all the 
staff members from 20 hospitals in Chengdu City of Sichuan Province said 
that they were physically threatened by patients.58 In 2007, Zheng Xuqian et 
al. studied medical violence in 250 hospitals nationwide, reporting that 
73.33% hospitals experienced incidents where medical staff members had 
been violently beaten, threaten or abused by patients or their family 
members, and 61.48% hospitals experienced incidents where the deceased 
patient’s family members laid wreaths or set up a mourning hall inside 
 
55 CNTV 2013. 
56 Hesketh et al. 2012, p. 2. 
57 See generally Zheng, Deng & Chen 2002. 
58 See generally Wang et al. 2006. 
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hospitals.59 Recently in 2014, Jia studied 316 hospitals nationwide and found 
that the proportion of hospitals that suffered from medical violence had risen 
from 90% in 2008 to 96% in 2012, and the percentage of medical staff 
members who had been attacked and suffered from obvious injury had risen 
from 47.7% in 2008 to 63.7% in 2012.60 
Besides reports in the Chinese media, violence against Chinese doctors 
has also made the headlines in English media such as the Economist,61 the 
BMJ (originally called the British Medical Journal),62 the National Public 
Radio (NPR),63 the BBC,64 the Lancet,65 the New Yorker,66 and the 
Washington Post.67 
Violence against doctors is common in many other countries.68 
However, in countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and the US, violence against 
doctors is virtually always done by patients or their close relatives and serious 
injury and murder are relatively rare.69 Compared to these countries, China is 
unique on account of “the extreme nature of the violence and the use of Yi 
Nao vigilante groups.”70 
1.2.3. Provider Negligence and Medical Disputes 
Although there is no report on the incidence of adverse events, some 
empirical studies suggest that the rate of medical disputes due to provider 
negligence compared to all identified medical disputes is strikingly high. For 
example, Yang et al. found that 52.3% of the medical disputes could be 
attributed to the negligent healthcare provider in Huangshi of Hubei 
Province (2003-2005).71 Wang found that 59.36% of the medical disputes are 
associated with negligence in a hospital (2004-2006).72 Song even reported 
that as high as 93.83% of all medical disputes were caused by medical 
malpractice in Yueyang of Hunan Province (2007-2010).73 
 
59 See generally Zheng et al. 2007. 
60 See generally Jia et al. 2014. 
61 The Economist 2012; 2013. 
62 Hesketh et al. 2012; Tucker et al. 2015. 
63 Langfitt 2013. 
64 Sudworth 2014. 
65 The Lancet Editorial 2014. 
66 Beam 2014. 
67 Rauhala 2015. 
68 See generally International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 2012. 
69 Hesketh et al. 2012, p. 2. 
70 Id. 
71 Yang, Zhao & Bao 2006, p. 1861. 
72 Wang 2008, p. 10. 
73 Song 2011, p. 4. 
 
 
12 Intersentia 
Introduction 
Moreover, Li provided a much more complete picture of the 
distribution of various factors.74 He found that of the 260 medical disputes 
occurring in 4 hospitals in Dongguan of Guangdong Province (2007-2011), 
145 (55.77%) were attributable to the health care provider, 79 (30.38%) to the 
patient75 and 36 (10.38%) to other social factors. Furthermore, Li specifically 
pointed out that of all the 145 disputes where providers were negligent, 74 
(51.03%) were caused by failure to live up to the then medical standard or 
lack of commitment, 24 (30.38%) by failure to fulfil the duty of disclosure, 9 
(11.39%) by excessive medicine. 
Hence, the above data suggest that more than half of all medical 
disputes can be attributed to physician negligence. However, evidence on the 
extent to which physician negligence contributes to all AEs is currently 
unavailable.  
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The previous Section shows that recently in China the frequency and severity 
of medical disputes (a subset of AEs) have been increasing substantially, 
which remains an issue of concern to the whole society. Although the root 
cause of many medical disputes may be deficiencies in the health care system, 
a substantial part of them can be attributed to sub-standard quality of care. 
One may thus wonder what legal remedies are available in China that are 
intended to maintain the quality of medical care and thus reduce the 
frequency and severity of AEs. Are these legal remedies effective and 
efficient? 
On the other hand, in cases where an AE (especially a negligent one) 
occurs, one may also wonder how the Chinese legal system handles medical 
malpractice claims. Will victims of medical malpractice obtain adequate 
compensation quickly and cheaply? The prevalence of Yi Nao incidents 
suggests that many victims of medical malpractice do not trust the formal 
legal system. Instead, they resort to the “weapons of the weak.” Some argued 
that this is because the legal channels for handling medical disputes are 
ineffective, inefficient, and biased towards hospitals.76 Is this argument valid? 
 
74 See generally Li 2013. 
75 Of all the 79 patient-provoked disputes, 26 (32.91%) were associated with the patient’s 
lack of medical knowledge, 21 (26.58%) with the patient’s strategy of using violence to 
obtain compensation, and 18 (22.78%) with the patient’s extremely high expectation of 
curative effects. 
76 Id. 
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In this thesis, it is taken for granted that if the Chinese legal remedies 
were effective and efficient at preventing medical malpractice (or quality 
assurance) and compensating victims of medical malpractice adequately, 
there would be a substantial reduction in the frequency and severity of 
medical malpractice (and ultimately in medical disputes, AEs, violence 
against doctors, and Yi Nao incidents). This assumption is in line with law 
and economics literature on the goals of accident law.77 Based on this prior 
assumption, answers to the following three interrelated main research 
questions will be provided in this thesis: 
(1) Are the current legal remedies for medical malpractice in China sound 
from a legal perspective? 
(2) Are these legal remedies also efficient when measured against economic 
benchmarks? 
(3) If not, how can we improve these legal remedies? 
If the answers to the first two questions are “Yes,” there will be no need to 
answer the third one. 
The first main question can be divided into two sub-questions. (1-a) 
What are the legal remedies currently available in China that are aimed at the 
prevention of medical malpractice and the compensation of victimised 
patients? (1-b) Are these remedies sound according to traditional legal 
doctrines that have been developed in China?  
The second main question can be divided into two sub-questions as 
well. (2-a) How should the legal remedies be structured in order to prevent 
medical malpractice and compensate victims for iatrogenic injuries efficiently 
in theory and have these theoretical predictions been tested? (2-b) Are the 
legal remedies in China efficient in the light of economic benchmarks?  
In the case where the answers to the first two main questions are not 
“Yes,” the thesis will proceed to answer the third main question.  
It should be noted that, in China, the primary legal remedy for medical 
malpractice is private law compensation under tort law (hereinafter the 
malpractice system), which is the central focus of this thesis. However, the 
malpractice system is not operating without the influence of other legal 
remedies such as regulation, private insurance, and social security. These 
alternative remedies to tort law and their interaction with the malpractice 
system, will also be addressed in this thesis, though in a less detailed way. 
Specific questions call for particular methods. In this thesis, three 
methods are carefully chosen in order to answer the research questions – the 
 
77 See generally infra Chapter 7. 
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doctrinal approach, empirical legal research, and comparative law and 
economics, which will be addressed in the following section. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. THE DOCTRINAL APPROACH 
Doctrine is often defined as “a synthesis of rules, principles, norms, 
interpretive guidelines and values” which “explains, makes coherent or 
justifies a segment of the law as part of a larger system of law.”78 The doctrinal 
approach “lies at the heart of any lawyer’s task because it is the research 
process used to identify, analyse and synthesise the content of the law.”79 In 
order to answer Sub-question (1-a), it is important that the description of the 
legal remedies should reflect the true content of the law in the light of 
dominant doctrines in China, which lays the foundations of further 
discussions.  
3.2. EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 
Empirical Legal Research (hereinafter ELR) is concerned with “the systematic 
collection of information (‘data’) and its analysis according to some generally 
accepted method.”80 Data are just “facts about the world,”81 which may come 
from “a wide range of sources including surveys, documents, reporting 
systems, observation, interviews, experiments, decisions, and events.”82 ELR is 
primarily interested in law in action rather than the law in the book.83 Also, 
ELR is focused on the “functioning of organisations and institutions in the 
legal field” and “effects, consequences or impacts of legal arrangements on the 
behaviour of persons and organisations.”84 Empirical evidence can be either 
quantitative or qualitative.85 Due to limitations of time and financial 
resources, this PhD project will employ the qualitative approach.  
 
78 Hutchinson 2013, p. 9. 
79 Id. 
80 Cane & Kritzer 2010, pp. 4-5. 
81 Epstein & Martin 2014, p. 3. 
82 Cane & Kritzer 2010, pp. 4-5. 
83 Leeuw & Schmeets 2016, p. 2. 
84 Leeuw & Schmeets 2016, pp. 5-6. 
85 Epstein & Martin 2014, p. 3. 
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Sub-question (1-b) will be answered by using empirical evidence the 
medical malpractice law in action, the functioning of the legal remedies 
pertaining to quality assurance and compensation, and their impact on actors 
in the health care sector. The main data are collected from court decisions 
and semi-structured interviews. As Epstein and Martin pointed out, “we 
could have extracted information from the text of court decisions” and the 
“data in this case would be words, not numbers, that could interpret, organise 
into categories, and use to identify patterns.”86 In order to figure out how the 
malpractice law functions in practice, I have conducted an analysis of 592 
court decisions from the Gulou District People’s Court, located in Nanjing of 
the Jiangsu Province in China.  
Semi-structured interviews are non-standardised interviews that are 
often used in qualitative analysis.87 A list of issues and questions are listed 
before the interview and additional questions that were not expected before 
the interview could be raised in the process.88 Semi-structured interviews 
allow for “probing of views and opinions” especially when it is important to 
“explore subjective meanings that respondents ascribe to concepts or 
events.”89 For the purpose of finding out more information that cannot be 
drawn from court decisions, 21 semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with judges, attorneys, public health officials, physicians, etc. in Nanjing and 
elsewhere in China. Key findings of existing empirical studies will be 
summarised as supplementary evidence.  
3.3. COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 
3.3.1. Why Law and Economics? 
The law and economics approach is adopted to answer Sub-question (2-a). A 
question that is often raised by lawyers is – Why should we be bothered 
about law and economics? This can be answered from two perspectives – 
positive analysis and normative analysis. 
Positive analysis is intended to “provide a system of generalisations 
that can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any 
change in circumstances.”90 An essential assumption of economics is that 
rational maximisers respond to incentives – “that if a person’s surroundings 
 
86 Id. 
87 Gray 2014, pp. 385-386. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Friedman 1953, p. 4. 
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change in such a way that he/she could increase his satisfaction by altering 
his behaviour, he/she will do so.”91 Incentives are provided by prices in the 
market and by sanctions in the legal system. To economists, “sanctions look 
like prices, and presumably, people respond to these sanctions much as they 
respond to prices.”92 Specifically, tort sanctions can be viewed as “prices” that 
induce potential tortfeasors to take appropriate precautions in order to avoid 
being held liable for harm done. This deterrence function of tort law is also 
stressed by article 1 of the new Tort Law 2009 in China, which reads “this law 
has been formulated for the purposes of … preventing … tortious acts.”  
The legal system also assumes that individual actors are rational, which 
can be evidenced by many legal principles or standards such as “freedom of 
contract”93 and the “reasonable person” standard.94Hence, the intersection of 
the basic assumptions of economics and law provides a strong case for using 
economic methods to analyse legal problems. Based on “mathematically 
precise theories (price theory and game theory)”95 and “empirically sound 
methods (statistics and econometrics),” economics is perfectly fit for analysing 
how people respond to “implicit prices” of legal sanctions.96 
In this thesis, it is important to first describe and predict how parties 
and stakeholders in a medical malpractice setting will behave in response to 
incentives provided by different legal rules. In this way, it is possible to 
observe the effects of different legal rules on the behaviour of people. This is 
what positive economics is about, which is already very interesting.  
In contrast, normative analysis “incorporates value judgements about 
what the economy should be like or what particular policy action should be 
recommended to achieve a desirable goal.”97 Besides “justice” and “fairness,” 
efficiency is also integral to society. Efficiency is a legitimate goal that has 
 
91 Posner 2011, p. 5. 
92 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 3. 
93 Freedom of contract is the doctrine “that people have the right to enter into binding 
private agreements with others … that people are able to fashion their relations by private 
agreements.” Garner 2014. Therefore, the underlying assumption of freedom of contract is 
that people are rational so that they are able to pursue their interests through contracts. 
94 A “reasonable man” is a “hypothetical person … who exercises the degree of attention, 
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment … The reasonable man acts sensibly, does things 
without serious delay, and takes proper but not excessive precaution.” Id. It follows that a 
reasonable man in law is almost identical to a rational man in economics. 
95 Readers who have not been trained in economists or mathematics should not be 
intimidated by the application of mathematics to legal analyses. As we will see in the 
following chapters, only a basic high school level mathematical knowledge is employed to 
demonstrate critical propositions when it is indeed necessary. Higher and Further 
Mathematics such as Calculus is avoided throughout this thesis.  
96 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 3. 
97 McConnell, Brue & Flynn 2009, p. 7. 
 Introduction 
Intersentia 17 
been recognised and treasured in China throughout the post-Mao era.98 
Hence, the first main research question also asks about the efficiency of the 
legal remedies for medical quality assurance and victim compensation.  
The pursuit of efficiency should be reflected in legislation and law and 
economics seems highly fit for this job. Based on the fundamental assumption 
that people are rational maximisers of their ends in life, economics offers a 
powerful tool to conduct cost-benefit analysis which is aimed at enhancing 
efficiency.99 In welfare economics, the basic notion of efficiency is Pareto 
efficiency, meaning a situation where “it is impossible to change it so as to 
make at least one person better off … without making another person worse 
off.”100 Dissatisfied with Pareto efficiency, contemporary economists relaxed 
the stringent requirement of Pareto efficiency and developed the notion of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (or a potential Pareto improvement), which “allows 
changes in which there are both gainers and losers but requires that the 
gainers gain more than the losers lose.”101  
Therefore, after the positive analysis of legal remedies for medical 
malpractice is done, normative economics will lead to the formulation of 
some policy recommendations in line with the normative criterion of 
efficiency. 
3.3.2. The Use of Comparative Law 
In some chapters of this thesis, the systems of compensating victims of AEs in 
foreign jurisdictions (primarily the US, New Zealand, and several European 
countries) and relevant empirical evidence have been mentioned as a frame of 
reference for China. However, this has been done primarily from a functional 
approach.102 It will be done in a problem-oriented way. The focus will be on 
how a legal system deals with the problem of medical malpractice and on 
empirical evidence on whether it works in practice. The ultimate purpose is 
to ascertain what are the best practices in other legal systems. Hence, it 
 
98 The relationship between efficiency and fairness is not only an economic and political 
issue, but also one of social development. Since the adoption of the reform and opening-up 
policy in 1978, the Communist Party and the Government of China have undergone a 
continual process of exploration into understanding the relation between efficiency and 
fairness, from “treating efficiency and fairness equally” to “giving priority to efficiency 
over fairness” and then to “properly balancing the relation between efficiency and fairness 
both in primary distribution and redistribution, and giving more consideration to fairness 
in redistribution.” See generally Li & Zhang 2013. 
99 Posner 2011, pp. 4-5. 
100 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 14. 
101 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 42. 
102 Siems 2014, pp. 26-27. 
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should not be regarded as a fully-fledged application of traditional 
comparative law.103 Detailed descriptions and comparisons of medical liability 
or no-fault schemes among different jurisdictions around the world are 
currently available elsewhere,104 and will therefore not be repeated in this 
thesis. 
Several legal jurisdictions have been chosen in the light of whether 
they can be interesting examples or can provide some useful lessons for 
China, which of course is a way of cherry picking. For empirical evidence, 
the main focus is on empirical studies in the US, because the deterrent 
function of tort law is strongly stressed there and relevant empirical literature 
on the deterrent effect of medical malpractice liability is voluminous. Since 
both the US and China primarily depend on fault-based tort liability to deal 
with medical malpractice issues, the US experience may provide China with 
useful lessons. Be that as it may, if other legal systems such as the Netherlands 
also provide some valuable empirical evidence or interesting legal solutions 
that may be relevant to China, they will be briefly addressed as well.  
For alternative schemes to tort law, medical no-fault compensation 
schemes in New Zealand and Scandinavian countries will be analysed. The 
reason for this choice is that these are the only jurisdictions in the world 
where comprehensive no-fault compensation schemes that are alternative to 
tort law are well developed. 
4. STRUCTURE 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into three parts as follows: 
Part I (Chapter 2 to Chapter 6) examines the legal remedies for medical 
quality assurance and victim compensation in China, which is intended to 
answer Sub-question (1-a) and Sub-question (1-b). Chapter 2 is concerned 
with the provision of health care and the regulation of the medical profession. 
It is primarily aimed at answering the question of how the regulatory system 
works in practice in terms of quality assurance (or the prevention of medical 
errors). Chapter 3 thoroughly describes the substantive system of medical 
 
103 The traditional approach to comparative law often includes the following four steps: “First, 
a comparative analysis starts with preliminary considerations, deciding on the research 
question and the choice of legal systems. Second, the comparatist has to describe the laws 
of these countries. Third, she has to compare them, in particular exploring the reasons for 
unexpected similarities and differences. Fourth, she should critically evaluate her findings, 
possibly also making policy recommendations.” Siems 2014, p. 13. 
104 See e.g. Dute, Faure & Koziol 2004; Stauch 2008; Hondius 2010c; Koch 2011; Oliphant & 
Wright 2013; Taylor 2015. 
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malpractice liability in China, which is now provided for by the new Tort 
Law 2009. Chapter 4 discusses the issues about medical disputes, iatrogenic 
injuries, malpractice litigation, and patient compensation in practice based on 
empirical evidence drawn from the analysis of court decisions and semi-
structured interviews that have been conducted on the one hand, and existing 
empirical studies on the other hand. Chapter 5 explores alternative regimes 
that may compensate victims of medical malpractice such as medical liability 
insurance, first-party insurance, and social security. Chapter 6 evaluates the 
legal remedies in China from the perspective of traditional legal doctrines and 
builds a bridge between the legal perspective in Part I and the law and 
economics approach in Part II. 
Part II (Chapter 7 to Chapter 11) is primarily concerned with 
economic theories and relevant empirical evidence pertaining to medical 
malpractice or AEs. While Chapter 7, Chapter 8, and Chapter 9 focus on legal 
mechanisms in the light of the prevention of medical errors, Chapter 10 and 
Chapter 11 examine legal mechanisms from the perspective of victim 
compensation. Chapter 7 reviews theoretical studies on the classic fault-based 
model of medical malpractice liability. Chapter 8 examines empirical 
evidence pertaining to the deterrent effect of medical malpractice liability 
and updates the classic model in the light of new evidence. Chapter 9 
addresses alternative legal remedies to tort law that are also aimed at quality 
assurance. Chapter 10 discusses the fault-based compensation mechanisms for 
iatrogenic injuries. Chapter 11 explores medical compensation schemes that 
are not based on the fault rule.  
Part III (Chapter 12 and Chapter 13) evaluates the legal remedies for 
medical quality assurance and victim compensation in China from the 
perspective of law and economics (Chapter 12), and tries to make a few 
concluding remarks and to formulate some policy recommendations (Chapter 
13). 
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
This part is intended to answer the first main research question – Are the 
current legal remedies for medical malpractice in China sound from a legal 
perspective? For this purpose, firstly, it is necessary to know what are the 
legal remedies currently available in China that are aimed at the prevention 
of medical malpractice and the compensation of victimised patients (Sub-
question (1-a)). In China, both public regulation (incl. criminal law) and tort 
law may be used to prevent medical malpractice. Victims of medical 
malpractice may obtain compensation via tort law, private insurance, or social 
security.  
Regulation of the medical profession will be described in Chapter 2. In 
addition, Chapter 2 will also sketch the outline of the Chinese health care 
provision system intending to provide the context of medical malpractice in 
China.  
The part of the tort system that deals with medical malpractice will be 
addressed in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 will describe the “law in the books” 
– substantive rules of medical malpractice liability and relevant rules of 
evidence. Chapter 4 will examine the “law in action” – empirical findings 
concerning the functioning and impact of the medical malpractice liability 
system.  
Other compensation schemes that may provide victims of medical 
malpractice with some remedies will be briefly addressed in Chapter 5. In 
China, these schemes may include medical liability insurance, first-party 
private insurance, and social security (social insurance and administrative 
assistance). 
After describing these legal remedies, they will be evaluated according 
to traditional legal doctrines (Sub-question (1-b)). In Chapter 6, traditional 
legal doctrines or benchmarks that prevail in China will be summarised. 
Then, the foregoing legal remedies will be evaluated in light of these 
traditional legal benchmarks. Thereafter, the weaknesses of the traditional 
approach will be pointed out and the need for a law and economics approach 
will be explained. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HEALTH CARE PROVISION  
AND REGULATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is intended to answer part of the first main research question. 
Specifically, it attempts to answer how the medical profession is regulated as 
far as the prevention of medical malpractice or quality assurance is concerned 
(Sub-question (1-a)). However, in order to answer this question better, it is 
helpful to draw the outline of how health care services are provided and 
financed in China in the first place. Hence, this Chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 2 will provide an overview of the current health care 
providers in the Chinese health care system. Then, Section 3 will address the 
financing of the health care provision, touching upon both public and private 
health insurance. Thereafter, Section 4 will describe the regulation of the 
quality of care, including currently applicable professional standards and 
regulatory enforcement mechanisms. 
2. THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The government of China has a constitutional duty to develop a system to 
provide health care to Chinese citizens. This duty is provided in the current 
Chinese Constitution as follows: 
The state develops medical and health services, promotes modern 
medicine and traditional Chinese medicine, encourages and supports the 
setting up of various medical and health facilities by the rural economic 
collectives, state enterprises and institutions and neighbourhood 
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organisations, and promotes health and sanitation activities of a mass 
character, all for the protection of the people’s health.1 
The task of directly providing health care to citizens is undertaken by various 
institutional and individual health care providers. Section 2.2 will give a brief 
account of the classification of medical and health institutions. Section 2.3 
will outline the scope of individual providers. 
2.2. INSTITUTIONAL PROVIDERS 
In China, institutional providers are broadly described as medical and health 
institutions (医疗卫生机构), which generally refer to any licensed or 
registered undertakings that provide medical care, disease prevention or 
health inspection services or conduct medical research or on-the-job 
training.2  
Regarding their functions, medical and health institutions can be 
divided into four groups: (1) hospitals, (2) health care institutions at the grass-
root level, (3) specialised public health institutions, and (4) other medical and 
health institutions.3 City-based hospitals are primarily intended to provide 
secondary and tertiary care to all patients.4 Grass-root-level care institutions 
are developed only to provide primary care to rural or community-based 
patients.5 Specialised health institutions offer special care such as disease 
prevention and maternal and child care to certain groups of patients.6 Other 
institutions may include medical research agencies, medical on-the-job 
training centres, medical examination centres, and information statistics 
centres, most of which do not provide medical care directly.7 Up to the end of 
April 2014, China had a total of 25,860 hospitals, 917,335 health care 
institutions at the grass-root level, and 35,029 specialised public health 
institutions.8 
More relevant to medical malpractice issues are medical institutions 
(医疗机构), which are the mainstream of medical and health institutions that 
specifically provide diagnosis and treatment services.9 All hospitals and health 
 
1 Constitution 2004 (China), art. 24, para. 1. 
2 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 1. 
3 Id. 
4 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 2. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 3. 
9 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 2. 
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care institutions at the grass-root level and most of the specialised public 
health institutions fall within the scope of medical institutions.10 The majority 
of medical care services are provided by hospitals and health care institutions 
at the grass-root level. In 2014, there were about 2.97 billion hospital 
admissions and 4.36 billion grass-root-level health care institution admissions, 
whereas there were only 260.46 million specialised public health institution 
admissions and 5.38 million other institution admissions.11 In view of the 
service they provide, all medical institutions can be roughly called “hospitals” 
in a broader sense, no matter whether their names contain the word 
“hospital.”12 Nonetheless, those medical institutions with a registered name of 
“hospital” are usually larger and have more medical resources, skilled health 
workers and better equipment than community/township health centres, 
village infirmaries or private clinics. 
Judging by the ownership, medical institutions can be either public or 
non-public (or private). Public hospitals are registered as state-owned or 
collectively-owned medical institutions,13 depending on whether they are 
financed and owned by the government or by collective entities such as 
industrial and mining enterprises or village committees. Non-public hospitals 
are financed and owned by private entities or individuals.14 Foreign medical 
institutions, companies, enterprises or other economic organisations may also 
cooperate with a Chinese counterpart to establish non-public Sino-foreign 
equity joint or Sino-foreign cooperative joint medical institutions.15  
Apart from financial investment and ownership, public and non-public 
hospitals may differ in several other aspects. First, they differ in the 
 
10 According to DR-Detailed Rules-Medical Institutions 2006 (China), art. 3, there are 12 
types of statutorily recognised medical institutions: (1) hospitals, (2) maternal and child 
health service centres, (3) community health service centres, (4) township health centres, 
(5) convalescent hospitals, (6) out-patient departments, (7) clinics, (8) village infirmaries, 
(9) first aid centres, (10 ) clinical laboratory centres, (11) specialised disease prevention 
and treatment institutions and (12) nursing homes.  
11 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 118. 
12 As a matter of the fact, all these medical institutions are called “hospitals” in everyday life 
in China, irrespective of their officially registered names. For instance, township health 
centres are usually called “township hospitals”, and occasionally even village clinics are 
called “village hospitals” by local people. Therefore, “medical institutions” and “hospitals” 
are used occasionally as interchangeable in this dissertation, if there is no need to make a 
strict distinction. 
13 According to Constitution 2004 (China), art. 6, para. 1, public ownership means the 
ownership of the properties by the whole people or the collective ownership by the 
working people. In accordance with Property Law 2007 (China), art. 54, para. 2, the 
ownership of state-owned properties is exercised by the State Council (the central 
government) on behalf of the State. 
14 See generally N-Private Medical Institutions 2010 (China). 
15 DR-Sino-Foreign Medical Institutions 2000 (China), art. 2. 
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employment relationship. Physicians of a private hospital enter into a labour 
contract (劳动合同) with the hospital and receive salaries entirely from the 
hospital.16 In contrast, physicians of a public hospital are quasi-public servants 
who are subject to an “employment contract” (聘用合同) and partially 
subsidised by the government.17 Second, they have different operational 
targets. Public hospitals are mostly run on a non-profit basis, while private 
hospitals are normally running for profits. Nonetheless, private hospitals may 
register as “non-profit medical institutions”, if they are willing to adhere to 
government-set prices for medical care.18 Third, they charge different prices. 
Public hospitals must charge medical expenses at government-set prices, 
whereas private hospitals are normally not limited by such a cap, unless they 
choose to register as non-profit medical institutions.19 Fourth, they enjoy 
different tax treatment. Public hospitals and not-for-profit private hospitals 
are free from enterprise income tax, whereas other private hospitals are not.20 
Public hospitals and not-for-profit private hospitals play a dominant 
role in the Chinese health care system. By the end of 2014, there were 
542,616 public medical institutions and 438,816 non-public medical 
institutions in China.21 Although the number of public and private medical 
institutions are comparable (1.24:1), public hospital admissions (2.65 billion 
in 2014) are about 8 times as many as private hospital admissions (324.65 
million in 2014).22 In the light of operational targets, the number of not-for-
profit (public and private) hospitals (17,705 in 2014) is more than double that 
of for-profit private hospitals (8,155 in 2014).23 However, admissions to not-
for-profit hospitals (2.81 billion in 2014) are roughly 17 times greater than 
those to for-profit private hospitals (165.91 million in 2014).24 
All the aforesaid medical institutions combine to form the Chinese 
medical care service system. In rural areas, there is a “three-level medical 
service network” that is composed of county-level hospitals, township health 
centres and village clinics, where the county-level hospitals perform the 
leading role. In urban areas, there is a “new type of urban medical service 
system” that features division of work and collaboration among diverse types 
 
16 See generally Labour Contract Law 2012 (China).  
17 See generally DR-Employment Contracts in Public Institutions 2002 (China). 
18 N-Private Medical Institutions 2010 (China). 
19 Id. 
20 Enterprise Income Tax Law 2007 (China), art. 26, para. 1, sub-para. 4. 
21 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, pp. 8-9. 
22 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 122. 
23 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 10. 
24 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 122. 
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of hospitals above the sub-district level25 and community health service 
centres at the sub-district level.26 Currently, patients, no matter where they 
come from, are basically free to choose any type of hospitals at any level and 
any location, although they may have to pay out-of-pocket medical expenses 
if their chosen hospitals are not covered by their health insurance schemes.27 
Patients tend to go to hospitals rather than clinics in the hope of getting a 
better quality of care, which is the reason why Chinese hospitals are often 
more crowded than clinics.28 
Irrespective of types, the ownership, levels or locations, the 
relationship between all medical institutions and their patients are governed 
by the same set of civil statutes – Contract Law 1999 and Tort Law 2009. As 
far as disputes over medical malpractice are concerned, there is no separate 
forum for dispute resolution or procedural rules that are designed for public 
medical institutions exclusively. 
2.3. INDIVIDUAL PROVIDERS 
In China, health workers (卫生人员) are considered to comprise a range of 
persons employed in medical and health institutions, such as technical 
medical personnel, village doctors and assistants, other technical personnel, 
administrative personnel and logistics technical workers.29 Medical technical 
personnel usually work in hospitals or community/township health centres.30 
They primarily include licensed (assistant) doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and 
medical laboratory scientists, etc.31 Licensed (assistant) doctors may also work 
at village clinics.32 Not all health workers are associated with medical 
malpractice issues. Only those who provide medical care service, namely 
medical technical personnel and village doctors and assistants, are medical 
practitioners who are likely to be involved in malpractice disputes, in which 
case they are universally termed “medical staff members” (医务人员).33 
Although an intern has not obtained the necessary qualifications, it is 
 
25 Hospitals in urban areas include ministry-level, provincial-level, prefecture-level and 
district-level hospitals. 
26 The State Council Information Office 2012. 
27 DR- Designated Medical Institutions 1999 (China), art. 12, para. 2. 
28 This situation may be reversed when the general practitioner (GP) system is supposed to 
be established in China by the end of 2020. See generally AR-General Practitioners 2011 
(China). 
29 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 23. 
30 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 24. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 54. 
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generally accepted that he/she is regarded as a medical staff member if he/she 
practices in a teaching hospital under the guidance of a qualified practising 
physician.34 
In China, all medical staff members must register and work at medical 
institutions, and also have to practice medicine under the name of their 
medical institutions.35 Even if there is only one doctor practising in his/her 
own clinic, he/she is still deemed to be the “medical staff member” of his/her 
medical institution. A great portion of medical staff members working at 
public medical institutions receive salaries and high-performance bonuses 
from their medical institutions, which are partly subsidised by the 
government. For instance, in public hospitals in Beijing, only about 10% of 
medical staff’s salaries are subsidised by the government, the other 90% are 
paid by their hospitals in the name of bonuses.36 In contrast, all medical staff 
members at private medical institutions are paid by their institutions through 
labour contracts without government subsidies. This difference, however, 
does not affect the legal basis of the doctor-patient relationship (or more 
precisely the hospital-patient relationship) – normally a medical service 
contract concluded between medical institutions and their patients. 
The relationships between doctors and hospitals are rather complicated 
in China. It depends on whether the hospital is public or private. Private 
hospitals are commercial companies. The relationship between the medical 
staff and private hospitals is based on the Labour Contract Law 2012. Private 
hospitals are basically free to hire or fire doctors without much governmental 
interference.  
Public hospitals are quasi-state organs or public institutions, which are 
established and maintained by the government. Before the 2000s, it was true 
that most medical staff members were state functionaries, whose employment 
was directly managed by the government. However, in 2002, China initiated 
the reform of the employment of public-institution staff members.37 Since 
then, more and more public hospitals have begun to shift from the old 
administrative affiliation system (行政任用制), under which neither hospitals 
could fire doctors freely nor doctors could quit office easily, to a more open 
and free employment system (聘用制), under which hospitals are relatively 
free to hire and fire doctors and doctors are totally free to quit the job.38 
Currently, some data show that the majority (more than 95% in the Jiangsu 
 
34 DR-Unregistered Interns 2004 (China), art. 3. See also Yang 2012, p. 20. 
35 Doctors Law 1998 (China), arts. 13-14. 
36 Li 2011. 
37 See generally DR-Employment Contracts in Public Institutions 2002 (China). 
38 Liu, Y. 2014, p. 44. 
Health Care Provision and Regulation 
Intersentia 31 
and Zhejiang Provinces) of individual providers are employed by public 
hospitals rather than administratively affiliated.39  
Under the employment contract, hospitals are permitted to conduct an 
annual assessment of the performance of each employed provider.40 Those 
providers who fail the assessment must take the necessary training or their 
positions will be changed accordingly.41 If they refuse to accept the change in 
positions, hospitals are entitled to terminate the employment contract 
unilaterally.42 In cases where employed providers cause medical accidents due 
to any breach of regulations or clinical protocols, hospitals may terminate the 
employment contract unilaterally at any time.43 
2.4. SUMMARY 
In China, health care is provided by various institutional and individual 
providers. City-based hospitals are the primary form of institutional 
providers. Urban areas and rural areas have different systems of medical 
institutions. Public hospitals and not-for-profit private hospitals serve a 
crucial role in the health care system, compared to for-profit private 
hospitals. Public hospitals are slightly subsidised by the government, while 
private hospitals operate without any subsidy. Not-for-profit hospitals are 
subject to governmental price regulations, whereas for-profit hospitals are 
free to charge market prices. Regarding the doctor-patient relationship and 
malpractice issues, there are no special rules or forums that are established for 
public or not-for-profit hospitals. Contract Law 1999 and Tort Law 2009 
apply to all doctor-patient relationships and disputes over medical 
malpractice 
Currently, in China, all individual providers are medical staff members 
in that they must register and practice at medical institutions (even a private 
clinic). The doctor-patient relationship is actually the hospital-patient 
relationship because it is the hospital and the patient that are parties to the 
medical service contract. Public hospitals now have the authority to hire and 
fire the majority of their employee-providers relatively freely. 
 
39 See generally Xiaoxiaosweety 2011. 
40 DR-Employment Contracts in Public Institutions 2002 (China), art. 5, para. 1. 
41 DR-Employment Contracts in Public Institutions 2002 (China), art. 5, para. 2. 
42 Id. 
43 DR-Employment Contracts in Public Institutions 2002 (China), art. 6, para. 2. 
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3. FINANCING OF PUBLIC HEALTH CARE 
PROVISION 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
For more than six decades, China has been endeavouring constantly to 
establish, develop and maintain its health care system, despite periods of 
successes and failures. In general, the financing of China’s health care system 
has undergone two eras, which are largely influenced by the economic 
structures before and after its economic reform initiated in 1978. During the 
Mao era (1949 to 1978), a closed, centralised and planned economy, which 
was copied from the former Soviet Union, was characteristic of China.44 Since 
the beginning of the post-Mao era (1978 onward), however, China has been 
on its way to an open, decentralised and market-driven economy. 
Correspondingly, China’s health care system in the Mao era was largely based 
on socialisation (expenses mainly paid by the government, state enterprises, 
and rural communes), whereas more and more elements of privatisation 
(expenses mainly paid by individual patients out of their own pocket) are 
attached to the post-Mao era.45 
In the next section, the health care reforms in China and financial 
impacts on individuals in Section 3.2 will be introduced. Then, attention will 
be given to the covered groups under the basic public health insurance 
systems and government subsidies in Section 3.3. After that, a summary will 
be made in Section 3.4. 
3.2. HEALTH CARE REFORMS AND FINANCIAL BURDENS 
ON INDIVIDUALS 
In China, the total costs of health care (卫生总费用) are shared by the 
government, society, and individuals.46 The government provides subsidies to 
public hospitals, and to the Basic Medical Insurance Schemes (hereinafter 
BMIS) and the Urban-Rural Medical Assistance System (hereinafter URMAS), 
and covers administrative costs associated with health care provision.47 
Society as a whole furnishes patients with health coverage through the BMIS, 
 
44 Twitchett & Fairbank 1987, pp. 63-64. 
45 See generally Wang & Tussing 2011.  
46 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 89. 
47 Id. 
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the URMA, and private health insurance.48 Besides, individuals (employees, 
unemployed urban residents, and rural residents) have to pay some out-of-
pocket expenses in cash depending on the kind of medical services they 
receive.49  
During the period 1949-1978 (Mao’s era), China established and 
maintained a socialist welfare system. In urban areas, the Government-
Funded Medical Care System (hereinafter GFMCS) and the Labour 
Insurance System (hereinafter LIS) had been developed in the early 
1950s. Only national public servants, employees of public institutions, and 
disabled veterans were eligible for cover under the GFMCS,50 and most 
medical expenses were financed almost entirely by the government.51 All 
employees of the enterprise were covered under the LIS,52 and all LIS 
premiums were paid by the administration or capital of each enterprise.53 In 
rural areas, people’s communes adopted a Rural Cooperative Medical Care 
System (hereinafter RCMCS). By the end of 1976, about 90% of all communes 
in China implemented the RCMCS.54 Since the government set prices of 
medical services extremely low in order to show the superiority of socialism 
over capitalism,55 out-of-pocket expenses paid by patients in cash might be 
conceivably minimal.  
Be that as it may, this socialist welfare system suffered from several 
problems. First, not all individuals enjoyed benefits under the LIS.56 
Employees of many newly established collective enterprises in towns and 
self-employed workers were not covered by any insurance plan.57 Insurance 
benefits for rural residents under the RCMCS were very limited. Second, the 
heavy burden of financing the LIS reduced the enterprise’s economic profits 
significantly, making the enterprise less productive.58 Third, it was inefficient 
to let each enterprise to manage its own insurance pool.59 Enterprises are 
primarily intended for promoting production and operating businesses.60 Not 
every enterprise is good at administering an insurance scheme.  
 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 AR-Government-Funded Medical Insurance 1952 (China), Preamble. 
51 AR-Government-Funded Medical Insurance 1952 (China), art. 5. 
52 AR-Labour Insurance 1953 (China), art. 4. 
53 AR-Labour Insurance 1953 (China), art. 7. 
54 Zhang & Ma 2011, p. 4. 
55 DR-MoH Report-Hospitals Running at a Loss 1981 (China). 
56 Si 1985, p. 22. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
 
 
34 Intersentia 
Part I. Legal Remedies for Medical Malpractice in China
The current health care system in China was the outcome of three 
rounds of health reforms after 1978 when China decided to shift to a market-
based economy. Beginning in the early 1980s, the first round of health reform 
aimed at making hospitals rely more on their operating income rather than 
on public financial subsidies.61 More and more new forms of non-public 
enterprises began to emerge, while the old LIS was not prepared to provide 
cover for employees of these enterprises and self-employed workers.62 The 
dissolution of people’s communes soon led to the collapse of the RCMCS, 
rendering rural residents uncovered by any insurance scheme.63 
Consequently, medical care became unaffordable for many uninsured 
patients.64 Some of the uninsured patients who were able to pay would begin 
to live in extreme poverty after paying considerable expenses in cash.65  
The second round, starting in 1998, was conducted to attach much 
more weight to social welfare than to economic benefits.66 The promulgation 
of the AR-BMI for Urban Employees 1998 was an important landmark in that 
it established the first nationwide public health insurance scheme– the Basic 
Medical Insurance for Employees (hereinafter BMIE) – in China, which is 
meant to replace the old LIS. Based on DR-Neo-Rural Cooperative 2003, the 
Neo-Rural Cooperative Medical Care (hereinafter NRCMC) began to develop 
in 2003, ending the history of a lack of health coverage for Chinese rural 
residents for about 20 years. Unemployed urban residents have also been 
covered under the Basic Medical Insurance for Urban Residents (hereinafter 
BMIUR) since 2007.  
Although the BMIS was established during the second round of the 
health care reform, the affordability of health care had not been improved 
due to dramatically increasing health care costs. On the one hand, it is alleged 
that the costs of health care were increasing because hospitals overcharged 
customer-patients in various ways. First, many hospitals would induce 
patients to receive excessive or unnecessary examinations.67 Second, many 
hospitals would provide extra types of services that are not ex ante permitted 
by the authorities.68 Third, many hospitals would charge an additional fee for 
special equipment or material.69 Fourth, many hospitals would not strictly 
comply with regulations on prices and refuse to disclose the composition of 
 
61 See generally Zhao & Feng 2010. 
62 Zhang & Ma 2011, pp. 5-6. 
63 Id. 
64 Zhang & Ma 2011, p. 6. 
65 Id. 
66 See generally Zhao & Feng 2010. 
67 Liu 2012, p. 184. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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service prices to patients.70 As a result, the costs of health care rose from 
367.87 billion yuan in 1998 to 1.45 trillion yuan in 2008, with an annual 
growth rate of 14.73%.71 On the other hand, the proportion of government 
subsidies to health care provision to total health care costs was relatively low. 
On average, during the period 1998-2008, only about 17% of all health care 
costs were paid by the government, and 30% by society, whereas almost 53% 
was paid by individuals.72 Hence, although the second round of the reform 
established the BMIS, individuals still faced heavy burdens of out-of-pocket 
expenses in that the government had not shared a greater portion of total 
health care costs.  
The third round was initiated in 2009, intending to reduce individual 
burdens for medical care.73 The “overall objectives” of the 2009 reform are to 
“establish and improve a basic medical and health care system covering both 
urban and rural residents, which provides safe, effective, convenient and 
affordable medical and healthcare services for the people” by the end of 
2020.74 The reform is still evolving. Therefore, it is too early to say whether 
the reform will achieve its goals at the end of the day. Recent data shows that 
the government began to increase its subsidies to public health care. For the 
period 2009-2014 on average, the government increased its share of total 
health care costs to about 25%, and society’s share rose to almost 36%.75 
Hence, since the beginning of the third round of the reform, individuals seem 
to have shared roughly 40% of total health costs.76 Nevertheless, due to the 
dramatic increase in total health care costs, the reduction in individuals’ share 
of the costs does not seem to suggest that individuals’ financial burden is 
relieved. On average, whereas individuals had to pay 379.79 billion yuan in 
cash for the period 1998-2008, they had to pay more than one trillion yuan 
for the period 2009-2014.77  
3.3. CURRENTLY COVERED GROUPS AND GOVERNMENT 
SUBSIDIES 
In China, the BMIS are composed of three types of public health insurance – 
the BMIE, the BMIUR, and the NRCMC. The BMIS are designed to provide 
 
70 Id. 
71 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 91. 
72 Id. 
73 See generally Zhao & Feng 2010. 
74 N-Deepening of Health Reform (2009) (China). 
75 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 91. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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different groups of Chinese citizens, in the light of their professional status 
and location, with basic public health insurance coverage for medical 
expenses. The employed urban population and the self-employed are covered 
by the BMIE,78 the rural population by the NRCMC,79 and the unemployed 
urban population by the BMIUR.80 Whereas the BMIE is mandatory for 
employees, it is voluntary for the self-employed.81 Also, the BMIUR and the 
NRCMC are also voluntary.82 By the end of 2011, more than 1.3 billion 
Chinese citizens were covered by the BMIS, representing at least 95% of the 
whole population.83 
As a rule, insured persons should finance the BMIS by their own 
contributions, especially when they are self-employed or freelance workers, 
and they have to pay the whole BMIE premium by themselves.84 In other 
cases, however, the premiums are shared by the employer or the government. 
First, if the insured is an employee, the BMIE premiums should be paid 
jointly by the employer (about 6% of the total amount of the employees’ 
wages) and the employee (2% of his wages).85 Second, under the BMIUR, 
unemployed urban residents are heavily subsidised by the government. For 
instance, the required BMIUR premium for the year of 2016 is at least 570 
yuan for each insured, of which 420 yuan (73.68%) are subsidised by the 
government.86 The relatively vulnerable group of unemployed urban residents 
– those who enjoy the minimum living safeguard, the disabled who have lost 
the ability to work, senior citizens aged 60 or more, and minors of low-
income families – are fully subsidised by the government.87 Third, rural 
residents are also partly subsidised by the villagers’ committees and the 
government under the NRCMC.88 In 2014, the per capita cost of the NRCMC 
premium was 410 yuan, of which 90 yuan (21.95%) were paid by the 
government.89 
 
78 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 23. 
79 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 24. 
80 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 25. 
81 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 23. 
82 AR-BMI for Urban Residents 2007 (China); DR-Neo-Rural Cooperative 2003 (China). 
83 See generally Li 2012. 
84 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 23, para. 2. 
85 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 23, para. 1; AR-BMI for Urban Employees 1998 
(China), art. 2, para. 3. 
86 DR-Promotion of the BMIUR 2016 (China), art. 1, para. 2. 
87 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 25, para. 3. 
88 DR-Neo-Rural Cooperative 2003 (China), art. 1, para. 2, sub-para. 1. 
89 DR-Increase in BMIUR & NRCMC Premiums 2014 (China), arts. 1-2. 
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3.4. SUMMARY 
After three rounds of health care reforms since the Mao era, China’s public 
health care provision has largely shifted from an enterprise-based labour 
insurance system to a society-based social insurance system, although the full 
impact of the reforms cannot yet be assessed. The new system covers the 
majority of both employed and unemployed, urban and rural residents. The 
Chinese government realised the limitations of the market-oriented health 
care reforms (the first two rounds) and has begun to increase government 
subsidies to public health care provision since the latest round of health care 
reform. Currently, about 40% of all health care costs are paid by individuals 
out of their own pocket. However, the rapidly growing health care costs 
imply that the financing burden on individuals has not been much relieved. 
4. REGULATION OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In China, the power to direct and administer the affairs of public health is 
entrusted by the Constitution to the State Council (central government).90 
Specifically, it is now the National Health and Family Planning Commission 
(hereinafter the NHFPC)91 of the State Council that oversees public health 
affairs. Its duties include but are not limited to: drafting laws and regulations 
in relation to public health; planning the resource allocation of medical care, 
public health services; establishing a basic medicine system to standardise 
drug prices; and supervising and administering public health, medical care 
services.92  
Correspondingly, there are local Health and Family Planning 
Commissions (hereinafter the HFPC) at the provincial, prefecture and county 
levels, which perform similar functions within their own jurisdictions. The 
NHFPC and each local HFPC, which can be described together as the public 
 
90 Constitution 2004 (China), art. 89, para. 1, sub-para. 7. In China, the National People’s 
Congress (hereinafter NPC) is the organ of supreme power, which is also the supreme 
legislative organ. The State Council is the executive organ of the NPC, which directs all 
levels of local governments. 
91 The then Ministry of Health (hereinafter MoH) and National Population and Family 
Planning Commission merged into the current National Health and Family Planning 
Commission in 2013. 
92 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2014. 
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health authorities, have the power to direct subordinate units or danwei,93 
such as hospitals, health inspection and supervision organs, and medical 
associations.  
In the following, the focus will be on how the medical profession is 
regulated in China as far as quality assurance is concerned. In general, the 
process of regulation is twofold – input controls and output controls. On the 
one hand, the government sets many prior criteria that should be met before 
any institutional or individual provider is allowed to operate or practice in 
the health care sector to guarantee a minimum level of competence (Section 
4.2). On the other hand, the government continually supervises the 
behaviour of those providers who have been permitted to enter the medical 
profession intending to ensure the quality of care (Section 4.3). Then, in 
Section 4.4, the role of “self-regulation” in the Chinese health care system 
will be discussed. A summary will be given in Section 4.5. 
4.2. INPUT CONTROLS 
4.2.1. Controls on the Entry of Institutional Providers 
To be qualified to operate, medical institutions must satisfy some statutory 
requirements. They must register with the public health authorities and apply 
to the same authorities for the Operating License for Medical Institutions 
(hereinafter OLMI).94 The basic criteria for establishing medical institutions 
must be enacted by the central public health authorities.95 Accordingly, the 
then MoH promulgated the DR-Criteria for Medical Institutions 1994. 
Without a license, any institution or individual is not permitted to carry out 
diagnostic and therapeutic activities.96 Whoever contravenes this prohibition 
will be punished by the public health authorities above the county level.97 
Those lawbreakers’ activities may be restrained by injunction, and their 
illegal gains, pharmaceuticals, and equipment confiscated.98 A fine with a cap 
of 10,000 yuan may be imposed in the light of the seriousness of the 
violation.99 Moreover, individuals running a medical institution without the 
 
93 A unit or danwei (单位) is often the name given to a place of employment in China. 
94 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 15 and art. 24. 
95 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 8. 
96 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 24. 
97 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 44. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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OLMI will be guilty of the Crime of Illegal Medical Practice (hereinafter 
CIMP), if the violation is serious.100 
Empirical evidence on either administrative or criminal punishments 
imposed on institutional providers nationwide is currently unavailable. 
Nevertheless, some studies focusing on local jurisdictions show that a 
significant proportion of the hospitals that contravene codes of conduct are 
punished by the public health authorities because they practice without a 
license. A total of 1,309 (87.74%) of all the 1,492 punishments were imposed 
on unlicensed hospitals in Haidian District (2010-2014).101 In Futian District 
(2010-2012), 25 (19.23%) of all the 130 contraventions were practising 
without a license.102 Yudu County (2007-2009) punished 218 (21.90%) cases 
of practising without a license in all the 917 cases.103  
It is also reported that fines imposed on unlicensed hospitals are 
relatively modest. In Haidian District (2010-2014), the average of the fines 
imposed was 5,438 yuan.104 In Yudu County (2007-2009), the maximum of the 
fines imposed was 4,000 yuan, and the average was 1,477 yuan. Although this 
outcome is inconsistent with the cap of 10,000 yuan provided by the AR-
Medical Institutions 1994, article 44, after more than two decades the low 
level of fines is argued to be insufficient to deter law-breakers.105 
The frequency of the charges of the CIMP is even rarer. After 
reviewing 100 randomly selected cases of illegal medical practice, Zhang and 
Zhang reported that for every 16 cases of administrative punishments, only 
nine would involve criminal charges.106  
However, empirical data on the rate of identification of illegal 
practising without a license either by the public health authorities or by the 
public security authorities is unavailable.  
The OLMI of medical institutions with less than 100 hospital beds 
must be verified (校验) once every year, and those with over 100 hospitals 
beds verified once every two years by the same public health authorities that 
grant the OLMI.107 If a medical institution refuses to be verified in the light of 
 
100 Criminal Law 1997 (China), art. 336; JI-Criminal Filing Standards 2008 (China), art. 57, 
para. 2, sub-para. 2. 
101 Kong et al. 2016. 
102 Feng, Zhu & Xie 2013, p. 37. 
103 Xu et al. 2012, p. 213. 
104 Kong et al. 2016, p. 43. 
105 Kong et al. 2016, p. 44. 
106 Zhang & Zhang 2015, p. 48. 
107 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 22. 
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the preceding provision, its OLMI will be revoked.108 Currently, there is little 
evidence showing that many hospitals would be in violation of this rule. 
4.2.2. Controls on the Entry of Individual Providers 
To practise medicine, aspiring individual providers (doctors, nurses, 
pharmacists, etc.) should go through three phases successfully. First, they 
must obtain the required degrees or credentials after years of medical 
education and training.109 Second, they must pass the national exams for 
practising doctors, nurses, or pharmacists.110 If they pass the exam, they will 
receive the Certificate for Practising Doctors (hereinafter CPD),111 the 
Certificate for Practising Nurses (hereinafter CPN),112 or the Certificate for 
Practising Pharmacists (hereinafter CPP).113 Third, certified (assistant) doctors 
and nurses must apply to the public health authorities and certified 
pharmacists to the Drug Administration for a license to practise.114 If 
permitted, doctors will obtain the License to Practise as Doctors (hereinafter 
LPD),115 nurses the License to Practise as Nurses (hereinafter LPN),116 and 
pharmacists the License to Practise as Pharmacists (hereinafter LPP).117 
Hence, in China, the government controls the entry of aspiring individual 
providers through education, certification, and licensing. 
In 1993, China initiated the Regime of Standardised Training of 
Residents (hereinafter RSTR) in some local jurisdictions. Medical graduates 
who have just begun their job as residents will receive the training for a 
period of four to six years.118 The content of the training under the RSTR 
includes political ideology, professional ethics, clinical practice, theoretical 
knowledge and foreign language.119 After about two decades of local 
experiments, the central public health authorities decided to expand the 
 
108 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 45. 
109 Doctors Law 1998 (China), arts. 9-10; AR-Nurses 2008 (China), art. 7, para. 2, sub-para. 2; 
DR-Licensed Pharmacists 1999 (China), art. 9. 
110 Doctors Law 1998 (China), art. 8; AR-Nurses 2008 (China), art. 7, para. 2, sub-para. 3; DR-
Licensed Pharmacists 1999 (China), art. 10. 
111 Doctors Law 1998 (China), art. 12. 
112 DR-Nurse Examination 2010 (China), art. 16. 
113 DR-Licensed Pharmacists 1999 (China), art. 10. 
114 Doctors Law 1998 (China), art. 13, para. 2; AR-Nurses 2008 (China), art. 8, para. 2, sub-
para. 3; DR-Licensed Pharmacists 1999 (China), art. 12. 
115 Doctors Law 1998 (China), art. 13, para. 3. 
116 AR-Nurses 2008 (China), art. 7, para. 1. 
117 DR-Licensed Pharmacists 1999 (China), art. 14. 
118 DR-Standardized Training of Residents 1993 (China), art. 2 and art. 9. 
119 DR-Standardized Training of Residents 1993 (China), art. 8. 
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RSTR across the country.120 The current period of the training is reduced to 
three years, immediately after five years of medical school education.121 The 
content of training under the new RSTR focuses more on professional ethics, 
policies and regulations, the capability of clinical practice, theoretical 
knowledge, communication and inter-personal skills, etc.122 Some empirical 
evidence shows that the training is under-enforced in practice in that 
evaluations of residents after training primarily take the form of examinations 
which focus on theoretical knowledge.123 Residents may be induced to pay 
more attention to medical knowledge than to clinical techniques.  
Without a license, individual providers are forbidden to practise 
medicine.124 Unlicensed doctors may face very severe sanctions. If unlicensed 
doctors are found to provide treatment services, their activities will be 
banned, their illegal gains, pharmaceuticals, and equipment will be 
confiscated, and they will be fined up to 100,000 yuan for the violation by the 
public health authorities.125 In addition to the foregoing administrative 
sanctions, those lawbreakers may also be subject to criminal penalties if the 
violation is so serious that it constitutes the CIMP.126 They can be sentenced 
to fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, or control, and/or a criminal 
fine in light of the seriousness of the consequence.127  
In contrast, unlicensed nurses and pharmacists would face no or less 
severe sanctions. If unlicensed nurses are identified, it is their employer-
hospital rather than themselves that will be punished. The operation of the 
hospital involved will be suspended and hospital managers may be subject to 
administrative sanctions.128 If unqualified pharmacists are identified, they will 
be ordered to take intensified training within a fixed period.129 If they still fail 
the exam, they will be removed from their position.130 
Since all the aforementioned individual providers may be prone to 
commit medical errors if they are significantly unfit for practice, it is unclear 
why the Chinese law treats them so differently as far as illegal practice is 
concerned. 
 
120 See generally N-Establishment of Standardized Training of Residents 2013 (China). 
121 N-Establishment of Standardized Training of Residents 2013 (China), art. 6. 
122 DR-Standardized Training of Resident 2014 (China), art. 26. 
123 Chen 2016, p. 148. 
124 Doctors Law 1998 (China), art. 14, para. 2; AR-Nurses 2008 (China), art. 8, para. 2, sub-
para. 3; DR-Licensed Pharmacists 1999 (China), art. 12. 
125 Doctors Law 1998 (China), art. 39. 
126 Id.; Criminal Law 1997 (China), art. 336. 
127 Criminal Law 1997 (China), art. 336. 
128 AR-Nurses 2008 (China), art. 28. 
129 DR-Licensed Pharmacists 1999 (China), art. 27. 
130 Id. 
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Empirical data on punishments imposed on individual providers for 
practising without a license are rare. Some evidence suggests that for every 
two punishments (either administrative or criminal) of institutional 
offenders, there would be three punishments of individual offenders.131 
However, it is currently unknown how many individuals are practising 
medicine without a license and to what extent they will be identified. 
Some anecdotal evidence implies that the black market where clinics 
and unqualified doctors practise without a license is remarkably persistent in 
China, especially in rural and suburban areas.132 The demand for black market 
health care in those areas is high because the majority of healthcare resources 
are invested in urban areas, leaving rural and suburban areas without a 
sufficient supply of health care services.133 Another reason is that government 
supervision may be ineffective. On the one hand, local public health 
supervision agencies have only limited manpower, funds for operation, and 
necessary instruments to obtain evidence.134 On the other hand, many 
illegally practising individuals are under the protection of local gangsters, and 
public health agents are sometimes reluctant to enforce law fully because 
they may be personally threatened by those gangsters.135 Hence, it seems that 
the problem is likely to persist until when more high-quality medical services 
are available in rural and suburban areas and government supervision and 
public security are enhanced at the same time. 
4.3. OUTPUT CONTROLS 
4.3.1. Controls on the Performance of Institutional Providers 
4.3.1.1. Codes of Conduct and Sanctions 
Hospitals must operate and practise in compliance with relevant laws, 
regulations, and medical-technical norms.136 The AR-Medical Institutions 
1994 already provides several codes of conduct that hospitals must comply 
with. First, hospitals must disclose the OLMI, permitted specialties of 
practice, consultation hours, and fee scales to patients by displaying them in 
obvious places.137 Second, hospitals must provide treatment services within 
 
131 Zhang & Zhang 2015, p. 48. 
132 See generally Yuan & Zhang 2008. 
133 See generally Yin & Wang 2006. 
134 Du & Liu 2009, p. 26. 
135 Li, Wu & Luo 2007, p. 438. 
136 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 25. 
137 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 26. 
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the permitted scope.138 Third, hospitals must not employ non-health workers 
to carry out medical-technical work.139 Fourth, hospitals must rescue critically 
ill patients without delay, or transfer those patients promptly if it is difficult 
to treat them due to limitations of equipment or technical conditions.140 Fifth, 
hospitals must obtain the patient’s (or his/her family members’ or 
stakeholder’s) consent before conducting any surgery, special examination, or 
special treatment.141 
Hospitals may be punished by the public health authorities if they 
contravene the foregoing codes of conduct. For example, if hospitals provide 
treatment services outside the permitted scope, they should be warned, 
ordered to rectify the wrongdoing, and fined not more than 3,000 yuan for 
that wrongdoing; if the contravention is severe, their OLMI will be 
revoked.142 If hospitals employ non-health workers to do medical-technical 
work, they will be ordered to rectify the wrongdoing within a fixed period, 
and fined not more than 5,000 yuan for that wrongdoing; if the contravention 
is severe, their OLMI will be revoked.143 However, the AR-Medical 
Institutions 1994 do not provide any sanction for non-compliance with the 
other codes of conduct. Hence, it is uncertain whether hospitals in practice 
would comply with those other norms concerned with informed consent and 
transfer. 
In addition to the norms above, hospitals must abide by codes of 
conduct provided by other laws and regulations. According to the AR-
Medical Accidents 2002, hospitals (and also medical staff members) must 
practise as follows: 
Medical institutions and the staff members thereof shall, in the medical 
treatment activities, rigidly follow the laws, regulations, ministerial rules 
concerning medical treatment and health and the standards and 
conventions of medical treatment and nursing, and scrupulously abide by 
the professional ethics of medical treatment.144 
The preceding provision can be seen as an extension of the AR-Medical 
Institutions 1994 (China), article 25. The former broadly interprets “medical-
technical norms” as “standards and conventions of medical treatment and 
nursing,” which seems to have extended the scope of applicable professional 
 
138 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 27. 
139 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 28. 
140 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 31. 
141 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 33. 
142 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 47. 
143 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 48. 
144 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 5. 
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norms. Conventions or customary practice can be regarded as professional 
standards even if they are not in a written form. If hospitals (or staff members 
thereof) contravene any of the foregoing norms negligently and cause 
personal injuries, i.e. when a medical accident occurs,145 hospitals will be 
warned by the public health authorities; where the contravention is serious, 
their activities will be suspended and they will be ordered to rectify the 
wrongdoing within a fixed period, or their OLMI will be revoked.146 
The AR-Medical Accidents 2002 also provides several other written 
norms for hospitals. First, hospitals must provide staff members with 
educational and training programs to learn those codes of conduct and 
medical ethics.147 Second, hospitals must establish special departments to 
supervise the quality of medical care and handle complaints.148 Third, 
hospitals must record and properly keep case history materials and are 
prohibited to alter, fabricate, conceal, destroy, or steal case history 
materials.149 Fourth, hospitals must inform patients truthfully of the state of 
illness, measures of treatment, medical risks, etc.150 Fifth, hospitals must make 
preventive plans for avoiding and handling medical accidents so as to avoid 
the occurrence of medical accidents and mitigate the injuries caused by 
medical accidents.151 If hospitals are in breach of any of those norms, they will 
be ordered by the public health authorities to rectify the wrongdoing; if the 
breach is severe, the person-in-charge and other responsible persons will be 
given administrative punishments or disciplinary sanctions.152 Thus, in the 
light of the AR-Medical Accidents 2002, it is clear that failure to disclose 
relevant information to patients is punishable. However, the AR-Medical 
Accidents 2002 has not clarified whether failure to obtain the patient’s 
consent, to rescue or make a timely referral is punishable. 
Empirical data about the frequency of administrative punishments 
imposed on hospitals nationwide are rare. Nonetheless, there are several 
empirical studies of local jurisdictions. Some features of administrative 
punishments of hospitals are summarised and discussed as follows: 
- Most contraventions are identified by the public health authorities in 
the routine process of supervision and inspection and reported to the 
 
145 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 2. 
146 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 55, para. 1. 
147 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 6. 
148 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 7. 
149 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), arts. 8-9. 
150 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 11. 
151 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 12. 
152 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 56. 
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authorities by patients. 52.80% of all violations in Shenzhen City (2010-
2012) were recognised by the authorities and 39.2% were reported by 
patients.153 63.14% of those cases were identified by the authorities in 
Anhui Province (2011-2012) and 17.77% were reported by patients.154 
Reporting by hospitals is rare.155 However, this result does not 
necessarily mean that the public health authorities are incredibly 
effective at identifying wrong-doers. The rate of identification is 
currently unknown since no data on the total number of contraventions 
are available. What is more certain is that self-reporting is rather 
unreliable as a source of information. 
- For-profit private clinics, private out-patient departments, village clinics 
are more likely to be punished than public hospitals. In urban areas, 
private clinics or out-patient departments were involved in 209 cases of 
all the 214 cases of administrative punishments in Longgang District 
(2005-2009), while no public hospitals were punished.156 Also, the ratio 
of the frequency of public hospitals punished (n=4) to that of private 
hospitals punished (n=217) was about 1.84:100 in Shenzhen City (2010-
2012),157 while the ratio of the number of public hospitals (n=352) to 
that of private hospitals (n=1555) was about 23:100.158 In other words, 
private hospitals are roughly 12 times more likely to be punished than 
public hospitals. In rural areas, for example, of all the 699 hospitals 
punished in Yudu County (2007-2009), 472 were village clinics 
(51.50%) and 213 were private clinics (23.20%).159 This result implies 
that the quality of care provided by public hospitals may be 
considerably better than that provided by private clinics or village 
clinics, which is entirely understandable since more resources are 
invested in patient safety in not-for-profit public hospitals than in 
private for-profit clinics or small village clinics. 
- Licensed Hospitals are most likely to be punished for practising outside 
the permitted scope and employing non-health workers to conduct 
medical-technical work while rarely for causing medical accidents. In 
Haidian District (2010-2014), a total of 115 punishments (51.34%) were 
imposed for employing non-health workers, 70 (31.25%) for practising 
outside the permitted scope, whereas only 3 (1.34%) for medical 
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accidents.160 In Futian District (2010-2012), 28 (21.54%) of all the 130 
violations were involved with practising outside the permitted scope 
and 27 (20.77%) were for employing non-health workers.161 Hospitals, 
mostly private ones, attempt to practise outside the permitted scope in 
order to gain more profits, and to employ unqualified non-health 
workers with a view to lowering labour costs. The temptation to obtain 
more profits by violating regulatory codes of conduct is highly likely to 
sacrifice the quality of care.  
- Warnings and fines are frequently imposed while licensing sanctions are 
rarely used. In Haidian District (2010-2014), of all the 240 punishments 
imposed, 235 (97.92%) were fines (n=138) and warnings (n=97) while 
only one was revocation of the license.162 In Anhui Province (2011-
2012), 1,171 (90.78%) of all the 1,290 punishments were fines (n=868) 
and warnings (n=303) whereas only 14 were revocation of the licence.163 
In Longgang District (2005-2009), for all the 378 violations, a total of 
188 warnings and 199 fines were imposed while only the licences of five 
hospitals were revoked.164  
- Fines imposed on licensed hospitals who contravene codes of conduct 
are rather modest. In Haidian District (2010-2014), the average 
magnitude of fines was 2,489 yuan.165 In Yudu County (2007-2009), the 
average was 1,477 yuan. Of course, these results are consistent with the 
caps of 3,000 or 5,000 yuan mentioned above. However, those caps set 
in 1994 appear considerably low after more than two decades.  
As far as the quality of care is concerned, the preceding evidence seems to 
support the following implications. First, routine supervision and inspection 
by the public authorities and reliance on patient reporting may be more 
effective ways of identifying wrong-doers than hospital self-reporting. 
Second, patients are likely to receive a better quality of care in not-for-profit 
public hospitals than in for-profit or small-scale clinics. Hence, the quality of 
care may be affected by the resources available and hospitals’ financial 
incentives. Third, the public health authorities are very cautious about 
imposing licensing sanctions. Fourth, the caps of fines appear rather obsolete 
more than twenty years later. However, to what extent they should be 
increased needs to be answered very carefully. More research should be done 
 
160 Kong et al. 2016, p. 42. 
161 Feng, Zhu & Xie 2013, p. 37. 
162 Kong et al. 2016, p. 43. 
163 Fan et al. 2013, p. 1547. 
164 Yu et al. 2011, pp. 170-171. 
165 Kong et al. 2016, p. 43. 
Health Care Provision and Regulation 
Intersentia 47 
in order to find out the rate of identification of wrong-doers, the illegal gains 
of violations, administrative costs, etc.  
4.3.1.2. Hospital Accreditation 
In addition to the norm-sanction approach of output control, the practising 
activities and the quality of medical care services of licensed hospitals must be 
comprehensively appraised by external accreditation committees composed of 
experts.166 The objective of the accreditation is to administer medical 
institutions in line with their rankings, which are based extensively on their 
functions, tasks, facilities and equipment, advances in medical technology, 
quality of medical service and the scientific awareness of the management.167 
It is currently considered as an effective way to promote improvement in 
medical quality and conduct vocational quality monitoring in China.168 
The accreditation produces the rankings of hospitals. The ranking 
system of Chinese hospitals is composed of “Three Levels and Ten Grades” 
(三级十等). On the one hand, hospitals can be classified into three levels in 
the light of their functions and tasks as shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Three Levels of Hospitals in China169 
Level One/Primary 
Hospitals (一级医院) 
hospitals and health care centres at a grass-root level 
which directly provide prevention, treatment, health care 
and rehabilitation services to a community with a certain 
population 
Level Two/Secondary 
Hospitals (二级医院) 
regional hospitals which provide comprehensive medical 
and health care services to several communities and 
undertake certain tasks of teaching and scientific research 
Level Three/Tertiary 
Hospitals (三级医院) 
hospitals above the regional level which provide a high 
level of specialised medical and health care services to 
several regions and assume the tasks of higher education 
and scientific research 
 
On the other hand, hospitals at each level can be sub-classified into three 
grades, scaling down from the most qualified Grade A (甲等), to modest 
qualified Grade B (乙等), then to the least qualified Grade C (丙等), according 
to their accreditation scores based on their levels of technology, quality and 
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management.170 In addition, an exceptional “Top Grade” (特等) can be granted 
to an extremely well-qualified hospital.171 
There are three levels of accreditation committees: ministry level, 
provincial level and prefecture level.172 All accreditation committees are 
organised by the public authorities at the same level.173 All primary hospitals 
will be accredited by prefecture-level committees, while all secondary and 
most tertiary hospitals by provincial-level committees.174 Only the Top Grade 
can be granted by the ministry-level committee to some tertiary hospitals.175 
Hospital accreditation began to develop in China at the end of the 
1980s. From then on, China witnessed a surge in the first round of 
accreditation from 1989 to 1998. It is reported that as many as 17,708 had 
been accredited, of which 558 were tertiary hospitals, 3,100 were secondary 
hospitals and 14,050 were primary hospitals, together representing 26.4% of 
all Chinese hospitals up to the end of 1998.176 The incentives behind this surge 
might be explained by at least two reasons. First, from the perspective of 
patients, higher rankings mean better quality of care. Thus, hospitals of 
higher level and grade may attract more patients. Second, medical charges are 
linked to the rankings of hospitals.177 The higher the rankings, the more 
hospitals can charge and the more profits they can earn. For instance, tertiary 
hospitals may charge medical expenses twice as much as that of secondary 
hospitals.178  
Due to hospital accreditation, the quality of care and the management 
levels of Chinese hospitals were greatly improved compared to previous years. 
However, the incentives behind the surge were so strong that many 
“undesirable side effects” occurred in the first round of accreditation. First, 
many hospitals paid great attention to the development of hardware, such as 
adding hospital beds and constructing more buildings and purchasing heavy 
medical equipment, instead of quality of care and patient safety.179 Second, 
many hospitals had made concentrated efforts to maintain good quality of 
care and management before accreditation, while such efforts did not 
continue after the accreditation due to a lack of continuous external 
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supervision.180 Third, many hospitals made their endeavours to engage in 
fraudulent behaviour, such as modifying medical history data or setting up a 
fake emergency room, in order to obtain high scores in accreditation.181 
Fourth, some hospitals even paid bribes to accreditation committee 
members.182 
Painfully aware of these “side effects”, hospital accreditation had been 
suspended by the then MoH since 1998.183 Higher rankings mean higher 
benefits, which is a huge temptation. Therefore, many provinces continued to 
conduct hospital accreditation on their own even after 1998, showing their 
discontent with the MoH’s 1998 decision.184 
On consideration, the then MoH decided to restart hospital 
accreditation in 2011 and issued two new rules concerning accreditation – 
DR-Hospital Accreditation 2011 and DR- Accreditation Expert Database 
2011. The new criteria for accreditation attach considerable weight to the 
quality of care, patient safety, service, management, and performance, 
embodying the idea that patients’ welfare should be the prime 
consideration.185 There are periodical (every four years) and non-periodical 
accreditations, which are designed to ensure continual supervision.186 More 
non-governmental organisations and individuals, such as medical 
associations, medical insurance agencies and representatives of the masses, are 
allowed to participate in the accreditation process,187 aiming to guarantee a 
scientific, impartial and fair hospital accreditation.188 The results of the new 
round of accreditation only include “Grade A,” “Grade B,” and “Being 
Unqualified” (不合格), eliminating Grade C.189 If a hospital is accredited as 
“Being Unqualified”, the legal representative or the person chiefly in charge 
of the hospital should be subject to administrative or disciplinary sanctions 
rendered by the public health authorities.190  
Hospital accreditation was suspended twice after 2011. In 2012, the 
then MoH suspended the process because a significant number of unqualified 
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hospitals strived to obtain Grade A by fraud and revoked the Grade A 
qualification of 240 newly accredited hospitals.191 After 2012, the then MoH 
promulgated new standards for accreditation and began to review the 
qualification of hospitals that obtained Grade A in the 1990s.192 In 2014, it was 
reported that hospital accreditation was suspended again because some large 
hospitals objected to the new accreditation standards.193 Currently, it is 
unclear whether new rounds of hospital accreditation will be launched in the 
future.  
Interestingly, many hospitals that are dissatisfied with the Chinese 
hospital accreditation system attempted to get accredited by international 
institutions. For instance, by the end of October, 2015, a total of 38 Chinese 
hospitals had passed the accreditation conducted by the Joint Commission 
International (JCI).194 It remains to be seen how this trend will develop and 
what implications there will be.  
4.3.2. Controls on the Performance of Individual Providers 
4.3.2.1. Codes of Conduct and Sanctions 
Generally, individual providers (doctors, nurses, and pharmacists) must 
comply with regulatory standards provided by laws and regulations and 
professional codes of conduct.195 Some commonly seen obligations that 
individual providers should fulfil are summarised as follows: 
- Doctors and pharmacists shall abide by professional ethics;196 
- Doctors and nurses shall protect the patients’ privacy;197 
- Doctors and pharmacists shall strive to gain professional proficiency, 
update their knowledge, and raise the level of professional techniques;198 
- Pharmacists shall take continued medical education regularly;199 
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- Doctors shall not hide, forge, or destroy any medical documents and 
relevant materials;200 
- In case of an emergency, doctors shall adopt emergency treatment 
measures and shall not refuse to give emergency treatment;201 if a nurse 
finds it first, he/she shall immediately inform the doctor and take some 
necessary rescue measures at once;202 
- Doctors shall use medicines, sterilising drugs, and medical equipment 
approved for use by the government;203 
- Doctors shall disclose information truthfully and obtain consent before 
clinical experiments are conducted; 
- Doctors shall not solicit or accept bribes from patients;204 
- When a nurse finds that a doctor’s order is in violation of regulations or 
codes of conduct, he/she shall timely inform the doctor, and report it 
hospital managers if necessary. 
If individual providers contravene the preceding standards or codes of 
conduct, they will be subject to sanctions. Doctors or nurses will be warned 
or their licenses will be suspended by the public health authorities for at least 
six months but not more than one year; if the contravention is severe, their 
licenses will be revoked.205 Pharmacists will be sanctioned by the drug 
administration according to the seriousness of the consequences.206 
Where tangible personal injuries are caused by negligence on the part 
of any medical staff member, by definition, a “medical accident” occurs.207 
The negligent individual providers concerned will be subject to 
administrative or disciplinary sanctions (e.g. warnings), and their licenses will 
be suspended for a term of not less than six months but not more than a year; 
if the contravention is serious, their licenses will be revoked.208 
Empirical evidence on the total number of medical accidents and all 
kinds of administrative punishments imposed nationwide is rare. One study 
on health care punishments in Shanghai (2003-2006) suggests that negligent 
providers who are responsible for medical accidents are considerably under-
punished.209 For all the 565 suspected providers who were reported to the 
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public health authorities, only 51 (9.03%) were punished: 26 warnings, 24 
license suspensions, and only one license revocation.210 A total of 514 
(90.97%) were not punished, of which 397 (77.23%) were exempt from all 
charges because either the consequence of the medical accident was not 
serious or the hospital had already imposed disciplinary sanctions on the 
suspected provider.211 Remarkably, 106 (20.62%) of the 514 non-punished 
providers were exempted from liability due to exceeding the statutes of 
limitations.212 Where an illegal act is not discovered within two years of its 
commission, administrative penalty will no longer be imposed.213 Whether a 
provider’s behaviour is illegal (i.e. constituting a medical accident) will be 
determined by clinical expert witnesses first through the so-called process of 
Medical Accident Technical Ascertainment (hereinafter MATA).214 In 
practice, however, the MATA procedure is time-consuming, often exceeding 
two years, which explains why many providers who were responsible for 
medical accidents escaped punishments.215 
Not only administrative punishments but criminal penalties may be 
imposed as well. If those licensed providers216 who caused medical accidents 
were “seriously irresponsible” (严重不负责任), and caused death or serious 
harm to the patients, they will be sentenced to not more than three years of 
fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention on the charge of the Crime of 
Medical Accidents (hereinafter CMA).217 However, there is a lack of 
consensus on how to define being “seriously irresponsible.” Some scholars 
explained that providers were seriously irresponsible when they contravened 
laws, regulations, and codes and conventions of diagnosis and treatment 
negligently.218 This interpretation is consistent with the definition of medical 
accidents provided in AR-Medical Accidents 2002, article 2. However, this 
opinion cannot explain why Criminal Law 1997, article 335 employs the 
wording “seriously irresponsible” whereas AR-Medical Accidents 2002, 
article 2 only mentions “negligence.” Another interpretation from the 
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Supreme People’s Procuratorate (hereinafter SPP) suggests that providers are 
seriously irresponsible if they conduct any of the following actions:219 
(1) leaving his/her post without permission; 
(2) refusing to provide necessary medical treatment for any patient in a 
critical condition without any justifiable reason; 
(3) conducting experimental medical treatment without approval; 
(4) seriously violating the checking or re-checking system; 
(5) using any unapproved medicine, medical disinfectant or medical 
instrument; 
(6) seriously violating any law or regulation of the state or any expressly 
prescribed codes or conventions of diagnosis and treatment; or 
(7) any other case of being seriously irresponsible. 
The SPP enumerates several commonly recognised cases of seriously 
irresponsible behaviour and emphasises the seriousness of the offence. 
However, the SPP does not provide a definition of “serious irresponsibility” 
directly neither.  
In contrast, some scholars unambiguously maintain that serious 
irresponsibility is not merely ordinary negligence but gross negligence.220 In 
other words, a provider would be seriously irresponsible (grossly negligent) if 
an ordinary person (not a medical expert) could have reasonably foreseen the 
adverse consequence of the accident and could have reasonably avoided the 
accident.221 However, other scholars argued against the preceding 
interpretation because it would unduly restrict the scope of criminal liability 
for medical malpractice222 In their opinion, all violations of laws, regulations, 
and codes of medical conduct per se are serious.223 Hence, serious 
irresponsibility could simply be equated with negligence.224 
Interestingly, some pointed out the fact that imposing a special CMA 
on providers is intended to protect licensed providers in that its penalties are 
relatively lenient in contrast to that of similar crimes.225 Five reasons can 
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explain this leniency. First, the major risk faced by patients is their 
underlying conditions rather than medical interventions.226 Second, medical 
services are humanitarian activities that should be distinguished from illegal 
activities.227 Third, each patient is unique, and each condition changes rapidly, 
which makes therapeutic effects highly uncertain.228 Fourth, medicine is 
advancing, and codes of medical-technical work are being updated 
continually.229 Fifth, therapeutic risks are often so high that a successful result 
cannot be guaranteed.230 However, if medical services are so unique that 
providers deserve leniency, one may wonder why fines are not used instead 
of imprisonment or criminal penalties on providers are eliminated given the 
fact that licensing sanctions are already available.  
Individual providers are rarely charged with the CMA. Data from 6 
district courts in Beijing City (2013-2014) show that about 665 medical 
malpractice civil cases were concluded, whereas no providers were charged 
with the CMA.231 The first charge with the CMA in Beijing was pursued at 
the end of 2014, and so far, has not been finished yet.232 Nationwide, the two 
largest commercial legal databases show that criminal charges with the CMA 
are few and far between. By June 26, 2016, the Chinalawinfo (CaseShare) 
Database233 had collected 2,532 CIMP cases, 3,332 CNM cases, but only 16 
CMA cases. Similarly, the Lawyee Case Databases234 had gathered 4,082 CIMP 
cases, 5,842 CNM cases, but only 46 CMA cases. Recently, Zhang and Dai 
reviewed 16 CMA cases concluded between 1997 and 2014 and found that 
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most judges avoided interpreting what is “serious irresponsibility.”235 
Nevertheless, the majority of the contraventions of standards and codes of 
medical conduct indicate that the defendant was grossly negligent. For 
instance, in almost half of the 16 cases the defendants forgot to conduct skin 
test before injecting or were absent during the intravenous injection.236  
Hence, although the Criminal Law 1997, article 335 provides an 
unclear notion of “serious irresponsibility” which may blur the demarcation 
between civil liability for medical malpractice and the CMA, courts in 
practice are fairly cautious about imposing criminal penalties on providers.  
4.3.2.2. Periodical Doctor Assessment 
After obtaining the LPD, physicians are allowed to practice medicine in 
hospitals. However, they may lose their jobs if they fail to maintain or 
improve their professional expertise. All physicians should pass the Periodical 
Doctor Assessment (hereinafter PDA) to continue the practice. Institutions or 
organisations entrusted by the public health authorities must conduct regular 
assessment of the professional expertise, performance, and ethics of doctors 
according to professional standards237 every two years.238  
The result of the PDA is divided into the qualified (合格) and the 
disqualified (不合格).239 A licensed doctor, who is primarily responsible for 
the occurrence of a medical accident, who practices outside the permitted 
hospital or beyond the registered category of services, who is found to be in 
breach of good professional ethics, or who has been given an administrative 
punishment, should be assessed as disqualified.240 
Once a licensed doctor is evaluated as disqualified, he/she will face 
unfavourable licensing sanctions by the public health authorities. The 
doctor’s license will be suspended for three to six months, and he/she will be 
obliged to receive training and CME.241 When the suspension expires, the 
doctor should be assessed again by the assessment agency.242 If he/she passes 
the assessment, he/she may continue medical practice; if he/she fails again, 
his/her license will be revoked.243 
 
235 See generally Zhang & Dai 2016. 
236 Id. 
237 Doctors Law 1998 (China), art. 31, para. 1. 
238 DR-Doctors' Routine Assessment 2007 (China), art. 5, para. 2. 
239 DR-Doctors' Routine Assessment 2007 (China), art. 22. 
240 DR-Doctors' Routine Assessment 2007 (China), art. 27. 
241 DR-Doctors' Routine Assessment 2007 (China), art. 26. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
 
 
56 Intersentia 
Part I. Legal Remedies for Medical Malpractice in China
Some studies show that the PDA may promote the quality of care. 
First, some hospitals introduce the latest clinical guidelines and codes of 
conduct into training and CME.244 Second, some hospitals link the result of 
the assessment to rewards and punishments.245 Hence, physicians are induced 
to take the assessment seriously and invest in improving their expertise by 
updating their medical knowledge and skills continually.246  
However, other studies suggest that the current PDA system has its 
limitations. First, the primary form of the PDA in practice is a written 
examination which is mostly likely to test only the expertise of physicians.247 
Most of the questions needing to be answered are associated with basic 
theories, basic knowledge, basic techniques, and some knowledge of health 
and medical law.248 Professional performance and ethics are rarely assessed.249 
Second, in the case where a disqualified physician is identified, many 
hospitals are unwilling to invest too much in CME due to limited funding, 
and may temporarily change the disqualified doctor’s position.250 Third, 
perhaps the most serious problem is that many large hospitals assess their 
own staff members. Agencies that are entrusted by the public health 
authorities to conduct the PDA are normally large-scale hospitals or 
associations that satisfy one of the following conditions: (1) having more than 
100 beds; (2) having more than 50 doctors; or (3) academic organisations with 
complete structures.251 Thus, many large-scale hospitals would conduct “self-
assessment” without external oversight.252 These hospitals might unduly lower 
the difficulty of the examination in order to make it easier for their staff 
members to pass the PDA.253 For instance, in XX hospital for the period 2011-
2012, of all the 426 physicians who had taken the PDA, only one failed the 
assessment.254 After taking the resit exam, the disqualified easily passed the 
PDA.255 
Weighing up the foregoing pros and cons, it is unlikely that the 
current PDA regime in China is very effective at enhancing physicians’ 
professional expertise, performance, and ethics. 
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4.3.3. Medical Quality and Safety Incident Management 
4.3.3.1. Incident Reporting 
According to AR-Medical Accidents 2002, article 14, when any medical 
accident occurs, the medical institutions must report to the local 
administrative department of health. This obligation to report incidents is 
detailed by the DR-Incident Reporting 2011 in order to better implement the 
reporting system and enhance the quality of care continually.256  
Under this reporting system, all Medical Quality-Safety Incidents 
(hereinafter MQSI) must be reported to the public health authorities. An 
MQSI denotes an incident with tangible personal damage such as death, 
disability or organ/tissue dysfunction that was attributable to medical fault on 
the part of a medical institution or its staff members, or any defect in 
pharmaceuticals or equipment.257 Specifically, MQSIs are classified into three 
grades in the light of the severity of the personal injury and the number of 
victimised patients.258 Different grades require a different time limit for 
incident reporting.259 The criteria for classification and respective time limit 
for reporting are presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Three Grades of Medical Quality-Safety Incidents 
 Severity of Personal Injury Patient 
Number 
Time 
Limit 
Ordinary MQSIs 
mitigated disability, general organ/tissue 
dysfunction or other personal injuries  
15 days 
Gross MQSIs 
death, mid-level disability, or serious 
organ/tissue dysfunction  
12 hours 
disability below mid-level, organ/tissue 
dysfunction or other personal injuries  
Especially Gross 
MQSIs 
death or serious disability 
 2 hours 
 
The MQSI will be reported through the network and a unified national 
information system is established for the reporting.260 The performance of the 
incident reporting will be set as important criteria for hospital accreditation 
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and evaluation.261 Any medical institution that fulfils the reporting obligation 
well and enhances the quality of medical care significantly may be praised 
and rewarded by the public health authorities.262 However, where any 
medical institution hides the truth in making reports or fails to handle the 
MQSI properly, resulting in severe consequences, the individual directly 
responsible for the violation will be “disciplined in conformity with legal 
provisions” (依法处理) and the results must be announced by the public 
health authorities.263 
Nationwide data on the MQSI reporting is currently unavailable. One 
study reviewed 2,589 reported MQSIs in Jiangsu Province (2011-2014).264 The 
distribution of the reported MQSIs among the 13 municipal jurisdictions 
relative to the number of medical institutions and admissions is presented in 
Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: The Distribution of the Reported MQSIs in Jiangsu Province265 
Municipalities Reported MQSIs Medical Institutions Hospital Admissions 
No. Proportion 
(%) 
No. Proportion 
(%) 
No. 
(m) 
Proportion 
(%) 
Nanjing 204 7.88% 2,315 7.83% 62.00 12.89% 
Wuxi 78 3.01% 2,027 6.86% 42.53 8.84% 
Xuzhou 24 0.93% 4,454 15.07% 55.43 11.52% 
Changzhou 107 4.13% 1,123 3.80% 25.02 5.20% 
Suzhou 283 10.93% 3,007 10.17% 79.73 16.57% 
Nantong 1,113 42.99% 3,187 10.78% 37.19 7.73% 
Lianyungang 42 1.62% 2,612 8.84% 27.57 5.73% 
Huai’an 203 7.84% 710 2.40% 26.69 5.55% 
Yancheng 35 1.35% 3,067 10.38% 39.56 8.22% 
Yangzhou 258 9.97% 1,815 6.14% 24.43 5.08% 
Zhenjiang 160 6.18% 897 3.04% 22.36 4.65% 
Taizhou 79 3.05% 1,995 6.75% 13.32 2.77% 
Suqian 3 0.12% 2,345 7.93% 25.23 5.24% 
Mean 199.15 7.69% 2,273 7.69% 37.00 7.69% 
 
 
261 DR-Incident Reporting 2011 (China), art. 19. 
262 DR-Incident Reporting 2011 (China), art. 21, para. 1. 
263 DR-Incident Reporting 2011 (China), art. 21, para. 25. 
264 See generally Xia & Tian 2015. 
265 Data on the number and proportion of the reported MQSIs (2011-2014) are based on Xia & 
Tian 2015, p. 30, Table 1. Data about the number of medical institutions and hospital 
admissions in all 13 municipal jurisdictions of Jiangsu Province in 2013 are from Jiangsu 
Provincial Commission of Health and Family Planning 2014, pp. 210-351. 
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According to Table 2.3, it is evident that MQSIs were unevenly reported by 
various municipal jurisdictions. For instance, Xuzhou had the largest number 
(4,454) of medical institutions and the third largest number (79.73 million) of 
hospital admissions but reported almost the smallest number (24) of MQSIs. 
Nantong reported more 40% of all the MQSIs, although it only had an 
average number of hospital admissions. This result indicates that the MQSI 
reporting system meets with resistance in practice.  
In addition, even though the MQSI reporting is mandatory, Liu et al. 
found that most of the MQSIs were not reported of the providers’ own accord 
but were reported passively in cases where dissatisfied patients had already 
filed a lawsuit before the court, applied to the public authorities for a 
technical investigation, or applied for people’s mediation.266 Many MQSIs 
identified by hospitals in the course of routine administration were not 
reported to the authorities.267  
Several reasons may explain this low rate of reporting. First, hospitals 
hesitate over reporting in that they are very concerned with the result of 
hospital accreditation.268 Hospitals may fail the accreditation if they are 
responsible for medical accidents. Second, physicians are unwilling to report 
MQSIs for fear of losing reputation and chances of winning promotion and 
bonuses.269 Third, the mandatory obligation to report is not strictly enforced 
by the public health authorities and few providers are actually punished 
because of non-reporting.270 
4.3.3.2. Regulatory Threats 
In addition to the MQSI reporting system, the then MoH established the 
Medical Quality-Safety Dissuasion-Conversation System (hereinafter MQDS) 
in 2011. The MQDS is a form of regulatory threats (行政告诫),271 which is 
intended to improve the management of the quality of care and patient safety, 
and the prevention of MQSIs through soft measures such as dissuasion and 
conversation instead of punishments. In China, regulatory threats fall into the 
 
266 Liu et al. 2012a, p. 10. 
267 Id. 
268 Ha et al. 2009, pp. 21-22. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 It is difficult to translate the Chinese term “行政告诫” into English. Literally, it could be 
translated as “administrative dissuasion.” However, some authoritative Chinese 
administrative law scholars such as Youyong Zhou (周佑勇), Lishen Yu (于立深), and 
Guoping Sun (孙国平) prefer to equate the term “agency threats” in the US with 
“行政告诫” in China. See Wu, Xiong & Lu 2012, p. 136. For more information about 
regulatory threats in the US, see Wu 2011.  
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category of administrative guidance (行政指导), which is a non-coercive form 
of administrative action for a certain administrative purpose.272 
The manager of a hospital which is directly involved in gross or 
especially gross MQSIs or has serious hidden dangers of MQSIs will be 
subjected to the MQDS.273 Once a gross or especially gross MQSI occurs or a 
serious MQSI hidden danger is identified, the public health authorities will 
organise and conduct the MQDS within 30 days.274 During the process, the 
public health authorities should point out the main problems and dangers 
faced by the hospital involved, and demand that the hospital rectifies any 
mistake within three months.275 If the manager refuses to undergo the MQDS 
process, the public health authorities should circulate a notice of criticism 
and must not accept any application for hospital accreditation or evaluation 
from the hospital involved.276 If the hospital involved fails to make 
rectifications in time or fails to carry out measures as required, the public 
health authorities will criticise and educate it and urge it to make 
corrections.277 
Ideally, the fear of losing the eligibility for accreditation may induce 
hospitals involved in MQSIs to make corrections quickly and invest more in 
patient safety. Hence, the MQDS is potentially effective at preventing 
medical errors that are due to defects in hospital management, training, 
coordination among hospital departments, etc. For the time being, however, 
there is no empirical evidence that can prove the effectiveness of the MQDS. 
One may wonder whether soft measures such as criticism, education or 
persuasion would be as effective as punishments.  
4.4. THE ROLE OF SELF-REGULATION 
In addition to direct governmental regulation, several medical associations 
also play a role in the “self-regulation” of the medical profession in China. 
Three major associations are the Chinese Hospital Association (hereinafter 
CHA), the Chinese Medical Doctor Association (hereinafter CMDA) and the 
Chinese Medical Association (hereinafter CMA). Providers may decide to join 
these associations voluntarily, meaning that in China it is not an essential pre-
 
272 Ying 2011, p. 199. Other forms of administrative guidance may include, inter alia, 
proposals, negotiations, commendations, encouragement, mediation, guiding plans, and 
information disclosure. Id., p. 201. 
273 DR-Administrative Dissuasion 2011 (China), art. 2. 
274 DR-Administrative Dissuasion 2011 (China), art. 5. 
275 DR-Administrative Dissuasion 2011 (China), art. 9. 
276 DR-Administrative Dissuasion 2011 (China), art. 12. 
277 DR-Administrative Dissuasion 2011 (China), art. 13. 
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condition for providers to be enrolled as members of these associations. 
Providers obtain licenses from, and register with, the public health 
authorities rather than with those associations. 
Secondary and tertiary medical institutions are eligible to join the 
CHA.278 The key purposes of the CHA are to protect the legal rights and 
interests of the members, play an active role in trade instruction, limited self-
regulation, coordination, and supervision, and try its best to improve the 
management level of member institutions.279 Notably, the CHA can be 
entrusted or authorised by the NHFPC to carry out such activities as 
supervising medical ethics, medical care quality and safety, assisting in 
drafting regulations on hospital management and criteria for assessing 
managers’ performance, participating in hospital accreditation, etc.280 The 
members are required to adhere to the CHA’s Statutes and decisions and 
maintain the legal rights and reputation of the CHA.281 Any member who has 
violated the CHA’s Statutes severely will be removed from the CHA 
membership.282 However, the CHA does not have any competence in 
imposing disciplinary sanctions on its members, when they breach laws and 
regulations in the healthcare sector. 
Licensed (assistant) doctors are qualified for joining the CMDA,283 
which aims to protect the doctor’s legal rights and interests and promote the 
improvement of the doctor’s medical standard and quality of service.284 Some 
significant tasks which the CMDA undertakes are to enhance the limited self-
regulation of doctors, to assist in drafting professional standards of care and 
codes of conduct and to establish regimes of on-the-job training, routine 
assessment of the doctor’s performance and review of the medical 
technology.285 It is demanded that members should abide by the CMDA’s 
Statutes and decisions, medical ethics, professional standards and codes of 
conduct, and maintain the legal rights and interests and reputation of the 
membership.286 If it is authorised, the CMDA has the power to bestow awards 
to excellent doctors on the one hand and impose disciplinary sanctions on 
those members who breach medical professional standards and ethics on the 
other hand.287 However, the CMDA’s Statutes do not specify what kinds of 
 
278 Chinese Hospital Association 2011, art. 2. 
279 Id., art. 3. 
280 Id., art. 6, para. 6. 
281 Id., art. 12. 
282 Id., art. 13. 
283 Chinese Medical Doctor Association 2012, art. 2. 
284 Id., art. 3. 
285 Id., art. 6, para. 3. 
286 Id., art. 11. 
287 Id., art. 6, para. 9. 
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disciplinary sanctions shall be imposed, except that those members who 
severely violate the Statutes should be removed from the membership.288 
All medical institutions and medical staff members, medical colleges 
and medical enterprises can join the CMA.289 It is a national academic 
organisation, which is an important social force in the development of 
medical science and technology and a linkage between the government and 
the medical professionals. To promote academic communications in 
medicine, to publish medical journals and books and to carry out continuing 
medical education and on-the-job training and so on are among the CMA’s 
basic functions.290 As far as medical malpractice and professional standards are 
concerned, the tasks entrusted by the government to conduct the MATA 
system and publish and update the Clinical Practice Guidelines (hereinafter 
CPG) and the Norms of Technical Operations in Clinical Practice (hereinafter 
NTOCP) are the most notable.291 Members have an obligation to abide by the 
CMA’s Statues and decisions, accomplish the tasks entrusted to them, 
promote the development of the CMA and maintain the legal rights and 
interests of the CMA.292 Those members who severely violate the CMA’s 
Statutes should be denied membership.293 
To sum up, medical professional associations in China do play a role in 
the “self-regulation” of the medical profession. However, the degree of 
independence of these associations from the government is surprisingly low. 
Without the authorization and permission from the government, many 
functions of these associations are unable to be fulfilled. In this respect, they 
actually play the role of assistants to the public health authorities. Many 
substantial functions such as imposing administrative or disciplinary 
punishments, especially the suspension or revocation of a license, are still 
within the exclusive competence of the public health authorities. This may be 
explained by the fact that China lacks a liberal tradition of self-regulation294 
and that the government may still be reluctant to allow any non-
governmental organisation to be too independent.295 
 
288 Id., art. 13. 
289 Chinese Medical Association 2010, art. 9. 
290 Id., art. 7, paras. 1-4. 
291 Id., art. 7, para. 6. 
292 Id., art. 11. 
293 Id., art. 13. 
294 Ding 2012, p. 110. 
295 Liu 2013a. 
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4.5. SUMMARY 
In China, the medical profession is directly regulated by the government. 
Specifically, the public health authorities (the new NHFPC and local HFPCs) 
administer the health care provision system within their respective 
jurisdictions. The authorities control both inputs (competence of health care 
providers) and outputs (service quality and patient safety).  
As far as input controls are concerned, both institutional and 
individual providers should obtain a license from the authorities before they 
can practise medicine. If they practise without a license, they will be subject 
to administrative punishments and/or criminal penalties. Empirical evidence 
on the rate of identification of offenders is rare. Some available evidence 
suggests that practising without a license is not an uncommon phenomenon, 
especially in rural and suburban areas. It seems likely that the government 
control of inputs may not be so effective in these areas. Then, it is likely that 
some iatrogenic injuries may not be caused by negligence on the part of 
relatively competent providers but by the technical incompetence of 
unqualified people.  
When it comes to output controls, the authorities basically employ the 
command-and-control method. Providers must comply with professional 
codes of conduct that are provided for by relevant laws, regulations, and 
medical-technical norms. If they contravene any code of conduct, 
institutional providers will be subject to administrative punishments, whereas 
individual providers may be sanctioned either administratively and/or 
criminally. Empirical data on the rate of identification of lawbreakers are 
currently unavailable. Some evidence shows that sanctions actually imposed 
on identified wrong-doers are fairly lenient – the size of fines is relatively 
modest and license revocation and criminal penalties are rarely imposed. One 
may question whether the current sanctioning system is sufficient to deter 
non-compliance. 
In order to induce providers to maintain subsequent expertise and 
service quality, hospitals may choose to be accredited by external 
organisations and doctors are supposed to be assessed periodically. However, 
it seems that hospital accreditation meets with considerable resistance in 
practice and has been suspended several times. Some evidence also implies 
that the PDA system is not targeted at professional performance and ethics 
but only at medical knowledge and techniques and doctors assessed by their 
employer-hospitals rarely fail the exam. One may wonder whether the 
accreditation and the PDA system are effective at quality assurance.  
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In cases where an MQSI (adverse incident) occurs, providers are 
supposed to report the MQSI to the authorities. However, empirical evidence 
suggests that the reporting system does not work well in that providers are 
unwilling to report MQSIs for fear of being punished or losing reputation, 
promotion, or bonuses and that the authorities do not enforce the reporting 
obligation strictly. 
In addition to the command-and-control method, the authorities also 
adopt a non-coercive regime of regulatory threats, whereby the authorities 
criticise, educate, and urge hospital managers to make corrections. However, 
evidence on the efficacy of this regime is currently rare. Given that the 
command-and-control method is not so effective in practice, one may 
wonder whether the soft measure of regulatory threats will actually work.  
Besides direct government regulation, several professional associations 
play an assistant role in the regulation of the medical profession. However, 
the role of these associations is rather limited because the Chinese 
government does not allow true self-regulation in the health care sector. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 2 examined the organisation, financing, and regulation of healthcare 
provision in China. Several conclusions can be drawn here. First, all 
individual providers are employed medical staff members of medical 
institutions (hospitals, health centres, and clinics). The medical service 
contractual relationship (doctor-patient relationship) is actually between 
medical institutions and patients rather than between doctors and patients. 
The law (contract law, tort law, etc.) applies to all doctor-patient 
relationships and medical malpractice disputes, irrespective of whether public 
or private, for-profit or not-for-profit hospitals are involved. Second, 
although the government recently started to increase investment in public 
health care provision, patients on average still have to pay about 40% of all 
medical expenses out of pocket. Hence, patients normally have a strong 
incentive to claim compensation once they suffer iatrogenic injuries. Third, 
although China has established a comprehensive system of public regulation 
of the medical profession, its effectiveness in quality assurance is open to 
suspicion on account of inadequate enforcement in practice. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COMPENSATION FOR IATROGENIC 
INJURIES UNDER TORT LAW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
From an ex post facto perspective of a case where an iatrogenic injury 
suffered by a patient occurred, one may wonder what the potential legal 
consequences of iatrogenic injuries could be in China. As addressed in 
Chapter 2, a negligent provider who caused injuries to the patient (a “medical 
accident”) may be subject to administrative punishments (license 
suspension/revocation) and/or criminal sanctions (imprisonment).1 Some 
consequential losses such as medical expenses may be covered by various 
insurance or social security schemes.2 This Chapter focuses on the system of 
private law compensation for iatrogenic injuries. Specifically, it will explore 
the issue of what legal rules or regimes victimised patients may rely on to 
obtain redress and how good they may appear according to the available 
literature in China (part of Sub-question (1-a)).  
To begin with, Section 2 will briefly summarise the development of 
the Chinese medical malpractice liability system. Then, currently applicable 
rules concerning medical malpractice will be discussed in detail in Section 3.  
2. DEVELOPMENT 
Medical malpractice liability was first developed in the West hundreds of 
years ago. As a matter of history, medical malpractice liability can be traced 
back to the fourteenth century in England and the late eighteenth century in 
 
1 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.2.1. 
2 See infra Chapter 5. 
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the US.3 In France, medical malpractice liability began to grow at the end of 
the eighteenth century.4 In China (PRC), however, medical malpractice 
liability had not been taken seriously until the late 1980’s when China began 
to rebuild its civil law regime after the Cultural Revolution. 
The evolution of medical malpractice liability in modern China is full 
of twists and turns. Before the 1980’s, few medical malpractice claims were 
brought before the court when neither a substantive civil law regime nor a 
well-functioning civil litigation system was available in Mao’s China.5 Most of 
the medical accidents were handled by the administrative authorities and 
some criminal penalties were imposed on negligent providers.6 Some evidence 
shows that although the victimised patient or his/her family members were 
not allowed to obtain compensation from hospitals concerned, they might get 
some limited financial aid from the government if they fell into financial 
dislocations due to the death or disability of the patient.7 Also, part of the 
medical expenses, lost earnings and/or loss of maintenance due to iatrogenic 
injuries might also be covered by then social security schemes for public 
officials and employees (the GFMCS and the LIS).8 However, empirical data 
on the extent and size of the aid or social insurance benefits are unavailable. 
As of the beginning of the 1980’s, China began to restore its civil 
justice system.9 Although the Principles 1986 (full title: General Principles of 
Civil Law)10 contain a general fault-based tort clause11 which provides a 
potential legal basis for medical malpractice claims, this act does not provide 
specific and detailed rules concerning medical malpractice liability.  
 
3 Danzon 1985a, p. 59. 
4  Boccara 2009, p. 342. 
5 Harris & Wu 2005, pp. 459-460. 
6 Li 1987, pp. 1-3; Liang 1998, pp. 24-29. 
7 JI-No Compensation Shall Be Granted 1964 (China). See also Wang & Oliphant 2012, pp. 
26-27. 
8 See supra Chapter 2, Section 3.2. 
9 The NPC enacted two statutes which are the cornerstone of the civil litigation system – 
the Civil Procedure Law 1982 (China) (and later the Civil Procedure Law 1991) and the 
Principles 1986 (China).  
10 China has not enacted a civil code yet. The Principles 1986 is intended as a transitional 
form of civil law until China promulgates the unified civil code. Based on the Principles 
1986, many single civil statutes have been enacted, such as Contract Law 1999 (China), 
Property Law 2007 (China), and Tort Law 2009 (China). In June 2016, the codification of 
Chinese civil law was initiated and the draft General Part of Civil Law (民法总则) was 
submitted to the NPC. It is expected that the Chinese Civil Code will be enacted around 
2010. See generally Sun 2016. 
11 Principles 1986 (China), art. 106, para. 2 reads, “Citizens and legal persons who through 
their fault encroach upon state or collective property, or the property or person of other 
people shall bear civil liability.” 
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Merely a year later, an administrative regulation12 was issued in order 
to provide both substantive rules for compensating medical injuries and 
procedural rules for resolving medical disputes. On the one hand, this 
regulation adopted an extremely limited compensation regime. Victimised 
patients would only receive a fixed lump sum of modest payment from 
defendant hospitals,13 which could seldom make good the real losses. On the 
other hand, it pre-empted medical malpractice litigation by establishing an 
administrative adjudication (行政裁决) regime, under which the dispute 
would be resolved by the public health authorities rather than by the court. 
Victimised patients could not file a lawsuit before the court unless they were 
unwilling to accept the result of the administrative adjudication.14 
With the deepening of the market economy in China, the deficiencies 
of the AR-Medical Accidents 1987 became more and more obvious. Harris 
and Wu summarised four deficiencies as follows: (1) narrowness in the 
definition of medical accidents (directly causing death, disability or tissue-
organ functional impairment); (2) unfair limitations on compensation (a 
limited lump sum of modest payment);15 (3) weaknesses in the system for 
expert testimony (lack of neutrality and credibility); and (4) conflicts and lack 
of integration with other laws (contradicting the Principles 1986 and the 
Civil Procedure Law 1982, 1991).16 Dissatisfied with this regulation, the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) stressed that the Principles 1986 and the AR-
Medical Accidents 1987 should be equally applicable, and some local courts 
applied the Principles 1986 in deciding medical malpractice cases, e.g. Liu v. 
Datong Clinic.17 
In response to the above deficiencies, the SPC issued the JI-Rules of 
Evidence 2001, article 4 of which reversed the burden of proof as to both 
fault and causation in medical malpractice litigation. It provides that the 
defendant had to produce evidence to prove that either it was not at fault or 
 
12 AR-Medical Accidents 1987 (China). In China, administrative regulations are statutes 
enacted by the State Council in order to perform its executive role. As far as legal 
authority is concerned, administrative regulations are inferior to national laws 
promulgated by the NPC or the SC-NPC but superior to rules or regulations issued by local 
congress or government.  
13 AR-Medical Accidents 1987 (China), art. 18. 
14 AR-Medical Accidents 1987 (China), art. 11. 
15 In particular, the limited compensation appeared considerably inadequate during a period 
when more and more residents were not covered the LIS. See supra Chapter 2, Section 3.1. 
16 Harris & Wu, 2005, pp. 459-463. 
17 In Liu v. Datong Clinic, although the injury (the sub-acute pelvic inflammatory disease) 
caused by poorly disinfected medical equipment could not be regarded as serious as a 
medical accident defined by the AR-Medical Accidents 1987 (China), the court 
nonetheless granted the plaintiff damages in accordance with the Principles 1986 (China). 
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there was no causal link between negligence and injuries.18 The SPC justified 
the virtually full reversal of the burden of proof on the grounds that patients 
as medical laymen are unable to understand medical procedures and produce 
evidence due to severe information asymmetry.19 
Moreover, the State Council amended the AR-Medical Accidents 1987 
and replaced it with the AR-Medical Accidents 2002. The new regulation has 
expanded the definition of medical accidents, removed several unfair 
limitations on compensation, rebuilt a much more neutral expert 
ascertainment regime and replaced the old administrative adjudication regime 
with a new administrative mediation system.20 In addition, parties to a 
medical dispute are encouraged to negotiate and settle the dispute in private 
before initiating the administrative mediation system or filing a lawsuit.21 
Therefore, as of 2002, three means of resolving medical disputes are available: 
(1) behind-the-scenes negotiation, (2) administrative mediation by public 
health authorities and (3) formal civil litigation. 
Although the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 has eased the conflicts with 
the Principles 1986 and the Civil Procedure Law 1991 by greatly expanding 
compensation and abolishing the administrative adjudication regime, it is still 
a relatively limited compensation regime in comparison to the then 
compensation system in tort law. The latter was based on article 106, para. 2 
of Principles 1986, together with two judicial interpretations22 issued by the 
SPC – JI-Emotional Damage 2001 and JI-Personal Injury 2003. First, the AR-
Medical Accidents 2002 requires that injuries suffered by the patient must be 
“tangible” or “obvious.”23 Second, it does not provide for compensation for 
death,24 the amount of which is often substantial in other personal injury 
cases involving death. Third, more caps are placed on some compensation 
items such as compensation for living expenses for the dependent and 
compensation for emotional distress.25 
None of the foregoing limitations can be found in the Principles 1986 
and relevant judicial interpretations. For this reason, some courts were more 
willing to apply the Principles 1986 instead of the AR-Medical Accidents 
 
18 JI-Rules of Evidence 2001 (China), art. 4, para. 1, sub-para. 8. 
19 Li 2002, pp. 70-71; Xi & Yang, 2011, p. 69. 
20 Harris & Wu, 2005, pp. 463-468. 
21 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 46. 
22 The SPC is entrusted by the NPC to issue judicial interpretations of national laws in order 
to unify the application of law nationwide. In practice, judicial interpretations are as 
enforceable as the law itself unless they are replaced by new national legislation or 
legislative interpretations by the SC-NPC. See generally e.g. Wei 1997. 
23 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 4. 
24 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 50. 
25 Id. 
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2002 for the sake of awarding fair and adequate compensation to victimised 
patients. Eventually, the SPC split medical malpractice claims into two types 
– medical accident claims and ordinary claims.26 The differences between 
these two types of medical malpractice claims are briefly summarised in Table 
3.1. 
Table 3.1: Medical Accident Claims versus Ordinary Claims 
 Medical Accident Claims Ordinary Claims 
Definition - negligence on the part of providers27 
- contravening laws, regulations, 
rules, codes of conduct, or customary 
practice28 
- “obvious” (明显的) personal 
injuries29 
- fault (either intent or 
negligence) on the part of 
providers30 
- damage to person31 
Rules - AR-Medical Accidents 2002 - Principles 1986  
Damages32 - More limited (more caps + no 
compensation for death) 
- Less limited (less caps + 
compensation for death) 
Expert 
witness33 
- clinical physicians selected by local 
medical associations from local 
hospitals (MATA) 
- forensic pathologists 
independent of the medical 
profession 
 
Then, an entirely illogical paradox emerged. Although, by definition, patients 
were injured more severely in medical accidents (obvious injuries) than in 
ordinary torts (less obvious injuries), they would, in theory, obtain less 
compensation under medical accident claims than under ordinary claims. In 
practice, however, it would not be possible for plaintiff-patients always to opt 
for compensation under ordinary claims freely.34 It was argued that the 
 
26 JI-Notice on Referring to the RHMA 2003 (China). 
27 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 2. 
28 Id. 
29 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 4, para. 1.  
30 Principles 1986 (China), art. 106, para. 2. 
31 Id. 
32 For a detailed contrast between the two rules of damages, see e.g. Ding 2012, pp. 196-197; 
Wang & Oliphant 2012, p. 38. 
33 JI-Notice on Referring to the RHMA 2003 (China), art. 2. 
34 In most cases, the court would normally first ask clinical experts to offer their testimony as 
to whether the adverse event could constitute a medical accident. If the clinical experts 
testified that there was no medical accident, the court may then ask forensic pathologists 
to testify whether there would be any ordinary fault. Hence, once clinical experts testified 
that the event was a medical accident, then plaintiff-patients would have no choice but to 
accept the potentially lower amount of damages determined in light of AR-Medical 
Accidents 2002 (China). See e.g. Xiamen Intermediate People’s Court and Siming District 
People’s Court 2008, p. 77. 
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presence of this paradox would completely contradict the principle of fairness 
and equity35 and greatly undermine the unification of the application of law.36 
To resolve this paradox, the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress (SC-NPC) provides for 11 articles on liability for iatrogenic 
injuries in Chapter Ⅶ of the new Tort Law 2009. The new rules are intended 
to unify the old double tracks of medical malpractice claims.37 Tort Law 2009 
confirms the Principles 1986’s approach to both liability rules and rules of 
damages. Scholars generally welcomed the unification of applicable medical 
malpractice liability rules.38 More strikingly, Tort Law 2009 has abandoned 
the rule of virtually full reversal of the burden of proof. However, some 
criticised the abandonment of the reversal of the burden of proof and 
regarded it a “backward” step in the road of victim protection.39  
In addition to tort law, contract law may play a limited role in medical 
malpractice claims. The current medical malpractice tort rules, together with 
some relevant reforms of the old rules, and the role of Contract Law 1999 will 
be examined in Section 3.  
3. THE SUBSTANTIVE SYSTEM OF PRIVATE 
LAW COMPENSATION 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1. The Relevance of Contract Law 
In China, it is generally accepted that the doctor-patient relationship is a 
medical service contract concluded between hospitals and patients.40 Under 
such a contract, hospitals provide specific medical care services to patients in 
 
35 Xiamen Intermediate People's Court and Siming District People’s Court 2008, pp. 87-88. 
36 Ai & Fang 2010. 
37 Recently, the JI-Notice on Referring to the RHMA 2003 (China) was repealed by the SPC 
on April 8, 2013.  
38 See e.g. Xi & Yang 2011, pp. 72-75. 
39 Wang & Oliphant 2012, pp. 50-51. 
40 Liu & Li 2002, p. 6; Qiang 2010, p. 19; Wang, C. 2011, p. 65. This viewpoint is also 
supported by the SPC. In the JI-Causes of Civil Action 2001 (China), the JI-Causes of Civil 
Action 2008 (China), and the JI-Causes of Civil Action 2011 (China), the SPC stipulates a 
cause of action called “Disputes over Medical Service Contracts” (医疗服务合同纠纷). 
Some scholars do not believe the doctor-patient relationship is of civil law. They argue 
that it is of administrative law or a hybrid of civil and administrative relationship. See e.g. 
Hu 2001, pp. 57-59; Zhang 2001. 
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return for an agreed payment.41 Therefore, in theory, the Contract Law 1999 
is applicable to the doctor-patient relationship. However, the Contract Law 
does not provide for any special rule for the standard of medical care or 
medical malpractice issues. Some contract law scholars argued that the 
primary contractual obligation that health care providers have to fulfil is to 
exercise due care in the course of treatment (an obligation of means),42 which 
is actually not different from the standard of care in tort law. Moreover, 
parties under the contract are not permitted to either waive tort liability for 
personal injuries43 or alter the statutory standard of care in tort law.44 
In case an iatrogenic injury occurs, patients are allowed to choose 
either a contractual claim or a tort claim (the concurrence of contractual and 
tort liability).45 To patients, contractual claims may look superior to tort 
claims in that the former has longer statute of limitations (2 years)46 than the 
latter (1 year).47 However, most patients in practice opt for tort claims for 
three reasons. First, medical malpractice liability and quantum rules under 
tort law are much more detailed than under contract law.48 Second, the expert 
witness regime is designed to serve medical malpractice claims under tort law 
rather than under contract law.49 Third, recovery for non-pecuniary losses is 
often denied under contract law.50  
Since the Chinese public health insurance system (BMIS) is still under-
funded and under-developed, some residents (esp. unemployed, rural, or poor 
people) may not be covered by health insurance schemes and even those who 
are covered by the BMIS may have to pay a significant proportion (40% on 
average) of medical bills out of their own pocket.51 Hence, some Chinese 
 
41 Cheng 2007, p. 18. 
42 Han 2005, pp. 95-96. 
43 Contract Law 1999 (China), art. 53, para. 1, sub-para. 1. 
44 Contract Law 1999 (China), art. 52, para. 1, sub-para. 5. 
45 Contract Law 1999 (China), art. 122. 
46 Principles 1986 (China), art. 135. 
47 Principles 1986 (China), art. 136, para. 1. 
48 For old medical malpractice rules in tort law, see supra Section 2. for the current medical 
malpractice rules in tort law, see infra Sections 3.2 to 3.6. However, Contract Law 1999 
(China) does not specify any rule for medical malpractice. 
49 In practice, the majority of expert evidence is produced by the MATA system, which is 
intended only for determining whether a medical accident occurs. By definition, a medical 
accident is a severe type of tort.  
50 Contract Law 1999 (China), art. 113, para. 1 provides that only “economic losses” are 
compensable under contract law. See also Zheng & Chen v. Jiangsu Hospital (China), 
where the court decided that changing the agreed treatment plan unilaterally without the 
consent of the patient constituted a breach of contract. In addition, the court denied the 
plaintiff’s claim for non-pecuniary damages. This decision was appraised and published by 
the SPC on its official gazette. 
51 See supra Chapter 2, Section 3. 
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patients cannot afford treatment services, especially those that are 
expensive.52 One important question is whether hospitals can legitimately 
refuse to provide treatment services for patients who refuse to pay for medical 
bills. This question should be answered in the light of two scenarios. 
Under the first scenario, the hospital finds that the patient cannot 
afford medical bills before admitting him/her to the hospital. Is the hospital 
legally allowed to refuse to enter into a contract with the patient? It all 
depends. In the case of emergencies where the patient is critically ill, the 
hospital and physicians should conduct emergency treatment measures 
immediately and should not refuse to give emergency treatment.53 In case the 
hospital is not capable of rescuing the patient due to limited equipment or 
technology, it must refer the patient to another hospital promptly.54 Urgent-
care centres and hospitals should not refuse to provide or delay emergency 
medical measures because of unpaid medical bills.55 If physicians breach their 
duty of rescuing and treating the critically ill patient in time and cause 
serious consequences, they will be subject to license sanctions (suspension or 
revocation) and/or criminal penalties.56 In addition, the victimised patient or 
his/her close relatives may file a lawsuit against the faulty hospital either 
under contract law or under tort law.57 However, in non-emergent cases, it is 
currently not compulsory for the hospital to admit the patient.  
Due to this compulsory obligation to enter into the medical service 
contract in case of emergencies and the fact that many patients cannot afford 
treatment, a lot of Chinese hospitals are facing the problem of arrears of 
medical bills. This problem often occurs in public hospitals, since they are 
not-for-profit and are not allowed to increase service prices freely. According 
to one recent empirical study, three types of non-paying patients – those who 
are insolvent, who have no close relatives, or whose identity cannot be 
verified – accounted for about 16% of all the unpaid medical bills in the 
 
52 Id. 
53 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 31; Doctors Law 1998 (China), art. 24. 
54 AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China), art. 31. 
55 DR-Prehospital Emergency Care 2013 (China), art. 25. 
56 Doctors Law 1998 (China), art. 37. 
57 Since the medical service contract has not been concluded, there will be no liability for 
breach of contract. However, the Contract Law 1997 (China) contains some general 
provisions on culpa in contrahendo (缔约过失责任). Art. 42 provides that “In the course 
of negotiations, the party that falls under any of the following circumstances, thus causing 
losses to the other party, shall be liable for the losses: … (3) taking any other act contrary 
to the principle of good faith.” See generally Han 2014. Breaching the statutory duty to 
rescue critically ill patients may be regarded as an act contrary to the principle of good 
faith. However, some local courts tend to apply tort law to such cases where the faulty 
defendant breaches a statutory duty and results in harm. See e.g. Liu 2010. 
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Shandong Province for the period 2008-2010.58 Nationwide, these non-paying 
patients incur about three to four trillion yuan medical expenses annually.59  
In 2013, in order to help these non-paying patients and lessen the 
financial burden on public hospitals, China established the Regime of 
Assistance for Non-paying Emergencies (hereinafter RANE), which is 
intended to cover the medical bills incurred by those patients who are unable 
to pay or whose identity cannot be verified.60 Accordingly, the government 
established a special fund, which is partly subsidised by the government and 
partly relies on donations.61 
Although some of the unpaid bills may be covered by the RANE, the 
lion’s share of them are still borne by hospitals.62 For instance, for the period 
2011-2013, the Third People’s Hospital of the Chengdu City had admitted 286 
non-paying patients, none of whom had been refused treatment or been 
driven out.63 By the end of 2014, these patients had incurred costs of a total of 
274,667 yuan, most of which were still covered by the hospital itself.64 
Under the second scenario, the hospital finds that the patient cannot 
afford the treatment after admitting him/her. Is the hospital allowed to 
terminate treatment or cancel the medical service contract? According to 
article 94 of the Contract Law 1997, the hospital may terminate the contract 
if the patient “delayed performance of their main obligation after such 
performance has been demanded, and fails to perform within a reasonable 
period.” Obviously, the main obligation that the patient has to fulfil is to pay 
the medical bills. Hence, it seems that the hospital is allowed to cancel the 
contract in the case where the patient is unable to pay.  
In practice, however, Chinese courts seem to add two conditions for 
the termination of the contract: first, it must not contravene 
humanitarianism, i.e. the patient’s health must not be adversely affected by 
the termination; and second, experts testify that the patient’s condition meets 
the standards for being discharged from the hospital.65 Therefore, the hospital 
 
58 The remaining 84% of the unpaid medical bills were due to non-paying health insurers or 
governmental institutions. Zhang et al. 2013, p. 47. 
59 Li, H. 2014, p. 5. 
60 N-Assistance for Non-Paying Emergencies 2013 (China). 
61 Id. 
62 Li 2014, pp. 7-8. 
63 Li 2014, p. 7. 
64 Id. 
65 See e.g. Chongqing Children’s Hospital v. Pang et al. (China), where a patient who was 
fully cured refused to pay medical expenses and refused to leave the ward in order to 
continue to enjoy the service. The court decided that it was justifiable for the plaintiff-
hospital to cancel the medical service contract, to claim back unpaid medical expenses, 
and to ask the defendant-patient to leave the ward. See also Chen & Dai 2011, pp. 27-28. 
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will not be allowed to cancel the contract freely and will be held liable for 
any harm done to the patient by physician inaction out of concerns for costs. 
Neither is the patient allowed to stay in the ward bed without paying 
anything when his/her conditions meet the standards for leaving hospital. 
It seems that contract law is not totally irrelevant to the doctor-patient 
relationship. However, as far as medical malpractice is concerned, contract 
law is not that relevant in China.66 
3.1.2. The General Clause for Medical Malpractice Claims 
Hence, in China, tort law is the primary route for victimised patients (or their 
family members), especially those who only receive modest social insurance 
benefits in cases of permanent disability or death, to obtain compensation for 
iatrogenic injuries. Also, tort law is the only regime that provides victims 
with reparation for non-pecuniary losses (精神损害).  
Before 2010, as we saw in Section 2, the legal basis for medical 
malpractice claims could be found in either administrative regulations (AR-
Medical Accidents 1987, 2002) or civil law (Principles 1986, JI-Emotional 
Damage 2001, and JI-Personal Injury 2003). Since 2010, the primary legal 
basis has become the Tort Law 2009, together with JI-Emotional Damage 
2001, and JI-Personal Injury 2003.67 
Chapter VII of the Tort Law 2009 provides for 11 articles (arts. 54-64) 
to handle liability issues concerning iatrogenic injuries. The general clause for 
medical malpractice liability is stipulated by article 54, which reads as follows 
Where a patient sustains any harm during diagnosis and treatment, if the 
medical institution or any of its medical staff is at fault, the medical 
institution shall assume compensatory liability. 
When comparing article 54 to the old rules in the AR-Medical Accidents 
2002,68 we can easily identify three alterations. First, the requirement of 
 
66 Some Chinese scholars have even begun to question the desirability of the theory of 
medical contractual liability. For instance, Ye took as an example the recent shift in 
French medical liability law from contractual liability to statutory tort liability to support 
his argument that China should learn from the French experience and abandon the theory 
of medical contractual liability which is already rarely applied in practice. See generally 
Ye 2012. 
67 These two judicial interpretations are still applicable insofar as they do not contravene the 
new Tort Law 2009 (China).  
68 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 2 defines “medical accidents” as “those that have 
caused personal injury to the patients negligently by the medical institutions or the staff 
members thereof in the activities of medical treatment by violating the laws, regulations, 
ministerial rules concerning medical treatment and health or the standards or conventions 
 
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“negligence” has been changed to “fault,” which, by definition, consists of 
both intent and negligence. Second, the requirement of “wrongfulness” or 
“unlawfulness” –contravening laws, regulations, rules, codes of conduct, or 
customary practice – has been cancelled. Third, the threshold of “obvious 
personal injury” has been abolished as well.  
When reading article 54 and the old general tort clause in the 
Principles 1986 together,69 we can find that article 54 is more detailed in two 
respects. First, article 54 clarifies that either the hospital’s fault or its 
employee-provider’s fault suffices to establish liability. Second, article 54 
reaffirms that the AR-Medical Accidents 2002’s approach that the medical 
institution is the sole defendant that is liable for paying damages for 
iatrogenic injuries. Most scholars in China regard the hospital’s liability in 
article 54 as “vicarious liability” (替代责任).70 However, this viewpoint seems 
somewhat ambiguous because vicarious liability is usually intended to make 
an employer liable for the actionable conduct of an employee,71 but is not 
meant to exonerate the employee’s tort liability.72  
Article 54 looks very like a “channelling of liability,” where liability is 
allocated exclusively to one responsible tortfeasor.73 The Tort Law does not 
provide the hospital with the right of recourse against faulty medical staff 
members. Nevertheless, this does not affect the possibility that the hospital 
and its staff members may work out an agreement on this issue under the 
employment contract.74 
Both feasance and nonfeasance are subsumed under the notion of 
“fault” in article 54. Hospitals will be held liable for harm due to inaction if 
they breach their affirmative duty of care owed to patients.75 
Most of the remaining articles in Chapter VII of the Tort Law can be 
subsumed under article 54. It is interesting, in the light of the nature of the 
duty of care, that the Law divides medical malpractice claims into two types – 
 
of medical treatment and nursing.” AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 3, para. 1 sets 
the threshold of compensable damage as “obvious personal injury.”  
69 Principles 1986 (China), art. 106, para. 2 reads, “Citizens and legal persons who through 
their fault encroach upon state or collective property, or the property or person of other 
people shall bear civil liability.” 
70 Wang 2013, p. 185; Yang 2014, p. 323. 
71 Garner 2014. 
72 In Europe, the employer and the employee are jointly liable for the damage caused by the 
employee in the majority of the cases. See Van Dam 2013, p. 512.  
73 See e.g. Faure 2016, pp. 621-629. 
74 Wang 2013, p. 192. 
75 See e.g. in He v. A Chongqing Hospital (China), the appellate court remarked that “the 
defendant-hospital shall be held liable because it is fully capable of conducting an 
emergency Caesarean … but it had delayed the surgery for about four hours without any 
justification, which was in breach of their statutory duty to rescue the patient promptly.” 
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medical technical malpractice (hereinafter technical malpractice) claims and 
medical ethical malpractice (hereinafter ethical malpractice) claims.76 
Technical malpractice refers to the breach of the duty of care required of 
providers as regards medical techniques – diagnosis, examination, the choice 
of therapies, surgeries, medication, monitoring, etc.77 In contrast, ethical 
malpractice denotes the breach of the duty of care regarding medical ethics – 
informed consent, privacy, bona fides, etc.78 These two types of claims will be 
addressed respectively in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3.  
In addition to the two types of malpractice claims mentioned above, 
Chinese hospitals, together with manufacturers, may also be held jointly and 
severally liable for defective medical products, including substandard blood, 
which will be examined in Section 3.4. Sometimes, courts even rely on 
“equitable liability” to resolve a dispute over medical malpractice in cases 
where neither the provider nor the patient is at fault (Section 3.5). 
The Tort Law 2009 does not provide for new rules concerning expert 
evidence. Hence, the two-track expert testimony system – clinical physicians 
selected by medical associations from hospitals and forensic pathologists 
independent of the medical profession – still exist for the time being. Section 
3.6 will give a brief introduction to the expert evidence system. 
Although the Tort Law 2009 outlines the compensable heads for 
personal injuries cases,79 it does not specify detailed rules about how to 
calculate damages. Currently, Chinese courts still rely on the JI-Emotional 
Damage 2001 and the JI-Personal Injury 2003 to measure damages in all 
personal injury cases. The Chinese law of damages will be sketched in Section 
3.7. A summary will be given in Section 3.8. 
3.2. TECHNICAL MALPRACTICE 
3.2.1. Introduction 
As mentioned earlier, fault is a requirement for establishing medical 
malpractice liability. Article 57 of the Tort Law 2009 defines the standard of 
care regarding medical techniques in China for the first time, which reads 
 
76 This new division between technical malpractice claims and ethical malpractice claims 
should be distinguished from the old division between medical accident claims and 
ordinary claims. The new division is only intended to show the different types of the 
medical duty of care, whereas the old division was made because of different definitions 
and applicable rules.  
77 Yang 2009a, p. 48. 
78 Id. 
79 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 16 and art. 22. 
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Where any medical staff member fails to fulfil the duty of medical care 
corresponding to the then medical standard (当时的医疗水平) and causes 
any harm to a patient, the medical institution shall assume the 
compensatory liability. [italics added] 
Hence, currently in China, technical malpractice should be assessed against 
the duty of care “corresponding to the then medical standard.” According to 
lawmakers, article 57 is significantly important in that it explicitly introduces 
the notion of duty of care and standard of care into Chinese tort law,80 which 
are recognised in most countries.81 The wording “then” clearly excludes the 
possibility of applying retrospective liability to medical malpractice cases. All 
the medical standards against which the provider’s behaviour is assessed 
should be prevailing at the time of treatment. Providers should not be held 
negligent merely because a medical standard is updated after the treatment. 
Be that as it may, the Law still does not clarify how the “medical 
standard” itself should be determined. Ambiguities in such terms are left to 
courts and legal scholars.  
The following section will first summarise scholarly opinions on the 
relationship between statutory standards, written treatment norms, and 
unwritten customary practice on the one hand, and the standard of care on 
the other in Section 3.2.2. Any relevant legal rule will also be examined. 
However, for technical malpractice liability to be established, the 
requirement of causation has to be satisfied too. Also, the establishment both 
of fault and of causation rely on proof rules, and so the causation and proof 
rules will be discussed in Sections 3.2.3 and Section 3.2.4 respectively. 
Causation and proof issues discussed in Section 3.2 are largely applicable to 
ethical malpractice claims and medical products liability. Hence, they will not 
be addressed again in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4. 
3.2.2. Statutory Standards, Written Treatment Norms, and Unwritten 
Customary Practices 
Unlike article 2 of the AR-Medical Accidents 2002, which requires that “a 
statutory standard provided for by laws, administrative regulations, or 
ministry rules, a treatment and care norm (诊疗护理规范) or a customary 
practice (常规)” must be contravened before a medical accident can be 
established, article 57 of the Tort Law 2009 only provides for an abstract 
 
80 Wang 2013, p. 317.  
81 For more information on the standard of care in the US tort law, see e.g. Keeton, 
Sargentich & Keating 2004, pp. 369-440. For the standard of care in Europe, see e.g. Van 
Dam 2013, pp. 234-258. 
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notion of the “then medical standard” and leaves it undefined. Nonetheless, 
one may immediately wonder how a breach of a statutory standard, a 
treatment norm or a customary practice should be treated in the light of the 
new Tort Law.  
A statutory standard is a legal duty imposed on the medical profession 
by several state organs (the NPC or SC-NPC, the State Council, and various 
ministries). China has a long tradition of regulating the medical profession by 
the state.82 Thus, many professional standards are directly enacted by the state 
rather than by the profession itself.83 
The distinction between a treatment norm and customary practice is 
difficult to make. It seems that neither the drafters of the AR-Medical 
Accident 2002 nor those of the Tort Law have ever attempted to make such a 
distinction.84 Some argued that treatment norms are written practice 
guidelines issued by various medical professions associations, while customary 
practices are unwritten conventions that need to be ascertained based on 
expert testimony.85 Others maintained that only those practice guidelines that 
at least have been endorsed by the NHFPC (then MoH) could be regarded as 
treatment norms.86 It follows that, at a minimum, a treatment norm should be 
in a written form. Hence, an unwritten convention could only be regarded as 
a customary practice. 
Since statutory standards and treatment norms are normally act-based 
rules in a written form, it is much easier for a plaintiff to prove whether a 
contravention of a rule has occurred. Given this fact, article 58 of the Tort 
Law provides for a special rule as follows, 
Under any of the following circumstances, a medical institution shall be 
presumed to be at fault for any harm caused to a patient: 
(1) violating a statutory standard provided for by laws, administrative 
regulations, or rules, or a treatment norm (诊疗规范); 
(2) concealing or refusing to provide the medical history data related to a 
dispute; or 
(3) forging, tampering or destroying any medical history data. [italics 
added] 
Clearly, article 58 adopts the ‘prima facie evidence of negligence doctrine’, 
under which the presumption of fault may be rebutted by a showing of 
 
82 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.4. 
83 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3. 
84 The Drafting Group 2002, pp. 9-10; Wang 2013, pp. 317-322. 
85 Ding 2012, pp. 110-113. 
86 See generally Xu 2010. 
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adequate counter evidence.87 The reason for this presumption is that 
violations of those standards or norms are very strong prima facie evidence 
that the medical institution was at fault.88 However, the presumption of fault 
could be rebutted in cases where e.g. a physician had exercised a reasonable 
level of care in rescuing an emergency although he/she violated some 
standards or norms.89  
An interesting question is whether compliance with these standards 
and norms can exclude the possibility of being found liable. Lawmakers give a 
negative answer: statutory standards and treatment norms are often set at a 
minimum level and are more likely to be out of date, while the standard of 
medical care may require a higher level or other types of care and may keep 
up to date more easily.90 Hence, it is often argued that adherence to statutory 
standards or treatment norms has only evidentiary value and per se is not 
sufficient to disprove fault.91 
The deletion of the wording “a customary practice” by article 58, sub-
para. 1 suggests that the presumption rule does not apply to cases where a 
customary practice is contravened. However, this does not imply that a 
customary practice cannot be used as the standard of medical care. The court 
should decide this issue on a case-by-case basis. Although some scholars 
attempt to equate the standard of medical care with the customary practice, 
their argument is basically unfounded.92  
It ought to be noted that taking an unwritten customary practice as the 
standard of care implies the use of the “locality rule,” since a customary 
practice is often developed, recognised and adopted by the local medical 
community. The locality rule “defined the relevant group whose standard of 
practice would govern the local medical community in which the defendant 
doctor practised.”93 However, the Tort Law is silent on this issue. 
Once the locality rule had been contained in the draft Tort Law, which 
reads “when determining the standard of care required of the health care 
provider, due consideration shall be given to factors such as locations, 
qualifications of the medical institution and of the practitioner.”94 However, 
due to complexities of this issue, lawmakers finally decided to leave this 
provision out.95 Be that as it may, lawmakers recommended alternative 
 
87 Ding 2012, pp. 107-108. 
88 Wang 2013, p. 322. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Ding 2012, pp. 107-108. 
92 Xi & Yang 2011, p. 73. 
93 Weiler 1991, p. 21. 
94 Xi & Yang 2011, pp. 73-74; Wang 2013, p. 318. 
95 Id. 
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solutions: on the one hand, statutory standards and treatment norms are 
unified and detailed rules that should be complied with nationwide; on the 
other hand, the locality rule may apply to cases where no statutory standards 
or treatment norms are violated.96 In other words, the “then medical 
standard” may be interpreted as the “then medical standard there” if 
consideration of local factors is justified by specific circumstances.97 
3.2.3. Proof and Causation Issues 
3.2.3.1. General Proof Rules 
The burden of proof in civil cases rests on the plaintiff as a matter of principle 
unless otherwise provided by the law.98 In medical malpractice cases, the issue 
of the burden of proof is complex and controversial. For the period of1986-
2001, there was no special provision relating to the burden of proof in either 
the AR-Medical Accidents 1987 or the Principles 1986, and thus the general 
principle applied to medical cases.  
The general allocation of the burden of proof was dramatically 
reversed for medical malpractice liability in the following decade (2001-
2010). As of 2001, the defendant-hospital began to bear the burden of proving 
the absence of both fault and causation.99 This reversal rule was fiercely 
criticised for three reasons. First, it would encourage frivolous actions.100 
Patients would be more willing to file malpractice claims if they bore little 
burden of proof. Second, it would induce providers to practice defensive 
medicine.101 Providers would take excessive precautions in response to the 
increased risk of losing a malpractice lawsuit due to failure to disprove 
causation and fault. Third, it violates the principle of “equality of arms.”102 
There should be a fair allocation of the risk of losing a lawsuit between the 
plaintiff and the defendant.103 The reversal rule imposes too much risk on the 
defendant, which is unfair.104 
 
96 Id. 
97 Id. In contrast, some strongly advocated the locality rule and believed that it could apply 
to all medical malpractice cases in China. See e.g. Wang & Oliphant 2012, p. 45. However, 
this radical argument is largely unfounded. 
98 JI-Rules of Evidence 2001 (China), art. 2. 
99 JI-Rules of Evidence 2001 (China), art. 4, para. 1, sub-para. 8. 
100 Shao 2013, p. 105. 
101 Id. 
102 Yang 2009b, p. 37. 
103 Shen 2005, p. 29. 
104 Yang 2009b, p. 37. 
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Hence, article 54 of the new Tort Law 2009 has largely abandoned this 
quasi-total reversal rule. The only exception is article 58, under which the 
burden of proof regarding fault would be transferred to defendant-hospitals 
via presumption of fault in some rather limited circumstances.105 However, 
plaintiff-patients still should produce evidence to establish causation. Article 
58 provides for a rule of presumption of fault rather than that of causation. 
As far as the standard of proof is concerned, China had applied an 
“obviously more forceful” standard in civil cases for the period 2001-2014, 
which was provided by article 73, para. 1 of the JI-Rules of Evidence 2001 as 
follows  
Where both parties concerned produce contradicting evidence to prove 
the same fact but neither has enough evidence to rebut the evidence of 
the other party, the People’s court shall determine which evidence is 
obviously more forceful than the other evidence by taking the case into 
consideration, and shall affirm the evidence that is more forceful [italics 
added]. 
Some interpreted the “obviously more forceful” as a high probability nearly 
“nine times out of ten.”106 However, a case study found that many courts in 
practice simply equate “obviously more forceful” with the “preponderance of 
evidence” standard (more than 50%) in the US law.107 Hence, during the 
period 2001-2014, the application of the standard of proof in civil cases is not 
always unified or consistent in China due to dividing interpretations of the 
“high probability” standard.  
In response, in 2015, the SPC tried to clarify this issue by article 108, 
para. 1 of the newly enacted JI-Application of Civil Procedure Law 2015, 
which reads 
For evidence provided by a party who bears the burden of proof, where a 
people's court finds out a high probability of the existence of the facts to 
be investigated upon examination in combination with relevant facts, it 
shall be deemed that the facts exist. [italics added] 
Hence, the preponderance of evidence (more than 50%) rule does not seem to 
be compatible with the high probability rule. According to the drafters, the 
high probability should be interpreted as about 75%.108 
 
105 See supra Section 3.2.2. 
106 Li 1999, p. 20. 
107 See generally Wu, Z., 2013. 
108 Shi & Yan 2016, p. 660. 
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3.2.3.2. Defining Causation 
Despite the fact that causation plays an essential role in tort law, none of the 
provisions in the civil law statutes or any judicial interpretation has ever 
defined this term. The theory of causation in tort law has largely been 
developed by legal scholars and courts in China. Currently, it seems that the 
adequacy theory plays a significant role in tort cases.109  
Interestingly, although the law and the SPC are silent on how to 
define the adequacy theory, some provincial courts have attempted to provide 
a clear definition of an “adequate cause.”110 For instance, the Shanghai High 
People’s Court believes that the determination of causation shall be based on 
the adequacy theory: 
… an adequate causation exists between a negligent treatment and an 
injury if the treatment is the conditio sine qua non of the injury and if the 
treatment substantially increases the objective probability of the 
occurrence of the injury.111 
Similarly, the Jiangsu High People’s Court defines the adequacy theory as 
follows: 
The causation between an action and an injury would be established, if 
the injury would have not occurred but for the action, and it is reasonably 
likely that the presence of the action would have resulted in the injury; 
the causation would not be established, if although the injury would have 
not occurred but for the action, the injury would normally have not 
occurred even in the presence of the action.112 
Combining the foregoing two guides, it is evident that the Chinese version of 
the adequacy theory also bases causation on two essential tests: (1) the “but 
for” or “conditio sine qua non” test, and (2) the “adequacy” – an increased 
 
109 For more information on the development of the theory of causation in Chinese tort law, 
see e.g. Yu 2016. 
110 See e.g. LJI-Shanghai Guide to Malpractice 2005 (China); LJI-Jiangsu Guide to Torts 2011 
(China). Local judicial guides issued by high or intermediate courts are not judicial 
interpretations. They are by no means applicable rules and cannot be directly cited in 
decisions. In practice, nevertheless, these local guides are highly influential in local judges’ 
application of law in the sense that cases of the first instance may be overruled by 
appellate courts if trial judges do not strictly follow relevant guides issued by the appellate 
courts. In other words, local judicial guides represent opinions of appellate courts. 
111 LJI-Shanghai Guide to Malpractice 2005 (China), art. 13. 
112 LJI-Jiangsu Guide to Torts 2011 (China), art. 5, para. 1. 
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objective probability or reasonable likelihood.113 Interestingly, in China the 
first step is also referred to as “causation in fact/factual causation” 
(事实上的因果关系) and the second one as “causation in law/legal causation” 
(法律上的因果关系). While factual causation is essential to the establishment 
of liability, legal causation is more concerned with the scope of 
compensation. Hence, issues of legal causation will be addressed in Section 
3.7 where the law of damages in China is examined. 
3.2.3.3. Uncertainty over Factual Causation 
In particular, proof of causation is difficult in medical malpractice cases. 
Besides faulty treatments, injuries suffered by patients may result from two 
non-tortious factors: (1) the normal outcome of the patient’s underlying or 
pre-existing medical condition, and (2) therapeutic risks inherent in 
treatment beyond physicians’ control.114 It is often indeterminate whether, or 
which part of, the final injury is attributable to the negligent treatment. In 
practice, a significant proportion of medical cases involves scientific 
uncertainty and are quite difficult cases to resolve.  
At least two factors may contribute to evidential uncertainty and 
dispute over causation (“causal uncertainty”). First, there is evident 
informational asymmetry between medical professionals and patients (and 
judges).115 Second, it is not infrequent in some medical cases that even 
medical experts are unsure whether or to what extent an injury was caused 
by the negligent treatment.116 In short, causal uncertainty may make proof of 
causation highly problematic. 
Although the Tort Law 2009 provides for rules handling alternative 
causes,117 multiple sufficient causes,118 joint torts (no single defendant’s 
conduct could cause full harm alone),119 and contributory negligence,120 it 
does not specify any rule concerning causal uncertainty in medical 
malpractice cases. For this reason, after reading the text of the Tort Law 2009, 
 
113 This two-step approach is similar to that under German tort law. See e.g. Magnus 2000, pp. 
64-65. 
114 Khoury 2006, pp. 51-52; Stauch 2008, p. 76; Yang 2008, p. 38; Wang 2014, pp. 8-10. 
115 Khoury 2006, p. 51. 
116 Young, Faure & Fenn 2004, p. 507. 
117 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 10 (liability in solidum unless the real tortfeasor could be 
identified). 
118 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 11 (liability in solidum). 
119 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 12 (several liability apportioned in light of relative 
responsibility). 
120 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 26 (apportioned in light of comparative negligence) and art. 27 
(no liability in case the harm is caused intentionally by the victim). 
 
 
84 Intersentia 
Part I. Legal Remedies for Medical Malpractice in China
Oliphant concluded that, “by providing a general solution only to the 
problem of ‘alternative’ or ‘indeterminate’ defendants and restricting itself to 
an all-or-nothing approach, the new Chinese Tort Liability Law lags behind 
cutting-edge developments at national level” – proportional liability.121 
3.3. ETHICAL MALPRACTICE 
In China, not all medical ethics are recognised by law and thus become 
enforceable. According to the Tort Law 2009, only three types of medical 
ethics are legally protected – respecting the patient’s autonomy, protecting 
the patient’s privacy, and providing services with bona fides. Ethical 
malpractice on the part of providers could be established if they failed to 
disclose information or to obtain consent, if they infringed upon the patient’s 
privacy,122 or if they conducted unnecessary examinations.123 Compared to the 
latter two, disclosure malpractice claims are the most important form of 
ethical malpractice claims in that they are often intertwined with technical 
malpractice claims and associated with the choice of treatment measures and 
iatrogenic injuries. Hence, only disclosure malpractice issues will be 
addressed in this section.  
Before the advent of the Tort Law 2009, the patient’s right to informed 
consent was stipulated dispersedly by some laws and regulations regarding 
health care provision. However, none of these laws and regulations had 
provided for compensatory liability for breach of the informed consent rule.124 
Nevertheless, the “undergoing reform in China has germinated and fertilised 
patients’ awareness of informed consent and their readiness to sue 
hospitals”125 and more and more local courts began to accept and hear medical 
 
121 Oliphant 2012, p. 395. For more information about proportional liability from the 
perspective of comparative law, see generally Gilead, Green & Koch 2013. 
122 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 62 reads, “A medical institution and its medical staff shall keep 
confidential the privacy of a patient. If any privacy data of a patient is divulged or any of 
the medical history data of a patient is open to the public without the consent of the 
patient, causing any harm to the patient, the medical institution shall assume the tort 
liability.” 
123 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 63 reads, “A medical institution and its medical staff shall not 
conduct unnecessary examinations in violation of the procedures and standards for 
diagnosis and treatment.” 
124 In other words, a provider who is found in contravention of any of these rules pertaining 
to informed consent would be subject to administrative punishments. See supra Chapter 2, 
Section 4.3. However, victims could not claim compensation for any infringement of their 
rights to informed consent on the basis of these rules. For a detailed discussion on the 
evolution of the informed consent doctrine in China, see generally Zhao 2012. 
125 Dai 2003, p. 59. 
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cases concerning disputes over informed consent even without a clear legal 
basis around 2000.126 
One of the most impressive achievements of the new Tort Law is that 
it exposes a health care provider’s “breach of the duty of disclosure to 
potential civil (tort) liability.”127 The Law creates the informed consent 
doctrine by article 55, which reads 
In the course of providing treatment services, medical staff members shall 
disclose the condition and relevant medical measures to patients. If any 
surgery, special examination or special treatment is needed, the medical 
staff shall disclose the medical risks, alternative treatment plans and other 
information to the patient in a timely manner, and obtain the written 
consent of the patient; or, when it is not advisable to disclose the 
information to the patient, disclose the information to the close relative of 
the patient, and obtain written consent from the close relative. 
Where any medical staff member fails to fulfil the duties in the preceding 
paragraph and causes any harm to a patient, the medical institution shall 
assume the compensatory liability. [italics added] 
In normal circumstances, providers only have to disclose information on the 
patient’s condition and relevant medical measures to patients. However, in 
some special circumstances, providers are supposed to disclose “medical risks” 
and “alternative treatment plans” to patients and obtain their written consent. 
Whether all risks or alternative plans, or only those significant ones should be 
disclosed (the materiality test) is not specified by the Law.  
Special circumstances refer to “surgery, special examination or special 
treatment.” While the notion of “surgery” is clear and easy to understand, 
“special examination or special treatment” are rather ambiguous phrases. The 
Tort Law does not define these phrases. Nonetheless, they are defined 
elsewhere.128 
The Tort Law treats the duty to inform and the duty to provide 
treatment as two different types of duty of medical care. Hence, the “then 
medical standard” (article 57) that is intended for technical malpractice claims 
 
126 Jiang 2006, pp. 116-117. 
127 Zhao 2012, p. 164. 
128 DR-Detailed Rules-Medical Institutions 2006 (China), art. 88 provides, “Special 
examination and treatment refer to any examination and treatment: (1) that entail some 
risks and may produce adverse consequences; (2) that may produce adverse consequences 
and risks due to the patient’s idiosyncratic pre-dispositions or critical conditions; (3) that 
are of clinical experiments; or (4) that may impose a considerable financial burden on 
patients. 
 
 
86 Intersentia 
Part I. Legal Remedies for Medical Malpractice in China
does not seem to apply to disclosure malpractice claims.129 In theory, it 
follows that expert testimony may become unnecessary in disclosure 
malpractice cases in that information disclosure is “essentially a matter of 
practical and ethical consideration rather than one requiring exclusively 
medical judgement/technical skills.”130 If article 57 does not apply to 
disclosure malpractice claims, one may wonder what standard providers have 
to comply with when disclosing information. However, the Law is silent on 
the standard of disclosure. Hence, it is still open to argument whether the 
doctor-oriented or the patient-oriented approach should be adopted in China. 
According to para. 2 of article 55, in case the provider fails to disclose 
sufficient information and inflicts any harm on the patient’s autonomy, the 
provider-hospital shall be held liable for paying non-pecuniary damages if the 
patient suffered severe emotional distress.131 
3.4. MEDICAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
To non-Chinese readers, it may be somewhat odd to mention medical 
products liability in the context of medical malpractice liability, since the 
provision of health care services and the sale of medical products are usually 
separated in most countries. However, in China, hospitals rely heavily on 
drug sales to “provide nearly 80% of their revenue”132 due to low service 
prices and government subsidies. Some reported that hospitals’ markup could 
be 15%.133 Hence, the Law treats medical institutions rather like sellers in 
products liability cases.  
To begin with, it is necessary to see how Chinese law handles products 
liability in ordinary cases. In principle, strict liability (liability irrespective of 
fault) applies to manufacturers134 while fault liability applies to sellers.135 
However, towards the victim, either the manufacturer or the seller of a 
 
129 Zhao 2012, pp. 165-167. 
130 Zhao 2012, p. 167. 
131 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 22. See also infra Section 3.7.3. 
132 Burkitt 2015. 
133 Gu 2014, p. 160. 
134 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 41 provides, “Where a defective product causes any harm to 
another person, the manufacturer shall assume the tort liability.” See also Product Quality 
Law 2000 (China), art. 41, para. 1. 
135 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 42, para. 1 provides: “Where a product with any defect due to 
the fault on the part of the seller causes any harm to another person, the seller shall 
assume the tort liability.” In addition, according to art. 42, para. 2, the seller shall also be 
held liable if it “can neither specify the manufacturer of a defective product nor specify 
the supplier of the defective product.” See also Product Quality Law 2000 (China), art. 42. 
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defective product is strictly liable.136 In other words, the victim may claim 
damages from either the manufacturer or the seller provided that he/she 
could prove that the product was defective and caused the injury he/she 
suffered. The defect is defined as “an unreasonable danger” or a breach of 
safety standards.137 After paying the whole damages to the victim, the 
manufacturer and the seller have recourse against each other in accordance 
with who is ultimately liable for the defect.138 Punitive damages may be 
granted in case of intentional torts.139 
Hence, towards the victim, both the manufacturers and the seller are 
held strictly liable in the first place, often termed “intermediate liability” 
(中间责任).140 Then, between the manufacturer and the seller, either the 
former is ultimately liable (based on strict liability) or the latter is ultimately 
liable (based on fault).141 Thus, the liability is not really joint and several 
liability (or liability in solidum), but is what most Chinese scholars term as 
“imperfect liability in solidum” (不真正连带责任).142 The legislative rationale 
behind this imperfect solidary liability is to “better protect victims by making 
it more convenient for them to file a lawsuit, by reducing the burden of proof 
 
136 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 43, para. 1 provides, “Where any harm is caused by a defective 
product, the victim may claim damages for his/her injury from either the manufacturer or 
seller.” See also Product Quality Law 2000 (China), art. 43. 
137 Product Quality Law 2000 (China), art. 46 provides, “The defect mentioned in the Law 
refers to an unreasonable danger existing in the products that threatens the safety of 
person or property, or a breach of national or industrial standards that are intended to 
protect the health, person, or property of citizens.” 
138 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 43, para. 2 provides, “If the defect of the product is caused by 
the manufacturer and the seller has paid full damages to the victim, the seller shall have 
recourse against the manufacturer for the payment.” Art. 43, para. 3 provides: “if the 
defect of the product is caused by the fault on the part of the seller and the manufacturer 
has paid full damages to the victim, the manufacturer shall have recourse against the 
seller.” See also Product Quality Law 2000 (China), art. 43. 
139 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 43, art. 47 provides, “Where a manufacturer or seller knowing 
any defect of a product continues to manufacture or sell the product and the defect causes 
a death or any serious damage to the health of another person, the victim shall be entitled 
to claim a proper amount of punitive damages.” In China, products liability is the only 
type of tort cases where punitive damages may be imposed. All the other types of tort 
cases apply compensatory damages. 
140 See generally Yang & Yang 2013. 
141 Id. 
142 The basic features of the “imperfect liability in solidum” include: (1) that the victim is 
entitled to claim damages from each of the multiple defendants; (2) that liability is 
generated by several independent torts rather than a joint tort; (3) that each of the 
multiple defendants has to pay the same amount of damages for the same harm; and (4) 
that either each of the multiple defendants has no recourse against the others, or recourse 
is sought not because of contribution among joint-tortfeasors but because one or several of 
the multiple defendants are ultimately liable. See generally e.g. Kong 1994; Wu 2008; 
Wang 2009; Jiang 2010; Gao 2012. 
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on them, and by imposing the risk of insolvency on all potentially liable 
parties.”143 In practice, for the purpose of efficiency, most courts would list 
manufacturers and sellers as joint defendants and resolve all disputes in a 
single trial.144 
It should be noted that products liability in China is strict liability, but 
it is not absolute liability. The manufacturer may legitimately raise three 
defences against both the victim and the seller, of which the development 
risk defence is the most remarkable one.145 However, the law is silent on 
whether the seller may raise any of these defences against the victim if the 
victim sues it first. Some argue that the seller should be allowed to raise these 
defences against victims; otherwise, the seller who was not at fault but 
nonetheless had paid full damages to the victim first would ultimately bear 
the losses alone if the manufacturer raised any of the defences.146  
Before the inception of the Tort Law, it was highly debatable whether 
hospitals should be treated as sellers. For instance, in the famous Liang v. The 
Third Hospital et al. (or “Qi Er Yao” case),147 the trial court regarded the 
defendant-hospital as a seller. The reason was that the hospital “purchased 
the pharmaceutical in question at the price of 36.005 yuan from the 
defendant-company, and then sold it to the victimised patient at the price of 
46.10 yuan, with a markup of 28%, which is not different from a sale in the 
market.” The hospital lodged an appeal and argued that hospitals are not 
sellers primarily on three grounds: first, the giving of medicine is a treatment 
activity for the purpose of curing diseases, which is by no means a sale in the 
market; second, most medicine is prescribed by physicians in the light of the 
patient’s conditions rather than the patient’s free choice; and third, the 
markup is not a profit but a permitted remedy for the government’s under-
investment in public hospitals.148 However, the hospital’s arguments were not 
accepted by the appellate court, and the hospital was still held liable as a 
seller. 
 
143 Jiang 2010, p. 19. 
144 Jiang 2010, p. 20. 
145 Product Quality Law 2000 (China), art. 41, para. 2 provides, “Producers shall not be held 
liable if they can prove one of the following cases: (1) that the products have not been put 
into circulation; (2) that the defects are non-existent when the products are put into 
circulation; or (3) the defects cannot be found at the time of circulation due to scientific 
and technological limitations.” Sub-paras. 1-2 are merely proof of the absence of causation. 
Only sub-para. 3 is the development risk defence. 
146 Zhang 2013, p. 222; Dong 2015, pp. 188-190. 
147 For a detailed description and comment on the “Qi Er Yao” case, see Zhao 2013, pp. 306-
309. 
148 Liang v. The Third Hospital et al. (China). 
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This dispute ends with the advent of the Tort Law. Article 59 confirms 
that hospitals are sellers of medical products, which reads 
Where any harm to a patient is caused by the defect of any 
pharmaceutical, medical disinfectant or medical instrument or by the 
transfusion of substandard blood, the patient may require compensation 
from the manufacturer or institution providing blood, or require a 
compensation from the medical institution. If the patient requires 
compensation from the medical institution, the medical institution that 
has paid the compensation shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the liable 
manufacturer or institution providing blood. 
As far as pharmaceuticals, disinfectant, and medical instruments are 
concerned, article 59 is virtually a repetition of article 43. Hence, the same 
definition of the defect applies to these medical products, and the same 
defences are available to manufacturers of medical products.  
What is hotly debated is how to treat blood used for transfusion. Some 
argue that blood can be a product while others do not agree.149 Lawmakers 
believe that blood used for transfusion is “quasi-products,” and hence they list 
“substandard blood” and other real medical products parallel to each other in 
article 59.150 The rationale is that “providers of blood are abler than patients at 
controlling, bearing, and spreading risks of transfusion infection.”151 
Therefore, strict liability applies to cases involving substandard blood. 
However, the Law does not specify what “substandard” means. 
According to lawmakers, the wording “substandard” in article 59 is intended 
to describe the quality of blood itself rather than the behaviour of blood 
providers or hospitals.152 In practice, many statutory standards concerning the 
collection, testing, storage, transportation, and transfusion of blood are 
imposed on blood banks and hospitals.153 Once they contravene any of these 
standards and cause harm to patients, they may be found liable based on fault 
liability in that article 59 is not meant to apply to those cases where e.g. 
article 54 is applicable. Therefore, strict liability for substandard blood in 
article 59 is specifically intended to handle cases where neither the blood 
bank nor the hospital is at fault – the so-called “faultless blood transfusion” 
(无过错输血).154 
 
149 Yang & Yang 2013, pp. 11-12. 
150 Wang 2013, pp. 328-330. 
151 Id. 
152 Wang 2013, p. 327. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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It follows that “substandard blood” in article 59 narrowly only refers to 
the blood contaminated by malignant bacteria or viruses either that cannot be 
reliably detected due to a window period155 or that are unknown to the 
medical community in the light of the then state of the art.156 Before the 
inception of the Tort Law, courts were divided on how to tackle this difficult 
issue: some courts applied strict liability to these cases and held the hospital 
liable irrespective of fault; in contrast, some courts insisted that fault liability 
should be applicable and denied the plaintiff’s claims; and, more remarkably, 
some courts simply applied “equitable liability” (公平责任)157 to these cases 
and apportioned the damage between the plaintiff and the defendant in light 
of fairness.158 With the enactment of the Tort Law, it is now clear that strict 
liability applies to substandard blood cases.  
This narrow interpretation of “substandard” also implies that liability 
for harm due to substandard blood is stricter (almost absolute) than ordinary 
products liability since the former excludes the possibility of raising a 
development risk defence.159 The rationale behind this difference is that 
lawmakers intend “to intensify patient protection and to induce hospitals and 
blood banks to take more precautionary measures to prevent iatrogenic 
injuries.”160 However, if the blood bank is not allowed to raise the 
development risk defence, why is such a defence available to the 
manufacturer of medical products? 
When it comes to recourse, a notable difference between a seller-
hospital and an ordinary seller is that recourse is sought unidirectionally. 
Hospitals who have paid full damages to victimised patients are allowed to 
claim the payment back from manufacturers or blood banks who are 
ultimately liable, while it is unclear whether the latter may have recourse 
against the former.  
 
155 In medicine, a window period for a test designed to detect a specific disease (often 
infections) is the time between the first infection and when the test can reliably detect 
that infection. In blood transfusion, the window period is significant in that during the 
period, an infected person cannot be detected as infected but may still be able to infect 
others.  
156 Yang & Yang 2013, p. 12. 
157 The relevance of “equitable liability” will be addressed in infra Section 3.5. It should be 
noted that “公平责任” is also translated by Chinese scholars as “equity liability” or 
“fairness liability” in English. See e.g. Koziol & Zhu 2010; Zhang 2011. They all refer to 
the same Chinese legal concept.  
158 Wang 2013, pp. 326-327. 
159 Yang & Yang 2013, p. 12. 
160 Id. 
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3.5. EQUITABLE LIABILITY 
Equitable liability is a fairly elastic regime in Chinese tort law. Article 24 of 
the Tort Law provides, “Where neither the victim nor the actor is at fault for 
the occurrence of the damage, both of them may share the damage based on 
the actual situations.”161 Thus, it is argued that equitable liability “manifests 
more the spirit of distributive justice than corrective justice”162 According to 
lawmakers, “actual situations” mean “the means and details of the action, the 
magnitude of the losses, the impacts of the losses and the financial positions 
of the two parties, etc.”163 In practice, particular attention is paid to the 
disparity in financial positions between the two parties and it is highly likely 
that the party with a deeper pocket would share a larger portion of the 
damage.164 
One may question whether equitable liability is applicable to medical 
malpractice claims. The uncertainty here is generated by the fact that article 
24 is located at the General Part of the Tort Law whereas liability for 
iatrogenic injuries (arts. 54-64 in Chapter VII) lies at the Special Part. Hence, 
it can be said that article 24 is a general principle that may apply to all types 
of special torts at the Special Part. However, it can be equally argued that 
because medical torts are a special type of torts, Chapter VII may exclude the 
possibility of applying article 24 to medical disputes. Regrettably, neither the 
Tort Law nor the SPC has ever specified this issue. 
In practice, local courts are divided on this issue. On the one hand, 
many courts would like to apply equitable liability in the event that the 
victim suffered considerable harm and had to shoulder heavy financial 
burdens.165 On the other hand, some courts would object to the application of 
equitable liability to medical malpractice cases and hold that “it is groundless 
to apply equitable liability to medical malpractice cases where only fault 
liability applies.”166  
Unlike courts, scholars are generally opposed to the application of 
equitable liability to medical torts for two main reasons. First, it makes 
medical malpractice liability “stricter” and may stimulate defensive 
 
161 See also Principles 1986, art. 132. 
162 Wang, L. 2011, p. 225. 
163 Wang 2013, p. 130. 
164 Wang. L. 2011, pp. 254-255. 
165 See e.g. Yang v. Ruijing Hospital (China); Liu v. Pingdingshan Hospital (China); Li v. 
Shaoyang Hospital (China); Xu v. Changge Hospital (China); Wang v. Nantong Affiliated 
Hospital (China); Shen v. A Hospital (China); Yang v. Shantou Affiliated Hospital (China). 
166 Huang v. Chen (China). 
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medicine.167 Second, a rich hospital relative to a poor patient may become less 
rich when compared with the whole population of its patients.168  
This contradiction between prevailing court practice and main 
academic opinions gives rise to greater uncertainty as to the applicability of 
equitable liability to medical disputes.  
3.6. EXPERT EVIDENCE 
3.6.1. Introduction 
In medical malpractice claims, expert evidence is critical since judges lack the 
necessary medical expertise to determine, inter alia, whether there is a breach 
of the standard of medical care and whether or to what extent the faulty 
treatment has contributed to the injury.169 The expert witness system is 
relevant to the topic of medical malpractice in that it may have significant 
implications for the substantive determination of medical liability and the 
apportionment of damages.  
For the period 2002-2009, two parallel expert witness systems were 
available for medical malpractice claims – the Medical Accident Technical 
Ascertainment System (hereinafter MATAS) for medical accident claims, and 
the Judicial Ascertainment System (hereinafter JAS) other for ordinary 
claims.170 Section 3.6.2 will briefly describe the basics of the two systems. 
Section 3.6.3 is intended to compare and contrast these two systems. Section 
3.6.4 will discuss any changes concerning the two systems after the advent of 
the Tort Law 2009. 
3.6.2. The Basics 
3.6.2.1. The MATAS 
The MATAS, dating back to the 1980s,171 has been run by various levels of 
medical associations172 since 2002.173 By 2010, about 400 ascertainment 
 
167 Shu 1998, p. 74; Deng, Li & Chen 2007, p. 120. 
168 Xu 2004, p. 21; Deng, Li & Chen 2007, p. 121. 
169 Zhang & Chen 2013, p. 240. 
170 For the differences between medical accident claims and ordinary claims, see supra 
Section 2. 
171 The old MATAS (1987-2001) was established in accordance with arts. 12-17 of the AR-
Medical Accidents 1987 (China). Expert witnesses were directly administered by special 
ascertainment committees, which were in turn led by the public health authorities. 
However, this old MATAS was criticized for protectionism (both ascertainment 
 
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institutions had been established by various levels of medical associations, 
with a total of 1,500 staff members.174 
The most remarkable advantage of the MATAS is that each medical 
association has developed its own expert bank,175 from which several experts 
are randomly selected by both parties to a medical dispute to form an ad hoc 
Expert Ascertainment Group (hereinafter EAG).176 Both clinical providers and 
forensic pathologists with senior titles, within or outside the local 
jurisdiction, may be included in the expert bank.177 When being demanded, 
qualified clinical providers or forensic pathologists are obliged to be included 
in the expert bank and to undertake the duty of providing expert 
testimony.178 There must be an odd number of EAG’s members and more than 
half of its members shall be experts in the major discipline involved.179 In case 
it is necessary to ascertain the cause of the death or the degree of disability, 
forensic pathologists should be selected randomly from the expert bank to 
join the EAG.180 Up to 2010, about 100,000 medical experts had been included 
in expert banks.181 The expert bank is sub-divided into 62 specialties in order 
to guarantee the scientific standard of ascertainment.182 
The EAG shall provide testimony on the basis of a collegial system 
(simple majority votes) rather than individual opinions.183 Based on all 
evidence, statements, and answers from both disputants, the medical 
association that administers the EAG shall issue a letter of ascertainment 
 
committees and public hospitals were subordinate to the same public health authorities), 
monopoly (experts not belonging to authentication committees were not permitted to 
testify in court), and lack of transparency (no signatures of experts and conducted in black 
boxes). Harris & Wu 2005, pp. 461-462. For a more thorough discussion on medical expert 
expertise in China, see Ding 2012, pp. 143-186. 
172 Local medical associations are branches of the Chinese Medical Association (CMA). For 
more information on the CMA, see supra Chapter 2, Section 4.4. It should be made clear 
that just as the CMA is subordinate to the NHFPC (MoH before 2013), a local medical 
association is subordinate to the HFPC at the same level within the same jurisdiction. 
Hence, no medical associations in China are self-regulated organisations. 
173 The current MATAS was created on the basis of the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), 
arts. 20-34.  
174 See generally Zhang 2010. 
175 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 23, para. 1.  
176 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 24, paras. 1-2. 
177 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 23, paras. 2-4. 
178 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 24, para. 3. 
179 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 25. 
180 Id. 
181 See generally Zhang 2010. 
182 Id. 
183 Id.; AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 31, para. 1. 
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within 45 days.184 The letter of ascertainment shall include, inter alia, 
whether the provider has contravened any statutory standards, treatment 
norms, or customary practice, whether there is a causal link between the 
negligent treatment and the personal injury, to what extent the negligent 
treatment has contributed to the injury, and the degree of the accident.185  
In case any of the disputants refuses to accept the conclusion of the 
first ascertainment, a second ascertainment conducted by medical associations 
of the higher level may be initiated.186 The final conclusion of ascertainment 
shall be treated as the basis for imposing administrative punishments and 
compensation for iatrogenic injuries.187 Up to 2010, the rate of medical 
accidents that would be established had been between 35% and 37% in the 
first ascertainment, and between 51% and 53% in the second 
ascertainment.188 The conclusions of the first instance and the second instance 
had matched in 75% of all ascertainment.189 More than two-thirds of all 
ascertainment had been used in litigation.190 After the first ascertainment, 
litigants would only apply for a second ascertainment in less than one-quarter 
of the cases.191 
Disputants should pay some fees for the ascertainment to medical 
associations.192 In case a medical accident is established, these fees will be paid 
by the hospital ultimately; if not, the fees will be paid by the disputant that 
applies for the ascertainment.193 The ascertainment fee is relatively low. In 
Jiangsu Province, for example, where there are 7 appointed experts or more, 
the fee is 2,200 yuan for the first ascertainment and 3,200 yuan for the 
second; if there are less than seven experts, the fee is 1,700 yuan for the first 
ascertainment and 2,200 yuan for the second.194 
3.6.2.2. The JAS 
The JAS is much older than the MATAS, which can be traced back to the 
1930s.195 Forensic pathologists had played a significant role in ascertaining the 
 
184 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 29. 
185 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 31, para. 2. 
186 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 39, para. 2. 
187 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 42. 
188 See generally Zhang 2010. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), art. 34. 
193 Id. 
194 N-Jiangsu Accident Ascertainment Fees 2002 (China) 
195 Zeng et al. 2015, p. 553. 
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cause of the death of a patient between 1949 and 1986196 However, during the 
period 1987-2002, most expert evidence on medical malpractice was offered 
by experts under the MATAS. Since 2003, the JAS has begun to grow rapidly 
in that ordinary claims need to be resolved on the expert testimony offered 
by forensic pathologists.197 Unlike the MATAS which can be applied for 
outside litigation, the JAS is only intended to be used in litigation.198 While 
medical associations are administered by the public health authorities, 
forensic institutions and pathologists are administered by the judicial 
administrative authorities.199 Hence, the JAS is rather independent of the 
medical profession. By the end of 2011, there were a total of 2,284 forensic 
ascertainment institutions.200  
The procedure of the JAS is much simpler than that of the MATAS. 
There is no expert bank, the EAP that primarily consists of clinical experts, 
the collegial system, a short time limit for providing a conclusion, or two 
instances of ascertainment under the JAS. Three qualified forensic 
pathologists with necessary equipment are allowed to engage in judicial 
ascertainment.201There is no hierarchical relationship between ascertainment 
institutions.202 The court may appoint a forensic pathologist without any 
geographical restriction.203 The forensic pathologist must offer testimony 
individually and put his/her signature to the conclusion of ascertainment.204 
If, in the process of litigation, any party concerned has any objection to the 
conclusion of ascertainment, the forensic pathologist will appear in court to 
bear witness.205 In practice, forensic pathologists normally provide testimony 
on whether there was any fault on the part of the provider, whether there 
was causation between the fault and the injury, to what extent the injury was 
caused by the faulty treatment, and the degree of disability. In 2011, forensic 
pathologists had provided about 8,000 pieces of expert evidence for medical 
malpractice cases.206  
Ascertainment fees are often considered as part of litigation costs, 
which are in principle imposed on the losing party.207 In case neither of the 
 
196 Id. 
197 See supra Section 2.  
198 Judicial Ascertainment Administration 2005 (China), art. 1. 
199 Judicial Ascertainment Administration 2005 (China), art. 3. 
200 Zeng et al. 2015, p. 554. 
201 Judicial Ascertainment Administration 2005 (China), art. 5. 
202 Judicial Ascertainment Administration 2005 (China), art. 8. 
203 Id. 
204 Judicial Ascertainment Administration 2005 (China), art. 9. 
205 Judicial Ascertainment Administration 2005 (China), art. 11. 
206 Zeng et al. 2015, p. 554. 
207 AR-Litigation Costs 2007 (China), art. 29. 
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parties wins the lawsuit completely, they should share all litigation costs.208 
Compared to fees under the MATAS, the fees under the JAS are relatively 
higher. It is reported that forensic ascertainment fees would often be between 
4,300 and 10,000 yuan.209 Some even pointed out that in practice in most 
cases the fee would be around 10,000 yuan.210 
3.6.3. A Comparison and Contrast 
The main similarities and differences mentioned are summarised in Table 3.2 
as follows: 
Table 3.2: Similarities and Differences between the MATAS and the JAS 
 JAS MATAS 
Nature litigation activities (basis 
for compensation) 
administrative activities (basis for 
administrative punishments and 
compensation) 
Targets of 
ascertainment 
- fault 
- causation 
- causal potency 
- degree of disability 
- unlawfulness (implying negligence) 
- causation 
- seriousness of liability (equivalent to 
causal potency) 
- degree of the accident (in light of 
disability or death) 
Organiser judicial ascertainment 
institutions 
medical associations 
Administration 
concerned 
judicial administrative 
authorities 
public health authorities 
Appointed experts - forensic pathologists 
- independent of the 
medical profession 
- clinical providers (the majority, always 
included) 
- forensic pathologists (the minority, not 
always included) 
- less independent of the medical 
profession 
Procedures - less strict 
- an individual decision 
- personal signature on 
the conclusion 
- experts obliged to appear 
in court 
- stricter (quasi-litigation) 
- a collective decision by a simple 
majority vote 
- no personal signature on the conclusion 
- experts not obliged to appear in court 
Competent 
Authorities 
judicial administrative 
authorities 
public health authorities 
 
208 Id. 
209 Guo 2015, p. 296. 
210 Liu, Y. 2014, p. 68. 
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 JAS MATAS 
Levels no limits to the level, location or number of times - first ascertainment 
- second ascertainment at a 
higher level 
   
Fees - the applicant or the hospital if a medical accident 
is established has to bear 
- lower fees 
- the losing party has to bear 
- higher fees 
 
After comparing and contrasting the two systems, it is clear that neither of 
them is necessarily superior to the other. On the one hand, the MATAS has 
three advantages over the JAS. First, the MATAS may ensure a better 
scientific level of ascertainment through peer review than the JAS.211 Clinical 
providers have better knowledge, expertise, and experience than forensic 
pathologists as far as the determination of negligence is concerned.212 The 
sub-division of the expert bank into 62 specialties is conducive to greater 
accuracy of the conclusion. Pathologists, who are better at ascertaining the 
cause of a death and the degree of disability, may also be included in the 
expert bank. Second, the MATAS may better promote due process than the 
JAS. The MATAS is conducted on the basis of a quasi-litigation, where 
appointed experts review both disputants’ evidence and hear their statements 
and answers. In contrast, the JAS does not have such a strict procedure. 
Third, the MATAS is administratively less costly than the JAS. The 
ascertainment fee under the MATAS is relatively lower than that under the 
JAS. 
On the other hand, the JAS appears superior to the MATAS in two 
aspects. First, the JAS may ensure better impartiality than the MATAS. 
Forensic institutions and pathologists are independent of the medical 
profession and the public health authorities. In practice, forensic 
ascertainment conclusions are more welcomed by patients and the court.213 
Second, the JAS may better facilitate the fact-finding in court than the 
MATAS. In case the ascertainment conclusion is disputed, forensic 
pathologists will often attend the court and testify in person, whereas clinical 
experts will rarely do so.214 
 
211 Liu, X. 2014, pp. 64-69. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
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3.6.4. The Two Systems after the Inception of the Tort Law 
The implementation of the new Tort Law 2009 has not changed the double 
tracks of expert witness systems substantially. The SPC simply issued an 
ambiguous statement that when deciding medical cases, the court may, upon 
the request of litigants or ex officio, organise forensic ascertainment or other 
ascertainment.215 Hence, the MATAS and the JAS are still running parallel to 
each other for the time being. The only change is that both of them are now 
called the Medical Injury Ascertainment System (hereinafter MIAS). 
However, the administration, organisation, and procedures of each system 
remain largely unchanged.  
Local high people’s courts interpret the preceding SPC’s statement 
differently. For instance, both Jiangsu High Court216 and Beijing High Court217 
issued new rules concerning ascertainment. Although they both allow the co-
existence of the MATAS and the JAS, they take a very different attitude 
towards the choice of priority between them – while Jiangsu prefers the 
MATAS to the JAS, Beijing assigns a priority to the JAS.218  
Currently, it is unclear whether the two parallel systems will merge in 
the future. 
3.7. THE LAW OF DAMAGES 
3.7.1. Introduction 
For the period 1987-2001, only a rather limited lump sum of compensation 
has been available to victimised patients.219 Between 2002-2009, two parallel 
criteria for compensating iatrogenic injuries had existed – one220 for medical 
accident claims, and the other221 for ordinary claims (and for any other civil 
claims). Since the implementation of the Tort Law, the criteria for medical 
accident claims have not been applicable any longer. The current criteria for 
compensating iatrogenic injuries (also for any other type of personal injury) 
 
215 JI-Application of Tort Law 2010 (China), art. 3. 
216 LJI-Jiangsu Guide to Injury Ascertainment 2010 (China); LJI-Jiangsu Notice on Injury 
Ascertainment 2010 (China). 
217 LJI-Beijing Guide to Malpractice 2010 (China). 
218 For a detailed comparison between the Jiangsu model and the Beijing model, see generally 
Xiao 2011. 
219 AR-Medical Accidents 1987 (China), art. 18. 
220 AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China), arts. 49-52. 
221 Principles 1986 (China), art. 119, together with the JI-Emotional Damage 2001 (China) 
and JI-Personal Injury 2004 (China). 
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are primarily provided for in article 16 and article 22, together with the JI-
Emotional Damage 2001 (for non-pecuniary losses) and the JI-Personal Injury 
2003 (for pecuniary losses). 
Since the criteria in the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 are not applicable 
anymore, the details of those criteria will not be described in this section. The 
general finding is that victims would obtain more damages by the criteria for 
ordinary claims than by the criteria for medical accident claims in that fewer 
caps had been imposed on the former, and the latter did not permit death 
compensation while the former did.222 
In the remaining parts of this section, the current criteria for 
compensating personal injuries will be addressed. Section 3.7.2 will discuss 
compensation for pecuniary losses and Section 3.7.3 will touch upon 
compensation for non-pecuniary losses. Section 3.7.4 will examine the hotly 
debated issue of whether injury due to non-tortious causative factors such as 
the pre-existing condition should be compensable. 
3.7.2. Compensation for Pecuniary Losses 
3.7.2.1. The Legal Basis 
Article 16 of the Tort Law defines the categories of compensation for 
pecuniary losses as a consequence of harm to health, bodily integrity, or loss 
of life, which reads as follows, 
Where a tort causes any personal injury to another person, the tortfeasor 
shall compensate the victim for the reasonable costs and expenses for 
treatment and rehabilitation, such as medical expenses, nursing fees and 
travel expenses, as well as the lost earnings. If the victim suffers any 
disability, the tortfeasor shall also pay the costs of disability assistance 
equipment for the living of the victim and disability compensation 
(残疾赔偿金). If it causes the death of the victim, the tortfeasor shall also 
pay the funeral service fees and death compensation (死亡赔偿金). 
Although the Tort Law has specified the scope of compensable injuries, it 
does not provide for detailed criteria for calculating each category of 
compensation. The court still has to refer to the JI-Personal Injury 2003, since 
new judicial interpretations on damages have not been enacted by the SPC 
yet. Based on arts. 17-29 of the JI-Personal Injury 2003, the criteria for 
measuring pecuniary losses in personal injury cases can be summarised in 
Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Criteria for Measuring Pecuniary Losses in Personal Injury Claims 
Compensation Items JI-Personal Injury 2003 
medical expenses (art. 19) - medicine expenses and hospital expenses, etc. 
- necessary expenses for recovering, appropriate 
face-lifting expenses and other follow-up 
treatment expenses  
loss of earnings due to missed 
working time (art. 20) 
- fixed income: the income actually reduced 
- no fixed income: his average income during the 
latest three years 
- unable to prove his average income during the 
latest three years: the average wages of the 
employees in the same or similar industry at the 
locality of the case-accepting court of the last 
year 
nursing expenses (art. 21) - the nursing personnel has income: referring to 
the loss of earnings due to missed working time 
- have no income or any nurse is employed: 
referring to the remuneration rates of the local 
nurses engaging in the labour services of the same 
class of nursing 
traffic expenses (art. 22) - the expenses that actually occurred to the 
victim and his necessary accompanying carers 
due to medical treatment or due to hospitalisation 
in another hospital 
accommodation expenses 
(art. 23) 
- treated in another place and unable to be in 
hospital due to objective reasons, the reasonable 
proportion of the accommodation expenses that 
actually occurred to the victim and his 
accompanying carers 
food allowances for 
hospitalisation (art. 23) 
- referring to the standard of food allowances for 
the business trip enjoyed by ordinary 
functionaries of local state organs 
expenses for nutrition (art. 
24) 
- referring to the opinions of the medical 
institution  
disability compensation (art. 
25) 
- on the basis of the extent of the victim’s 
inability to work or the grade of injury or 
disability and in the light of the per capita 
disposable income of the urban residents or the 
per capita net income of the rural residents at the 
locality of the case-accepting court of the last 
 
222 Ding 2012, pp. 190-191. 
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year, for a period of 20 years as of the day when 
the disability is determined 
- at the age of 60 or over, the period shall be 
reduced by one year for each year of age added 
- at the age of 75 or over: 5 years 
expenses for disability aids 
(art. 26) 
- in the light of reasonable expense standards of 
common applicable devices 
funeral expenses (art. 27) - in light of the per capita monthly average wage 
of the employees at the locality of the case-
accepting court of the last year, and at the total 
amount of six months of such wage  
death compensation (art. 29) - shall be calculated for 20 years in the light of 
the per capita disposable income of the urban 
residents or the per capita net income of the rural 
residents at the locality of the case-accepting 
court of the last year 
- at the age of 60 or over, the period shall be 
reduced by one year for each year of age added 
- at the age of 75 or over: 5 years  
living expenses for the 
dependent (art. 28) 
- on the basis of the extent of the victim’s 
inability to work, and in light of the per capita 
consumption expenditures of the urban residents 
or the per capita annual living consumption 
expenditures of the rural residents at the locality 
of the case-accepting court of the last year 
- if the dependent is a minor, the period shall be 
calculated up to the age of 18 
if the dependent has no ability to work or no 
other source of income, the period shall be 
calculated as 20 years 
- at the age of 60 or over, the period shall be 
reduced by one year for each year of age added 
- at the age of 75 or over, the period shall be 
calculated as 5 years 
 
3.7.2.2. The Abstract/Standardised Approach to Future Damage 
In ordinary cases where no disability or death is concerned, the “full 
compensation” rule is adopted – all reasonable once-and-for-all losses 
(damnum emergens), e.g. medical expenses, travel expenses, or lost earnings, 
that can be objectively measured will be fully compensable.223 In order to 
 
223 Wang 2013, p. 94. 
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achieve full compensation, the “difference hypothesis”224 should in principle 
apply.  
However, the evaluation of future damage (lucrum cessans) in serious 
cases where disability or death is involved is a rather complicated matter. It 
has to take into account various personal factors such as “the nature of the 
injury, the age the victim will reach, his mental and physical strength, and 
the expected future development of the victim’s position” and external factors 
like “inflation, the rise in wages, as well as changes in tax law and social 
security law.”225 The SPC employs an abstract/standardised rather than a 
concrete/individualised approach to the calculation of future damage.226 The 
standardised method, however, may ignore an individual victim’s actual 
financial positions or earning capability, which may deviate from the 
difference hypothesis and devalue the full compensation principle. 
Disability compensation and death compensation are the two essential 
categories of compensation for future damage. It is, therefore, necessary to 
describe briefly how they are calculated. Disability compensation in China is 
based on the “doctrine of elimination of earning capacity” (劳动能力丧失说), 
complemented by the “doctrine of lost earnings” (收入丧失说).227 Article 25, 
para. 1 of the JI-Personal Injury 2003 provides that disability compensation 
must be calculated by multiplying the degree of the victim’s loss of earning 
capacity and a standardised quantity. The latter is normally the product of a 
period of 20 years and the Per Capita Disposable Income (hereinafter PCI)228 
for the previous year in the area of the court which is hearing the case or the 
victim’s domicile or habitual residence, if the PCI there is higher in terms of 
the victim’s Hukou229 registration. The PCI is further sorted into the Per 
Capita Disposable Income of the Urban Residents (hereinafter urban PCI) and 
the Per Capita Net Income of the Rural Residents (hereinafter rural PCI). The 
criteria for measuring disability compensation is abstract because the PCI is 
an objective and average index that applies to a certain local jurisdiction. 
Article 25, however, does not abandon the doctrine of lost earnings 
altogether. In its second paragraph, article 25 stipulates that if the disabled 
 
224 According to this difference hypothesis, “damage or loss is the difference between the 
wealth of a person as it is at a given time, and the wealth as it would have been at the time 
if the damaging event had not occurred.” F. Mommsen, Beiträge zum Obligationenrecht, 
2. Abteilung, Zur Lehre von dem Interessen, Braunschweig: Schwetschke 1855, p. 3, cited 
in Visscher 2015, p. 11. 
225 Van Dam 2013, pp. 360-361. 
226 Huang 2004, p. 260. 
227 Huang 2004, pp. 317-318. 
228 The CPI is the average income a person has after paying taxes.  
229 Hukou denotes to the system of registered permanent residence in China, which divides 
Chinese citizens into rural residents and urban residents based on their locality. 
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victim’s actual earnings are not reduced due to his/her disability, or the other 
way around his/her employment is dramatically affected by his/her minor 
disability, damages for disability may be adjusted accordingly.  
When it comes to death compensation, the “doctrine of lost 
maintenance” (抚养丧失说) is the common currency in English, German and 
French tort law.230 The law provides “a right to compensation to the natural 
person whom the deceased maintained or would have maintained if death 
had not occurred.”231 Therefore, if there is no such “natural person,” the 
defendant will not have to pay any death compensation. In contrast, death 
compensation is calculated in light of the “doctrine of lost expected 
inheritance” (继承丧失说) in China.232 The death of the deceased not only 
means the loss of life but also implies the loss of future earnings that the 
deceased would have earned in the rest of his/her life if it were not for the 
fatal accident.233 The deceased’s expected future earnings less his/her expected 
personal expenditure (roughly amount to 25% to 40% of his/her total income) 
are considered to be the expected inheritance of his/her family members or 
other legitimate heirs.234 The measure of the loss of expected future earnings 
of the deceased is also standardised in China. According to article 29 of the JI-
Personal Injury 2003, death compensation is calculated by the product of a 
period of 20 years and the PCI at the seat of the case-accepting court (or the 
victim’s domicile or habitual residence, if the PCI there is higher) of the last 
year.  
Reading article 29 in conjunction with article 25, it seems that the SPC 
regards dead as full disability (100%) in economic terms. The degree of loss of 
earning capacity is measured by the degree of disability, which is divided into 
ten levels ranging from Level 1 (full disability) to Level 10 (least severe 
disability). The compensation coefficients are summarised in Table 3.4. 
 
230 Van Dam 2013, pp. 336-370. 
231 Van Dam 2013, p. 369. 
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Table 3.4: Compensation Coefficients in Light of the Degree of Disability235 
Degree of Disability Compensation Coefficients 
Level 1 (full disability: equivalent to death) 100% 
Level 2 90% 
Level 3 80% 
Level 4 70% 
Level 5 60% 
Level 6 50% 
Level 7 40% 
Level 8 30% 
Level 9 20% 
Level 10 (least severe disability) 10% 
 
Hence, in most cases, both disability and death compensation can be 
expressed in the same formula – 20*PCI*Coefficient – where the coefficient 
for the former ranges from 100% to 10% while the one for the latter is always 
100%. 
Strikingly, before the inception of the Tort Law 2009, the SPC 
permitted an extra claim for living expenses for the dependent (secondary 
victims) in light of article 28 of the JI-Personal Injury 2003. This maintenance 
compensation is calculated by the product of the Per Capita Consumption 
Expenditures (hereinafter PCE),236 the coefficient for disability (death treated 
as full disability), and the years that the dependent would have been 
financially supported by the primary victim by law. The PCE is also divided 
into the PCE of urban residents (hereinafter urban PCE) and the PCE of rural 
residents (hereinafter rural PCE).  
Since disability and death compensation are already intended to 
recover the victim’s future pecuniary losses, one may wonder why a separate 
maintenance compensation is warranted. After all, if the victim were not 
injured, he/she would have to financially support his/her dependents out of 
his/her disposable income. It seems that the dependent would be able to 
obtain “double compensation.” The SPC has not provided a satisfactory 
 
235 N-Criteria for Ascertaining the Degree of Disability 2005 (China). 
236 While the PCI is used to measure the average income a person can have after paying taxes 
annually, the PCE is intended to describe how much money is spent on average by a 
person on purchasing products and services annually. By definition, the PCE is smaller 
than the PCI. In 2014, the PCI nationwide was about 20,167 yuan while the PCE was 
about 14,491 yuan. In other words, roughly 70% of a person’s disposable income had been 
spent on consumptions annually. National Bureau of Statistics of China 2015. 
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explanation for this arrangement.237 Lawmakers have noted this conflicting 
arrangement and have abandoned compensation for maintenance fees in 
article 16 of the Tort Law 2009. However, if maintenance expenses were not 
compensable any longer, secondary victims after 2010 would be worse off 
than victims before 2010. To resolve this problem, the SPC simply orders that 
after 2010 “living expenses for the dependent should be counted into the 
compensation for disability or the compensation for death.”238 However, there 
is still no explanation why both the PCI and the PCE are considered when 
measuring future damage. 
3.7.2.3. Caps on Pecuniary Damages 
According to the JI-Personal Injury 2003, a cap of a period of 20 years has 
been placed on several categories of compensation e.g. for the nursing 
expenses (article 21, para. 3), for disability (article 25, para. 1) and death 
(article 29). The 20-year period will be deducted by one year for each year of 
age added if the victim reaches 60, and the 20-year period will be reduced to 
5 years if the victim reaches 75.  
Why should there be a cap of 20 years? The SPC provides four reasons 
to justify the cap. First, the cap of 20 years is consistent with previous laws239 
and regulations.240 Second, because the interest or dividends that victims can 
earn by investing the damages over the period need not be deducted in China; 
there may not be a wide gap between the once-and-for-all award based on a 
period of 20 years and the counterpart method depending on life expectancy 
which is used in other countries. Third, since a much longer period entails a 
greater likelihood of uncertainty and may consequently lead to gross over-
compensation, it is necessary to choose a moderate period of 20 years which is 
socially acceptable. Fourth, article 32 provides for a possibility of extending 
the period, which largely offsets the disadvantages of the cap.241  
The first three of the reasons above are highly questionable. Regarding 
the SPC’s first reason, it is rather weak to mention simply that some old 
legislation adopts the cap of 20 years without explaining why the old law 
chooses that cap. Also, the cap of 20 years is not in tune with all the previous 
legislation. For instance, the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 provides for a 
 
237 Huang 2004, p. 351. 
238 JI-Application of Tort Law 2010 (China), art. 4. 
239 See e.g. State Compensation Law 1994 (China), art. 27. 
240 See e.g. AR-Road Traffic Accidents 1991 (China), art. 37. 
241 Huang 2004, pp. 325-326. 
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longer period of 30 years for disability compensation.242 It appears that the 
choice of 20 years or 30 years is quite groundless.  
The SPC’s second reason lacks the support of empirical evidence and is 
theoretically unlikely to be true. The SPC’s approach tends to result in under-
compensation. On the one hand, victims under 55 would be under-
compensated significantly. The average life expectancy is roughly 75 for both 
men and women in China.243 According to the 2010 census, about 80% of 
Chinese residents were under 55.244 These facts imply that 80% of Chinese are 
expected to live longer than 20 years. The younger the victim, the greater the 
under-compensation. On the other hand, victims older than 55 (about 20% of 
the population) would only be modestly over-compensated. Arts. 25-29 of the 
JI-Personal Injury 2003 provide that for victims older than 60, the period of 
20 years shall be reduced by one year for each year older, and for victims 
older than 75 years, the period of 20 years shall be reduced to 5 years. Given 
the small proportion of victims older than 55, it is expected that over-
compensation for the aged would be modest compared to under-
compensation for victims younger than 55.  
When it comes to the SPC’s third reason, there is also no empirical 
evidence to support that the cap of 20 years is socially accepted. The fact that 
many close relatives of the deceased are frustrated or angry at inadequate 
death compensation may suggest otherwise.245 
Pertaining to the SPC’s fourth reason, the possibility of re-opening a 
case to extend the duration of payment by 5 to 10 years by article 32 is a 
welcome remedy to the inadequacy of compensation caused by the cap of 20 
years. However, this corrective still seems insufficient. For one thing, the 
period of 20 years is extended in exceptional circumstances and is actually 
based on what victims “indeed need” rather than what they are likely to lose 
in the future.246 For another, article 32 applies to compensation for the 
nursing expenses, the expenses for aid for disability and disability 
compensation except death compensation. This may lead to unfair results 
because a full (100%) disabled victim may obtain a payment of compensation 
for up to 30 years whereas the close relatives of a deceased victim could only 
receive a similar payment for up to 20 years. In terms of lost earning 
 
242 Although it adopts a longer period, it based compensation on the PCE rather than the PCI. 
Hence, suppose the PCE is equal to 70% of the PCI, then, remarkably, the two methods of 
calculating disability compensation would yield similar amounts (70%*30=21 versus 
100%*20=20). 
243 World Health Organisation 2011, p. 46. 
244 National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010. 
245 Ju & Ma 2012, p. 100. 
246 Ding 2012, p. 199. 
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capabilities or future incomes, there should have been no difference between 
a 100% disabled victim and a deceased victim. The longer payment period 
may contribute to the wide disparity between death compensation and 
disability compensation, which seems particularly worrying in the context of 
traffic accidents. This disparity may even produce evil incentives for drivers 
to kill rather than injure the victim in order to avoid paying larger 
damages.247 Be that as it may, so far, there has been no evidence that doctors 
would do the same thing.248  
3.7.3. Compensation for Non-Pecuniary Losses 
3.7.3.1. The Legal Basis 
Article 22 of the Tort Law 2009 provides for the basis for claiming damages 
for non-pecuniary losses, which reads as follows 
Where any harm caused by a tort to a personal right or interest of another 
person inflicts a serious emotional distress on the victim of the tort, the 
victim of the tort may claim compensation for the infliction of the 
emotional distress. 
In order for emotional distress to be compensable, it must be “serious.” 
According to lawmakers, “occasional pain and unhappiness” should not be 
count as serious emotional distress.249 However, no further interpretation 
regarding the wording “serious” is provided. In its commentary on article 22, 
the SPC argued that “seriousness” is a stringent criterion, which requires that 
the defendant’s behaviour is so “extreme and injurious” that it is “beyond the 
 
247 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the saying “better to kill the pedestrian than to only 
disable him” becomes a latent practice among motorists. Behind this practice is the bare-
faced cost and benefit analysis: while many drivers may afford paying death 
compensation, few are capable of paying disability compensation. Although traffic liability 
insurance is available, not all the compensation will be paid by the insurer. Some 5% up to 
20% of the damages may be deducted according to the degree of the driver’s liability. 
Regarding criminal charges, it is usually difficult to prove a homicide in the case of “an 
accident.” The criminal penalty for a negligent traffic accident, however, is normally from 
one to three years of imprisonment. Therefore, some drivers prefer to give up personal 
freedom for a few years in return for a huge reduction in compensation. See e.g. Sohu 
News 2010. 
248 This can be explained by two reasons. First, doctors would not be personally liable for 
compensation although they might lose promotion or bonuses, or get fired if they caused a 
medical accident. Second, doctors would be easily detected and subject to licensing 
sanctions and criminal charges if they killed a patient deliberately. 
249 Wang 2013, p. 123. 
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limits of tolerance when leading a normal life,” that is “like nothing on 
earth,” or that “absolutely cannot be tolerated by a civilized society.”250 In 
medical malpractice cases, pain and suffering due to physical injuries fall into 
the category of serious emotional distress when the injuries meet the criteria 
for disability (at least Level 10).251  
Another ambiguous wording in article 22 is the “victim of the tort” 
(被侵权人). One may wonder whether it includes secondary victims (often 
close relatives) who suffer emotional distress because of the death of the 
primary victim. Regarding this, both lawmakers and the SPC maintained that 
emotional distress suffered by close relatives of the deceased should be 
regarded as serious enough.252 Article 18 of the Tort Law 2009 also provides 
that “where a tort causes the death to the victim, the close relative of the 
victim shall be entitled to require the tortfeasor to assume the tort liability.” 
Arts. 18 does not exclude the close relative’s right to claim non-pecuniary 
damages. There is no requirement that the close relative must have witnessed 
the death of the victim.253 The ties of kinship already suffice in most of the 
cases.  
3.7.3.2. The Measure of Non-Pecuniary Damages 
Six benchmarks that the court should consider when determining 
compensation for non-pecuniary losses is provided for by article 10 of the JI-
Emotional Damage 2001, which reads as follows 
(1) the seriousness of the fault; 
(2) means, occasion, and manner of the infringement; 
(3) consequences of the infringement; 
(4) earnings gained by the tortfeasor through the infringement; 
(5) financial capacity for the tortfeasor to pay damages; and 
(6) the average standard of living in the locality where the case-accepting 
court sits. 
 
250 Xi & The Supreme People’s Court 2010, p. 171. 
251 Id. 
252 Xi & The Supreme People’s Court 2010, p. 173; Wang 2013, p. 124. 
253 Nonetheless, if the close relative witnessed the process of the victim’s death, a higher 
amount of non-pecuniary damages may be granted. See e.g. Yan v. Zhu & Beijing Bus Co. 
Ltd. (China), where an old professor witnessed the death of his young daughter who was 
only 14. The professor and his daughter quarrelled with the bus conductor Ms. Zhu over 
tickets when suddenly Ms. Zhu attacked his daughter and strangled her neck until the 
daughter was dead. Professor Yan sued Ms. Zhu and her company. The trial court granted 
100,000 yuan as non-pecuniary damages. The appellate court increased it to 300,000 yuan 
since “the plaintiff had witnessed the whole process of his only daughter’s death.”  
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In China, it is generally believed that compensation for non-pecuniary losses 
has three functions: compensation, satisfaction (抚慰), and punishment.254 
The first three benchmarks of article 10 seem in tune with these functions. 
The first benchmark is intended to achieve the punishment function: 
intentionally inflicted emotional distress tends to be more severe than 
negligently inflicted emotional distress; emotional damages for gross 
negligence should be larger than that for ordinary negligence. The second 
and third benchmarks are closely associated with how much emotional 
distress or pain and suffering has been inflicted on victims or their close 
relatives to offer adequate compensation and satisfaction. The more 
unacceptable the means, occasion and manner of the infringement, the more 
severe the consequences are, and the more considerable the emotional 
distress may be. 
The last three benchmarks, however, appear somehow questionable. 
The fourth benchmark concerns unjust enrichment and the plaintiff may 
claim for restitution of unjust profits in accordance with article 92 of the 
Principles 1986. Therefore, the fourth benchmark is only justifiable insofar as 
the court can establish that the tortfeasor’s unjust enrichment affects the 
plaintiff’s emotions.255 The fifth benchmark aims at connecting the 
tortfeasor’s financial capacity to the measure of non-pecuniary loss. This is 
highly debatable, for compensation for non-pecuniary loss is a kind of civil 
liability rather than social relief or donation.256 Considering the tortfeasor’s 
financial position would lead to unfair outcomes in the context of medical 
malpractice claims: patients suffering similar iatrogenic injuries would obtain 
higher non-pecuniary damages from large hospitals (“deep-pocket”) than 
from small hospitals. The last benchmark involving the average standard of 
living seems rather odd since non-pecuniary damages are intended to 
compensate non-pecuniary loss which has nothing to do with the standard of 
living. 
Although there is no statutory cap on non-pecuniary damages, 
lawmakers reported that high courts in some provinces impose a cap of 
50,000 yuan while in other provinces they adopt a cap of 100,000 yuan.257 
However, it is unclear why these caps are imposed. 
 
254 Wei 1987, p. 25. 
255 Ding 2012, pp. 211-212. 
256 Wei 1987, p. 27. 
257 Wang 2013, p. 124. 
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3.7.4. Uncertainty over Legal Causation 
In cases where factual causation is already established but it is indeterminate 
which part is caused by the faulty treatment and the patient’s pre-existing 
condition, it is debatable whether the defendant should be held liable for any 
harm due to the non-tortious factor. The new Tort Law 2009 does not 
provide for any clear rule concerning how to deal with such non-tortious 
factors. Note, however, that the legal basis for handling non-tortious factors 
in medical malpractice cases once existed. For the period 2002-2009, article 
49, para. 1 of the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 provided such a basis, which 
reads as follows: 
The following elements shall be taken into consideration in the 
determination of the specific sum of compensation for a medical accident: 
(1) The grade of the medical accident; 
(2) The degree of liability (责任程度) of the negligent medical act in the 
consequences of the injury caused by the medical accident; 
(3) The relationship between the injury caused by the medical accident 
and the state of the pre-existing illness. 
Sub-para. (2) and sub-para. (3) together provide a basis for apportioning 
damages between the negligent health care provider and the patient whose 
pre-existing medical condition also contributed to the occurrence or 
expansion of the final injury. It is also evident that the patient’s pre-existing 
condition cannot be regarded as contributory negligence on the part of the 
patient. Hence, the relationship between the negligent treatment and the pre-
existing condition can only be understood by comparing the influence of the 
two causative factors. 
The extent to which the tortfeasor’s negligent treatment contributed to 
the occurrence or expansion of the injuries suffered by the victim is defined 
as the “degree of liability” by article 49. Also, widely termed “causal potency” 
or “causal significance,” it denotes the degree of the causal connection 
between negligent treatment and harmful consequences in terms of factual 
causation. In practice, the degree of liability is recommended by expert 
witnesses in the first place and determined by the court in the end. According 
to article 36 of the DR-Accident Ascertainment 2002 and Liu,258 the degree of 
liability can be broken down into six categories as shown in Table 3.5. 
 
258 Liu, X. 2014, p. 245. 
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Table 3.5: Degrees of Liability 
Code Degree of Liability  Range of Causal Significance (%) 
A No responsibility 0 
B Minor responsibility 1~20 
C Secondary responsibility 21~40 
D Equal responsibility 41~70 
E Major responsibility 71~90 
F Full responsibility 91~100 
 
The AR-Medical Accidents’ approach to non-tortious factors was argued to be 
applicable to other tort cases by analogy. In practice, before 2014, this 
approach was de facto widely adopted in the trial of traffic accident cases. The 
publication of Guiding Case No. 24259 by the Supreme People’s Court, 
however, marked a turning point in the application of article 49 para. 1 to 
other tort cases by analogy. In Rong v. Wang & Yongcheng Insurance Ltd., 
the appellate court clarified that the ratio decidendi is that 
[i]f the victim of a traffic accident was not at fault, the influence of his/her 
pre-existing or underline vulnerabilities or pre-dispositions on his/her 
final harm does not fall within any statutory ground of justification that 
can mitigate the tortfeasor’s compensatory liability.  
Accordingly, the appellate court held the defendant fully liable for all harm 
suffered by the victim. This is similar to the eggshell skull rule (“a tortfeasor 
takes his victim as he finds him”) in the common law.260 The Guiding Cases 
are highly authoritative because the selected cases’ selection and publication 
clearly indicate that the SPC shares the same opinion as the appellate court.261 
As a matter of fact, currently many local courts tend to refuse to adopt article 
49’s approach in traffic accident cases.262 Therefore, article 49 is no longer 
applicable to traffic accident cases by analogy.  
Theoretically, the Tort Law 2009 has replaced the AR-Medical 
Accidents 2002 as far as medical malpractice claims are concerned. Since the 
Tort Law does not provide for any provision that is equivalent to article 49 of 
 
259 Rong v. Wang & Yongcheng Insurance Ltd. (China). See The Supreme People’s Court 
2015, pp. 77-80.  
260 Guiding Case Office of the Supreme People’s Court 2015, p. 11. The defendant has to be 
responsible for all of the adverse outcomes of the victim’s own vulnerabilities or 
predispositions such as an eggshell skull or a weak heart. For more information on the 
eggshell skull rule, see Van Dam 2013, p. 344. 
261 For more information on the newly developed regime of Guiding Cases in China, see e.g. 
Deng 2015. 
262 See e.g. Yin & Li v. Xue & PICC (China); Sun et al. v. Ansheng Tianping Ltd. (China). 
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the AR-Medical Accidents, it is questionable whether it is still justifiable to 
continue to apply article 49 to medical malpractice claims after 2010.  
3.8. SUMMARY 
All patients injured after 2010 should base their claims against defendant-
hospitals on the new Tort Law 2009, which has unified the double tracks of 
compensation systems for iatrogenic injuries during the period 2002-2009. 
The current medical liability rules are precisely located in Chapter Ⅶ of the 
Tort Law, with article 54 as the fault-based general clause for medical 
malpractice claims. Similar to the doctrine of “channelling of liability,” article 
54 imposes liability on hospitals exclusively without granting a right of 
recourse against negligent medical staff members. Medical malpractice claims 
are divided into technical malpractice claims, and ethical malpractice claims.  
Under technical malpractice claims, the standard of care required of 
providers is the “then medical standard.” Defendant-hospitals will be 
presumed to be at fault if providers contravene statutory standards or written 
treatment norms. Whether a breach of a customary standard necessarily 
establishes negligence should be determined by the court on a case-by-case 
basis. Compliance with statutory standards, written treatment norms, and 
customary practices does not imply the absence of negligence. It is unclear 
whether the locality rule applies to medical malpractice cases. Causation is 
undefined in China, and local courts seem to apply the adequacy theory first 
developed in German law. In principle, the plaintiff-patient should bear the 
burden of proving fault, causation, and injury in order to establish medical 
liability. In cases where the provider violates a statutory standard or a 
treatment norm, the burden of proof regarding fault will be shifted to the 
defendant-hospital – it has to bear the burden of proving the absence of fault. 
The Tort Law is silent on how to deal with uncertainty over causation, 
especially in cases where a non-tortious factor (i.e. the patient’s pre-existing 
condition) is involved.  
Ethical malpractice consists of disclosure malpractice and other forms 
of malpractice (e.g. a breach of confidence, unnecessary examinations), with 
disclosure malpractice being the most significant form. The Tort Law imposes 
the duty of disclosure (and the duty to obtain a written consent when 
surgery, special examination, or special treatment is concerned) on providers. 
Medical risks and alternative treatment plans should be disclosed in cases 
where surgery, special examination, or special treatment is needed. For the 
first time, article 55 provides a legal basis for claiming civil damages for the 
violation of the patient’s right to informed consent. However, the Law does 
not specify the criteria for information disclosure.  
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Besides medical malpractice claims, article 59 of Chapter VII provides 
a basis for medical products liability, which is based on strict liability. 
Towards victims, either the court or the manufacturer/blood bank is strictly 
liable. After paying full damages, the hospital may have recourse against the 
manufacturer/blood bank. It is unclear whether the development risk defence 
can be raised by defendants.  
In cases where neither the defendant nor the plaintiff was at fault, 
article 24 of the Tort Law apportions the damage between the two parties 
under the doctrine of equitable liability. It is unclear whether article 24 
should be applicable to medical malpractice claims. 
The expert evidence systems play an essential role in the establishment 
of medical liability. The two competing systems – the MATAS and the JAS – 
are still running parallel to each other today. There are many pros and cons of 
these two systems. The Tort Law does not touch upon this issue. It is unclear 
whether these two parallel systems will merge in the future. 
After 2010, the general civil law of damages situated at Chapter Ⅱ of 
the Tort Law applies to all medical malpractice and product liability claims. 
However, the detailed criteria for calculating compensation are still provided 
for in the JI-Personal Injury 2003 and the JI-Emotional Damage 2001. 
Regarding pecuniary damages, an abstract/standardised method applies to the 
measure of disability/death compensation. A cap of 20 years is also imposed in 
most of the cases. This approach is likely to lead to under-compensation. 
When it comes to non-pecuniary damages, several benchmarks are stipulated 
against which damages should be measured. However, many of these 
benchmarks do not appear relevant to emotional distress. In cases where non-
tortious causative factors are involved, the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 once 
allowed proportional apportionment between tortious and non-tortious 
factors but the current Tort Law does not specify this rule. It is also unclear 
whether local courts will apply the Guiding Case No. 24 to medical 
malpractice claims widely in the future. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 3 has described the substantive medical malpractice system in China. 
After almost a decade of “trial and error,” China began to unify its private law 
system of compensation for iatrogenic injuries with the Tort Law 2009, 
departing from a chaotic system of double tracks of compensation criteria – 
the one provided for by the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 and the one by the 
Principles 1986 (including the JI-Emotional Damage 2001 and the JI-Personal 
Injury 2003). At present, only the Tort Law, together with the preceding two 
judicial interpretations, applies to medical malpractice and medical products 
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liability claims. Hence, in all disputes over medical liability, victimised 
patients are theoretically better off now for the following three reasons: (1) a 
broader notion of medical fault is defined, (2) more patient rights (e.g. those 
to informed consent, privacy, and professional services with bona fides) are 
defined and protected by tort liability; and (3) a relatively higher amount of 
compensation is available.  
However, the achievements of the Tort Law 2009 are still theoretically 
limited. First, some critical terms or criteria are ambiguous or undefined. The 
notion of the “then medical standard” should be further defined. The criteria 
for information disclosure and the concept of causation need to be defined. 
Whether equitable liability is applicable to medical malpractice or medical 
products liability claims should be clarified. Second, the quasi-full reversal of 
the burden of proof (regarding fault and causation) has been abandoned by 
the Tort Law; however, the problem of information asymmetry is still 
prevalent in the health care sector. The Tort Law is silent on how to reduce 
the difficulties faced by plaintiff-patients in producing evidence. Third, the 
Tort Law has not touched upon the issue of expert witnesses. The double 
tracks of expert ascertainment still exist today. The unnecessary competition 
between the two parallel systems may lead to multiple times of ascertainment 
in a single case which may increase litigation costs significantly. Fourth, the 
Tort Law has not corrected the unjustifiable limitations or caps imposed by 
the JI-Personal Injury 2003. Fifth, the Tort Law is silent on whether the AR-
Medical Accidents 2002’s approach to non-tortious factors is still applicable, 
which may lead to chaotic legal application in practice. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MEDICAL DISPUTES, IATROGENIC INJURY, 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT 
COMPENSATION: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After describing the substantive and evidence rules pertaining to medical 
malpractice claims in China in the previous chapter, this chapter will explore 
the question of how the Chinese malpractice system actually works in 
practice (part of Sub-question (1-a)). Specifically, the aim is to figure out the 
features of medical dispute resolution, the major causes of negligent 
iatrogenic injuries, the role played by expert witnesses in litigation, the way 
the court actually handles hard cases, the rate and degree to which victimised 
patients in fact obtain compensation, the barriers to quick and fair 
compensation, and finally the actual impact of the law on medical dispute 
resolution and the behaviour of providers. 
To answer the preceding sub-questions, empirical data are 
indispensable. Although a comprehensive empirical study on the measure of 
malpractice like the famous Harvard Study in the US1 has not yet been 
conducted in China, some scattered empirical studies concerning these issues 
are currently available.  
Several legal scholars and local courts have conducted empirical 
studies on malpractice litigation2 and the implications of the expert witness 
 
1 See generally Harvard Medical Practices Study 1990; Burris et al. 1991; Leape et al. 1991; 
Localio et al. 1991; Weiler et al. 1993. 
2 See e.g. Weng, Fan & Sun 2005; Beijing High People’s Court First Civil Chamber, 2006; 
Wang et al. 2006; Beijing Haidian District People’s Court, 2008; Xiamen Intermediate 
People’s Court and Siming District People’s Court, 2008; Wang 2010; Zhejiang High 
People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2010; 2011; Tang et al. 2012; Liebman 2013; Jiangsu 
Nantong Intermediate People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2013; Liu & Song 2013; Wei et 
 
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systems for judges and litigants.3 Although these studies are fairly 
informative, they are often subject to two limitations. On the one hand, many 
of them are based on data collected from online case databases. In practice, 
however, most courts tend to publish only a minority of high-quality 
decisions online and mediated or withdrawn cases are never reported online.4 
It is thus impossible to see the whole picture of malpractice litigation by 
merely examining decisions at random published online, no matter how large 
the number is. On the other hand, many studies carried out by local courts 
are primarily qualitative, focusing on the application of legal rules rather than 
on the frequency and size of claims and their potential impact on the 
prevention of medical errors, and a quarter of these studies were done before 
2009. In order to overcome these limitations, in July 2014 I paid a visit to a 
trial court in China – the Gulou District People’s Court (hereinafter the 
Gulou Court) – and collected a total of 592 decisions concerning medical 
disputes accepted between 2002 and 2013. All the main findings are 
presented in Section 2 and their implications, together with that of prior 
studies, are discussed in Section 3. However, the appellate court of the Gulou 
Court was not willing to provide appellate decisions. Instead, some interviews 
with judges,5 which were intended to ascertain any further information on 
the matter, will be presented in Sections 3.1-3.6 as a complement to the data 
on court decisions.  
In addition, a group of scholars, mostly in the field of public health, 
have paid particular attention to the ways of medical dispute resolution.6 
These quantitative studies are often based on samples collected from the 
whole country, a local jurisdiction, several hospitals or a single hospital. Data 
are mostly collected by surveys or retrospective reviews of hospital 
documents, which are sufficient for answering part of the sub-questions in 
this Chapter. Some findings of these studies are summarised in Section 3.7. In 
order to clarify some unreported issues, several semi-structured interviews 
 
al. 2013; Zhejiang Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2013; Li et al. 
2014; Sun et al. 2014; Zhejiang Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, 2015; Bai & Pei 
2016; Hu & Shi 2016. 
3 See e.g. Wang & Su 2009; Liao et al. 2010; Xu et al. 2010; Zhang 2010; Chengdu Jingjiang 
District People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2011; Fang & Yang 2011; Liu et al. 2012a; Liu 
et al. 2012b; Xiao 2014. 
4 Liu, Wang & Zhang 2014. 
5 See infra Appendix 3: Abbreviations of Semi-Structured Interviews. 
6 See e.g. Zheng, Deng & Chen 2002; Chinese Hospital Association, 2004; Yang, Zhao & Bao 
2006; Zheng et al. 2006; Zheng et al. 2007; Shu 2008; Wang 2008; Xu & Lu 2008; Xie 2009; 
Song 2011; Zheng et al. 2012; Li 2013; Liu & Feng 2013. 
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with physicians, public health officials, and malpractice lawyers were 
conducted,7 the results of which will also be summarised in Section 3.7. 
Finally, some empirical studies touch upon the issue of “defensive 
medicine.” Most of these studies are surveys conducted into the attitudes of 
physicians towards medical disputes and malpractice risks. A summary of 
some of them is in Section 3.8 together with a discussion of the extent to 
which “defensive medicine” may be explained by the malpractice system. 
Some of the interview results are summarised in Section 3.8 as well. 
2. RESULTS OF THE COURT DECISIONS FROM 
THE GULOU COURT 
2.1. FREQUENCY AND OUTCOMES OF CLAIMS 
A total of 592 cases were collected by the year of acceptance, which ranges 
between 2002 and 2013. Table 4.1 presents the breakdown of cases accepted, 
the size of the population of the Gulou District,8 and the cases accepted per 
million residents by year. 
Table 4.1: Cases Accepted by the Gulou Court by Year 
Year 
Cases (No.) No. of Population 
(Thousand) 
Cases per million 
residents (No.) 
02  22   607 36.24 
03  25   638 39.18 
04  27   656 41.16 
05  57   684 83.33 
06  57   696 81.90 
07  55   695 79.14 
08  50   687 72.78 
09  27   673 40.12 
10  44   659 66.77 
11  41   646 63.47 
12  50   635 78.74 
13 137 1,030 133.01 
 
 
7 See infra Appendix 3: Abbreviations of Semi-Structured Interviews. 
8 For data on the population of the Gulou District, see Nanjing Gulou District Bureau of 
Statistics 2015. 
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In general, the number of cases accepted was on the increase in recent years 
even when it was adjusted for population growth, with a sudden surge in 
2013. There was a growth trend in the number of cases accepted, though it 
was not steady. For example, it increased from 36.24 cases per million 
residents in 2002 to 83.22 in 2005, decreased to 72.78 in 2009 and increased 
again to 66.77 in 2010 and 133.01 in 2013. Taking data in 2002 as the base 
number, the number of cases accepted per year more than doubled in 2005 
and there was an almost fourfold increase in 2013. Remarkably, the rapid 
increases from 2004 to 2005 and from 2009 to 2010 coincided with the 
implementation of the JI-Personal Injury 2003 and the Tort Law 2009 
respectively.  
However, there was no new legislation concerning medical 
malpractice claims between 2010 and 2013. The abnormal surge in 2013 may 
be explained by the fact that two districts of Nanjing City – the then Gulou 
District and the then Xiaguan District – merged into the current Gulou 
District in 2013.9 The two former districts might have had a different 
frequency of cases accepted before 2013. 
If we ignore the temporary decrease in 2009 and the abnormal increase 
in 2013, we will find that the number of cases accepted adjusted for 
population growth was relatively stable, and it will be hard to say whether 
the new Tort Law had any impact on the frequency of claims. 
Nearly half of the cases were still settled by final judgements, although 
in-court mediation10 began to play a more substantial role as time went on. Of 
all the 592 cases, 47% (n=280) were closed by judgements, 38% (n=224) by 
consent judgements upon mediation in court, whereas only 15% (n=88) by 
rulings granting withdrawal of an action,11 as presented in Figure 4.1. As time 
went on, the proportion of mediated court cases tended to overtake that of 
judged cases from 2011 onwards. Figure 4.1 shows the breakdown of the 
proportion of each kind of cases closed each year to all cases closed each year 
from 2003 to 2013. 
 
9 See generally Shen 2013. 
10 Judges in China are actively encouraged to mediate in a dispute and to nudge litigants to 
reach a settlement, especially in difficult cases like medical malpractice. Once such a 
settlement is reached, the court will prepare a consent judgment stating the claims, facts of 
the case and results of mediation. Civil Procedure Law 1991 (2012 Amendment) (China), 
art. 97. 
11 Unlike a judgment, a ruling in China only applies to procedural issues such as refusing to 
accept a case, objection to jurisdiction or dismissing a case. Civil Procedure Law 1991 
(2012 Amendment) (China), art. 154. 
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Figure 4.1: Cases Closed in Different Ways during the Period 2003-2013 
Judged Cases; 
47%
Mediated 
Cases; 38%
Withdrawn 
Cases; 15%
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Cases Resolved in Different Ways by Year of Decision 
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Plaintiffs would win in roughly three quarters of all cases.12 In the majority 
(67.86%; n=190) of all the 280 judgements judges granted awards, while in 
the remaining 90 judgements the claims were dismissed. Hence, as far as cases 
closed with judgements are concerned, the rate of winning was 67.86%. All 
in-court-mediated cases closed with consent judgements (n=224) granted 
awards whereas no damages were awarded where a case was withdrawn 
(n=88). Taking into account only judgements and consent judgements, the 
rate of winning rose to 82% [(190+224)/(280+224)]. When all cases are 
considered, the rate of winning cases was still as high as 70% (414/592). 
 
12 “Winning a case” refers to the outcome of a case where the plaintiff is awarded damages 
either in full or partially. The “rate of winning cases,” “success rate” or “chances of 
success” denotes the percentage of the number of cases where the plaintiff won over the 
number of all the cases studied.  
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However, the degree of winning13 was relatively low. The degree of 
winning a case can only be measured by cases closed by judgements, for data 
on the value in dispute were seldom reported either in consent judgements or 
rulings. Of all the 190 judgements with some awards, the degree of winning 
ranged widely from 0.08% to 112%, with a relatively low mean of 27%. In 
the majority (68%; n=130) of all the 190 cases, the plaintiffs received less than 
30% of their claims. The plaintiffs obtained more than 50% of their claims in 
only 17% (n=32) of all the 190 cases, with only one complete winning case14 
where the plaintiff received 112% of his claims (the defendant was willing to 
pay extra money through liability insurance for blood transfusion).  
2.2. REPRESENTATIVES AND DEFENDANTS 
In the majority of cases patients were themselves plaintiffs and were 
represented by lawyers. On the one hand, 496 of all the 592 cases recorded 
the relationship between the plaintiff and the patient. In 63% of all these 496 
cases, the patient himself/herself was the plaintiff (n=313) and in 37% his/her 
legal representatives or close relatives (=183) were the plaintiffs. On the other 
hand, 461 of all the 592 cases included data on legal counsel. Of all these 461 
cases, almost 60% were represented by lawyers (n=351), 2 by legal aid lawyers 
without charge, 4% by legal workers who have a basic level of legal 
knowledge and can only work at grass-root level legal service firms (n=26) 
and 14% by close relatives or friends (n=82). 
Most of the defendants were large public hospitals and no physicians 
were sued. In all the 592 cases, a total of 54 defendants were sued and the 
overwhelming majority of the defendants were medical institutions (93%; 
n=50), except one pharmaceuticals producer, one blood products producer 
and two blood centres. Of all the 50 medical institutions, 86% were hospitals 
(n=43), the remaining were health centres (n=2), out-patient clinics (n=3) and 
private clinics (n=2); 80% were public institutions (n=40), while 20% private 
ones (n=20); 38% were tertiary Grade A hospitals (n=19), 22% secondary 
hospitals (n=11), 4% primary hospitals and 16% unaccredited hospitals. The 
50 medical institutions were sued 601 times altogether, of which 22 hospitals 
were sued more than twice. Two of the largest tertiary Grade A hospitals in 
the Gulou District appeared in court as defendants 324 times, creating more 
than 50% of the caseload.  
 
13 The “degree of winning a case” is defined as the percentage of the final awards of a case 
over the case’s value in dispute (damages initially claimed by the plaintiff). 
14 Gu v. Drum Tower Hosp. & Shanghai RAAS Co., Ltd. (China). 
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To non-Chinese readers, it may be unbelievable that no individual 
provider was sued. However, as stated in previous chapters, all individual 
providers practice as staff members of medical institutions (even as small as a 
clinic)15 and the “channelling of liability” seems applicable to medical 
malpractice cases.16 Hence, medical institutions are the sole defendant in 
malpractice lawsuits and joint and several liability is not applicable here. 
2.3. LENGTH OF TRIALS17 
Exceeding the statutory time limits for trial was fairly common. On average, 
it took 289 days for the court to close a case with a judgement, 149 days with 
a consent judgement and 194 days with a ruling granting the withdrawal of 
an action. The maximum duration of trial was 1766 days (almost five years). 
All the average trial days exceeded the time limits for trial in civil litigation – 
three months for a summary procedure and six months for a formal 
procedure. In the vast majority (76%; n=157) of the 216 cases following a 
formal procedure 157 cases exceeded the time limits, while only 166 (44%) of 
the 376 cases following a summary procedure did so. Therefore, judges found 
it difficult to adjudicate within the time limits in more than half (55%; n=323) 
of all the 592 cases. 
2.4. CAUSES OF ACTION18 AND LEGAL STANDARDS 
APPLIED 
Accident claims were surprisingly rare whereas ordinary claims were the 
major cause of action. Of all the 592 cases, 73% (n=430) were brought under 
 
15 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
16 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.1. 
17 According to the Civil Procedure Law 1991 (2012 Amendment) (China), a civil case can be 
tried following either a “formal procedure” or a “summary procedure.” Where a case is 
simple with “clear facts, unambiguous rights and obligations and minor disputes,” a 
summary procedure shall apply. Id., art. 157. Different time limits are imposed on trials. 
Under a formal procedure, a case should be closed within six months after the case is 
docketed. Id., art.149. Under a summary procedure, however, a case should be closed 
within three months after it is docketed. Id., art. 161. 
18 As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, victimised patients are allowed to file a claim 
against the defendant’s hospitals either under contract law or tort law. Hence, there is a 
separate cause of action based on contract law – Disputes over Medical Service Contract 
(hereinafter contract claims). When it comes to tort law, before 2010, two parallel causes 
of action – accident claims and ordinary claims – existed, as described in supra Chapter 3, 
Section 2. After 2010, the only cause of action under the Tort Law 2009 is Disputes over 
Liability for Iatrogenic Injury (hereinafter injury claims).  
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ordinary claims, while only 19% (n=111) under injury claims, 7% (n=44) 
under accident claims, and 1% (n=7) under contract claims. The fact that 
injury claims occurred less frequently than ordinary claims was not 
surprising, for the Tort Law had only entered into force in 2010.  
Similarly, the AR-Medical Accident 2002 was seldom used, and the 
majority of cases were disposed of in accordance with the Principles 1986. 
Only the 280 cases closed with judgements reported information about legal 
standards applied. 234 cases were accepted before 2010 and applied legal rules 
before the Tort Law 2009, and 46 after 2010 and applied the Tort Law. As far 
as liability rules prior to the Tort Law are concerned, almost 96.15% (n=225) 
of all the 234 judgements were decided pursuant to the Principles 1986 
(article 5, article 106, para. 2 & article 132), whereas only about 2.56% (n=6) 
the AR-Medical Accident 2002 (article 2), 1.28% (n=3) the Contract Law 1999 
(article 60), less than 1% (n=2) the Product Quality Law 2000 (article 26 & 
article 41) combined with the Principles 1986. In one case (Zheng & Chen v. 
Jiangsu Hospital), the plaintiff argued that the defendants should be subject to 
strict service liability on the basis of the Consumer Law 1993. The court ruled 
against this argument on the grounds that the defendant was a not-for-profit 
public hospital and was by no means a “business operator” which is required 
by article 3 of the Consumer Law. Table 4.2 gives the distribution of the 
application of liability rules. and about 16% (n=46) the Tort Law (arts. 54-57) 
Table 4.2: Liability Rules Applied to Medical malpractice Cases 
period Liability Rules Contained in Cases Applied 
(No.) 
Percentage 
2002-
2009 
Principles 1986 223 96.15% 100% 
AR-Medical Accidents 2002 6 2.56% 
Contract Law 1999 3 1.28% 
Principles 1986 & Product Quality 
Law 2000 
2 0.85% 
2010-
2013 
Tort Law 2009 46 100% 
 
Surprisingly, both the “bonus pater familias” and the “medical customary 
practice” were cited most frequently as the standard of care for technical 
malpractice, followed by the duty of information disclosure for ethical 
malpractice.19 246 of the cases above, which were closed with judgements, 
 
19 For the distinction between technical malpractice and ethical malpractice and the 
standard of care applicable to medical malpractice claims in China, see supra Chapter 3, 
Sections 3.2-3.3. 
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involved only a single treatment measure whereas the remaining cases 
involved two or more treatment measures. It turned out that the court had to 
determine negligent behaviour 297 times in total in these 280 cases. The 
court seemed most likely to hold the defendant liable in three scenarios: (a) 
where the defendant breached the “due care,” the “due diligence,” the “high 
degree of diligence,” or the “maximum duty of care” (40%; n=119); (b) where 
the defendant violated treatment norms, or customary practices (26%; n=77); 
and (c) where the defendant failed to adhere to the duty of disclosing 
information and obtaining the patient’s informed consent (19%; n=56). 
Cases involving direct contravention of statutory standards defined by 
laws and regulations were rare; so were cases of applying the reversal of the 
burden of proof rule. The court established liability in a few instances of the 
foregoing 297 potentially negligent treatment measures: (a) where the 
defendant violated laws, regulations and departmental rules on medical 
provision (5%; n=16); (b) where the reversal of the burden of proof applied 
(4%; n=13); (c) where the defendant breached contractual obligations of 
proper medical care (4%; n=11); (d) where the rule of res ipsa loquitur applied 
(1%; n=4); and (e) where the defendant was presumed to be negligent because 
the authenticity of medical records could not be determined due to the 
defendant’s negligence (n=1). 
The court often confirmed causation without giving much explanation. 
Of all the 280 cases, 246 mentioned causation issues or reported how cause 
was established. However, in about 38% (n=94) of the 246 cases, the court 
simply applied the conditio sine qua non rule by stating that there were no 
injuries but for the medical negligence without giving any argument without 
further elaboration. This often occurred in cases where a direct infringement 
was involved. 
The court was most likely to apply a “proportional liability” to many 
cases where there was severe uncertainty over factual causation. In almost 
38% (n=95) of the aforementioned 246 cases, the court identified that, where 
there was a certain degree of causality (even with a probability of less than 
50%) between the negligence and the damage, such causality could not be 
excluded or there was indirect causality. The degree of causal connection 
would then be transferred into the degree of liability, against which the final 
awards are measured.  
When confronted with causal uncertainty, the court also switched the 
causal link to other kinds of injuries in some cases. If there were no tangible 
personal injuries, the court might establish that there was a causal connection 
between the negligence and the loss of expectations/chances of being cured, 
survival or a longer life (3.6%; n=9), pure emotional distress caused by the 
provider’s failure to disclose information sufficiently and to obtain consent 
(8%; n=21), or pure added medical costs (2%; n=4). 
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In some rare cases, the court would grant damages even though the 
defendant was not at fault. In four of all the 280 judgements, the court 
granted compensation to the plaintiff in cases where it was already 
established that the defendant had not been at fault. One judgement was 
based on equitable liability.20 The other three judgements had no legal basis. 
Strikingly, the court nonetheless granted damages in that the non-negligent 
defendants “were willing to pay some ex gratia money out of 
humanitarianism.”21 
Quantum/damages rules22 under the AR-Medical Accidents were 
seldom applied while those under the JI-Personal Injury 2003 and the JI-
Emotional Damage were frequently used both in accident claims and in 
ordinary/injury claims. Only the 190 judgements with some awards reported 
data on the applicable quantum rules. Whereas 156 applied rules prior to the 
Tort Law 2009, 34 applied the Tort Law. Note that the preceding two judicial 
interpretations are still applicable. Of all the foregoing 156 accepted before 
2010, roughly 90.38% (n=141) applied the Principles 1986, together with the 
aforesaid two judicial interpretations, while only 7.05% (n=11) exclusively 
applied the AR-Medical Accident 2002 (arts. 49 & 50), about 3.85% (n=6) 
applied the AR-Medical Accident and the Principles 1986/judicial 
interpretations jointly, and 1 applied Contract Law 1999 (article 107). After 
2010, all the 34 cases applied the Tort Law and the two judicial 
interpretations jointly. Table 4.3 presents the distribution of the application 
of quantum rules. 
Table 4.3: Quantum Rules Applied to Medical Malpractice Claims 
Period Quantum Rules Contained in Cases (No.) Percentage 
2002-2009 Principles 1986 & Interpretations 141 90.38% 100% 
Regulation  11 7.05% 
Regulation & Principles 
1986/Interpretations 
  6 3.85% 
Contract Law   1 0.64% 
2010-2013 Tort Law & Interpretations  34 100% 
 
Plaintiffs seemed to enjoy a higher rate of winning and degree of winning and 
more damages on average in cases where the Tort Law rather than the 
 
20 Wang v. Brain Hospital (China). For more information on equitable liability, see supra 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5. 
21 Xiong v. Drum Tower Hospital (China); Qian v. Zhongda Hospital (China); Zhou & Jin v. 
Children’s Hospital (China). 
22 For more information about the law of damages in China, see supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7. 
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Principles 1986 applied, even after being adjusted for the CPI. 66% (n=149) of 
all the 225 cases where the Principles 1986 applied were closed with an 
average award of 87,248 yuan, only representing 20% of the value in dispute. 
In contrast, 72% (n=33) of all the 46 cases decided under the Tort Law were 
resolved with an average award of 130,746 yuan, which represented 33% of 
the value in dispute. This finding was striking because actually uniform 
quantum rules – the JI-Emotional Damage 2001 and the JI-Personal Injury 
2004 – apply to both kinds of cases even after the advent of the Tort Law. 
Table 4.4 presents the different outcomes in cases where the Principles 1986 
and the Tort Law applied. 
Table 4.4: Outcomes under the Principles 1986 and the Tort Law 2009 
Liability 
Rules 
Total Cases 
with 
Awards 
Rate of 
Winning 
Degree 
of 
Winning 
Mean 
Damages 
(￥) 
CPI** Mean 
Damages 
Adjusted 
for CPI 
(￥)*** 
Principles 
1986* 
225 149 66% 20% 87,248 474.49 
(2002-
2009) 
87,248 
Tort Law 46 33 72% 33% 130,746 569.90 
(2010-
2013) 
108,857 
* Equitable liability and product liability were also included in this category. 
** The Consumer Price Index (CPI)23 is often used to adjust data for inflation. Data in 1978 is taken as 
the base number (100). 
*** The mean damages granted under the Principles 1986 for the period 2002-2009 were taken as the 
base number. 
 
2.5. THE IMPACT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY24 ON THE 
TRIAL 
Expert evidence was frequently used by the court and clinical experts from 
the municipal medical association provided the majority of expert 
testimonies. Data on the use of expert opinions were not recorded in 
withdrawn case documents. With the focus on the 504 cases closed by either 
judgements or consent judgements, it appears that information about expert 
opinions was recorded in 60% (n=293) of the 504 cases. In all these 293 cases, 
a total of 420 expert testimonies were produced, 85.71% (n=360) of which 
 
23 For data on the CPI in China from 1978 to 2013, see e.g. China Economic Net 2014. 
24 For more information on expert evidence in China, see supra Chapter 3, Section 3.6. 
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were given by clinical experts from the medical association while 14.29% 
(n=60) via forensic pathologists. Of all the 360 testimonies offered by clinical 
experts, 286 were provided by the Nanjing Municipal Medical Association, 73 
by the Jiangsu Provincial Medical Association, and only one by the Chinese 
Medical Association. Moreover, of all these 293 cases, almost 58% (n=169) 
involved only one expert testimony, 40% (n=116) involved two expert 
testimonies, and about 3% (n=8) involved three expert testimonies. Sources of 
expert evidence are presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Sources of Expert Evidence 
Expert witnesses Testimonies 
(No.) 
Percentage 
Clinical experts 
from medical 
associations 
Nanjing Municipal Medical 
Association 
286 68.10% 
Jiangsu Provincial Medical 
Association 
 73 17.38% 
Chinese Medical Association   1 0.24% 
Forensic patho-
logists 
Various forensic ascertainment 
institutions 
 60 14.29% 
Total 420 100% 
 
For plaintiffs, the MATAS was least favourable, the JAS most favourable, 
whereas the newly developed MIAS was somewhere in between. As far as 
accident claims are concerned, only a minority (11%; n=27) of all the 243 
testimonies testified for the plaintiffs (i.e. medical accidents were established). 
Insofar as injury claims are involved, a simple majority (55%; n=28) of all the 
51 testimonies testified in favour of the plaintiffs (i.e. liability for medical 
injuries was established). When it comes to ordinary claims, a significant 
majority (80%; n=45) of all the 56 testimonies testified in favour of the 
plaintiffs (i.e. medical fault could be established). In total, only about 30% 
(n=100) of all the 350 testimonies testified for the plaintiff. Moreover, experts 
were unable to give opinions in five cases, either because it was impossible to 
distinguish whether evidence materials were genuine or fake or because the 
patients refused to accept tests or examinations again. 
Full responsibility was rare and more cases were testified as below 
equal responsibility than above it.25 82 of the 100 expert testimonies testifying 
for the plaintiffs reported the degree of liability, of which almost 33% (n=27) 
suggested major responsibility, 30% (n=24) secondary responsibility, 23% 
 
25 For more information about the degree of liability, see supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.4. 
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(n=19) minor responsibility, 13% (n=11) equal responsibility and only about 
1% (n=1) full responsibility. 
Medical experts were most likely to testify against the plaintiff on the 
grounds of lack of causation. A total of 250 (71.43%) of the 350 cases with 
some data on expert evidence testified against the plaintiffs. Of all the 250 
testimonies, 236 reported the reason why the experts found no liability. In 
almost 44% (n=103) of all the 236 cases, experts testified that although there 
were some deficiencies in diagnoses and treatment, there were no (direct) 
causal links between the treatment and the damage; in 25% of the cases, 
neither a violation of customary practices nor (direct) causation could be 
established; in about 22% (n=52) of the cases, no contravention of statutory 
standards, treatment norms, or customary practices could be found; in about 
5% (n=11) of the cases, although there were some deficiencies in treatment, 
there was no tangible damage. 
Plaintiffs were more dissatisfied than defendants with expert 
testimonies provided by medical associations under the MATAS. In all the 
350 cases recording expert testimonies, the plaintiff challenged accident 
testimonies (under MATAS) 108 times and both accident and forensic 
testimonies (under JAS) 31 times. In contrast, the defendant only challenged 
accident testimonies 24 times, forensic testimonies twice and both types once. 
Expert witnesses, especially those clinical experts under the MATAS, 
rarely appeared in court to give opinions. Pathologists under the JAS 
appeared in court in eight cases, whereas clinical experts from expert groups 
organised by the medical association appeared in court only in three cases. 
Instead of appearing in court, the medical association offered a written reply 
in 27 cases while forensic pathologists did so in only 5 cases. 
The court relied heavily on expert opinions, especially those provided 
by forensic pathologists, and found it hard to challenge the opinions 
completely. Of all the aforesaid 350 cases, almost 65% (n=227) reported how 
judges dealt with expert testimonies. Judges completely adopted expert 
testimonies in almost 57% (n=129) of the 227 cases, partly adopted in about 
39% (n=88) and refused to adopt in only 10 cases. There were 103 cases with 
more than two types of expert opinions. In about 51% (n=38) of the 103 cases, 
the court adopted forensic testimonies under the JAS; in almost 23% (n=17), 
the court adopted accident testimonies under the MATAS; and, in 24% (n=18) 
where both types of testimonies gave largely the same conclusions, the court 
adopted both testimonies completely or partly. 
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Figure 4.3: Admissibility of Expert Testimonies 
completely 
adopted
57%
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39%
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The court was most likely to reject a testimony on the grounds that some 
medical errors other than medical accidents could satisfy the requirements of 
negligence or a slight degree of causal link could suffice in the case of causal 
uncertainty. The court partly or completely rejected expert testimonies in 
43% (n=98) of the aforesaid 227 cases. A total of 138 testimonies were 
reported in these 98 cases. The courts were ready to reject an expert 
testimony in five cases: (1) where there were some other types of malpractice 
that the experts had ignored (37%; n=51), (2) where although a medical 
accident could not be established, some identified deficiencies were sufficient 
for establishing ordinary medical negligence (33%; n=45), (3) where there 
was some causal link between the negligent treatment and the injuries 
although this link might not be so “direct” (14%; n=20), (4) where experts 
made mistakes in deciding the degree of liability (5%; n=7) and (5) where 
experts made mistakes in identifying the damage, and there were other 
intangible injuries such as loss of opportunities (5%; n=7) 
2.6. PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS AND SPECIALITIES 
INVOLVED 
Pre-existing conditions. A total of 343 judgements or consent judgements 
reported the primary disease that brought the patient to the defendant. 
Primary diseases such as neoplasms (15.45%; n=53) and diseases of the 
musculo-skeletal system and connective tissue (10.20%; n=35) were most 
frequently associated with medical disputes, followed by diseases of the 
nervous system (9.62%; n=33), the circulatory system (9.33%; n=32), the 
genito-urinary system (9.04%; n=31), the digestive system (8.45%; n=29), the 
respiratory system (5.54%; n=19) and so on. 
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Specialities Involved. The same group of the 343 cases as mentioned 
above reported disciplines involved. Largely corresponding to primary 
diseases, medical disciplines like oncology (15.74%; n=54) and bone surgery 
(10.79%; n= 37) were most frequently confronted with malpractice claims, 
followed by neurology (8.16%; n=28), cardiology (7.00%; n=24), urinary 
surgery (6.12%; n=21), gastro-enterology (5.54%; n=19), general surgery 
(5.25%; n=18), etc. The frequency of the top ten of these specialities is 
presented in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4: Frequency of the Top-Ten Specialities Related to Adverse Events 
(AE) 
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2.7. SERIOUSNESS26 AND CAUSES27 OF IATROGENIC 
INJURIES28 
Both death and minor injuries were fairly frequent consequences of medical 
errors or defective medical products. The extent of iatrogenic injuries was 
reported in the 190 judgements with some awards. It turned out that almost 
40% (n=74) of all the 190 cases involved minor injuries, and in about 36% 
(n=68) malpractice resulted in death. Less frequent injuries were emotional 
distress only in about 14% (n=27) of the cases, serious injuries in nearly 9% 
(n=17) and pure economic losses in only four. This result is summarised in 
Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Seriousness of Iatrogenic Injuries 
Extent Death 
Serious 
Injuries 
Minor 
Injuries 
Emotional 
Distress Only 
Pure 
Economic 
Loss 
Total 
Frequen-
cy (No.) 
68 17 74 27 4 190 
Percen-
tage 
35.79% 8.95% 38.95% 14.21% 2.11% 100.00% 
 
The largest category of the causes of iatrogenic injuries was technical 
malpractice mostly related to errors in diagnoses, surgery, nursing and 
monitoring and medication, followed by ethical malpractice primarily 
 
26 Seriousness of medical injuries is divided into five categories: (1) “minor injuries” (injuries 
below the sixth level of disability or medical accidents below Grade A, Level Three; 
moderate, minor or trivial organ dysfunction), (2) “serious injuries” (disability from the 
first level to the sixth level or medical accidents from Grade B, Level One to Grade D, 
Level Two; relatively severe, severe or complete organ dysfunction), (3) “death,” and (4) 
“emotional distress alone.” In some rare cases, no personal injury had been caused by 
negligent treatment but some added financial costs were incurred because of the negligent 
treatment. The patient may claim these added costs back from the defendant-hospital 
either under contract law or under tort law. 
27 In the light of the Tort Law 2009, causes of iatrogenic injuries can be divided into three 
categories: (1) technical malpractice, (2) ethical malpractice, and (3) defective medical 
products. See supra Chapter 3, Sections 3.2-3.4. 
28 Of course, iatrogenic injuries include both negligent and non-negligent ones. See supra 
Chapter 1, Section 1.1. In the context of Chinese law, the primary type of iatrogenic 
injuries is the negligent one due to medical malpractice However, in a minority of the 
cases where a patient suffers injury from a defective medical product or substandard blood, 
the injury falls within the category of the non-negligent one, which is based on strict 
liability under tort law. See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.4. But note, this non-negligent 
iatrogenic injury due to defective products should not be confused with non-negligent 
iatrogenic injuries coverable under no-fault insurance schemes. 
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concerning informed consent. Many cases involved more than a single type of 
malpractice and many injuries were caused jointly by several medical errors. 
The aforesaid 190 judgements reported a total of 230 adverse events (AE)29 
which could be classified into three groups and twelve categories as shown in 
Table 4.7. In general, technical malpractice accounted for 72% (n=166) of all 
the 230 AEs, ethical malpractice represented 27% (n=61), while defective 
products explained only about 1% (n=3). As far as technical malpractice is 
concerned, diagnosis (23%; n=53), surgery (22%; n=50) and nursing and 
monitoring (15%; n=35) related errors were the most frequent ones. When it 
comes to ethical malpractice, the overwhelming majority (23%; n=53) type of 
malpractice was a breach of the duty to inform or duty to obtain consent, in 
contrast to management related errors (3%; n=6) and organizsation related 
errors (less than 1%; n=2).  
Table 4.7: Causes of Iatrogenic Injuries 
Type of Adverse Events (AE) Frequency 
(No.) 
Percentage 
(1) Medical Technical Malpractice 166 72.17% 
Diagnosis-related 53 23.04% 
Surgery-related 50 21.74% 
Nursing and monitoring-related 35 15.22% 
Medication-related 18 7.83% 
Other treatment errors 7 3.04% 
Anaesthesia-related 2 0.87% 
Infection-related 1 0.43% 
(2) Medical Ethical Malpractice 61 26.52% 
Disclosure or self-determination-related 
(Informed consent) 
53 23.04% 
Management-related 6 2.61% 
Organisation-related 2 0.87% 
(3) Defective Medical Products 3 1.30% 
Blood and blood products-related 2 0.87% 
Drug-related 1 0.43% 
Total 230 100.00% 
 
29 Adverse events here only refer to negligent AEs and medical product accidents. But note, 
non-negligent AEs include, but are not limited to, medical product accidents. 
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2.8. DAMAGES AWARDS 
Remarkably, plaintiffs were on average awarded more damages in mediated 
cases than in judged ones. 190 cases closed by judgements and all the 224 
cases closed by consent judgements upon in-court mediation were rendered 
with some awards. A total of almost fifty million yuan was paid as 
compensation in the 414 cases, with an average amount of about 121,000 
yuan for each winning case. On average, plaintiffs received a higher amount 
of compensation in cases closed by in-court mediation (about 142,000 yuan) 
than in cases closed by judgements (about 96,000 yuan). The largest award in 
judgements (about 889,000 yuan) was far less than the largest award in 
consent judgements (as high as 3.84 million yuan). Table 4.8 shows the mean, 
median and the largest damage awards in general. Both medians are far lower 
than the means, indicating the substantial influence of extremely large 
awards on the means. 
Table 4.8: Mean, Median, and Maximum Damages 
 Cases 
(No.) 
Mean (￥) Median (￥) Maximum 
(￥) 
Judgements with 
Awards 
190  95,906 45,382   889,027 
Consent 
Judgements 
224 141,557 42,760 3,840,000 
 
As time went on, awards in each year were largely on the increase, especially 
from 2004 to 2010 and from 2011 to 2013, even after being adjusted for the 
CPI. Table 13 compares and contrasts the damage awards respectively in 
(consent) judgements each year from 2003 to 2013. In order to show the 
trend of the average size of damages awards more clearly, data on the mean, 
median, and maximum of the awards for the period 2003-2013 is presented in 
Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9: Awards in (Consent) Judgements by Year of Decision* 
Year Total Number of 
(Consent) Judgements 
Mean (￥) 
Awards 
Median (￥) 
Awards 
Maximum (￥) 
Awards 
Judgements  
without  
Awards (No.) 
2003 25  25,454  19,959  103,906 10 
2004 7  23,967  15,772  58,188  1 
2005 52  77,882  36,814  595,530  10 
2006 54  75,127  36,100  521,597  15 
2007 41  81,561  27,593  790,146  15 
2008 49  89,800  47,271  467,804  11 
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Year Total Number of 
(Consent) Judgements 
Mean (￥) 
Awards 
Median (￥) 
Awards 
Maximum (￥) 
Awards 
Judgements  
without  
Awards (No.) 
2009 28  90,728  50,487  490,262  2 
2010 33  122,163  56,790  924,699  3 
2011 45  79,711  33,303  362,607  5 
2012 52  122,090  73,921  1,876,791  7 
2013 91  144,508  60,188  2,832,226  10 
* In order to exclude the influence of inflation, all data on damages are adjusted for the CPI.30 Data in 
2003 is taken as the base number.  
 
Figure 4.5: The Trend of Awards in (Consent) Judgements by Year of 
Decision 
 
 
The court tended to increase the degree of liability testified by expert 
witnesses. A total of 163 judged cases reported the degree of liability the court 
finally determined. Both the mean and the median degrees of liability of all 
the 163 judged cases was roughly 50%, falling within the category of equal 
responsibility. The most frequently decided degrees were equal responsibility 
(26%; n=42), secondary responsibility (25%; n=41) and minor responsibility 
(23%; n=38), followed by full responsibility (17%; n=27) and major 
responsibility (9%; n=15). Compared with degrees testified by expert 
witnesses, the court found a higher proportion of cases as not less serious than 
equal responsibility (52% compared with 47%) or as full responsibility (17% 
compared with only 1%). Table 4.10 presents the degrees of liability given by 
both expert witnesses and the court. 
 
30 For data on the CPI in China from 1978 to 2013, see e.g. China Economic Net 2014. 
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Table 4.10: Degrees of Liability in Comparison 
Degree of Liability Expert Opinions Court Decisions* 
Full 1% (n=1) 17% (n=27) 
Major 33% (n=27) 9% (n=15) 
Equal 13% (n=11) 26% (n=42) 
Secondary 30% (n=24) 25% (n=41) 
Minor 23% (n=19) 23% (n=38) 
* Mean Degree = 51%; Median Degree = 50%; Maximum Degree = 100% 
 
The degree of liability was mostly determined by comparing the causal 
potency or significance of the faulty treatment, on the one hand, and the 
causal potency of the patient’s pre-existing conditions, on the other hand, to 
the occurrence or expansion of the final injuries. A total of 188 of all the 190 
judgements closed with awards reported the causes contributing to the 
occurrence or expansion of the patient’s injuries. In 72% (n=135) of the 188 
cases, the patient’s injuries were caused by multiple factors, while the 
patient’s injuries were wholly caused by negligence on the part of a single 
hospital in 28% (n=53) of the cases. As far as cases where multiple causative 
factors are involved, the most frequent (n=127) concurrent cause of injuries in 
all these 135 cases was the patient’s pre-existing conditions. Less frequent 
causes included comparative negligence31 on the part of the patient in seven 
cases and joint torts in three cases. The distribution of the single and multiple 
causative factors are presented in Figure 4.5. 
 
31 Comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff was applied in the following cases: (1) 
Zhu v. Children’s Hospital & Jiangsu Hospital (China) (where the plaintiff failed to re-
examine his heart as required by the doctor’s advice); (2) Fu v. Jiangsu Hospital (China) 
(where the plaintiff was determined to have left hospital before his surgery wound 
completely healed); (3) Jia et al. v. Zhongda Hospital (China) (where the close relatives of 
the deceased patient refused to give consent to final rescue medical attempts in case of 
emergency); (4) Zhang v. Zhongda Hospital (China) (where the patients were 
uncooperative in the operation); (5) Zhang & Wang v. Zhenjiang First Hospital & 
Children’s Hospital (China) (where the parents delayed to refer their child to another 
hospital); (6) Wang et al. v. Jiangsu Hospital (China) (where the plaintiff failed to pay 
enough attention to medical history and showed it to the doctor in time); and (7) Yuan & 
Zheng v. Brain Hospital (China) (where the patient, in spite of his old age and severe 
illnesses, took the liberty to go to another ward and used the sports equipment without 
the guidance of any medical staff member). 
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of Causative Factors  
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The size of final damages was influenced by the degree of liability and 
collateral benefits set-offs. Final damage awards were basically calculated on 
the basis of the sum of the consequential pecuniary losses (medical bills, 
nursing costs, loss of earnings, etc.), with collateral benefits subtracted 
(compensation lucre cum damno), and non-pecuniary losses (numerical 
assessment of emotional distress). The pecuniary losses were lessened in 
proportion to the degree of liability. This process can be described by 
Expression 4.1 as follows: 
 
 
 
The final damage awards were limited more by the degree of liability than by 
the collateral benefits set-offs. As noted before, damage awards in the 
majority of the 190 judged cases closed with awards (72%; n=136) were 
reduced by taking into account the degree of liability. In contrast, only about 
7% (n=14) judged cases reported that social insurance benefits were deducted 
from the full pecuniary losses. So did two judged cases where even private 
health insurance benefits were subtracted. 
Although generally available in most cases, compensation for non-
pecuniary losses was largely moderate and normally limited by a non-
statutory cap of 50,000 yuan. 163 (86%) of the aforementioned 190 
judgements awarded compensation for emotional distress or pain and 
suffering. The damage awards for non-pecuniary losses ranged from 1,000 
yuan to 60,000 yuan, with a mean of about 14,853 yuan and a median of 
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10,000 yuan. Although damage awards for non-pecuniary losses exceeded 
50,000 yuan in two old cases,32 they were the exception rather than the rule. 
The court seldom gave more explanation for awarding non-pecuniary 
damages than simply stating that the “plaintiff had suffered serious emotional 
distress,” though it explained more when refusing to award such damages. In 
all the 163 judgements with emotional damage awards, the court explained 
why claims for emotional damages had been denied in 17 cases. The court 
argued that claims for emotional damages in the following cases should be 
denied: (a) where no serious personal injury or disability was caused (n=5); (b) 
where the degree of the defendant’s negligence was minor (n=4); (c) where 
the presiding judge held that compensation for death should be regarded as 
compensation for emotional distress (n=2); (c) where the presiding judge held 
that claims for emotional distress could never be based on contract law (n=1); 
(d) where although the patient’s right to informed consent was encroached 
upon, there was no causal link between the emotional distress and the 
personal injuries (n=1); (e) where pain and suffering was caused by post-
operative complications rather than negligence on the part of the defendant 
(n=1); (f) where the patient or his close relatives were also negligent (n=1); (g) 
where negligence on the part of the defendant was not a major cause for the 
occurrence or expansion of the damage (n=1) or (h) where the victimised 
patient was so young that he/she was unable to feel pain and suffering (n=1). 
Plaintiffs were awarded fewer damages in cases where patients died 
than in cases where patients were received serious injuries. A total of 190 
cases with the extent of injuries identified reported the damages awarded. All 
the mean, median and maximum amounts of damages were summarised in 
Table 11 in terms of different categories of the extent of injuries. On average, 
plaintiffs obtained the largest damages (289,446 yuan) in cases where patients 
suffered serious injuries and the second largest damages (129,150 yuan) where 
patients died. Only an average amount of damages of 54,437 yuan was 
awarded in cases involving minor injuries and 14,498 yuan in cases where 
only emotional distress was caused. Table 4.11 shows the association between 
damages and extent of injuries. Smaller medians indicate the substantial 
influence of large damage awards on the means. 
 
32 Wu v. Drum Tower Hospital (China); Li & Cheng v. Jiangsu Hospital (China). 
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Table 4.11: Damages and Extent of Injuries 
Extent of Injuries Damages (￥) Total Number 
Mean Median Maximum 
Death 129,150 71,606 584,340 69 
Serious Injuries 289,446 250,256 889,027 18 
Minor Injuries 54,437 30,441 224,147 75 
Emotional Distress 
Only 
14,498 10,000 50,000 28 
 
2.9. LITIGATION COSTS33 
Costs of the action were relatively high, especially for rural plaintiffs. 502 of 
all the 592 cases in the study reported data on litigation costs. The initial case 
acceptance fees ranged from 50 yuan to 19,834 yuan, with a mean of 1,662 
yuan and a median of 900 yuan. The initial case acceptance fees advance to 
the court were halved in value in the final stage of litigation in almost 30% 
(n=142) of the 502 cases. Therefore, the final case acceptance fees paid to the 
court ranged from 25 yuan to 19,834 yuan, with a reduced mean of 1,469 
yuan and a new median of 702 yuan. The average expert ascertainment fees 
paid to the municipal medical association were 2,180 yuan, to the provincial 
medical association were 3,197 yuan, to the Chinese Medical Association 
were 8,500 yuan and to the medico-legal authentication institutions were 
6,606 yuan. Before the trial, litigants on average had to advance a total of 
4,395 yuan as litigation costs in general, 5,938 yuan as litigation costs in cases 
closed by judgements and 2,479 yuan in cases closed by in-court mediation. 
At the end of the trial, the final mean litigation costs, in general, were slightly 
reduced to 4,200 yuan. 
Plaintiffs did have to share a large proportion of costs of the action. 
Before the trial, plaintiffs were required to advance an average litigation cost 
of about 3,261 yuan, representing almost 72% of the mean initial costs of the 
action. At the end of the trial, plaintiffs were ordered to pay a reduced 
average litigation cost of 2,277 yuan, still representing nearly 60% of the final 
mean litigation costs. 
Plaintiffs had to advance higher litigation costs before the trial in cases 
where the new Tort Law applied, although they actually paid less at the end 
of the case. A total of 234 cases reported both the advance of litigation costs 
and the application of law, consisting of 44 new tort law cases and 190 old 
cases. Plaintiffs on average had to advance 4,293 yuan in the former cases, 
 
33 Litigation costs include court acceptance fees and medical ascertainment fees but do not 
include attorney fees. 
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whereas only 3,696 yuan in the latter case. In contrast, 44 new tort law cases 
and 195 old cases recorded data on the final burden of litigation costs. 
Plaintiffs only had to pay 2,206 yuan for litigation costs in the new tort law 
cases while 2,868 yuan in the old cases. Nevertheless, high advance payments 
already build barriers to access to justice to many victimised patients. These 
increased advance payments may be explained by the fact that the reversal of 
the burden of proof rule has been abolished by the new Tort Law. As a result, 
plaintiffs have to advance expert ascertainment fees before the trial, which 
were usually advanced by the defendant prior to the advent of the Tort Law. 
3. DISCUSSIONS (SUPPLEMENTED WITH 
INTERVIEW RESULTS) 
3.1. HIGH-RISK HOSPITALS, SPECIALITIES AND MEDICAL 
DISPUTES 
Data on court decisions from the Gulou Court (hereinafter Gulou Data) show 
that most medical malpractice claims (60%) are associated with general 
hospitals (Level 2 or Level 3), which are consistent with Li et al.’s study (66%, 
nationwide)34 and Liu et al.’s study (95.58%, Beijing).35 However, this finding 
does not necessarily suggest that the quality of care provided by high-level 
hospitals is worse than that provided by low-level health centres or clinics. 
The high rate of medical disputes associated with high-level hospitals may be 
explained by two factors other than service quality. First, a high proportion of 
all patients are actually treated by high-level hospitals.36 The more hospital 
admissions, the higher the frequency of medical disputes. Second, these 
hospitals are intended by the government to treat more serious, dangerous, or 
complex diseases.37 The riskier the disease, the higher the chances of resulting 
in treatment failure and medical disputes. 
According to the Gulou Data, oncology (15.74%), bone surgery 
(10.79%), and neurology (8.16%) are the top three specialities related to 
medical disputes. This finding contradicts Li et al.’s finding that obstetrics and 
gynaecology (19%), plastic surgery (19%), and general surgery (15%) are the 
top three,38 but is partly consistent with Liu et al.’s finding that obstetric and 
 
34 Li et al. 2014, p. 5. 
35 Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 212. 
36 Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 224.  
37 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.1.2. 
38 Li et al. 2014, p. 4. 
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gynaecology (23%), bone surgery (21%), and general surgery (13%) are most 
frequently involved.39 The differences among these findings may be 
attributed to the heterogeneity of service quality among different localities in 
China. Be that as it may, all these most frequently involved specialties fall 
within the category of surgery where operative manual and instrumental 
techniques are used on a patient. Modern surgical technology becomes more 
and more intrusive, which increases therapeutic risks significantly.40 At least, 
these data indicate that there may be a positive correlation between the 
complexity and intrusiveness of medical interventions and the frequency of 
medical disputes. 
3.2. THE ROLE OF EXPERT WITNESSES 
Based on the Gulou Data, we can find that the court relies heavily on expert 
evidence to resolve medical malpractice claims, which is widely confirmed by 
other studies.41 About 60% of the 504 judged or mediated cases involved 
medical ascertainment and a total of 420 expert testimonies were produced 
(1.43 testimonies per case), 95% of which were completely or partly adopted 
by the Gulou Court whereas only 5% were rejected. In Ezhou of the Hubei 
Province (2002-2008), more than 70% of the 145 cases underwent medical 
ascertainment, and a total of 251 expert testimonies were given (1.73 
testimonies per case), most of which were adopted by the court.42 Hence, 
medical ascertainment has almost become a must in malpractice litigation, 
which may in effect dwarf the importance of the issue of burden of proof.43 In 
other words, since either the proof or the lack of proof of liability is given by 
the expert, then the burden of proof is relevant insofar as who should pay 
ascertainment fees in advance (usually the party who bears the burden of 
proof).44  
Three factors may explain why judges retreat in the face of the 
determination of malpractice liability. First, modern medicine is highly 
technical and professional which is by no means readily intelligible to lay 
people.45 Even when a judge is a medical graduate, in an era when medicine 
 
39 Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 214. 
40 Yang, Zhao & Bao 2006, p. 1861. 
41 See e.g. Wang 2010; Zhejiang High People’ Court, First Civil Chamber, 2010; Jiangsu 
Nantong Intermediate People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2013; Liu & Song 2013; Wei et 
al. 2013; Zhejiang Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, 2015; Hu & Shi 2016. 
42 Liao et al. 2010, p. 2. 
43 Wang 2010, p. 116. 
44 Id. 
45 Chengdu Jingjiang District People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2011, p. 55. 
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advances rapidly, he/she will soon fall behind his/her colleagues who are 
practising clinical medicine.46 Thus, a judge, be he/she a medical graduate or 
not, may feel or be regarded as unqualified to determine medical malpractice 
issues.47 Second, placing heavy reliance on medical expert evidence may help 
courts and judges to protect them from challenge by litigants since litigants’ 
attention will be distracted from court decisions to conclusions of medical 
ascertainment.48 Third, to trial judges, basing court decisions on expert 
testimonies may help reduce the chances that their cases will be remanded by 
appellate courts for a new trial since it is also difficult for appellate judges to 
challenge an expert testimony (unless a new medical ascertainment is 
conducted at the request of the appellate court).49 A trial judge whose cases 
are often remanded by the appellate court for new trial will adversely affect 
his/her promotion prospects.50 
The Gulou Data also tell us that the court sometimes prefers forensic 
testimonies to accident testimonies, although it is often believed that clinical 
experts are more qualified than forensic pathologists for peer review. A judge 
from the appellate court explained, 
Expert testimonies provided by medical associations are often rather vague 
and only give a very brief demonstration of the conclusion. For instance, 
the letter of conclusion may simply state that “no treatment norm has 
been contravened,” but it does not specify how the experts have come to 
this conclusion. Being presented with such a short testimony, we would 
feel at sea if patients somehow pointed out the defendant’s fault according 
to some medical textbooks. In contrast, the letter of conclusion offered by 
pathologists is more detailed with a thorough demonstration of how they 
came to the conclusion … We, as judges who lack medical knowledge and 
experience, really hope that experts would present us with a detailed 
answer to the issues of fault and causation.51 
It seems that judges prefer forensic testimonies to accident testimonies in that 
this helps make their work less burdensome and their decisions more 
convincing. To medical lay people, a detailed and well-argued ascertainment 
conclusion appears more acceptable than a brief and vague conclusion, 
irrespective of the expertise of the experts who produce the testimony. The 
 
46 Wang 2010, p. 116. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Wang 2010, p. 117. 
51 Interview-2014-13. 
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briefness and vagueness of the accident testimony may also explain why 
patients challenge accident testimonies more frequently than forensic ones. 
In addition, the Gulou Data disclose that clinical experts rarely signed 
the conclusion letter and appeared in court to testify, although pathologists 
always signed the conclusion letter and sometimes appeared in court, which 
is consistent with most previous studies.52 Article 73 of the Civil Procedure 
Law 1991 (2012 Amendment) provides that a witness shall testify in court in 
principle; nonetheless, if the witness is unable to appear in court, due to 
health reasons, remote residence and travel difficulty, a force majeure or any 
other justifiable reason, he/she may testify by written testimony or any other 
means as permitted by the court. Mr. Hu, an official from the public health 
authorities in Nanjing, said that most experts invent excuses such as falling ill 
for their refusal to appear in court.53 Without being present in court, experts 
are not subject to cross-examination, which may go against the fact-finding 
process.54  
Two factors may help explain why clinical experts are unwilling to 
sign the conclusion letter and appear in court. First, these experts are worried 
that they might face revenge by angry patients or their family members if 
they testified against the plaintiff.55 For this very reason, even the experts’ 
personal signatures on the conclusion letter are usually not disclosed to the 
patients or their family members in e.g. Nanjing.56 Second, since accident 
ascertainment by definition should be conducted by a group of experts, it is 
difficult in practice to summon all members of the expert group, most of 
whom are high-ranking doctors and are very busy with their work, to appear 
in court at the same time.57 
In addition, one judge even questioned the usefulness of making 
experts appear in court by arguing that 
[c]linical experts do not seem to know how to play the role of a witness 
for they always quarrel with plaintiff-patients, give irrelevant answers, or 
simply admit that they are unable to answer some of the questions, which 
does not assist the trial but creates greater uncertainty. All of these will 
 
52 See e.g. Liao et al. 2010; Chengdu Jingjiang District People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 
2011; Zhejiang Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2013. 
53 Interview-2013-1. 
54 Liao et al. 2010, p. 2. 
55 Interview-2013-1. 
56 Id. 
57 Interview-2014-13. 
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make it more difficult for us to render a clear and convincing judgement 
… Thus, we prefer a written testimony to testifying in court.58 
Again, judges’ preference for written evidence rather than cross-examination 
could be explained by their lack of medical expertise. If judges do not 
understand what experts say in court, how will they be able to conduct a 
cross-examination? A well-argued written testimony would facilitate the trial 
significantly and judges could simply include the ascertainment conclusion in 
their decisions. That judges retreat from determining malpractice liability on 
their own may further reinforce the current essential role played by expert 
witnesses in medical malpractice lawsuits. 
Interestingly, although the Gulou Court would initiate the medical 
ascertainment procedure in the vast majority of the cases, it still emphasises 
that in cases where the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur” (事实自证) could apply, 
it would be unnecessary to commence the ascertainment process.59 The mere 
fact of the occurrence of an accident, prima facie, will raise an inference of 
fault and causation if the following conditions are met: 
(1) the instrumentalities were exclusively controlled by the hospital;  
(2)  the accident does not ordinarily occur in the absence of the hospital’s 
fault, and 
(3) other possible causes have been reasonably excluded.60 
In Lü v. Drum Tower Hospital, the Gulou Court argued: 
Because the surgery was performed “behind the scenes” (密室性), the 
entire surgical procedure was only open to medical practitioners who 
participated in the surgery, and the medical records were written by these 
practitioners, it would be very difficult for the patient to produce evidence 
to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. In such a special case, 
one can infer from the occurrence of the complications suffered by the 
patient and some circumstantial evidence that the defendant might be at 
fault. 
However, this rule is rarely used in practice. In all the 592 cases studied, the 
preceding case was the only one that applied this rule. 
 
58 Id. 
59 Jiangsu Nanjing Gulou District People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2014. 
60 Id. 
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3.3. LOCUS OF LIABILITY AND STANDARD OF CARE 
3.3.1. Locus of Liability 
Risks of compensation facing medical institutions and medical staff members 
are different, because article 54 of the Tort Law 2009 provides that all 
compensation for medical injury shall be paid by medical institutions solely 
and entirely. This is absolutely true when the medical institution is at fault 
itself in e.g. management or organisation which leads to the occurrence of 
medical injury in the course of diagnoses and treatment.  
But what if the injury is solely or primarily caused by malpractice on 
the part of medical staff members? Although medical staff members cannot be 
sued directly by the victimised patient, their medical institutions can impose 
internal punishments such as “fines” on the wrongdoers.61 A hospital is 
composed of many different departments. Not only the wrongdoer but also 
the whole department to which he/she belongs may have to be fined by the 
hospital. That is to say, the total compensation paid by the hospital to the 
victimised patient is sometimes de facto shared among the hospital, the 
department and the individual wrongdoer.  
Due to the lack of law that governs this issue, the actual proportion of 
corresponding liability varies from hospital to hospital and even from case to 
case. One doctor interviewed said that a doctor who commits medical 
malpractice is usually fined no more than 10% of the total compensation.62 
Sometimes, even this 10% fine is not actually imposed, making the internal 
punishment a mere formality.63 Another doctor interviewed offered a specific 
example. Suppose the total compensation is 500,000 yuan, a doctor who 
commits a tort has to pay 10,000~20,000 yuan (2~4%), and the remaining 
compensation is divided between the department (16~18%) and the hospital 
(80%).64 In some exceptional cases where the department does not want the 
dispute to be heard by the hospital, the dispute can even be settled between 
the department and the patient without the involvement of the hospital.65 
 
61 Interview-2014-1; Interview-2014-2; Interview-2014-4; Interview-2014-5; Interview-
2014-6; Interview-2014-7. 
62 Interview-2014-1. 
63 Interview-2014-1. 
64 Interview-2014-5. 
65 Some rich departments have established “compensation funds” on their own, which are 
actually a form of self-insurance. Doctors in these departments contribute some of their 
performance bonuses awarded by the hospital to the “compensation funds.” See Interview-
2014-4. 
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As a matter of interest, it seems that doctors are more worried about 
other types of internal sanctions than fines imposed by their employer-
hospitals. If it is ordinary malpractice rather than medical accidents, the 
doctor concerned will not be subject to administrative punishments or 
criminal penalties imposed by the state. Nevertheless, one doctor interviewed 
mentioned that, in addition to fines imposed by the hospital, the wrongdoer 
also faces reduced chances of promotion and low scores of performance 
evaluation.66 Sometimes, his/her professional title may be degraded, e.g. from 
an “attending doctor” to a “resident doctor.”67 Furthermore, his/her right to 
prescribe may also be limited accordingly.68 
3.3.2. Technical Malpractice 
In accordance with the Gulou Data, the court was very flexible in applying 
the standard of care for medical malpractice and did make a clear distinction 
between the “bonus pater familias/due care” or the “medical customary 
practice.” Judges often used terms such as “due care,” “due diligence,” “high 
degree of diligence,” or “maximum duty of care” without defining them.  
Previous studies found a similar chaotic application of the standard of 
care. For instance, Tang et al. analysed 243 malpractice lawsuits collected 
from on-line databases for the period 2005-2010 and reported that the 
“treatment norm” test (诊疗规范标准) was employed in 44.03% (n=107) of all 
the cases, the “medical standard” test (医疗水平标准) in 29.63% (n=72), and 
the “reasonable doctor” test (理性医生标准) in 26.34% (n=64).69 Tang et al. 
defined the three tests as follows:70 
- The treatment norm test: rules or customary practices that all medical 
professionals should comply with when providing specific treatment. 
- The medical standard test: the standards that should be followed by 
clinical physicians, which require that the efficacy and safety of the 
treatment measure have been confirmed and that the treatment measure 
is ready to be implemented in clinical practice in accordance with 
available medical equipment, technology, personnel, etc. 
- The reasonable doctor test: the same level of expertise and care as a 
reasonable doctor would exercise under the same or similar 
circumstances. 
 
66 Interview-2014-1. 
67 Interview-2014-1. 
68 Interview-2014-1. 
69 Tang et al. 2012. 
70 Id.  
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Tang et al.’s preceding definition of the “medical standard” test might be 
influenced by Korean or Japanese law.71 However, the fact that some Chinese 
judges mentioned this term in their decisions does not necessarily imply that 
they bear the same definition in their mind. At least, neither the lawmakers 
nor the SPC has ever defined the “then medical standard” in the same way as 
Japanese or Korean law.72 
Interviews with judges provide a better insight into how judges 
understand and apply the standard of care required of physicians in practice. 
Ms. Justice A (alias) from the appellate court of the Gulou Court – the 
Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court (hereinafter Nanjing Court) – confirmed 
that a reasonable doctor test (合理医师标准) is adopted in China (at least in 
Nanjing).73 However, whether a treatment measure is reasonable or not is 
tested against the so-called “then medical standard” as currently required by 
article 57 of the Tort Law 2009.  
However, again, how should the “medical standard” be interpreted? 
Mr. Justice Li from the Gulou Court explained that the “medical standard” 
could be classified into four categories as presented in Table 4.12.74 
 
71 For more information on the “medical standard” test which is widely adopted in South 
Korea (perhaps also in Japan) and which seems to have influenced art. 57 of the Tort Law 
2009 (China), see generally Suk 2007; Xia 2007, pp. 105-139. 
72 For the commentaries provided by the law makers and the SPC on the Tort Law 2009, see 
generally Xi & The Supreme People’s Court 2010; Wang 2013. 
73 Interview-2014-13. 
74 Interview-2014-10. Mr. Justice Li also kindly provided an internal document that 
summarises the opinions of the Gulou Court, see Jiangsu Nanjing Gulou District People’s 
Court, First Civil Chamber, 2014. 
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Table 4.12: Four Categories of the “Medical Standard” Applied by the Gulou 
Court 
Categories Name Definitions Explanations 
Class One Minimum standards 
(最低水平) 
- Non-technical 
requirements provided for 
by laws and regulations 
- standards developed after the 
treatment should not be applied 
retrospectively (art. 57, Tort 
Law) 
- the locality rule75 should not 
apply to Class One and Class 
Two, but could apply to Class 
Three 
- When applying Class Four, 
specific factors such as the trust 
between doctors and patients 
should also be taken into 
account76 
Class Two Basic medical 
standards 
(基本医疗水平) 
- Standardised written 
treatment norms 
Class 
Three 
Ordinary medical 
standards 
(通常医疗水平) 
- Customary practices that 
cannot be standardised in a 
written form 
Class Four Medical standards 
based on trust 
(信赖医疗水平) 
- Medical standards based on 
trust between doctors and 
patients that are higher than 
ordinary medical standards 
 
“Treatment norms” may refer to a variety of written documents such as 
clinical guidelines published by the Chinese Medical Association (CMA) and 
medical textbooks.77 However, treatment norms are often outdated quickly. 
Hence, the court often regards customary practices “prevailing in Level-
Three-Grade-A hospitals in several provinces” as the standard of medical 
care, but rejects the “cutting-edge standard developed by some experts 
through a large number of human trials.”78 International clinical guidelines 
are rarely considered.79 
As far as the standard for diagnosis, the Gulou Court clarified that the 
“reasonable duty of medical care” should not be interpreted as the “golden 
standard” for diagnosis.80 The “golden standard” refers to the diagnostic 
measure that is widely recognised by the clinical and medical community as 
the most reliable method, such as biopsy, microbiological culture, special 
examination and imaging diagnosis, and long-term follow-up.81 
 
75 The locality rule denotes that differences in localities, levels of hospitals, and qualifications 
of physicians should be taken into account when determining the standard of care. 
76 For instance, if a hospital boasts in the advertisement that it can cure some diseases with 
certainty, or that it has the most advanced equipment or the best qualified physicians, and 
if a patient goes to the hospital because s/he trusts what the hospital says, then the court 
shall apply the high level of standard as advertised by the defendant-hospital. Chen 2011. 
77 Interview-2014-10. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Jiangsu Nanjing Gulou District People’s Court, First Civil Chamber 2014. 
81 Id. 
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The Nanjing Court does not seem to classify the medical standard in 
such a detailed way, although it does confirm that the locality rule should 
apply when necessary.82 
Several interviewees pointed out the problems of determining fault in 
the medical ascertainment procedure.83 The then medical standard test 
suggests that a physician’s conduct should be assessed against a reasonable 
doctor’s behaviour in similar circumstances, which entails the use of the 
locality rule and peer review. In practice, clinical experts selected for the 
purpose of providing expert evidence are high-ranking physicians who are 
better qualified and more experienced than the average level.84 Two problems 
may arise. First, experts from Level-Three hospitals may be more likely to 
find that a physician from a Level-One health centre acted below the “then 
medical standard.”85 Second, experts from a locality with higher levels of 
quality of care may tend to confirm that a physician from a locality with 
lower levels of quality of care does not comply with the “then medical 
standard.”86 Hence, the current regime of expert witnesses may appear unfair 
and biased against hospitals of low levels or hospitals located in localities 
where medical resources are rather limited. 
Given that judges often rely on expert testimony to decide fault, the 
defects in the medical ascertainment system may reduce the accuracy of court 
decisions. Since experts from high-level hospitals and localities with more 
medical resources are often included in the expert bank, it is reasonable to 
estimate that the likelihood of false positives (i.e. finding a non-negligent 
doctor at fault erroneously) may exceed that of false negatives (i.e. 
exonerating a negligent doctor erroneously).  
3.3.3. Ethical Malpractice 
It is found, on the basis of the Gulou Data, that disclosure malpractice 
accounted for about 23% of iatrogenic injuries and the Gulou Court 
confirmed the patient’s right to know and to self-determination as early as 
around 2004. In Chen v. Stomatological Hospital, the court made clear that 
“physicians are not supposed to disclose any information to patients but only 
 
82 Interview-2014-13. Ms. Justice A (alias) also provided an internal document that 
summarizes the opinions of the Nanjing Court, see Jiangsu Nanjing Intermediate People’s 
Court, First Civil Chamber 2014. 
83 Interview-2013-1; Interview-2014-10; Interview-2014-14. 
84 For information on the selection of clinical experts, see supra Chapter 3, Section 3.6. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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the risk of commonly seen complications that cannot be prevented by a 
properly given treatment.”  
In Wang v. Drum Tower Hospital, the court defined the doctrine of 
informed consent for the first time as follows: 
Treatment is administered with the consent of the patient rather than out 
of a professional privilege naturally owned by physicians. The law 
requires physicians to respect patient autonomy in order to protect 
individual dignity during the course of treatment. Patients not only have 
the right to be informed of their conditions, treatment measures, the risks 
associated with treatment, alternative treatment plans, and the prognosis, 
but also are entitled to give consent to or turn down the physician’s 
decision. In particular, the consent should in principle be given by 
patients themselves in case the treatment measure would have a 
significant impact on their life, health, and safety. [italics added] 
In the same case, the court also defined the standard of information 
disclosure: 
Patients rely heavily on the information provided by physicians to grant 
or refuse consent. Therefore, the information disclosed by physicians 
should be readily intelligible to patients. The effective discharge of the 
duty of information disclosure is an essential guarantee that an “informed 
consent” could be given. Physicians are supposed to disclose information 
to such an extent that patients can fully understand and make true 
decisions accordingly. [italics added] 
Remarkably, the Gulou Court had already adopted a clear scope and standard 
of disclosure even more detailed than article 55 of the Tort Law before 2009.87 
The scope of disclosure is more or less identical with that of article 55.  
The duty to disclose alternative treatment plans is highly contentious. 
It is very difficult to determine the scope of alternative plans. For instance, 
providing that a disease can be cured either by a short surgery or by a method 
of internal medicine lasting several months, it is unclear whether these two 
plans are alternative to each other.88 For another instance, suppose that there 
is only one treatment plan for a disease in Nanjing, but there may be multiple 
plans in Shanghai or Beijing which entail high medical expenses, it is 
questionable whether these treatment plans in different localities are 
alternative to one another.89 The Gulou Court seems to regard treatment 
 
87 For more information about disclosure malpractice in China, see Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
88 Interview-2014-10. 
89 Id. 
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plans provided by different specialties within the same hospital as alternatives 
to one another.90 However, it is silent on how to cope with treatment plans in 
different hospitals or localities.91 
As far as the standard of disclosure is concerned, article 55 is silent 
while the Gulou Court employed the patient-oriented approach before 2009. 
However, the court did not clarify whether a specific/subjective patient or a 
reasonable/objective patient should be set as the benchmark. 
Recently, the Gulou Court seems to have adopted the “double-test 
doctrine” (二重标准说), which is a combination of a reasonable/objective 
physician test and a reasonable or a specific patient test.92 The objective tests 
are given priority in most of the cases, whereas the subjective patient test will 
be taken into account only when it is too unfair to ignore a specific patient’s 
requirements.93 With the rapid development of medicine, it is unrealistic to 
reject the subjective patient test completely, since patients are heterogeneous 
and have different requirements.94  
3.4. CAUSAL UNCERTAINTY AND PROPORTIONAL 
LIABILITY95 
3.4.1. Uncertainty over Factual Causation 
Remarkably, the Gulou Data tell us that the court was most likely to apply a 
“proportional liability” to many cases where there was causal uncertainty (the 
majority); in addition, the court also switched the causal link to other kinds of 
injuries in some cases (the minority). Hence, the “high probability” standard 
of proof96 in China is almost totally circumvented by the court in malpractice 
lawsuits. On the one hand, it is found that the court frequently adopted a 
“proportional liability” in many malpractice cases where there was causal 
uncertainty. In the court’s opinion, a certain degree of causal link P* between 
medical malpractice and harm done – even when the P* is as low as 10% – 
suffices to establish causation. Then the court would normally calculate 
 
90 Jiangsu Nanjing Gulou District People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2014. 
91 Id. 
92 Interview-2014-10; Jiangsu Nanjing Gulou District People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 
2014. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 This section is mainly based on Yu 2016. 
96 For more information on proof rules in China, see supra Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.1. 
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pecuniary damages based on the product of the P* and the amount of 
pecuniary losses suffered by plaintiff-patients.  
On the other hand, in some cases of wrong diagnosis or breach of the 
duty of information disclosure, if the P* is relatively low, the court might also 
switch the causal link between malpractice and physical harm to the causal 
connection between malpractice and the loss of chances of recovery, survival 
or longer life, or the infliction of pure emotional distress.  
There is additional evidence showing that this relaxation, or more 
appropriately, “abandonment” of the “high probability” standard of proof in 
medical malpractice cases is not unique to the Gulou Court, but rather has 
become a common practice nationwide.97  
Ms. Justice A (alias) explained the rationale behind this deviation as 
follows: 
Sometimes, expert testimony on causation is highly ambiguous, using 
wording such as “there is a certain degree of causation” or “the possibility 
of the causal link cannot be excluded.” We, as judges, often feel confused 
by this wording and then we decide to use our discretion to interpret the 
testimony. If the defendant grossly breaches the duty of medical care and 
this breach of duty may sufficiently lead to iatrogenic injuries, we will 
find that the causation is established. The word “sufficiently” implies a 
standard of proof relatively lower than the “high probability” standard. 
Otherwise, it would be unfair on plaintiff-patients and their right to life 
and health could not be protected well. [italics added]98 
It thus seems that the deviation is caused by both the ambiguity of expert 
testimony and by judges’ natural partiality to the weaker party – patients. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Chinese approach to 
uncertainty over factual causation is that Chinese courts are so flexible that 
they may apply either proportional liability or the lost chance doctrine to 
medical cases at their discretion. By reading cases from the Gulou Court, two 
patterns can be detected. First, the court would apply proportional liability 
mostly likely to (direct infringement) cases where errors in treatment 
procedures are involved and expert witnesses provide a statistical causal 
probability or merely testify that the “causation cannot be eliminated 
(不排除因果关系).” Second, the court would apply the lost chance doctrine 
mostly likely to (indirect infringement) cases where wrong diagnoses or 
failure to disclose critical medical information is concerned and expert 
witnesses normally disprove the existence of factual causation. In either of 
 
97 Liu, X. 2014, pp. 251-252. 
98 Interview-2014-13. 
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the two foregoing patterns, the plaintiff would be compensated for at least a 
small proportion of his/her full harm. 
Three factors may help explain why the court chooses a two-pattern 
approach to medical malpractice cases.  
First, expert witnesses themselves systematically employ the 
proportional approach to factual and legal causation together.99 The 
defendant’s compensatory liability should be proportional to the “causal 
potency (原因力)” of the faulty treatment to the occurrence of the patient’s 
final injury, which is ultimately based on the probability of the factual 
causation.100 Therefore, if expert witnesses already provide the court with a 
statistical causal probability (although it might be lower than 50%), it would 
become very convenient for the court to apply proportional liability in the 
light of equity and victim protection.101  
Second, in cases where expert witnesses disproved any causal 
connection, the court would find it difficult to estimate the statistical 
probability.102 If the physical injury or death did occur, the court would 
roughly establish causation between malpractice and lost chances of survival 
or living a longer life.103 If the risk did not materialise, the court would grant 
some compensation for non-pecuniary losses to the plaintiff.104  
Third, both proportional liability and the lost chance doctrine are 
theoretically compatible with the Tort Law. On the one hand, the Tort Law’s 
silence on the definition of causation leaves it open to a broader and more 
flexible interpretation. Neither the traditional all-or-nothing approach nor 
proportional liability is evidently excluded by the Tort Law. On the other 
hand, article 2 of the Tort Law defines the scope of protection so broadly as 
“civil rights and interests,” which does not seem to exclude chances of 
survival and living a longer life as well.105 Hence, lost chances of survival or 
living a longer life may well fall into the category of compensable damage. 
 
99 In practice, expert witnesses usually make a rough estimate of the causal probability based 
on several levels: 100% (full liability 全部责任), 75% (primary liability 主要责任), 50% 
(equal liability 同等责任), 25% (secondary liability 次要责任), 10% (minor liability 
轻微责任) and 0% (no liability 无责任). The factual and legal causation are not clearly 
distinguished and are actually determined together. Interview-2014-14. See also supra 
Chapter 3, Section 3.7.4. 
100 Interview-2014-14. 
101 Interview-2014-10. 
102 Id. 
103 Shan v. Third Hospital (China); Feng & Xue v. Drum Tower Hospital (China); Zeng et al. 
v. Drum Tower Hospital (China); Wang et al. v. Jiangsu Hospital (China); Qi & Qi v. 
Stomatological Hospital (China). 
104 Yan v. Drum Tower Hospital (China); Zhu v. Children’s Hospital (China). 
105 Interview-2014-10. 
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3.4.2. Uncertainty over Legal Causation106 
On the basis of the Gulou Data, we can find that the court would apportion 
damages where it is established that, besides the defendant’s faulty treatment, 
the patient’s pre-existing condition also contributed to his/her final injuries. 
The defendant’s share of the damages would be in proportion to the causative 
potency or significance of the faulty treatment on the injuries. This rule was 
once provided for by article 49 of the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 and even 
applied to traffic accidents by analogy. Because of Guiding Case No. 24, article 
49 is currently not applicable to traffic accidents. However, the Gulou Data 
prove that the article 49’s approach is still applicable even when the Tort Law 
has nullified the AR-Medical Accidents as far as medical malpractice is 
concerned.  
This practice is not unique to the Gulou District. At the provincial 
level, at least high courts in Beijing,107 Zhejiang,108 Xinjiang,109 and Anhui110 
have expressly pronounced that they will continue to apportion damages 
between the faulty hospital and the patient whose pre-existing conditions 
contributed to the damage after 2010. 
In an interview, Mr. Justice Dai explained why applying Guiding Case 
No. 24 to medical cases involving non-tortious factors is undesirable.111 
Unlike drivers and pedestrians who are strangers to each other before the 
accident, patients at large receive benefits from medical care under a 
contractual relationship with health care providers. Therefore, it may be an 
unfair burden on health care providers to make them pay for the portion of 
the injury that is caused by risks within the patient’s own sphere.112 
3.5. DEFECTIVE MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND 
SUBSTANDARD BLOOD 
Data from Gulou show that defective medical products and substandard blood 
accounted for less than 2% of all the iatrogenic injuries. There is little dispute 
over the fact that pharmaceutical and medical equipment are products where 
 
106 For more information about the rules regarding legal causation in China, see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.7.4. 
107 LJI-Beijing Guide to Malpractice 2010 (China), art. 36. 
108 LJI-Zhejiang Guide to Malpractice (2010), art. 19. 
109 LJI-Xinjiang Guide to Malpractice (2011), art. 27. 
110 LJI-Anhui Guide to Malpractice (2011), art. 30. 
111 Interview-2015-1. 
112 Id. 
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strict product liability in principle applies. However, it is highly debated 
whether blood could be regarded as a product in China.113 The dominant view 
is that no matter whether blood could be considered as a product, article 59 of 
the Tort Law expressly imposes strict liability on hospitals and blood banks in 
cases where an injury is caused by substandard blood and the defence of 
development risks is not applicable here.114 
Remarkably, the Nanjing Court refuses to accept the foregoing 
dominant view. Ms. Justice A (alias) stressed that it is fault liability that 
applies to cases involving substandard blood in that blood is by no means a 
product.115 Since the problem of a “window period” – even the most advanced 
technology cannot guarantee that blood intended for transfusion does not 
contain any infectious virus – always exists, it is unjustified to impose these 
risks on hospitals and blood banks, most of which are not-for-profit 
organisations.116 However, if it is established that neither the hospital nor the 
blood bank was at fault, we would nonetheless grant some modest damages to 
the patient based on equitable liability (article 24, Tort Law).117 The rationale 
behind this arrangement is that, in order to maintain social stability, hospitals 
and blood banks, as enterprises, can play a role as “insurance companies” by 
spreading risks through purchasing blood transfusion accident insurance 
(输血事故保险).118 
The difference between the dominant view and Nanjing’s approach 
lies primarily in the fact that full compensation still applies under strict 
liability whereas it often does not apply under equitable liability. It seems 
that courts in Nanjing are very cautious about imposing blood infection risks 
on hospitals and blood banks.  
3.6. PAYMENT OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
It is shown by the Gulou Data that patients normally have a high chance of 
winning a case (70%), which is highly inconsistent with previous studies by 
Li et al. (67%)119 and Liu et al. (71.21%).120 Since about 11% of the 243 
accident testimonies testified for the plaintiff whereas almost 80% of the 56 
forensic testimonies testified in favour of the plaintiff, the high rate (70%) of 
 
113 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
114 Id. 
115 Interview-2014-13. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Li et al. 2014, p. 7. 
120 Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 216. 
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winning a case suggests that the court may deviate from accident testimonies 
wholly or partly, and is thus partial towards victim protection in many, if not 
most, cases. The Gulou Data also show that the court would reject (part of) 
the accident testimony by finding that some less obvious medical errors other 
than a medical accident could be established or a slight degree of causal link 
would suffice because of causal uncertainty.121 In this way, the court 
increased the plaintiff’s likelihood of winning a case greatly.  
However, the court is not extremely biased in favour of victimised 
patients. It attempts to keep a balance between the interests of patients and 
that of hospitals, especially public hospitals that provide the lion’s share of all 
medical services to society.122 The Gulou Data show that full compensation 
would be granted in less than 20% of all the cases where the plaintiff won. In 
the remainder of these cases, damages would not be full, either because there 
was uncertainty over factual causation, or the court applied proportional 
liability or the lost chance doctrine, or because the patient’s pre-existing 
condition also contributed to the injury, the court would apportion damages 
between the plaintiff and the defendant.123 Hence, although plaintiff-patients 
enjoyed a high likelihood of winning a case, the degree of such a win was 
relatively low as the Gulou Data prove: on average, only less than 30% of 
their original claims would be met.  
One important implication of this finding of the low degree of winning 
is that plaintiff-patients may feel entirely dissatisfied or even frustrated with 
damages awards when it turned out that 70% of their original claims, which 
they may see as perfectly legitimate, would be rejected by the court. Patients 
may not be aware of the honest endeavours made by the court to increase 
their chances of winning the case, which they may take for granted. 
Ironically, patients may feel a major disappointment with the reduced 
damages, and thus may develop a deep distrust of the entire malpractice 
litigation system.124 
Another striking finding based on the Gulou Data is that although the 
law treats 100% disability as equivalent to death in terms of future pecuniary 
damage, the average damages for death (129,150 yuan) were less than half of 
that for serious injuries (289,446 yuan), which is consistent with Li et al.’s 
finding.125 This may be explained by the fact that a disabled victim is likely to 
incur more medical expenses even after the accident whereas the deceased 
victim will surely not after death. Li et al. argued that this result implies that 
 
121 See supra Section 3.4; Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.3. 
122 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.2. 
123 See supra Section 3.4. 
124 Harris & Wu 2005. 
125 Li et al. 2014 
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the “loss of life” is less substantial than the “loss of health,” which goes against 
our sense of just and fairness.126 Some anecdotal evidence also reports that in a 
traffic accident scenario where it is very difficult to distinguish between an 
intentional tort and negligence, some drivers might take the risk of being 
charged with homicide and kill the wounded victim in order to avoid paying 
greater damages.127 This may be less worrying in the health care sector since 
physicians are not personally held liable for paying damages,128 although they 
might suffer some non-monetary losses or sanctions.129 
3.7. THE TIME AND MONEY SPENT ON MALPRACTICE 
LITIGATION 
3.7.1. The Burden of Time 
The Gulou Data report that on average it took about 173 days to close a 
malpractice case, and more than half exceeded the time limits for trial. 
Previous studies even reported a higher number. Liu et al. reported 309.2 
days in Beijing130 and Li et al. reported 999 days nationwide.131 Li et al.’s data 
may be somewhat exaggerated since they based their research on on-line case 
databases where hard cases needing a longer period to trial are more likely to 
be published than simple ones. Hu and Shi reported that in Zibo of Shandong 
Province, the average time needed to try malpractice cases is three to five 
times longer than other types of civil cases.132 
One explanation for this long length of trial time is that medical 
ascertainment procedures are initiated more often than not, and many, if not 
most, cases involved ascertainment more than once, which prolonged the 
trial significantly. In Gulou, medical ascertainment was initiated in more than 
60% of all the 592 cases, which is consistent with data in Beijing (57.8%),133 in 
Zibo of Shandong (88.46%),134 in Ningbo of Zhejiang (51.85%).135 The 
proportion of cases involving two or three times of ascertainment was 20.95% 
 
126 Li et al. 2014, p. 8. 
127 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2.2. 
128 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.1. 
129 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.2. 
130 Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 218. 
131 Li et al. 2014, p. 4. 
132 Hu & Shi 2016, p. 112. 
133 Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 218. 
134 Hu & Shi 2016, p. 112. 
135 Zhejiang Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2013, pp. 77-78. 
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in Gulou, 19.03% in Beijing,136 and 15.38% in Ningbo of Zhejiang.137 This 
finding supports the claim that many litigants challenge the conclusion of 
ascertainment provided by expert witnesses and applied for another 
ascertainment, which delayed the litigation process considerably. The 
existence of the two parallel regimes of expert witnesses – the MATAS and 
the JAS – may intensify the prolongation of malpractice litigation.138 
Another explanation is that, compared to ordinary civil cases, medical 
malpractice claims are highly technical and complicated, which entails longer 
time to make professional opinions both for expert witnesses and for judges.139 
Although the burden of time on plaintiff-patients is heavy, it is less 
burdensome for physicians. Since hospitals are the sole defendant in 
malpractice litigation, physicians involved are still allowed to work in 
hospitals normally140 and hospitals will send their own lawyers and experts, 
who are employed specifically for the purpose of defence, to appear in court 
to defend the case.  
3.7.2. The Burden of Financial Costs 
According to the Gulou Data, on average the plaintiff would obtain a total of 
121,000 yuan as damages and incur 4,200-yuan litigation costs (court 
acceptance fees and ascertainment fees) at the same time. In other words, for 
every 28.81-yuan damages, 1 yuan would be spent on litigation procedures. In 
this regard, it seems that the burden of litigation costs on litigants in China is 
relatively modest. 
The above conclusion would be weakened if we took into account 
legal fees and average incomes of Chinese residents. As far as medical 
malpractice claims are concerned, contingency fees are strictly forbidden in 
the Jiangsu Province.141 Hence, plaintiff-patients have to pay legal fees if they 
are going to hire a legal representative. Legal fees for non-property civil 
disputes in Nanjing range from 2,500 yuan to 10,000 yuan.142 From 2002 to 
2012 in Jiangsu Province, the average per capita consumption expenditure 
(PCE) of urban households was about 11,100 yuan and of rural households 
was only 5,021 yuan.143 Before trial, plaintiff-patients would have to advance 
 
136 Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 218. 
137 Zhejiang Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court, First Civil Chamber, 2013, pp. 77-78. 
138 For more information on the expert witness system applying to medical malpractice 
litigation, see supra Chapter 3, Section 3.6. 
139 Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 218. 
140 Li et al. 2014. 
141 GR-Jiangsu Attorney Fees (China), art. 8. 
142 GR-Jiangsu Criteria for Attorney Fees (China), Appendix 1. 
143 Qianzhan Net 2015. 
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4,395 yuan as litigation costs, together with paying legal fees (at least 2,500 
yuan). That is to say, because of the ban on contingency fees, the initial 
financial burden on plaintiff-patients would at least amount to 6,985 yuan, 
which was about 62% of the urban PCE and almost 137% of the rural PCE.  
Is there any legal aid available for victims of medical malpractice? At 
least in the Jiangsu Province, there has been legal aid available for poor 
victims since 2001144 or poor victims who “suffered severe bodily injuries” 
since 2005.145 Law firms that participate in legal aid schemes should provide 
legal services free of charge.146 However, the Gulou Data show that plaintiff-
patients were represented by attorneys in only 60% of the cases and legal aid 
attorneys helped plaintiffs in only two of the 496 cases in the recorded 
information on the identity of counsels. This finding implies that many 
attorneys may not be willing to provide free legal aid services in view of the 
fact that medical malpractice claims are rather complicated and it could take 
them quite a long time and a lot of energy to handle even a single case.  
The fact that about 40% of plaintiff-patients filed medical malpractice 
claims before the court without any assistance of attorneys suggests that 
many, if not most, victimised patients would be in an unfavourable position 
in litigation given that most of them are both medical and legal laymen. 
Furthermore, when confronted with such considerable costs of litigation and 
the lack of readily available legal aid, many patients may never file any claim 
before the court due to poverty. 
3.8. THE IMPACT OF THE TORT LAW 2009 AND THE 
ROLE OF CHINESE COURTS 
In some aspects, the Tort Law has made advances. First and foremost, it has 
unified the substantive rules regarding medical malpractice by abandoning 
the distinction between accident claims and ordinary claims. In so doing, 
compensation for all iatrogenic injuries is based on the JI-Personal Injuries 
2003 rather than the AR-Medical Accidents 2002.147 To some extent, this may 
explain why damages for iatrogenic injuries grew faster after 2011.  
 
144 LR-Jiangsu Legal Aid 2001 (China), art. 13. 
145 LR-Jiangsu Legal Aid 2001 (2005 Amendment, China), art. 10, sub-para. 6. 
146 LR-Jiangsu Legal Aid 2001 (China), art. 2; LR-Jiangsu Legal Aid 2001 (2005 Amendment, 
China), art. 2. 
147 Theoretically, plaintiffs may obtain more compensation under the JI-Personal Injuries 
than under the AR-Medical Accidents in that the former allows death compensation and 
imposes fewer caps on compensation. See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2. 
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Second, since the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 does not apply to 
malpractice lawsuits any longer, clinical experts from the medical association 
now should make judgements in light of the Tort Law 2009. After 2010, the 
name of medical ascertainment provided by medical associations was changed 
from the MATAS to the MIAS, although the organisation and the expert bank 
largely remain unchanged. Nevertheless, the change in applicable rules did 
have some impact – while under the MATAS clinical experts testified for the 
plaintiff in only 11% of the cases, under the MIAS clinical experts did so in 
almost 55% of the cases, although the rate was still lower than that under the 
JAS (80%).  
However, in other aspects, the Tort Law’s achievements may be 
somewhat exaggerated. For instance, many applaud the Tort Law because it 
has abolished the reversal of the burden of proof rule regarding fault and 
causation in order to reduce defensive medicine. However, there is no 
empirical evidence showing that “defensive medicine” in China was caused 
by the reversal rule and that “defensive medicine” declines after 2010. As 
mentioned before,148 since Chinese courts rely heavily on medical 
ascertainment to determine fault and causation in hard cases, and expert 
witnesses are obliged to give a definite answer, the only case where the 
burden of proof matters is that the party which bears the burden of proof will 
have to pay advance ascertainment fees. In this regard, the Tort Law’s reform 
in the burden of proof may be unfavourable to plaintiff-patients, especially 
those who find it hard to afford the ascertainment fee. 
A second achievement of the Tort Law is that it provides a legal basis 
for claiming damages for disclosure of malpractice for the first time. 
However, as discussed before, we should not ignore the fact that the Gulou 
Court developed a fully-fledged doctrine of informed consent several years 
before the inception of the Tort law.149  
In addition to its achievements, the Tort Law has its limitations. On 
the one hand, it has not touched upon the issue of medical ascertainment 
which still struggles along the two conflicting and competing regimes of 
expert witnesses. The duplicate systems of expert evidence may reduce the 
litigant’s trust in the credibility of the malpractice system. Also, conducting 
multiple ascertainment tests increases litigation costs. However, this problem 
should be resolved by other legislation than the Tort Law. 
On the other hand, the Tort Law is silent on both the definition of 
causation and the rules regarding uncertainty over factual and legal causation 
where a non-tortious causative factor (e.g. the patient’s pre-existing 
 
148 See supra Section 3.2. 
149 See supra Section 3.3.2. 
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condition) is involved. However, this problem is lessened by the flexibility 
and creativity of local courts. The Gulou Data suggest that local courts may 
apply either “proportional liability” or the doctrine of lost chances to hard 
medical malpractice cases. Although the Tort Law is somewhat vague about 
these issues, the same vagueness allows a broader interpretation by local 
courts when applying the Tort Law.  
3.9. MEDICAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND VIOLENCE 
3.9.1. Negotiation, Administrative Mediation, and Litigation 
So far, this study has focused solely on the implications of court decisions. In 
practice, however, not all medical disputes are resolved through the litigation 
system. As far as medical dispute resolution is concerned, article 46 of the 
AR-Medical Accidents 2002 provides for three ways – behind-the-scenes 
negotiation, administrative mediation by the public health authorities 
(hereinafter AM), and civil litigation.  
Existing empirical evidence shows that a large proportion of medical 
disputes are resolved through negotiation. As early as in 2004, the Chinese 
Hospital Association reported that of all the surveyed medical disputes 
occurring in 200 hospitals nationwide, as high as 83.31% were resolved 
through negotiation, whereas only 10.48% through litigation and 6.2% 
through administrative mediation.150 A later study done by Zheng et al. found 
that of all the surveyed 53 medical disputes that involved compensation, 44 
(83.02%) were resolved through negotiation, while only 6 (11.32%) through 
litigation and 3 (5.66%) through administrative mediation.151 Recently in 
2013, Li found that of all the surveyed 260 medical disputes, as high as 232 
(89.23%) were resolved through negotiation, while only 20 (7.69%) through 
litigation and 8 (3.08%) through administrative mediation.152 After studying 
medical disputes in 9 public hospitals in the same year, Liu and Feng 
concluded that as high as 59 (77.64%) medical disputes were resolved through 
negotiation, whereas merely 12 (16.22%) through litigation and 3 (4.05%) 
through administrative mediation.153 Hence, about 7.69% to 16.22% of all 
medical disputes are resolved through formal litigation, and about 4.05% to 
6.2% through AM.  
 
150 See generally Chinese Hospital Association 2004. 
151 See generally Zheng et al. 2006. 
152 See generally Li 2013. 
153 See generally Liu & Feng 2013. 
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The low rate of application for AM seems to support that view that 
patients generally do not believe that the public health authorities can play a 
neutral and impartial role in mediation (i.e. they are the “boss” of public 
hospitals). The relatively low rate of filing claims before the court may be due 
to the heavy burden of both time and financial costs on plaintiff-patients. 
3.9.2. Yi-Nao Incidents 
When confronted with the choice of the way to resolve medical disputes, 
victimised patients may, on the one hand, fear that their claims would not be 
met fully, and may not be able to afford the time and money spent on 
litigation, and, on the other hand, do not believe that the public health 
authorities are unbiased and impartial. This may become a constant source of 
worry to them, and they might be more willing to settle the dispute through 
negotiation in private. This may be the most plausible reason for the 
“malpractice crisis” in China – it is not (allegedly) frivolous litigation or 
(allegedly) ever-increasing malpractice insurance premiums but “the lack of a 
credible system to deal with medical accidents and related problems in 
quality of care.”154 
In 2008, Xu and Lu conducted an extensive review of 557 Yi Nao or 
violent incidents which occurred in hospitals for the period 2000-2006.155 
Surprisingly, they found that not all violent incidents which happened in 
hospitals were for the purpose of claiming damages through coercive 
measures.156 About 69% of the violent incidents were simply due to patients 
or their family members losing control of their emotions.157 They were 
irritated because of mistrust of doctors, because their expectations of a cure 
were frustrated, because serious bodily injuries or death occurred, because of 
high medical expenses, etc.158 Nonetheless, they still found that about 18% of 
these events were true Yi Nao incidents, where violent or non-violent 
trouble-making measures were used as the means to compel hospitals to pay 
damages irrespective of whether provider negligence could be established or 
not.159  
According to Xu and Lu, one of the deep-rooted reasons for victimised 
patients to resort to these “weapons of the weak” is that they do not trust the 
 
154 Harris & Wu 2005, p. 456. 
155 See generally Xu & Lu 2008. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
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current medical dispute resolution system.160 They do not trust accident 
ascertainment because clinical experts more often than not would testify 
against them.161 They do not trust litigation because they cannot afford the 
burden of time and financial costs imposed by litigation.162 They do not trust 
AM because the public health authorities may be biased towards hospitals.163 
The “weapons of the weak” (Yi Nao) appear rather effective in 
practice. For instance, in the first half of 2006, a total of 200 Yi-Nao incidents 
occurred. Hospitals paid damages in 64.5% (n=129) of the 152 “resolved” 
medical disputes under the threat of the Yi Nao incidents.164 It is highly likely 
that in many, if not most, of the cases hospitals would pay compensation in 
order to avoid greater damage due to Yi Nao incidents even if no negligence 
could be established. In such cases, the “weapons of the weak” de facto turned 
fault-based medical malpractice liability into strict liability or even absolute 
liability. 
Many doctors interviewed admitted that being involved in Yi Nao 
incidents is a nightmare for most of Chinese hospitals and doctors.165 Not only 
is violence threatening, but consistent trouble-making behaviour is annoying 
as well. In order to settle the dispute as quickly as possible, many hospitals 
compromise with patients on claims of compensation, even if the hospitals 
have to pay a higher amount of compensation than what could have been 
granted by the court.166 However, some doctors interviewed who were also in 
charge of management were not willing to disclose any detailed data 
pertaining to the actual payment of compensation, which seems to have left 
deep scars in their hearts.167 In some cases, even though there is no 
malpractice, hospitals are still forced to pay some “buchang in terms of 
humanitarianism” (人道主义补偿).168 Although it is de facto blackmail, which 
can be punished administratively169 or criminally,170 reports of actual 
 
160 Id. 
161 See supra Section 2.5 and Section 3.2. 
162 See supra Section 3.6. 
163 See supra Section 3.8.1. 
164 See generally You & Chen 2006. 
165 Interview-2014-2; Interview-2014-3; Interview-2014-6. 
166 Interview-2014-3. 
167 Interview-2014-3; Interview-2014-7. 
168 In China, there is a clear distinction between buchang (补偿) and peichang (赔偿; 
compensation). One is obliged by law to pay peichang or compensation for injuries caused 
by fault on the part of him. The payment of buchang, however, implies that there is no 
fault on the part of the payer. The buchang money is paid solely out of sympathy and 
humanitarianism. 
169 Anyone who extorts property by blackmail should be detained for no more than 15 days 
and may be concurrently fined no more than 1000 yuan. Public Security Administration 
Punishments Law 2006 (China), art. 49. 
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punishments are rare. It appears that lots of these illegal acts of blackmail are 
covered in the name of the settlement of medical disputes. 
The police once often hesitated to intervene in Yi Nao incidents 
because it is difficult to distinguish between an ordinary medical dispute and 
illegal act.171 The police would try their best to avoid transforming the 
conflict between hospitals and patients into a conflict between the 
government and patients.172 In some extreme cases, the government might 
even order the hospital involved to pay compensation and the government 
would subsidise the payment out of general taxes.173 The rationale behind the 
government’s seemingly “irrational” behaviour is that social instability 
created by medical disputes would adversely affect the promotion prospects 
of the local head of government.174 This is exactly what Liebman called “state 
over-responsiveness to individual grievance.”175 
Although the government has announced several rounds of a 
crackdown on Yi Nao incidents and even criminalized coercive measures 
employed in Yi Nao incidents in the ninth amendment of the Criminal Law 
1997 (imprisonment up to 7 years), some reported that the crackdown was 
ineffective and only very rarely have Yi Nao mobs been charged and 
punished so far.176 Three reasons may explain why criminal charges against 
patients or their family members are hard to pursue or enforce: first, it is hard 
to make a clear distinction between a civil dispute and a Yi Nao incident; 
second, the police are not willing to intervene in medical disputes; and last 
but not least, the general public may feel sympathy for victimised patients 
who would lose both damages and personal freedom due to the 
criminalization of Yi Nao incidents.177 
3.9.3. People’s Mediation 
Recently, a new type of Medical Dispute People’s Mediation (hereinafter 
MDPM) was developed in many local jurisdictions. People’s mediation refers 
to “a process that a People’s Mediation Commission (hereinafter PMC) 
 
170 Whoever extorts property by blackmail, and the amount involved is quite large, is to be 
sentenced to not more than three years of fixed-termed imprisonment, criminal detention, 
or control; when the amount is large, the sentence is to be not less than three years but 
not more than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment. Criminal Law 1997 (China), art. 274. 
171 Interview-2014-12. 
172 See generally Ge 2016; Interview-2014-12. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Liebman 2013, p. 181. 
176 See generally Luo 2016. 
177 See generally Ren et al. 2016. 
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persuades the parties concerned in a dispute to reach a mediation agreement 
on the basis of equal negotiation and free will and thus solve the dispute 
between them.”178 The difference between AM and MDPM mainly lies in the 
fact that they have different mediators.179 By May 2014, a total of 3,396 PMCs 
for medical disputes had been established, 55% of which were financed by 
the government.180 
In two interviews,181 officials of justice maintained that MDPM has 
some advantages over the traditional three means of medical dispute 
resolution. First, the mediation by a persuasive third party may reduce the 
antagonism between the two disputants. More often than not, medical 
disputes resolved through MDPM are those with claims for a high amount of 
damages or with strong antagonism between the two disputants. Second, 
PMCs are “mass-based organisations” (群众性组织),182 which are non-
governmental organisations under the joint guidance of administrative 
departments of justice and courts at the grass-roots level183 and are 
independent of the public health authorities, hospitals or medical liability 
insurers. As far as neutrality is concerned, MDPM seems superior to AM. 
Third, no fee will be charged for MDPM184 and no process of medical 
ascertainment is required for the resolution of medical disputes. Thus, it is 
usually less costly and more time-saving to apply for MDPM than to file a 
lawsuit. Moreover, although no medical ascertainment is required in MDPM, 
the process of consulting clinical experts from the medical association may 
guarantee a minimum of necessary expertise. Some scholars also argue that 
the neutral position and considerable professional experience of meditation 
may contribute to the PMC’ success in resolving medical disputes.185 
There is a rising trend that the means of negotiation has been being 
gradually replaced with people’s mediation. In Beijing, for instance, the space 
for negotiation in private has been narrowed considerably by MDPM. The 
Beijing government orders that medical malpractice claims against public 
hospitals that exceed 10,000 yuan shall be resolved through people’s 
mediation or civil litigation, and, unsurprisingly, most malpractice claims in 
practice go beyond this cap.186 In Jiangsu, recent data show that of all the 
 
178 People’s Mediation Law 2010 (China), art. 2. 
179 For more information about the mediation system in China, see e.g. Di & Wu 2009; Wu, 
Y. 2013. 
180 See generally Jian 2014. 
181 Interview-2014-8; Interview-2014-12. 
182 People’s Mediation Law 2010 (China), art. 7. 
183 People’s Mediation Law 2010 (China), art. 5. 
184 People’s Mediation Law 2010 (China), art. 4. 
185 See generally Zheng et al. 2012. 
186 Liu, Chen & Zhao 2014, p. 211. 
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1,377 resolved MQSIs that had been reported to the authorities for the period 
2011-2014, a total of 1,250 (90.78%) were settled out of court (863 through 
bilateral negotiation, 346 through MDPM, 41 through AM) whereas only 127 
through litigation.187  
The success rate of MDPM is rather high. Data from the Nanjing 
Justice Bureau suggest that MDPM is highly successful in resolving medical 
disputes. In Nanjing of Jiangsu, about 800 medical disputes are handled by the 
Nanjing Medical Dispute PMC, of which 85% are mediated successfully.188 
On average, hospitals in Nanjing would pay 30,000 yuan to patients in these 
medical disputes.189 Data from the Shanxi Province show that 90% of medical 
disputes accepted by the Shanxi Provincial PMC are resolved successfully, 
and 98.1% of the patients involved are satisfied with the mediation result.190 
Nationwide, about 88% of medical disputes handled by PMCs are resolved.191 
However, some argued that the higher success rate is achieved at the 
expense of legal standards for liability and compensation.192 Unlike AM that is 
based on the conclusion of accident ascertainment, MDPM does not rely on 
any medical ascertainment. Instead, people’s mediators (usually retired 
doctors or lawyers) would consult clinical experts from the medical 
association about some difficult issues if necessary.193 However, this procedure 
is rather informal and not always initiated.194 It seems that the primary 
purpose of MDPM is to resolve the dispute rather than make a clear 
distinction between right and wrong, which is heavily criticised by liability 
insurers.195 To this end, the PMC would try to decrease the patient’s 
expectations of high damages and persuade the hospital to pay a modest 
amount of damages irrespective of whether liability could be established.196 
 
187 Id. For more information on the Chinese medical dispute resolution system, see generally 
infra Chapter 4. 
188 Interview-2014-12. 
189 Id. 
190 Ren 2015. 
191 Id. 
192 See generally Yi 2014. 
193 Interview-2014-12. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. Mr. Shen told me a typical case, “A patient from other localities went to a hospital in 
Nanjing and suffered actual injuries amounting to 100,000 yuan. He initially claimed 
200,000 yuan as damages. But eventually we managed to persuade him to accept 50,000 
yuan as final damages. Why? Because it would take him lots of money and time to file a 
lawsuit against the hospital in Nanjing. The patient would prefer to obtain 50,000 yuan 
immediately and go home instead of gaining 100,000 yuan or more one year later. The 
hospital would also be willing to pay such a modest amount of damages even if it was not 
at fault. Why? Because all conflicts or Yi-Nao incidents would be removed out of the 
hospital. Some rich hospitals even told us in private that they have enough money, and if 
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The mediation agreement would be concluded in a written form. Typically, 
the agreement would state that “the hospital was not at fault, but agreed to 
pay some compensation out of humanitarianism.”197 Why is it important to 
stress the absence of fault? This is because hospitals do not want to report the 
event as an MSQI to the authorities in order to avoid being punished or 
getting a low score in hospital accreditation.198 Patients normally do not 
object to this wording in the agreement as long as they obtain 
compensation.199  
To sum up, although patients would obtain quick compensation under 
MDPM, they would be likely to be under-compensated in some cases and 
overcompensated in other cases. Although hospitals might be less worried 
about Yi-Nao incidents, they would have to pay some modest compensation 
in the vast majority of the cases. The overall effect is currently unknown. 
What is certain in the Gulou District is that although the success rate to 
patients under MDPM (85%) is higher than that under litigation (70%), the 
average damages under the former (30,000 yuan) is about one quarter of that 
under the latter (121,000 yuan).  
3.10. DEFENSIVE MEDICINE 
3.10.1. Does Defensive Medicine Exist in China? 
In China, defensive medicine (防御性医疗) is normally defined as any 
defensive measures conducted by physicians for the purpose of avoiding 
medical risks, medical disputes and malpractice lawsuits rather than medical 
treatment.200 There are positive defensive medicine (hereinafter PDM) and 
negative defensive medicine (hereinafter NDM). PDM usually refers to 
excessive examinations, tests, consultations, referrals, etc., whereas NDM 
denotes refusal to admit patients who are critically ill, avoiding highly risky 
therapies, etc.201 
Although defensive medicine has been extensively studied in the 
West, Chinese scholars began to pay attention to this issue just a decade ago. 
 
we could help them cope with conflicts and Yi-Nao incidents in hospitals, they would 
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However, most of these studies are qualitative or theoretical discussions,202 
although empirical studies began to grow recently.203  
The vast majority of these empirical studies were based on 
questionnaire surveys of doctors from one or a number of hospitals in one 
local jurisdiction.204 Although nationwide studies are currently unavailable, 
these scattered studies in different locations indicate that defensive medicine 
does exist in China. Cheng et al. found that of all the 512 physicians surveyed 
from 9 hospitals in Beijing, 407 (79.49%) had practised defensive medicine at 
a high level.205 Han et al. surveyed 380 doctors from a hospital in Chengde of 
the Hebei Province and found that more than half (59%) of them admitted 
that they had practised defensive medicine and doctors who had experienced 
medical disputes were more likely than those who had not to practice 
defensive medicine.206 Li surveyed doctors from four hospitals in Dongguan of 
the Guangdong Province and reported that 74% of them had tried to keep 
medical records more complete, 68% had expanded examination items or 
treatment procedures, 57% had increased the frequency of subsequent visits, 
60% had increased time for treatment, 80% had refused to accept difficult 
cases.207 Cao and Chen found that 82.9% of all the 375 doctors surveyed from 
a hospital in Hebei Province complained that medical disputes adversely 
affected their work and the personal experience of a medical dispute 
intensified defensive medicine.208 Zhang et al. surveyed 428 doctors and 
nurses in Weifang of the Shandong Province and found that medical disputes 
significantly contributed to defensive medicine, PDM was prevalent in all 
specialties, and low-ranking young providers were more likely than high-
ranking senior providers to practice NDM.209 Based on a survey of 392 doctors 
in Shenzhen of Guangdong Province, Peng and Huang reported that 76.53% 
of the doctors often conducted defensive medicine.210 Last year, Ma et al., 
surveyed 476 doctors in a hospital in Hebei Province and found that the 
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frequently practised defensive medicine included more detailed records of 
medical conditions (91.2%), more information disclosure and informed 
consent (84.3%), more consultations and referrals (82.9%), excessive 
examinations (63.5%), avoiding highly risky treatment plans or operations 
(57.6%), refusing to admit patients who are critically ill (51.7%), etc.211 
All the preceding studies were based on the method of direct 
questionnaire surveys of providers. The problems with this method are that 
sometimes doctors cannot tell the difference between defensive medicine and 
behaviour for other purposes, and that, due to various considerations, 
providers may either over-report or under-report their frequencies of 
defensive medicine.212 In response to the deficiencies of the questionnaire 
method, Cao and Wu conducted a retrospective review of 110 medical 
records, in a combination of 20 interviews with doctors.213 Similarly, they 
found that various kinds of defensive medicine were conducted by 
physicians, and defensive medicine accounted for 24.6% of all expenses for 
examinations in internal medicine procedures and 21.1% of that in surgical 
procedures.214 
Moreover, several other doctors interviewed also confirmed the 
prevalence of defensive medicine in China.215 Both PDM216 and NDM217 were 
reported. 
The mentality of defensive medicine had even taken root in the heads 
of medical students – the aspiring physicians. Wang reported that of all the 
medical students surveyed, 68% had acquainted themselves with or were 
aware of the phenomenon of defensive medicine, 48% had been in favour of 
the practice of defensive medicine, 34% had doubted their initial decision to 
study medicine (5% even expressed their regret about studying medicine and 
said that they would find other jobs instead of clinical medicine), 49% had 
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department of the hospital declared that emergency cases would not be admitted. Ruijing 
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been unable to judge whether defensive medicine is ethical or not (all they 
expressed was that they had no other options), and 58% had preferred to 
choose “an old technique which is widely practiced and accepted rather than 
a new technique with more risks, although the new one may improve the 
curative effects and advance medical science.”218 
3.10.2. The Causes of Defensive Medicine 
All the preceding studies confirmed that medical disputes are the main cause 
of defensive medicine. However, given the fact that hospitals are always the 
sole defendant in medical malpractice litigation in China,219 why should 
individual providers have a feeling of fear of medical disputes? The individual 
providers’ fear may be explained by two reasons as follows. 
On the one hand, although negligent individual providers are not 
liable for paying damages to victims, they may be subject to other forms of 
sanctions. First, if they contravene statutory standards of care and cause 
severe iatrogenic injuries (medical accidents), they may be subject to 
administrative punishments (license suspension/revocation) or even criminal 
penalties (imprisonment).220  
Second, even if the negligent iatrogenic injuries are not severe enough 
to trigger administrative punishments or criminal penalties, negligent 
providers may nonetheless be punished by their employer-hospitals. In 
addition to fines imposed by the hospital, the wrongdoer also faces fewer 
chances of promotion and low scores of performance evaluation.221 
Sometimes, his/her professional title may be degraded, e.g. from an “attending 
doctor” to a “resident doctor.”222 Furthermore, his/her right to prescribe may 
also be limited accordingly.223 However, it is also remarkable to find that most 
of the other doctors interviewed seem not to be very familiar with or not so 
care about the details of internal punishments imposed by their own 
hospitals.224 This suggests that hospitals may be reluctant to impose other 
kinds of internal punishments if fines suffice. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that individual providers practise 
defensive medicine because they fear violent Yi-Nao incidents which 
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frequently occur with medical disputes. Jia found that of all the 316 hospitals 
surveyed, 100% held that violence against doctors had an adverse impact 
upon hospitals, as high as 96.9% expressed that the impact had been 
considerable.225 About 60% of all the staff members from these hospitals were 
of the opinion that the current working environment was bad, nearly 40% 
were considering changing their jobs and 16% expressed that “we would 
never allow our children to study medicine.”226 In other words, compared to 
malpractice litigation, hospitals, and individual providers may feel that Yi-
Nao incidents are much more difficult to tackle. Thus, they may practise 
defensive medicine with a view to preventing medical disputes from 
occurring in the first place. 
It should be noted, however, that excessive examinations (过度检查) 
or over-prescription (大处方) are induced by the pursuit of economic profits 
rather than for defensive purposes. A respondent found that “low-income and 
the perceived imbalance between efforts and rewards indeed contribute to 
physicians’ motivation” of excessive medicine (过度医疗).227 When many 
examinations are conducted, or pharmaceuticals are prescribed not for 
reducing the probability of AEs but primarily for gaining more profit, then 
the physician’s behaviour is excessive medicine, which has nothing to do 
with the risks of medical malpractice liability.228 To pursue more profit is a 
natural tendency of private medical institutions, where excessive tests and 
examinations are more commonly seen.229 Public medical institutions are 
non-profit organisations. In practice, however, due to increasingly low 
financial input from the government and more caps on the prices that they 
can charge, they may increase the frequency of tests and examinations in 
order to earn extra income on condition that it will not increase the risks 
they are facing.230 Nevertheless, economic incentives do not seem comparable 
to the threats of liability or Yi-Nao incidents.231 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 4 has presented and discussed empirical evidence on medical 
disputes, iatrogenic injuries, malpractice litigation, and patient compensation. 
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The data have been drawn from a self-conducted analysis of court decisions 
and semi-structured interviews, supplemented with existing empirical 
literature. Several conclusions have been reached. 
First, medical disputes frequently occur in secondary and tertiary 
hospitals and are frequently related to surgical procedures, not because the 
quality of care of these hospitals or specialties is low but because these 
hospitals are often overcrowded, and diseases treated by these hospitals and 
specialities are usually highly risky.  
Second, in most cases, judges rely heavily on expert witnesses to 
determine important medical malpractice issues such as fault and causation 
and they normally prefer a detailed written testimony submitted by the 
medical association or a forensic pathologist to an expert appearing in court as 
a witness and conducting cross-examination. 
Third, in practice, judges usually interpret the “then medical standard” 
as written standards prescribed by lawmakers and the government or 
customary practices if there are no such written standards. Whether the 
doctor complies with customary practices will be determined through the 
expert ascertainment (peer review) process. The current MATAS may be 
biased against doctors from low-level hospitals or localities with a low-level 
quality of care due to limited resources. 
Fourth, as far as disclosure malpractice is concerned, there is still 
uncertainty as to how to interpret the “alternative treatment plan” and how 
to define the standard of disclosure. The so-called “double-test doctrine” is 
very complicated to understand and apply in practice. 
Fifth, Chinese courts are so flexible and active that they systematically 
apply proportional liability to malpractice cases where it is not clear whether 
the faulty treatment or a non-tortious factor contributed to the patient’s 
injury in the absence of any legal basis. 
Sixth, although the Tort Law 2009 imposes strict product liability on 
hospitals and blood banks, courts in the Jiangsu Province are very cautious 
about enforcing this rule. Instead, they apply equitable liability to cases 
where neither the patient nor the hospital/blood bank is at fault and grant 
some modest damages to the patient. 
Seventh, although plaintiff-patients have a high chance of winning a 
case (about 70%), only a modest proportion (less than 30%) of their original 
claims will be satisfied. Severely disabled victims of medical malpractice may 
receive more damages than close relatives of deceased victims. 
Eighth, plaintiff-patients are often confronted with heavy burdens of 
time and money when they intend to obtain compensation through the 
litigation system. The proceedings are often delayed by medical 
ascertainment, which is hardly affordable to relatively poor plaintiff-patients. 
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The legal aid system seems under-developed, and contingency fees are strictly 
banned. 
Ninth, the biggest achievement of the Tort Law 2009 is that it has 
unified substantive medical malpractice liability and quantum rules. 
However, it is still limited in that it has not abolished the often conflicting 
parallel regimes of expert ascertainment – MATAS and JAS.  
Tenth, heavy burdens of the malpractice litigation system and distrust 
of administrative mediation often drive victimised patients to resort to 
“weapons of the weak” – Yi Nao incidents, which disturbs social stability and 
leads to considerable social costs. The newly developed people’s mediation for 
medical disputes may help in mediation between hospitals and patients. 
However, patients may obtain less compensation than they would otherwise 
receive in court.  
Eleventh, defensive medicine is prevalent in China, which may be 
accounted for both by the threat of medical malpractice litigation and by the 
violent nature of medical disputes (Yi Nao) per se. The pursuit of economic 
profits may explain some unethical practices such as over-prescription and 
excessive examinations that have little to do with treating the patient’s 
condition. 
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CHAPTER 5 
OTHER COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 attempts to examine alternative regimes of compensation in China 
that may cover at least part of the losses suffered by a victim of medical 
malpractice, which is an attempt to answer part of Sub-question (1-a). The 
most relevant mechanism is medical liability insurance (hereinafter MLI), 
often covering a large proportion of tort damages (Section 2). Some 
compensation schemes other than MLI will be examined in Section 3. 
2. MEDICAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (MLI) 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In this Section, an attempt will be made to answer three sub-questions 
concerning MLI in China: first, what the legal basis is (Section 2.2); second, 
what the existing state of affairs of MLI is in China (Section 2.3); and third, 
what problems MLI in China is facing (Section 2.4). 
2.2. LEGAL BASIS 
In China, the legal basis for liability insurance, in general, is currently 
provided for in article 65 and article 66 of the Insurance Law 2009,1 which 
read as follows: 
 
1 They were originally provided for in art. 49 and art. 50 of Insurance Law 1995 (China). 
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Art. 65: For the damage caused to a third party by the insured to a liability 
insurance contract, the insurer may directly pay insurance benefits to the 
third party according to law or the insurance contract. 
 Where the insured to the liability insurance contract causes any 
damage to a third party and the insured’s liability for compensating the 
third party has been determined, at the request of the insured, the insurer 
shall directly pay insurance benefits to the third party. If the insured 
delays making a request, the third party shall have the right to directly 
request the insurer to pay the insurance benefits for the damage which the 
third party shall be compensated for. 
 Where the insured to the liability insurance contract causes any 
damage to a third party and the insured has not compensated the third 
party for the damage, the insurer shall not pay insurance benefits to the 
insured. 
 Liability insurance means a type of insurance which takes the insured’s 
legal liability for compensation to a third party as the subject matter 
insured. 
Art. 66: Where an arbitration or litigation is instituted against the insured 
to a liability insurance contract for an insured accident which causes 
damage to a third party, the arbitration or litigation costs and other 
necessary and reasonable expenses paid by the insured shall be covered by 
the insurer, unless it is otherwise provided for by the insurance contract. 
Art. 65 defines liability insurance and the basic rights and obligations of the 
parties involved – the insurer, the insured, and the third party. Paragraph 1 
grants the insurer a right of choice – it may pay insurance benefits to either 
the insured or the third-party victim if the law or the contract permits, which 
is inconsistent with the ultimate goal of liability insurance.2 Where the law or 
the contracts do not specify this issue, in the light of paragraph 2, the insurer 
must directly pay insurance benefits to the third-party victim at the request 
of the insured, given that “liability for compensating the third party has been 
determined.” According to lawmakers, “liability … determined” usually refers 
to either of the following cases: first, damages have been determined by court 
judgements or arbitration awards; or second, damages have been determined 
by a settlement agreement between the insured and the third-party victim, 
which is accepted by the insurer.3 Of course, if the size of damages as it has 
been determined above exceeds the insured amount, the excess must be paid 
by the insured itself.4 In practice, however, the insured may sometimes fail to 
make such a request in time. In that case, paragraph 2 grants the third-party 
victim a direct right to claim insurance benefits from the insurer. In order to 
 
2 An 2009, p. 106. 
3 An 2009, p. 107. 
4 Id. 
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avoid the case where the insured refuses to compensate the third-party victim 
after receiving insurance benefits,5 paragraph 3 provides that the insurer 
should not pay insurance benefits to the insured before the insured 
compensates the victim. In accordance with article 66, all necessary and 
reasonable costs of litigation or arbitration shall be covered by the insurer as 
well. 
That being said, there are no special legal rules regarding medical 
liability insurance (hereinafter MLI). Hence, arts. 66-67 and other relevant 
provisions of the Insurance Law 2009 apply to MLI. In light of article 66, 
para. 4, MLI is often defined as a contract, under which the insurance 
company provides coverage against the insured medical institution’s liability 
for iatrogenic injury suffered by the patient for the duration of insurance 
coverage.6 Since arts. 66-67 are very short, detailed rights and obligations are 
stipulated in MLI contracts in practice.  
Also, it ought to be noted that it is generally not compulsory for any 
party to purchase insurance in China unless other national laws or 
administrative regulations provide otherwise.7 To this day, no other national 
laws or administrative regulations have yet provided for a compulsory 
obligation to purchase MLI. 
2.3. THE EVOLUTION OF MLI IN CHINA: LOCAL 
EXPERIMENTS 
2.3.1. Introduction 
Although malpractice litigation was established in the second half of the 
1980s, China had not developed MLI until the beginning of the 2000s. Since 
then, some provinces and large municipalities such as the Yunnan Province, 
Shanghai City, Beijing City, etc. have initiated their own MLI schemes. 
Currently, there is no unified MLI scheme that applies to the entire country 
as a whole. All MLI initiatives are local experiments. Hence, this Section will 
give a short introduction to several representative local MLI schemes 
(Sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.7) and summarise their similarities and differences 
(Section 2.3.8). 
 
5 Id. 
6 Chen 2013, p. 9. 
7 Insurance Law 2009 (China), art. 184, para. 2 provides, “For compulsory insurance, where 
laws and administrative regulations provide otherwise, such provisions shall apply.” 
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2.3.2. The Yunnan MLI Scheme 
The Yunnan Province was the first local jurisdiction in China that initiated 
the MLI scheme. In 1998, the Yunnan provincial government enacted the 
LGR-Yunnan Iatrogenic Injury Incidents 1998, article 16 reads as follows, 
Medical institutions and their medical staff members shall purchase 
medical professional liability insurance. 
 When a medical accident or error occurs in the insured medical 
institution, the insurance company shall, in the light of expert 
ascertainment conclusions and statutory criteria for compensation, pay a 
lump sum of compensatory damages to the patient or his/her family 
members, and pay necessary expenses for continued treatment or unpaid 
treatment expenses to the medical institution. 
The Yunnan MLI scheme was intended as compulsory liability insurance. The 
Yunnan public health authorities made it clear that the Operating License for 
Medical Institutions (OLMI) of a medical institution that failed to purchase 
medical liability insurance would be revoked.8 
The Yunnan government established the “Joint Office of Medical 
Professional Liability Insurance of the Yunnan Province” that serves as the 
insurance broker. The insured are medical institutions and medical staff 
members. Two commercial insurance companies – PICC Yunnan Branch and 
CPIC Kunming Branch – provide coverage jointly.  
The premiums that medical institutions should pay are determined on 
the basis of the number of ward beds (e.g. 300,000 yuan for a hospital with 
1505 to 2000 beds).9 The premiums for staff members are determined in 
accordance with their specialities and positions, ranging from 1 to 20 yuan 
per month.10 
According to article 16 of the LGR-Yunnan Iatrogenic Injury Incidents 
1998, iatrogenic injuries due to medical accidents (severe negligent AEs) and 
medical errors (less severe negligent AEs) are covered by the MLI scheme 
while those due to medical mishaps (non-negligent AEs) are not. Various caps 
are imposed on insurance benefits depending on the types of hospitals and 
seriousness of the incident. A deduction of 5% (but not exceeding 5,000 yuan) 
is imposed for every MLI claim.  
 
8 Rui et al. 2006, p. 35. 
9 Zhang, Liu, Zhao, Zhou & Wei 2007, p. 2. 
10 Id. 
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Zhang et al. conducted a retrospective review of MLI in the Yunnan 
Province for the period 1999-2003.11 During these five years, a total of 5,750 
policies had been taken out, and 54-million-yuan premiums had been paid 
(63.41% by medical institutions and 36.59% by individual providers).12 By the 
end of August 2004, a total of 277 claims had been settled, paying about 16.45 
million yuan as insurance benefits (roughly 59,000 yuan per claim).13 
Strikingly, Zhang et al. reported that there had been a rapid 
contraction of the MLI market during the five years as shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: The Loss Ratio and the Insured Medical Institutions in Yunnan 
Province14 
Year Claims 
(No.) 
Payouts 
(￥) 
Loss Ratio* 
(%) 
Insured 
Med. Inst. 
(No.) 
The ratio of 
Insured Med. 
Inst. to all Med. 
Inst. (%) 
1999 80 6,692,961 36.8 2,068 17.0 
2000 75 4,696,501 42.7 1,265 9.0 
2001 60 2,951,344 33.5 888 7.0 
2002 53 1,984,130 20.1 904 10.0 
2003 7 109,668 17.3 625 3.0 
* The loss ratio is the difference between the ratios of premiums paid to an insurance company and the 
claims settled by the company. 
 
More recent empirical data on the MLI market in Yunnan are currently 
unavailable.  
2.3.3. The Shanghai MLI Scheme 
With the implementation of the AR-Medical Accidents 2002, the Shanghai 
Municipal Government, by enacting the N-Shanghai Medical Liability 
Insurance 2002 and the N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance 
Implementation Schemes 2002, initiated an MLI scheme and encouraged all 
public hospitals to purchase MLI policies.15  
The Shanghai MLI scheme consists of insurance schemes covering 
liability for medical accidents and “liability for medical mishaps” 
(医疗意外责任).16 The MLI scheme for medical accidents was initiated on 
 
11 Zhang, Liu, Tian & Shi 2007, p. 101. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Zhang, Liu, Tian & Shi 2007, p. 103. 
15 Jin 2014, p. 16. 
16 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance 2002 (China), art. 1, para. 1. 
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Sep. 1, 2002; the scheme for medical mishaps would be initiated after more 
research.17 PICC Shanghai Branch underwrote the MIL contract in 2002.18 
The purchase of MLI policies is voluntary. The medical institution is 
the sole policyholder and the insured.19 However, both the medical 
institution and its staff members are required to bear part of the MIL 
premium.20 The whole premium is paid by the medical institution to the 
insurer annually.21 The premium that the medical institution has to bear is 
determined by the types of institutions, the number of ward beds, and the 
choice of caps (either 100,000 yuan or 200,000 yuan).22 Individual providers 
have to bear premiums annually in accordance with the types of their 
workplaces and jobs.23 
It appears that premiums of the next year are modified in light of the 
loss experience of the prior year. The detailed rates adjusted according to loss 
ratios are presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Premiums Adjustments under the Shanghai MLI Scheme 
Loss ratio of 
the prior year 
0-10% 
10-
20% 
20-
30% 
30-
50% 
50-
70% 
70-
100% 
100% 
plus 
Multiplicands 
for the basis 
premiums 
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1 1.1 1.3 
 
The Shanghai MLI scheme employs claims-made coverage, with a certain 
extended reporting period (ERP) or “tail coverage.”24 The ERP is two years, 
which applies to the first year of the MLI contract as well.25 However, the 
policy excludes claims that have already been made to the insured before the 
commencement date of the policy even when the accident occurred within 
the ERP.26 
The Shanghai MLI scheme for medical accidents covers the following 
costs: (1) economic compensation for personal injury due to a medical 
accident; (2) the costs of reducing the consequences of a medical accident; 
 
17 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance 2002 (China), art. 1, para. 2. 
18 Zhang, Liu, Zhao, Zhou & Wei 2007, p. 3. 
19 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 5, 
para. 1. 
20 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 6. 
21 Id. 
22 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 9. 
23 Id. 
24 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 8. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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and (3) litigation costs, attorney fees, expert ascertainment fees, etc., which 
should not exceed 10% of the cap that is placed on damages per capita per 
accident.27  
PICC Shanghai Branch and the Shanghai International Medical Centre 
(SIMC) jointly established the PICC Shanghai Medical Accident Liability 
Insurance Handling Centre (hereinafter PICC Shanghai MLI Centre) in 
October 2002, which has employed about 20 lawyers and 35 medical 
experts.28 The Centre is primarily intended to investigate medical accident 
disputes, settle MLI claims, and help the insured hospital in preventing AEs.29 
When informed of any medical dispute, the Centre will first try to 
encourage disputants to settle in private.30 If the disputants fail to settle, they 
may apply for MATA, administrative mediation (AM) or file a lawsuit.31 The 
insured medical institution shall be represented by the Centre in all legal 
proceedings.32  
The insurer must pay insurance benefits in accordance with court 
judgements, mediation agreements through the AM, or settlement 
agreements accepted by the insurer.33 
By the end of 2012, a total of 435 medical institutions in Shanghai had 
purchased MLI policies.34 During the period 2002-2012, the Centre had 
settled 10,830 claims, with an insurance payout of 277 million yuan (roughly 
25,577 yuan per claim).35 
That being said, a slight contraction of the MLI market was also 
reported. The number of insured medical institutions decreased from 486 in 
2002 to 435 in 2012, representing less than 90% of all medical institutions in 
Shanghai.36 
Remarkably, a large proportion of compensatory damages is still paid 
by medical institutions to patients even when MLI is available. Reportedly, 
only about 30% of all damages are covered by MLI policies in Shanghai.37  
 
27 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 7. 
28 Zhang, Liu, Zhao, Zhou & Wei 2007, p. 3. 
29 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 10. 
30 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 12, 
para. 1. 
31 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 12, 
para. 2. 
32 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 12, 
para. 3. 
33 N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 (China), art. 13. 
34 Jin 2014, p. 17. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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Another surprising fact is that the MLI insurer in Shanghai has 
remained in deficit for a long time. For the period 2003-2011 in the Putuo 
District of Shanghai, the annual insurance payout was 1.79 million yuan 
while the annual premium was 1.73 million yuan.38 For the period 2002-2010 
in Shanghai, a total of 268 million yuan had been collected as premiums 
whereas 238 million yuan had been paid as insurance benefits.39  
2.3.4. The Beijing MLI Scheme 
At the end of 2004, the Beijing Health Bureau enacted the N-Beijing Medical 
Liability Insurance 2004, and the Beijing MLI scheme was initiated in 2005. 
The Bureau is responsible for organising MLI, designing detailed insurance 
plans, and choosing the MLI insurer through public bidding.40 PICC Beijing 
Branch and CPIC Beijing Branch jointly underwrite the MLI policies.41 
The Beijing MLI scheme is compulsory for all state-owned not-for-
profit medical institutions.42 Both the medical institution and its staff 
members have to contribute to the premium, which is paid annually by the 
institution to the insurer.43 The medical institution is not allowed to increase 
service prices on account of paying the premium.44 
The MLI premium for medical institutions is determined with regard 
to types of the institution and the number of ward beds.45 The premium for 
individual providers is calculated on the basis of the types of their hospitals, 
specialties, and jobs.46 
The Beijing MLI scheme covers liability for harm due to clinical 
negligence,47 which is broader than liability for medical accidents with 
obvious negligent iatrogenic injuries.48 A cap of 200,000 yuan is imposed on 
the coverage.49 Non-pecuniary damages and litigation costs are covered by the 
scheme as well.50 
 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 N-Beijing Medical Liability Insurance 2004 (China), art. 8. 
41 Zhang et al. 2007, p. 4. 
42 N-Beijing Medical Liability Insurance 2004 (China), art. 2. 
43 Rui et al. 2006, p. 36; Zhang, Liu, Zhao, Zhou & Wei 2007, p. 4. 
44 N-Beijing Medical Liability Insurance 2004 (China), art. 5. 
45 Zhang, Liu, Zhao, Zhou & Wei 2007, p. 4. 
46 Id. 
47 N-Beijing Medical Liability Insurance 2004 (China), art. 1. 
48 Zhang, Liu, Zhao, Zhou & Wei 2007, p. 4. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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A supporting system was developed to facilitate the resolution of 
medical disputes and injury prevention.51 Accordingly, the insurer established 
two mediation organisations – the Beijing Health Law Research Committee 
Medical Dispute Mediation Centre and the Beijing Medical Education 
Association Medical Dispute Mediation Centre.52 
Although the Beijing government intended the MLI scheme as a 
compulsory insurance system, the number of the insured hospitals has been 
decreasing. There are about 729 medical institutions in Beijing, of which 445 
purchased MLI policies in 2005, 387 did so in 2006, and 341 did so in 2007, 
representing about 46% of all the medical institutions.53 Reportedly, only less 
than 10% of hospitals purchased MLI policies in 2013.54 
2.3.5. The Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance Scheme 
The Shenzhen Health Bureau initiated the Shenzhen MLI scheme in 2004 by 
enacting the N-Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance 2004. The MLI 
scheme was compulsory for all state-owned not-for-profit medical 
institutions and their staff members.  
The MLI premium consists of fixed premiums for the medical 
institution and individual risk savings (个人风险储金) for medical staff 
members.55 The fixed premiums must be paid by medical institutions and will 
not be returned.56 Individual risk savings will be paid by medical institutions 
(80%) and staff members (20%) jointly, and any money not required for 
claims will be treated as savings and returned to individual providers when 
they cease practising medicine.57  
Fixed premiums for medical institutions are determined by the types of 
institutions and the output of medical services (ascending from the tenth risk 
level to the first; ranging from 10,000 yuan to 350,000 yuan annually).58 
Individual risk savings are determined on the basis of specialities (ascending 
from the tenth risk level to the first; ranging from 140 yuan to 500 yuan per 
month).59 
 
51 N-Beijing Medical Liability Insurance 2004 (China), art. 7. 
52 Wang & Chen 2014, p. 134. 
53 Id. 
54 Li 2015, p. 119. 
55 N-Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance 2004 (China), art. 6, para. 1. 
56 N-Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance 2004 (China), art. 6, para. 2. 
57 N-Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance 2004 (China), art. 6, para. 3. 
58 N-Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance 2004 (China), art. 6, para. 9. 
59 N-Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance 2004 (China), art. 6, para. 10. 
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The Shenzhen scheme covers liability for medical accidents, liability 
for medical errors, and liability for medical mishaps.60 If an injury was caused 
by a medical staff member’s negligence, the damages should be apportioned 
between the staff member and the insurer (co-insurance). The detailed rules 
of the co-insurance are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Co-insurance between Individual Providers and the Insurer 
Types of Liability Individual providers (%) The insurer (%) 
Medical 
accidents 
(obvious 
injury) 
Grade One 40% 60% 
Grade Two 30% 70% 
Grade Three 20% 80% 
Grade Four 10% 90% 
Medical errors (less 
obvious injury) 
5% 95% 
Medical mishaps (non-
negligent) 
0 
100% (less than 20,000 
yuan) 
 
Remarkably, there was no cap placed on compensatory damages for the first 
few years.61 Insurance benefits are paid according to court judgements, 
administrative mediation agreements, and settlements recognised by the 
insurer.62 However, the absence of caps led to a surge in premiums and 
hospitals were not willing to pay high premiums. Hence, the insurer later 
placed a cap of 500,000 yuan per accident and 5 million yuan per year on 
damages.63 
2.3.6. The Ningbo MLI Scheme 
In 2008, Ningbo City established a compulsory MLI scheme for all public 
medical institutions. Private hospitals are also encouraged to participate in 
the scheme. By April 2010, a total of 220 medical institutions purchased MLI 
policies, including four private hospitals.64 
Four insurance companies in Ningbo jointly underwrite MLI policies.65 
The insurer also established a Medical Dispute Compensation and Handling 
Centre for investigating, evaluating, and settling claims.66 The Centre must 
 
60 N-Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance 2004 (China), art. 3. 
61 Zhang, Liu, Zhao, Zhou & Wei 2007, p. 4. 
62 N-Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance 2004 (China), art. 19. 
63 Zhang, Liu, Zhao, Zhou & Wei 2007, p. 4. 
64 Chen & Yuan 2011, p. 61. 
65 Chen & Yuan 2011, p. 60. 
66 Id. See also LGR-Ningbo Medical Dispute Resolution 2007 (China), art. 23. 
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intervene in the negotiations between hospitals and patients in cases where 
the value of a claim exceeds 10,000 yuan.67  
The Ningbo scheme covers not only liability for medical accidents, but 
also liability for medical mishaps (humanitarian damages).68 
It was claimed that the Ningbo MLI Scheme was successful. During the 
period 2008-2010, the Centre had accepted 1,102 claims, of which 75.8% 
(n=1,102) claims had been settled.69 It was found that the frequency of Yi-Nao 
incidents was on the decrease. The number of Yi-Nao incidents had been 
reduced by 30% from 2007 to 2008.70 
2.3.7. The Nanjing Scheme 
The Nanjing Municipal Government initiated the MLI scheme in 2009 and 
required all state-owned medical institutions at or above Level Two 
participate in the scheme.71 Through bidding, six insurance companies were 
chosen to provide MLI coverage in Nanjing jointly.72 By the end of 2013, all 
of these medical institutions (n=186) had purchased MLI policies.73 
The Nanjing MLI scheme is composed of primary insurance (covering 
liability for medical accidents, liability for medical errors, and liability for 
medical mishaps) and additional insurance (covering liability for injuries 
suffered by medical staff members due to violence, and liability for infectious 
disease).74 While the purchase of the primary insurance is compulsory, that of 
the additional insurance is voluntary.75 
Both the medical institution and the staff member have to contribute 
to the MLI premium. The premium for the medical institution is determined 
according to the number of ward beds.76 The premium for individual 
providers is determined in the light of their specialities, ranging from 60 yuan 
to 270 yuan annually.77  
It seems that the MLI premium is experience rated. The PICC Nanjing 
Branch adjusts premiums in the light of loss ratios of the previous year(s). The 
method of adjusting premiums for the year of 2009 is presented in Table 5.4. 
 
67 LGR-Ningbo Medical Dispute Resolution 2007 (China), art. 24. 
68 Chen & Yuan 2011, p. 61. 
69 Chen & Yuan 2011, p. 60. 
70 Id. 
71 Lin et al. 2016, p. 68. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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Table 5.4: MLI Premium Adjustments Used by the PICC Nanjing Branch 
(2009)78 
Loss ratio of 
the pre-
vious year 
0%-10% 10%-30% 30%-50% 50%-70% 
70%-
100% 
100% plus 
Coefficient 
for the base 
premium 
0.80 0.85 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 
 
A special system of medical dispute people’s mediation has been established 
to mediate between hospitals and patients.79 This people’s mediation was also 
argued to be successful. By the end of 2012, a total of 3,173 medical disputes 
were accepted, of which 98% were settled (n=3,173).80 People’s Mediation is 
independent of the MLI insurer. The insurer does not intervene in 
mediation.81 
Regarding medical accidents, the insurer must pay benefits on the basis 
of MATA conclusions.82 As far as medical errors are concerned, damages will 
be determined in the light of mediation agreements through people’s 
mediation or court judgements.83 
A cap of 100,000 yuan to 1 million yuan is placed on damages per 
capita per accident and a cap of 100,000 yuan to 6 million yuan is imposed on 
damages per year.84  
2.3.8. A Comparison and Contrast 
The similarities and differences of the foregoing six local MLI schemes are 
summarised in Table 5.5 as follows. 
 
78 Chen 2013, p. 164. 
79 Id. 
80 Lin et al. 2016, p. 69. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Chen 2013, p. 146. 
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Table 5.5: Six Representative Local MLI Schemes in China 
 Yunnan 
Province 
Shanghai 
City 
Beijing City Shenzhen 
City 
Ningbo 
City 
Nanjing 
City 
Year of 
Commen-
cement 
1998 2002 2004 2004 2008 2009 
MLI Mode - govern-
ment 
initiated 
- commer-
cial MLI 
- compul-
sory 
- occurrence 
coverage 
- govern-
ment 
initiated 
- commer-
cial MLI 
- voluntary 
- claims-
made with 
an ERP of 2 
years 
- govern-
ment 
initiated 
- commer-
cial MLI 
- compul-
sory for all 
public 
medical 
institutions 
- claims-
made with 
an ERP 
- govern-
ment 
initiated 
- commer-
cial MLI 
- compul-
sory for all 
public 
medical 
institutions 
- claims-
made with 
an ERP 
- govern-
ment 
initiated 
- commer-
cial MLI 
- compul-
sory for all 
public 
medical 
institutions 
- claims-
made with 
an ERP 
- govern-
ment 
initiated 
- commer-
cial MLI 
- compul-
sory for all 
Level Two 
or Three 
public 
medical 
institutions 
- claims-
made with 
an ERP 
The Insured - medical 
institutions 
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
institutions 
Premium 
Payers 
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
staff 
members 
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
staff 
members 
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
staff 
members 
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
staff 
members 
(risk 
savings) 
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
staff 
members  
- medical 
institutions 
- medical 
staff 
members  
Criteria for 
Calculating 
Premiums 
for 
Institutions 
- number of 
ward beds  
- number of 
ward beds 
- types of 
institutions 
- choice of 
caps 
- number of 
ward beds 
- types of 
institutions 
- output of 
medical 
services 
- types of 
institutions 
- unknown - number of 
ward beds 
Criteria for 
Calculating 
Premiums 
for Staff  
- specialities 
- positions 
- jobs 
- types of 
institutions 
- specialities 
- jobs 
- types of 
institutions 
- specialities - unknown - specialities 
Experience 
Rating 
- no - adjusted in 
light of the 
loss ratio of 
the previous 
year 
- unknown - no - unknown - yes 
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Scope of 
Coverage 
- medical 
accidents 
- medical 
errors*  
- medical 
accidents 
- non-
pecuniary 
damages 
excluded 
- costs of 
reducing 
the 
consequenc
es of an 
accident 
- litigation 
costs, 
attorney 
fees 
- clinical 
negligence 
(medical 
accidents + 
errors) 
- non-
pecuniary 
damages 
included 
- litigation 
costs 
- medical 
accidents 
- medical 
errors 
- medical 
mishaps 
- medical 
accidents 
- medical 
mishaps 
- medical 
accidents 
- medical 
errors 
- medical 
mishaps 
Deductibles - 5% (with 
a cap of 
5,000 yuan) 
- no - unknown - no - 10,000 
yuan 
- no 
Co-Insurance - no - no - no - yes - no - no 
Caps on 
Insurance 
Benefits 
- yes - yes - yes - no  
- yes 
(several 
years later) 
- yes - yes 
Dispute 
Resolution** 
- no special 
mechanism 
- PICC 
Shanghai 
MLI Centre 
- two 
Mediation 
Centres 
- no special 
mechanism 
- people’s 
mediation 
- a claims 
handling 
centre 
- people’s 
mediation 
* Coverage for liability for medical errors was abolished after the implementation of the AR-Medical 
Accidents 2002. 
** By the AR-Medical Accidents 2002, there are three ways of medical dispute resolution that apply to 
all local jurisdictions in China: (1) negotiation, (2) administrative mediation, and (3) litigation. In this 
row, only dispute resolution mechanisms other than the preceding three are listed. 
 
These six schemes share certain similarities. First, all of them were initiated 
by the government and are underwritten by commercial insurance 
companies. Second, the sole insured under the MLI contract is the medical 
institution, although medical staff members should contribute to part of the 
premium. Third, all of them cover liability for medical accidents – clinical 
negligence with an obvious personal injury. Fourth, all of them (at least 
ultimately) place caps on insurance benefits.  
Be that as it may, they differ in several aspects. First, not all of them 
are claims-made coverage. While most of them are claims-made with an ERP, 
the Yunnan scheme seems to be occurrence coverage. Second, not all of them 
are compulsory. Whereas most of them are compulsory insurance schemes (at 
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least for part of public hospitals), the Shanghai scheme adopts the voluntary 
approach. Third, not all of them employ the same criteria for determining 
premiums. As far as premiums for hospitals are concerned, although most of 
the schemes are based on the number of ward beds, the Shenzhen scheme 
takes the output of medical services as one of the criteria. Regarding 
premiums for individual providers, while most of the schemes take into 
account specialities, some also consider the types of hospitals. Fourth, not all 
of them have adopted experience ratings. Only the Shanghai and Nanjing 
schemes have expressly employed experience ratings. Fifth, not all of the 
schemes cover “liability for medical mishaps.” Whereas the Shenzhen, 
Ningbo, and Nanjing schemes provide cover for medical mishaps (non-
negligent AEs), the other schemes restrict cover to negligent AEs (medical 
accidents, medical errors, or clinical negligence). Sixth, not all of the schemes 
impose deductibles. Only the Yunnan and Ningbo schemes seem to adopt a 
deductible. Seventh, most of them do not employ co-insurance. Only the 
Shenzhen scheme splits damages between negligent providers and the 
insurer. Eighth, not all of them have established a special mechanism for 
medical dispute resolution. Only in Shanghai, Beijing, Ningbo, and Nanjing, 
there are some claims mediation and handling centres or people’s mediation 
commissions that may facilitate dispute resolution. 
Some of the other local jurisdictions than these six have implemented 
similar MLI schemes since 2007.85 Overall, however, MLI is rather under-
developed in China. Some empirical data show that by the end of 2013, only 
30,000 medical institutions had purchased MLI policies, representing less 
than 10% of all medical institutions in China.86 As mentioned above, there 
seems to be a contraction of the MLI market in Yunnan, Shanghai, and 
Beijing, although both the Yunnan and the Beijing schemes are claimed to be 
compulsory. In some other localities, no single MLI policy had ever been sold 
for almost a decade.87  
2.4. DISCUSSION 
After examining some local MLI schemes in China, one may wonder why it is 
still so underdeveloped in China and what solutions are already discussed. 
 
85 In 2007, the then MoH of China, together with the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) and the State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, 
enacted the DR-Promotion of MLI 2007 (China) and encouraged local experiments of MLI 
nationwide.  
86 Dong 2014, p. 17. 
87 Id. 
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This Section will try to explain the barriers that may prevent Chinese MLI 
schemes from developing well as follows:  
- Although many local MLI schemes require that at least public hospitals 
must purchase MLI policies, it is difficult to enforce this obligation. 
According to art. 184, para. of the Insurance Law 2009, compulsory 
insurance must be provided for by national laws or administrative 
regulations. In China, however, no national law or administrative 
regulation has ever provided that MLI shall be compulsory insurance. 
Currently, all local MLI schemes are based on local government orders, 
most of which do not specify any sanction. One exception is the Yunnan 
scheme, under which hospitals that fail to purchase MLI policies shall 
be subject to license revocation. However, this sanction has not been 
imposed in practice.88 In effect, if hospitals refuse to purchase MLI 
policies, the public health authorities currently cannot force hospitals to 
fulfil the obligation.89 
- Large hospitals are not willing to purchase MLI policies. First, large 
hospitals often have to pay considerable premiums, which may exceed 
the insurance benefits. For instance, one Level Three hospital in Beijing 
paid 1.9 million yuan as the premium while the insurer only paid about 
600,000 yuan as insurance benefits in that year,90 representing only 
31.58% of the premium. Hence, large hospitals may prefer self-
insurance rather than MLI. Second, not all insurance companies are 
willing or able to provide mediation services. One important motive for 
hospitals to purchase MLI is that they want to free themselves from 
handling medical disputes.91 In practice, however, many insurance 
companies do not provide such a service. One hospital manager even 
said, “If we still have to face conflicts between doctors and patients or 
Yi-Nao incidents after we have already purchased MLI policies, why do 
we need insurance companies?”92 
- Some hospitals want to conceal medical accidents. As addressed before, 
hospitals and individual providers may be subject to administrative 
punishments or even criminal penalties in cases where a severe medical 
accident occurs.93 These sanctions may adversely affect hospital 
accreditation, promotion, and reputation of physicians. Hence, hospitals 
 
88 Tan 2008, pp. 249-250. 
89 Chen 2013, p. 2. 
90 Dong 2014, p. 18. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3. 
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and physicians are induced to conceal medical accidents and try to settle 
the dispute in private even when they are not at fault.94 However, these 
behind-the-scenes settlements are often excluded from MLI coverage.95 
Therefore, these hospitals would opt for self-insurance rather than MLI. 
- Many insurance companies are not willing to sell MLI policies because 
of considerable uncertainty over legal standards. As described before, 
for the period 2002-2009, two parallel regimes of medical malpractice 
liability had existed.96 After the implementation of the new Tort Law 
2009, there are still two parallel expert ascertainment systems that may 
result in different outcomes. Hence, insurance companies often find it 
difficult to determine the frequency and severity of malpractice claims, 
which makes the calculation of premiums very arbitrary.97 Due to a lack 
of data on true claims history, they can only base premiums on some 
rough indicators such as the number of ward beds, types of hospitals, or 
specialities.  
The under-development of MLI market in China suggests that in a significant 
proportion of the cases, victimised patients still obtain compensation directly 
from hospitals.  
3. OTHER COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In many European legal systems, social security plays a primary role 
regarding compensation for victims of medical malpractice98 In some 
jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Nordic countries, a no-fault insurance 
scheme provides extensive cover for iatrogenic injuries.99 One may wonder, 
besides the fault-based medical malpractice liability and MLI, whether there 
are any alternative regimes that may cover at least part of a victimised 
patient’s losses. 
In China, losses suffered by victimised patients may be covered by 
some private insurance schemes and social security schemes. I will address 
 
94 Dong & Zhao 2015, p. 545. 
95 Id. 
96 See supra Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
97 Dong & Zhao 2015, p. 544. 
98 See generally Magnus, 2003a. 
99 See generally Dute, Faure & Koziol 2004. 
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the role of private health insurance and social security schemes that are 
relevant to victimised patients in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 respectively. 
Section 3.4. will discuss the relationship between social security and tort law 
in China. 
3.2. PRIVATE INSURANCE 
3.2.1. Private Health Insurance 
In China, private/commercial health insurance is a voluntary regime, which 
is a necessary supplement to social medical insurance (BMIS).100 Although the 
BMIS covers a large part of the population, the coverage for the expenses of 
some high-priced services may be rather limited. With the progressive 
increase in medical expenses101 and demand for diverse medical care, the 
BMIS is obviously unable to satisfy people’s needs. Thus, commercial health 
insurance has begun to grow very fast recently in China. Private health 
insurance aims to provide benefits that are not covered by the BMIS. Private 
health insurance is governed by the Insurance Law 2009 rather than the 
Social Insurance Law 2010.  
Currently, the role played by private health insurance in the Chinese 
health care system is quite limited. In 2012, a total of 86.3 billion commercial 
health insurance premiums was earned, with a year-on-year growth of 25%, 
which was faster than any other kind of personal insurance.102 By the end of 
2012, more than 50 million people had been covered by commercial health 
insurance in China.103 However, private health insurance only covered a 
small proportion (3.57%) of the whole population (almost 1.4 billion104). 
Hence, most Chinese patients primarily rely on the BMIS to cover their 
medical expenses.  
3.2.2. Medical Mishap Insurance 
Potential victims may also purchase private insurance against loss through 
accidental bodily injury or death. In the context of treatment, patients may 
purchase the so-called “medical mishap insurance” (医疗意外险). In practice, 
 
100 For a basic description of the financing of the BMIS, see supra Chapter 2, Section 3. 
101 See infra Section 3.5. 
102 Wang, P. 2014, p. 9. 
103 Yuan 2013, p. 118. 
104 According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China 2016, by the end of 2012, the total 
population in China had reached 1,354,040,000.  
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some hospitals tried to persuade patients to buy “surgical mishap insurance” 
(手术意外险) with a view to covering losses that are not caused by fault on 
the part of hospitals.105 However, many patients refuse to purchase this 
insurance and thus the market for surgical mishap insurance is rather under-
developed.106 
As mentioned before,107 in some Chinese cities (e.g. Shenzhen, Ningbo, 
and Nanjing), hospitals began to purchase medical mishap insurance for the 
benefit of patients. Why are these hospitals so benevolent toward their 
patients? Because hospitals want to resolve medical disputes as quickly as 
possible and safeguard themselves against Yi Nao incidents by paying injured 
patients a sum of compensation irrespective of whether they are at fault or 
not. Compared to disturbances caused by Yi Nao incidents, hospitals may well 
find it worthwhile to pay premiums for medical mishap insurance. Hence, it 
is striking to find that although Chinese tort law adopts the fault-based 
medical malpractice liability, meaning that hospitals cannot be held liable for 
non-negligent iatrogenic injuries, some hospitals in practice are “coerced” 
into purchasing medical mishap insurance for the benefit of patients in order 
to avoid Yi Nao incidents.  
3.3. SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES 
3.3.1. Introduction 
In China, the two most significant social security schemes are social 
insurance108 and social assistance.109 The Chinese social insurance system 
consists of basic pension insurance, basic medical insurance (BMIS), work-
related injury insurance, unemployment insurance, and maternity insurance, 
ensuring the rights of citizens to receive material assistance in old age, 
sickness, work-related injury, unemployment, and maternity from the State 
and society.110 The social assistance system is intended to guarantee the basic 
livelihood of citizens when they are relatively or extremely poor, when they 
suffer from natural disasters, when they cannot afford medical care, 
education, housing, etc.111 
 
105 Li, T. 2014. 
106 Id. 
107 See generally supra Section 2.3. 
108 See generally Social Insurance Law 2010 (China). 
109 See generally AR- Social Assistance 2014 (China). 
110 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 2. 
111 See generally AR- Social Assistance 2014 (China). 
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Not all of these schemes are relevant to victims of medical malpractice 
so only social security schemes that may cover medical expenses and lost 
future earnings will be addressed in Section 3.3.2 and Section 3.3.3 
respectively. Section 3.3.4 will give a summary and evaluation of these social 
security schemes in the light of compensation for damage caused by medical 
malpractice 
3.3.2. Social Security Schemes Covering Medical Expenses 
3.3.2.1. The Basic Medical Insurance Schemes 
The benefits under the BMIS are limited: only those expenses that are 
covered by the BMIS Drug Catalogue (基本医疗保险药品目录), the BMIS 
Treatment Items (基本医疗保险诊疗项目), and BMIS Medical Service 
Facilities (基本医疗保险医疗服务设施), and expenses for emergency 
treatment or rescue are compensable.112 The expenses payable under the 
BMIS are directly paid by the Social Insurance Agencies (hereinafter SIA) 
from the Basic Medical Insurance Funds (hereinafter BMIF) to the Designated 
Medical Institutions (hereinafter DMI).113 If patients intend to receive 
medical services that are outside the cover under the BMIS, they have to pay 
in cash for the expenses of these services or purchase private health insurance 
to cover these expenses. Even within the cover under the BMIS, insurance 
benefits may not make up for the whole medical expenses in that there are 
various deductibles and caps applicable to different categories of the insured, 
different levels of hospitals, different types of treatment, and different 
localities. For instance, on average only about 75% of the expenses of medical 
services that are covered by the BMIS are compensable in Shaanxi Province 
in 2015.114  
Currently, nationwide, about 40% of all medical expenses are paid by 
patients out of pocket on average.115 The direct implication of the fact that 
patients in China currently have to pay out-of-pocket medical expenses 
which are equal to about 40% of the total cost of medical services is that they 
still have a strong incentive to file a tort claim against hospitals for increased 
treatment costs due to medical malpractice. The higher the price, the stronger 
the incentive. 
 
112 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 28. 
113 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 29. 
114 Chinese Government Network 2016. 
115 See infra Section 3.5. 
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3.3.2.2. The Urban-Rural Medical Assistance System 
There are still some extremely vulnerable groups, i.e. urban or rural residents 
where the average income of family members living together is lower than 
the local standard for guaranteeing minimum subsistence 
(城乡低保家庭成员),116 rural dependents who are aged, disabled or under the 
age of 16 (农村五保户)117 and other family members who are in financial 
difficulties (其他经济困难家庭人员).118 In addition to the BMIS, those groups 
should be covered by the Urban-Rural Medical Assistance System 
(hereinafter URMAS), which is an important type of social assistance.119 
There are several ways of medical assistance. Premiums under the 
BMIUR and the NRCMC may be fully paid by the government directly.120 
The out-of-pocket expenses of basic medical care that are not covered by the 
BMIUR or NRCMC and are unaffordable for the vulnerable groups may also 
be partly subsidised by the Urban-Rural Medical Assistance Funds 
(hereinafter URMAF).121 Finance for the URMAF comes from channels such 
as public finance and budgeting, public welfare funds from lottery and 
donation.122 A large population of poor patients benefit from the URMAF. In 
2014, a total of 17.02 million patients received full government subsidies on 
BMIUR premiums (95.18 yuan per capita), 50.22 million patients obtained 
full subsidies on NRCMC premiums (64.32 yuan per capita), and 239,53 
million patients were granted partial subsidies on the out-of-pocket expenses 
by the URMAF (80.21 yuan per capita).123 
 
116 AR-Minimum Subsistence for Urban Residents 1999 (China), art. 2, para. 1; AR-Minimum 
Subsistence for Rural Residents 2007 (China), art. 3, para. 2. 
117 AR-Five Guarantees 2006 (China), art. 6. To be specific, “five guarantees” means providing 
those vulnerable rural villagers with “care and material support in their daily lives in 
terms of food, clothing, housing, medical care and burial expenses.” 
118 According to DR-Medical Assistance System 2009 (China), art. 2, para. 1, these other 
family members specifically refer to seriously ill patients living in a low-income family 
and other members who are suffering special hardships defined by the local government.  
119 Id. 
120 AR-Social Assistance 2014 (China), art. 29, para. 1. 
121 DR-Medical Assistance System 2009 (China), art. 2, para. 2; AR-Social Assistance 2014 
(China), art. 29, para. 2. 
122 DR-Medical Assistance Funds 2013 (China), art. 2. 
123 National Health and Family Planning Commission 2015, p. 336. 
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3.3.3. Social Security Schemes Covering Other Losses 
3.3.3.1. Basic Pension Insurance 
In China, all employees must participate in the basic pension insurance 
scheme (hereinafter BPIS), the premium of which is jointly paid by 
employers and employees.124 Individuals under the BPIS, who have paid 
premiums for over fifteen cumulative years when reaching the statutory 
retirement age, receive a monthly basic pension.125 A victim of medical 
malpractice who is also retired is certainly eligible for receiving an old-age 
pension. By the end of 2014, about 80% of the population has been covered 
under the BPIS.126 
For individuals participating in the BPIS pass away due to illness or 
non-work-related reasons such as medical malpractice, their dependents can 
receive funeral subsidies (about 4,000 yuan) and survivor’s pensions (about 
ten months of the deceased’s salaries).127 
If these individuals under the BPIS lose their earning capacity 
completely due to illness or non-work-related reasons such as medical 
malpractice before reaching the statutory retirement age, they can receive 
incapacity benefits (病残津贴).128 Incapacity benefits are a new regime which 
was unavailable before 2010. So far, it has been unclear how much benefits 
the incapacitated could receive. However, at least one thing is clear: rural 
residents and unemployed urban residents may not be eligible for incapacity 
benefits. 
3.3.3.2. Minimum Subsistence Guarantee and Support of the Especially Poor 
In case a household’s per capita income is lower than the local minimum 
subsistence standard, the State will grant the household some benefits to 
maintain the local minimum subsistence standard.129 In Nanjing, for instance, 
the guaranteed minimum subsistence standard was 660 yuan per month for 
both urban and rural residents in 2015.130  
Also, the state grants benefits to individuals if they are especially poor 
due to incapacity, young or old age and there is no person who is under a 
 
124 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 10, para. 1. 
125 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 16, para. 1. 
126 Bai 2015. 
127 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 17. 
128 Id. 
129 AR-Social Assistance 2014 (China), art. 9. 
130 Civil Affairs Bureau of Jiangning District of Nanjing Municipal 2015. 
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statutory obligation to maintain them.131 The support of the especially poor 
includes (1) providing basic living conditions, (2) looking after those who 
cannot take care of themselves, (3) providing disease treatment, and (4) 
handling funeral matters.132 
In a case where a patient becomes poor because of medical 
malpractice, he/she will be eligible for the foregoing social assistance if all the 
conditions are satisfied.  
3.3.4. Summary and Evaluation 
Medical expenses and foregone future earnings due to incapacity or death 
normally represent the lion’s share of pecuniary losses suffered by a victim of 
an accident. In China, several social security schemes may provide a 
minimum level of coverage for these pecuniary losses, no matter whether 
they are caused by accidents, diseases, or poverty. As far as treatment costs 
are concerned, the BMIS provides patients with cover against medical 
expenses, and those patients who are extremely financially vulnerable are 
covered under the URMAS. When it comes to foregone future earnings, the 
BPIS provides the dependents of a deceased employee with funeral subsidies 
and survivor’s pensions, and those employees who are completely 
incapacitated may receive incapacity benefits. Poor patients may also receive 
social assistance from the State. 
That being said, there is one essential difference between the tort 
system and social security – while the former is intended to make a victim 
whole again (full compensation), the latter will only provide a minimum level 
of compensation for the purpose of maintaining a minimum livelihood. For 
instance, on average not all but only about 60% of medical expenses are 
covered under the BMIS. Poor citizens will be maintained by the State at the 
minimum subsistence level rather than a higher level of livelihood. Also, not 
all citizens are covered by social security schemes equally. Rural residents and 
unemployed urban residents usually receive less social insurance benefits 
than those who are employed. Furthermore, compensation for non-pecuniary 
losses is only possible under tort law. 
Overall, we may conclude that many victims of medical malpractice in 
China do benefit from the development of various social security schemes in 
that they may receive compensation for part of their pecuniary losses much 
more quickly. Those patients who are eligible for social security benefits do 
not have to file a lawsuit which may be costly and time-consuming in order 
 
131 AR-Social Assistance 2014 (China), art. 14. 
132 AR-Social Assistance 2014 (China), art. 15, para. 1. 
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to receive compensation. However, these social security benefits may be 
fairly modest when compared to full compensation under tort law, and many 
rural or unemployed victims may not be eligible for these benefits. Hence, 
unlike victims in many European countries, victims of medical malpractice in 
China may still rely heavily on tort law to obtain compensation for iatrogenic 
injuries. 
3.4. RELATIONSHIP WITH TORT LAW 
In China, private insurance and most social security schemes described above 
are parallel to the tort system, meaning benefits paid to victims under these 
schemes will not be deducted from medical malpractice claims. In other 
words, the collateral-source rule133 in principle applies to cases where both 
social security benefits and tort damages are available.  
However, there is one exception – medical expenses that should be 
compensated by a third-party (e.g. a tortfeasor) will not be covered by the 
BMIS.134 Where the medical expenses are assumed by a third party but the 
third party fails to pay, the medical expenses should be prepaid from the basic 
medical insurance funds (BMIF), who in turn should be entitled to be 
reimbursed by the third party after prepayment (subrogation).135 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 5 addressed several compensation mechanisms that may be 
alternatives to tort law in China. On closer examination, it was found that 
none of these mechanisms are true alternatives. MLI is directly built on top of 
the tort system. The eligibility for and the amount of MLI benefits is often 
determined in light of medical malpractice liability and quantum rules. As far 
as social security schemes are concerned, they only provide some groups of 
victims with a minimum level of compensation rather than with full 
compensation. Therefore, we may conclude that the tort system is still 
indispensable to victims of medical malpractice in China. 
 
133 The collateral-source rule, also termed collateral-benefit rule, denotes the “doctrine that if 
an injured party receives compensation for the injuries from a source independent of the 
tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the damages that the tortfeasor must 
pay” and insurance proceeds are “the most common collateral source.” Garner 2014. 
134 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 30, para. 1. 
135 Social Insurance Law 2010 (China), art. 30, para. 2. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A DOCTRINAL EVALUATION AND 
TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After describing all the Chinese legal remedies related to medical quality 
assurance and victim compensation, one may wonder how these systems 
perform. However, before conducting any meaningful evaluation, one needs 
to make clear the benchmarks against which the legal remedies will be 
evaluated.  
There are at least three doctrinal benchmarks that are widely used in 
China – legal certainty, effectiveness, and fairness, which are defined as 
follows: 
- Legal certainty. Legal certainty is essential to the principle “treat like 
cases alike” and legal effectiveness. To guarantee legal certainty, at least 
two conditions must be met: (1) legal concepts and rules must be as 
unequivocal and as clear as possible, and different legal rules must not 
conflict with or contradict one another;1 and (2) the procedures and 
criteria for fact finding must be clear and consistent.2 
- Effectiveness. Each legal rule may have its own functions to fulfil. 
Lawmakers enact certain statutes because they intend to achieve some 
goals. A certain legal rule is said to be effective if it achieves its 
legislative goals in practice.3 A legal rule is de facto if not de jure invalid 
if it is ineffective at fulfilling its functions.  
 
1 Yu 2009, p. 70. 
2 Cao 2004, p. 16. 
3 Zhang, W. 2011, p. 49. 
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- Fairness or justice. As the saying goes, “Ius est ars boni et aequi,” i.e. the 
“law is the art of good order and justice.”4 In China, legal scholars also 
generally recognised that the most important value of the law is to 
achieve justice.5 As far as tort law is concerned, most Chinese tort 
scholars maintain that the basic rationale behind tort law is corrective 
justice, i.e. tortfeasors ought to restore victims to their pre-accident 
situations through compensation.6 In order words, tort law is intended 
to provide victims with fair and adequate compensation.7 This goal is 
also stressed by art. 1 of the Tort Law 2009 as victim protection – “to 
protect the legitimate rights and interests of parties in civil law 
relationships.” Therefore, the compensation function of tort law in 
China is generally considered to be a means to an end – corrective 
justice.8 In order for tort law to achieve corrective justice, two general 
requirements must be met: first, “legal doctrine (inputs) must embody 
basic principles of corrective justice;” and second, “the operation of the 
liability regime (outputs) must in practice provide for the initiation and 
proper disposition of legitimate claims and for the payment of 
appropriate damages to successful plaintiffs by wrongful defendants.”9 
In the next section, we will see how legal remedies in China work from the 
above traditional legal perspective. 
2. DOCTRINAL EVALUATION 
2.1. THE REGULATORY QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM 
China has enacted strict licensing rules for both medical institutions and 
individual providers.10 These rules are largely clear and certain, and they are 
 
4 Zippelius 2008, p. 13. 
5 Zhang, W. 2011, p. 273. 
6 See generally Tan & Yang 2009; Sun 2011; Yang, G. 2013. 
7 Ding 2012, p. 187. 
8 Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock made a clear distinction between the goal of compensation 
and that of corrective justice. According to them, tort law is for compensation in the sense 
that tort law can be regarded as “an important source of disability insurance.” Dewees, 
Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 112. In contrast, corrective justice means that tort law is 
intended to “ensure that culpable defendants compensate wrongfully insured patients.” 
Id., 1996, p. 117. In China, however, tort scholars seldom view tort law as an “insurance” 
scheme. They normally regard compensation as a means to achieve corrective justice. 
9 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, pp. 117-118. 
10 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4. 
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enforced directly by the government. One exception is the ambiguous 
concept of “serious irresponsibility,” which is one of the requirements of 
imposing the Crime of Medical Accidents (CMA) on culpable providers.11 
There is generally no concern about justice or fairness, except for input 
controls on the entry of different individual providers. The law imposes 
criminal penalties on unlicensed doctors while it shows leniency towards 
unlicensed nurses and pharmacists.12 If unlicensed nurses or pharmacists may 
equally pose a threat to patient safety, why should they not be punished as 
severely as unlicensed doctors?  
Perhaps the greatest worry for the regulatory quality assurance system 
is under-enforcement, which may significantly impede the goal of effective 
quality assurance. First, some evidence shows that the black market where 
clinics and unqualified doctors practise without a license is persistent in 
China, especially in rural and suburban areas.13 This suggests that at least in 
some areas, the licensing law for medical practice may be substantially under-
enforced. Second, the hospital accreditation system has been suspended 
several times,14 which challenges the soundness and effectiveness of hospital 
accreditation. Third, the Periodical Doctor Assessment (PDA) is primarily a 
written examination that tests knowledge rather than professional 
performance and ethics,15 which may not be effective in assuring the quality 
of care. Fourth, Medical Quality-Safety Incidents (MQSI) are considerably 
under-reported,16 which may account for many instances of under-
enforcement. Fifth, to hospitals that do not care about accreditation, the 
newly developed regime of regulatory threats does not seem to be effective.17 
2.2. THE VICTIM COMPENSATION SYSTEM: INPUT 
ANALYSIS 
2.2.1. Liability Rules 
As far as the law in books is concerned, there is great uncertainty over many 
legal concepts and rules. For example, the standard of care applying to 
 
11 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.2.1. 
12 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.2.2. 
13 Id. 
14 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.1.2. 
15 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.2.2. 
16 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.3.1. 
17 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.3.2. 
 
 
200 Intersentia 
Part I. Legal Remedies for Medical Malpractice in China
technical malpractice (“then medical standard”),18 the one applying to 
disclosure malpractice,19 and causation20 have not been defined by the Tort 
Law 2009, and whether equitable liability will be applicable to medical 
disputes is uncertain. However, when we turn our gaze from law in books to 
law in action, we will find that Chinese courts have developed their own 
approaches to resolving these problems. They interpret the “then medical 
standard” as a combination of statutory written norms and unwritten 
customary practices.21 They apply the “double-test doctrine” as the standard 
for information disclosure.22 They even apply both proportional liability and 
the lost chance doctrine to cases where factual causation is highly 
indeterminate.23 They do not widely apply equitable liability to medical 
dispute cases but seem to restrict it to cases where patients are injured due to 
substandard blood, but neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is at fault.24  
Most of the preceding fault-based rules of medical malpractice liability 
are compatible with principles of corrective justice, except for equitable 
liability and the “channelling of liability.”25 From the perspective of 
corrective justice, it is difficult to explain why the defendant-hospital may be 
held liable in some cases where neither the defendant nor the plaintiff is at 
fault, and why individual medical staff members should not be held liable 
jointly and severally even when they are negligent.  
2.2.2. Quantum Rules 
Legal uncertainty over quantum rules that was once considerable has been 
eliminated by the Tort Law 2009.26 Now, article 16 (recoverable heads of 
pecuniary damages) and article 22 (criteria for non-pecuniary damages) of the 
Tort Law, together with the JI-Personal Injury 2003 (detailed methods of 
measuring pecuniary damages) and the JI-Emotional Damage 2001 (detailed 
criteria for non-pecuniary damages), apply to all kinds of tortious medical 
cases (and all other personal injury cases) equally.  
That being said, quantum rules in China may not be regarded as fair 
enough for corrective justice. First, compensation for wrongful disability and 
death is systematically capped by an arbitrary period of 20 years, which is 
 
18 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2. 
19 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
20 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3. 
21 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.3.1. 
22 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.3.2. 
23 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.4. 
24 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.5. 
25 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.1. 
26 See supra Chapter 3, Section 2. 
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significantly unfair on young victims.27 Second, the assessment of non-
pecuniary losses should take into account several factors that have nothing to 
do with emotional distress suffered by victims28 and an arbitrary cap of 50,000 
yuan has been imposed by the court in practice,29 both of which are unfair to 
victims. Third, a severely disabled patient often receives much more damages 
than close relatives of a deceased patient.30 This may imply that the value of 
life is lower than the value of health, which may go against many people’s 
feeling of justice. Fourth, the law sets different compensation criteria for rural 
and urban residents.31 This means that even when several victims are injured 
or killed in the same accident, urban victims may receive higher 
compensation than rural victims, which may indicate that the value of life or 
health of urban residents is higher than that of rural residents.32 
2.3. THE VICTIM COMPENSATION SYSTEM: OUTPUT 
ANALYSIS 
2.3.1. Claims Initiation 
Currently in China, data on the ratio of the number of medical malpractice 
claims initiated to the total number of negligent AEs are unavailable. Neither 
could such data be generated from the analysis of court decisions or semi-
structured interviews. Hence, any discussion on medical malpractice claims 
initiation in China is highly speculative. What we now know is that only a 
small proportion (less than 20%) of medical malpractice claims are resolved 
through litigation and a large proportion of claims are settled through 
behind-the-scenes negotiation or people’s mediation.33 Many of these medical 
disputes resolved out of court are associated with violent Yi Nao incidents.34 
It seems that whenever a patient suffers severe injury after treatment, the 
patient or his/her close relatives will attempt to negotiate with the hospital in 
 
27 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2.3. 
28 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.3.2. 
29 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.6. 
30 Id. 
31 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2.2. 
32 Interestingly art. 17 of the Tort Law 2009 provides that “where the same tort causes the 
death of several persons, a uniform amount of death compensation may be determined.” 
However, the Tort Law has not specified whether the rural criteria or the urban criteria 
shall apply. Moreover, art. 17 does not seem useful for victims of medical malpractice, 
since there is often only one victim involved in a medical malpractice case. 
33 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.8.1. 
34 See supra Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2; Chapter 4, Section 3.8.2. 
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order to obtain some compensation. Hence, in case a medical error is severe 
or easily identifiable, the rate of claims initiation should not be low.  
That being said, many factors may prevent victims of medical 
malpractice from initiating claims. First, there is the problem of “claims 
consciousness,” because it is sometimes difficult for victimised patients to 
identify that their injuries are due to medical errors or that they have suffered 
iatrogenic injuries.35 Second, due to the high transaction costs (litigation costs, 
legal fees, ascertainment fees, or the risks of being punished because of 
adopting the Yi Nao approach), many victimised patients do not think it 
worthwhile to initiate claims. Third, part of the victim’s losses may well be 
covered by other collateral sources such as health insurance, pension benefits, 
and social assistance.36 
2.3.2. Claims Disposition 
In general, Chinese courts rely heavily on expert testimony to decide essential 
issues such as fault, causation, and the scope of liability, since judges as 
medical laymen cannot conduct peer review and handle scientific issues. The 
well-organised expert witness system in China may help in guaranteeing the 
accuracy of the settlement of claims.37 However, detailed empirical evidence 
on the accuracy of claims disposition is currently unavailable.  
Nonetheless, several factors may reduce the accuracy of claims 
disposition and generate more legal uncertainty in China. First, the double 
tracks of the expert witness system – the MATAS and the JAS38 – often lead to 
inconsistency and contradictions with respect to both fact finding and legal 
application. Second, since clinical expert witnesses are often high-ranking 
physicians from high-level hospitals, they may be likely, more often than not, 
to establish fault when they are reviewing the behaviour of low-ranking 
physicians or those from low-level hospitals.39 Third, more than 80% of 
claims are settled out of court, which “are almost certain to contain a 
significant margin of error.”40 It is often reported that, when facing Yi Nao 
incidents, hospitals give in and pay some damages not because they are at 
fault but because they want to restore hospital order as quickly as possible.41 
 
35 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 120. 
36 See generally Chapter 5. 
37 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.6. 
38 Id. 
39 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.2. 
40 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 120. 
41 See supra Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2; Chapter 4, Section 3.8.2. 
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Victimised patients normally obtain only one quarter of what they would 
otherwise obtain in court.42 
The heavy burden of time on victims is considerable. It normally takes 
a longer time for victims of medical malpractice than other types of victims to 
obtain compensation through litigation.43 This is unfair on victims of medical 
malpractice, since “compensation long after the occurrence of the injury is 
undoubtedly inadequate in terms of making the plaintiff whole again.”44 If 
they want to obtain compensation more quickly, they may choose alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR). However, they will face another type of unfairness 
– their claims will be considerably reduced compared to statutory quantum 
rules.  
2.3.3. Liability Insurance 
Liability insurance may attenuate the “moral significance of the damage 
award as a vehicle for corrective justice,”45 since liability insurers may 
represent the defendant throughout the process of dispute resolution and 
directly pay damages to the patient. Be that as it may, there should be little 
worry about this issue in China, since medical liability insurance (MLI) is 
rather under-developed (covering less than 10% of all hospitals) for the time 
being.46 
3. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. A SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINAL EVALUATIONS 
From traditional legal perspectives, the current Chinese legal remedies have 
been evaluated for medical quality assurance and victim compensation. As far 
as the regulatory medical quality assurance system is concerned, although 
regulatory standards are largely clear and certain, they may be under-
enforced for many reasons and unfair to some actors in the medical profession 
in some cases. When it comes to the input system of victim compensation, 
although liability rules are largely consistent with principles of corrective 
 
42 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.6. 
43 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.7.1. 
44 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 121. 
45 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 425. 
46 See supra Chapter 5, Section 2. 
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justice,47 quantum rules are relatively unfair for several reasons.48 Regarding 
the output of the victim compensation system, liability insurance in China 
does not seem to attenuate the moral significance of corrective justice.49 
However, a speculated low rate of claims initiation,50 and the actual delays in 
malpractice litigation51 suggest that there may be a wide gap between 
conceptual purity of corrective justice and actual victim protection in 
practice.  
The preceding doctrinal approach to the analysis of the legal remedies 
is legitimate insofar as it can help to maintain legal certainty, legal 
effectiveness, and fairness of legal provisions (esp. fair compensation). The 
prevalence and popularity of the doctrinal approach in China, however, does 
not necessarily mean that it is flawless. 
This approach suffers from at least two major drawbacks. First, it pays 
full attention to the values of “fairness” or “justice” while it ignores 
“efficiency.” Of course, the law is closely associated with morality and should 
reflect socially accepted values. However, the definition of fairness or justice 
is ambiguous, and it is not the only value that law intends to realise. On the 
one hand, it is hard to define and compare different types of fairness or 
justice. To take the damage calculation method as an example: while it is 
claimed that the concrete method achieves corrective justice, it is also 
claimed that the standardised method attains social justice or distributive 
justice. Why is one type of justice more important than another? That the 
Supreme People’s Court prefers social justice to corrective justice when 
calculating compensation is an unconvincing reason. On the other hand, 
many other values such as efficiency are also socially desirable. Law is more 
and more considered to be an instrument that serves to achieve important 
social goals. 
Second, the application scope of the “Legal Methods” is rather limited. 
The so-called “Legal Methods” are actually the methods of understanding and 
interpreting legal provisions. They serve more the purpose of maintaining and 
fixing the existing legal system than innovating new concepts, rules, and 
institutions. Armed with legal methods, judges may feel more confident in 
applying the law and deciding cases correctly. However, a scholar may find it 
difficult to analyse or explain the impact of law on actors’ behaviour solely 
with the help of legal methods. Therefore, an inter-disciplinary approach may 
 
47 Equitable liability and the “channelling of liability” contradicts the idea of corrective 
justice. See supra Section 2.2.1. 
48 See supra Section 2.2.2. 
49 See supra Section 2.3.3. 
50 See supra Section 2.3.1. 
51 See supra Section 2.3.2. 
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be advisable in the sense that it helps lawyers to better understand the 
interaction between law and society. 
3.2. A CALL FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Medical malpractice incurs heavy costs. Empirical evidence shows that 
medical disputes are prevalent and have become more and more frequent in 
China, and more than half of these disputes concern harm caused by medical 
errors. National data on the costs of medical errors and the costs of 
prevention are rare.  
Nonetheless, we can catch a glimpse of the picture by examining the 
data from the Gulou District of Nanjing. For all the 416 medical cases with 
damage awards accepted from 2002 to 2013, the mean award is about 112,000 
yuan; the mean court fees for both parties are roughly 4,000 yuan, and 
attorneys usually charge each side more than 2,500 yuan. Thus, the cost of 
medical errors in the Gulou District is about 112,000 yuan per case, with an 
administrative cost of at least 9,000 yuan52 per case. These numbers are not 
low, given that the urban average per capita consumption expenditure in 
Jiangsu Province from 2002 to 2012 was about 11,000 yuan, and the rural one 
was only 5,000 yuan. This suggests that the money saved by the avoidance of 
an adverse event caused by medical malpractice can support a jobless urban 
resident or two unemployed rural residents for an entire year.  
Efficiency entails avoidance or reduction of the costs of medical errors. 
Tort law aims at protecting victims’ rights and interests by means of 
compensation. Be that as it may, there is no denying that “the best way of 
victim protection is to avoid victimisation in the first place.”53 This requires a 
new understanding of the functions of tort law. While many Chinese tort law 
scholars do mention the deterrent or preventive aspect of tort law, they 
usually treat deterrence as a by-product and rarely apply an economic 
analysis. While lawyers give great weight to the compensation function of 
tort law, economists place more value on the deterrence function.54 
Interestingly, the deterrence function is already highlighted by article 1 of 
the Tort Law (2009), which reads “this law has been formulated for the 
purposes of … preventing … tortious acts.”  
The remainder of the thesis will summarise the economic theories and 
empirical evidence concerning the prevention of medical errors and victim 
 
52 Administrative costs are the sum of court fees and attorney fees for both sides.  
53 Faure 2004a, p. 7. 
54 Id. 
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compensation and evaluate the Chinese legal remedies from the perspective 
of law and economics.  
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
In Part I, it was explained that China has developed various legal remedies for 
medical malpractice, such as regulation, the medical malpractice liability 
system, liability insurance, first-party insurance, and social security. 
However, these legal remedies are far from perfect and many problems such 
as under-enforcement, under-compensation, and Yi Nao incidents arise in 
practice. The primary goal of this thesis is to conduct an efficiency analysis of 
the Chinese legal remedies for medical malpractice. In order to be able to 
answer the second main research question, economic literature will now be 
examined. 
Specifically, Part II will deal with part of the second main question – 
Sub-question (2-a) – How should the legal remedies be structured in order to 
prevent medical malpractice and compensate victims for iatrogenic injuries 
efficiently in theory and have these theoretical predictions been tested? This 
question is approached in the light of Calabresi’s analytical framework for the 
analysis of accident law. According to Calabresi, the primary goal of accident 
law is to reduce the sum of expected accident costs and the costs of care 
(primary cost avoidance). The secondary goal is to reduce the social and 
economic dislocation suffered by victims when the accident nonetheless 
occurs (secondary cost avoidance). The tertiary goal is to reduce the costs 
incurred by the legal procedures for resolving disputes (tertiary cost 
avoidance). In addition to theoretical models, available empirical evidence 
that is used to test these models is also incorporated.  
The primary goal corresponds to the preventive or deterrent function 
of accident law. Chapter 7 is aimed at explaining how the medical 
malpractice system could be designed in order to generate ex ante incentives 
for health care providers to take optimal precautions. Based on empirical 
evidence from the US, Chapter 8 will answer the question whether the 
malpractice system can be cost-effective in practice as far as deterrence is 
concerned. Chapter 9 will explore the desirability of alternative solutions – 
the contractual approach and regulation – in the light of optimal deterrence. 
In these chapters, the main economic benchmarks are primary cost avoidance 
and tertiary cost avoidance. Issues of secondary cost avoidance are addressed 
separately in the following chapters. 
The secondary goal corresponds with the compensation function of 
accident law. Chapter 10 will address the fault-based compensation 
mechanisms, mainly including tort law and liability insurance. Chapter 11 
will discuss the desirability of medical compensation mechanisms not based 
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on fault liability which consist of first-party insurance, no-fault compensation 
funds, and social security. When evaluating these compensation mechanisms, 
not only secondary cost avoidance but also primary and tertiary cost 
avoidance will be taken into account. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PREVENTING MEDICAL ERRORS THROUGH 
TORT LAW – THEORETICAL MODELS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter is intended to answer the question how to prevent medical 
errors efficiently through tort law (part of Sub-question (2-a)). Calabresi 
divided the goal of accident law into three sub-goals: “primary cost 
avoidance” or prevention (to reduce the frequency and severity of accidents 
and the costs of precautions); “secondary cost avoidance” or compensation (to 
reduce the economic dislocation suffered by victims when an accident 
nonetheless happens; and “tertiary cost avoidance” (to reduce the costs of 
administering the systems that are intended to reduce primary or secondary 
costs).1 As far as error prevention is concerned, efficiency requires that 
Calabresi’s primary costs should be reduced without incurring too high 
tertiary costs.2 It should also be noted that this chapter will answer the 
research question from a theoretical point of view.3 
This Chapter will begin with a brief introduction to the economic 
model of tort law (Section 2). Since China adopts fault-based tort liability to 
deal with medical malpractice issues, particular attention will be paid to the 
economic model under negligence. In Section 3, the basic economic model of 
the negligence rule will be applied to medical malpractice issues, discussing 
how the malpractice system (incl. the standard of care, causation, rules of 
 
1 Calabresi 1970, pp. 26-31. For critical reviews of Calabresi’s theoretical framework, see e.g. 
Posner 1970; 2005. 
2 For issues of secondary cost avoidance (compensation) through liability insurance and no-
fault compensation schemes their impact on tort liability, see infra Chapter 10 and 
Chapter 11 respectively. 
3 For empirical evidence concerning whether tort law is effective at reducing medical errors 
efficiently, see infra Chapter 8. For alternative regimes aimed at error prevention, see infra 
Chapter 9.  
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evidence, the law of damages, and dispute resolution) should be designed so 
that both primary and tertiary accident costs could be minimised. The final 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. THE CLASSIC MODEL OF TORT LAW4 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The classic accident models of tort law attempt to explain how to minimise 
Calabresi’s primary accident costs.5 Calabresi took it “as axiomatic that the 
principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of 
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.”6 Later, Brown developed a 
unified economic model of liability which takes into account the care taking 
of the injurer and the victim simultaneously.7 In contrast, Shavell made a 
clear distinction between unilateral accidents (where only the injurer can 
affect accident risk) and bilateral accidents (where both the injurer and the 
victim can contribute to the occurrence of an accident) and analyses them 
separately.8 Moreover, Shavell took into account two kinds of decisions that 
may affect accident risk – care levels and activity levels. Injurers and victims 
have to decide not only “the degree of care to exercise when engaging in an 
activity” (care levels) but also “whether, or how much, to engage in a 
particular activity” (activity levels).9 
For the sake of simplicity, this begins with the simplest model where 
the injurer and the victim did not know each other before the accident 
(accidents between strangers)10 and only the injurer can affect the accident 
risk (unilateral accidents).11 Also, it is further assumed that parties are risk 
 
4 I have already described the classic model of tort law elsewhere, see generally Yu 2016. 
5 Faure 2004a, pp. 7-8. 
6 Calabresi 1970, p. 24. 
7 See generally Brown 1973. 
8 See generally Shavell 1980. See also Shavell 1987a, pp. 4-46. 
9 Id. 
10 Although there is a contractual relationship between health care providers and patients 
before any adverse event occurs, parties in practice are not allowed to either waive tort 
liability or change the content of tort liability by mutual agreements. Also, the prevalence 
of considerable information asymmetry between health care providers and patients often 
renders regulating medical malpractice through contractual liability undesirable. See 
generally e.g. Calabresi 1978; Arlen 2006; Baker & Lytton 2010. 
11 In the literature, medical errors are normally treated as unilateral accidents for it is 
assumed that only health care providers can affect medical malpractice risks. See generally 
e.g. Shavell 1978; Boccara 2009; Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012. Of course, there are 
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neutral,12 that there is a lack of regulation and insurance, that injurers are 
solvent enough to pay full compensation, and that there are no litigation 
costs.13 Moreover, because in practice medical malpractice liability in China is 
primarily fault-based, only the model of the negligence rule in Section 2.2. 
will be presented. Nevertheless, the main theoretical findings concerning 
strict liability will be briefly mentioned where it is necessary. In Section 2.3, 
the tertiary goal of accident cost avoidance will be addressed.14 
 
some exceptions to this assumption. For example, if the patient did not take medication as 
her doctor advised and suffered an injury as a result, her own carelessness obviously 
contributed to her injury. However, these are relatively rare cases in practice relevant to 
medical errors committed by physicians. Hence, the unilateral-accident assumption is 
valid in most of the cases. 
12 Risk-neutral as well as risk-averse and risk-loving are the three categories of risk attitudes. 
However, before explaining risk attitudes, it is essential to introduce the notions of a 
random variable and the expected value in the first place. A random variable is “a 
numerical measurement of the outcome of a random phenomenon.” Agresti & Franklin 
2013, p. 265. For example, the harm of an accident is a random with two possible values: 
either H (if the accident does occur) or 0 (if no accident occurs). Suppose also that the 
probability of the accident is P, and thus the probability of no accident is (1-P). Then, the 
expected value of the harm of the accident (hereinafter the expected accident harm) is 
defined as the weighted average of the harm in the long run, i.e. P*H+(1-P)*0, which is 
simply P*H. Agresti & Franklin 2013, p. 269. Then, let us define risk-neutral by making 
reference to risk-averse and risk-loving. An individual is risk-averse if s/he prefers a 
certain harm M to a risky prospect of an uncertain harm M (expected value=P*H=M) with 
a high magnitude (H) and a low probability (P), where H will far exceed M if P is 
extremely low. In contrast, s/he is risk-loving if s/he prefers the risky prospect of an 
uncertain harm M (expected value=P*H=M) to a certain harm M. A risk-neutral individual 
is indifferent between a risky prospect of an uncertain harm M and a certain harm. Black, 
Hashimzade & Myles 2012, pp. 366-367. Therefore, the significance of the risk-neutral 
assumption is that it allows us to determine the prospect of accident costs in terms of 
expected values before any accident occurs. 
13 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 230. These assumptions, of course, may not be all valid in practice: 
Health care providers may be risk averse; the health care system may be heavily regulated 
by the state; a well-functioning medical malpractice insurance may have already been 
developed; individual physicians, especially young ones, may not have enough personal 
assets to pay damages; and patients may be discouraged from filing malpractice claims 
because of prohibitive litigation costs. The effects of relaxing these assumptions are already 
thoroughly examined by economists as well. See generally e.g. Schäfer & Müller-Langer, 
2009. The relaxation of these assumptions will be addressed in the remaining Sections in 
this Chapter and later Chapters.  
14 As mentioned before, secondary cost avoidance (compensation) and its impact on primary 
cost avoidance (prevention), together with tertiary cost avoidance, will be discussed in 
Chapter 10 and Chapter 11. 
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2.2. THE MODEL OF PRIMARY ACCIDENT COST 
AVOIDANCE 
As mentioned above, the first goal of tort law is to minimise total primary 
accident costs, which amount to the sum of the cost of care and the expected 
accident losses. The levels of activity are assumed to be constant. Then, the 
(expected) total accident costs can be mathematically presented as follows: 
T(x) = C(x) + p(x)H (Expression 1),  
where “x” denotes the level of care – how much time and effort spent; “C(x)” 
the cost of care – monetary value of the time and effort spent – when the 
injurer chooses to take x units of care, which is an increasing function; “p(x)” 
the probability of the accident when the injurer chooses to take x units of 
care, which is a decreasing function because more care will reduce the 
probability of the accident; “H” the magnitude of harm; “p(x)H” the expected 
accident cost; and “T(x)” the (expected) total primary accident costs before 
any accident occurs. T(x) can be illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1: The Optimal Level of Care15 
 
 
Intuitively, the curve of T(x) is U-shaped, suggesting there is a minimum at 
the bottom of the U.16 The level of care that corresponds to this minimum is 
denoted as x*. This x* is frequently referred to as the socially efficient level of 
precaution or the optimal level of care.17 A level of care higher or lower than 
x* is socially undesirable. On the one hand, if the injurer took too little care 
(below x*), too many accidents would be caused and scarce social resources 
 
15 Figure 7.1 is modelled on Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 200, Figure 6.3. 
16 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 200. 
17 Shavell 1987a, p. 34; Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 201. 
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would be wasted. On the other hand, the highest level of care (well past x*) 
could surely prevent an accident from happening; however, more scarce 
resources would be spoiled, since taking one more unit of care will incur 
greater costs than the reduced expected accident costs.18 
Under the model of the negligence rule, given that causation can be 
easily established in the absence of causal uncertainty, injurers will be held 
liable only when they fail to exercise due care ( ). Under the assumption that 
the court correctly sets due care equal to the socially optimal level of care 
( =x*),19 and also that the court sets the magnitude of compensatory liability 
(L) equal to the actual harm (H), then the total primary accident costs faced 
by a potential injurer is a piecewise function expressed as follows: 
ܶሺݔሻ ൌ ൜ܥሺݔሻ ൅ ݌ሺݔሻܮ, ݂݅	 ݔ ൏ ݔ෤ܥሺݔሻ, ݂݅	 ݔ ൒ ݔ෤ , ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ݔ෤ ൌ ݔ∗ ܽ݊݀ ܮ ൌ ܪ ሺܧݔ݌ݎ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊	 2ሻ.  
 
Graphically, T(x) can be expressed in Figure 7.2 as follows: 
Figure 7.2: The Total Primary Accident Costs Faced by Injurers under 
Negligence20 
 
 
The solid line in Figure 7.2 suggests that the minimum of the total primary 
accident costs faced by the injurer occurs exactly where the injurer exercises 
due care, no more and no less! Consequently, the negligence rule is efficient, 
because it is able to induce the potential injurer to exercise just the optimal 
 
18 Faure 2004a, p. 8. 
19 Due care, also termed reasonable care, ordinary care, adequate care or proper care, as a test 
for negligence, is “the degree of care that a prudent and competent person engaged in the 
same line of business or endeavour would exercise under similar circumstances.” Garner 
2014. The legal notion of due care is not necessarily identical with the economic notion of 
the optimal level of care x*. However, it would be social desirable if the court set due care 
equal to x* in order to economise on the total accident costs. 
20 Figure 7.2 is modelled on Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012, p. 32, Figure 2. 
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level of care ex ante. Strict liability is as efficient as the negligence rule as far 
as care levels are concerned. Under strict liability injurers will be induced to 
choose the socially optimal level of care as well, since total primary accident 
costs will become their own costs once causation is established.21  
Be that as it may, the negligence rule has its limitations when it comes 
to activity levels. Under negligence, injurers will not bear accident costs if 
they exercise due care. Hence, they will continually engage in their activity 
until they cannot obtain any extra utility,22 which would not be socially 
desirable if their activity were so inherently risky that they might generate 
considerable negative externalities. Strict liability is still efficient even if 
activity levels are taken into account, because injurers are obliged to 
internalise all total accident costs.23 Hence, they will attempt to minimise 
total primary accident costs by choosing an appropriate level of activities.24 
2.3. TERTIARY COST AVOIDANCE 
Tertiary costs, also termed administrative costs, are “costs of administering 
our treatment of accidents.”25 Specifically, administrative costs include “the 
time and effort spent by injurers, victims, and their legal counsel and insurers 
in coming to settlements and in litigation, as well as the publicly incurred 
operating expenses of the courts.”26 One of the unique features of Calabresi’s 
analytical framework is the idea that accidents should not be avoided without 
giving any thought to tertiary costs. Hence, the goal of tertiary cost avoidance 
serves as “a kind of general balance wheel to the cost reduction goal.”27  
 
21 Shavell 1987a, p. 8. 
22 Shavell 1987a, pp. 22-25. 
23 Shavell 1987a, p. 23. 
24 Id.  
25 Calabresi 1970, p. 28. 
26 Shavell 1987a, p. 262. 
27 Calabresi 1970, p. 28. 
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3. APPLYING THE CLASSIC MODEL TO 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional economic analysis of medical malpractice is largely based on 
the foregoing classic accident model of the negligence rule.28 This theoretical 
choice is consistent with judicial practice in most of the legal systems, 
including China, the US, Germany, France, the UK, etc.29 According to the 
model, iatrogenic injuries are caused by health care providers’ treatment 
unilaterally. It is important to provide health care providers with incentives 
to conduct the optimal treatment that minimises total primary accident costs 
– the costs of care and expected accident losses. Leaving aside liability, health 
care providers only bear the costs of care but do not bear expected accident 
losses. In an attempt to maximise their own expected welfare, providers will 
exercise too little care and engage too much in their activities. 
Tort liability,30 especially the negligence rule as applied in many legal 
systems, may be needed to induce providers to take into account expected 
accident losses and exercise the optimal treatment. In a well-functioning 
medical malpractice system, providers will only be held liable for negligent 
iatrogenic injuries if they fail to exercise due care that is assumed to be equal 
to the optimal level of care. Providers are presumed to bear the costs of 
treatment and know the costs and benefits of care and always comply with 
due care.31 Legal standards and quantum rules are optimally set and tertiary 
costs are negligible.32 Hence, under the classic model, the malpractice system 
can eliminate negligence and prevent all negligent iatrogenic injuries because 
fully informed providers will always choose to exercise due care (optimal 
treatment).33 Under the US law, for instance, if a provider deviates from the 
 
28 See generally Arlen 2013; 2014. For a more detailed normative comparison and contrast 
between negligence and strict liability, see generally e.g. Faure 2004a; Sher 2007; Schäfer 
& Müller-Langer 2009.  
29 See generally Oliphant & Wright 2013. 
30 In some legal systems such as Germany and the Netherlands, malpractice liability is 
mainly based on contract law. However, this contract-based malpractice liability does not 
seem to differ significantly from tort-based malpractice liability. Hence, the economic 
model of tort law also applies to contract-based malpractice liability. See e.g. Hondius 
2010a, pp. 134-144; Stauch 2013, p. 184.  
31 See generally Shavell 1980. 
32 Id. 
33 Arlen 2013, p. 34. 
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optimal treatment, he/she must do so “deliberately,” which may trigger 
punitive damages.34 
The presence of medical malpractice lawsuits in practice suggests that 
the ideal negligence-based malpractice model must be fraught with 
difficulties and frustration in practice. It should be noted that the model is 
based on a set of assumptions, including, inter alia, perfect information on 
safety and quality assurance, properly assessed damages, and the absence of 
insurance, regulation and tertiary costs.35 Many unique features of health care 
services may also detail the model or challenge the underlying assumptions of 
the model.36  
In the remaining part of this Chapter (and subsequent Chapters), we 
will see how the health care provider’s incentives are affected when these 
assumptions are relaxed. Section 3.2 will point out three distinguishing 
features of health care services. These features may not only affect the classic 
model of the negligence rule (discussed in this Chapter), but also may have 
implications for alternative regimes such as contractual waiver or variation of 
the statutory standard of care, safety regulation, liability insurance, etc. 
(discussed in subsequent Chapters). Section 3.3 to Section 3.7 will address 
how malpractice sub-rules (standard of care, causation, proof issues,37 and 
damages rules) and dispute resolution procedures should be designed in order 
to minimise primary and tertiary costs.  
 
34 In the US common law, punitive damages refer to those “awarded in addition to actual 
damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit.” Garner 2014. It 
seems that punitive damages are applicable to a broad category of tort cases in the US. In 
China, however, punitive damages are only applicable to some product liability cases in 
light of art. 47 of the Tort Law 2009 (China). Medical malpractice claims do not apply 
punitive damages.  
35 See Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012, pp. 28-29. 
36 Id. 
37 Although proof rules or rules of evidence lie beyond the scope of tort law, they play a 
significant role in the establishment of the elements of malpractice liability in court. As 
demonstrated later, not only substantive elements but also evidentiary issues can affect the 
primary goal of injury prevention. 
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3.2. FEATURES OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND THE 
CHOICE BETWEEN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT 
LIABILITY 
3.2.1. Product Uncertainty 
Health care services are provided to patients in order to cure their illnesses or 
injuries. However, the efficacy of a drug or a treatment is highly uncertain in 
many cases. “Recovery from disease is as unpredictable as is its incidence.”38 
One physician gave an example as follows: 
If I give penicillin to a patient with a strep throat, one or more of several 
things may occur: The patient may improve, which we all want to 
happen; the patient may develop an allergic reaction to penicillin; 
diarrhoea may occur after a few days; or nothing at all may change with 
the pharyngitis persisting.39 
It is often hard to foretell because the pathogenesis of a disease can sometimes 
be fairly complicated, and in severe cases physicians may be extremely 
inexperienced in making appropriate diagnoses or treatment decisions.40 The 
possibility of “learning from one’s own experience or that of others” in the 
medical profession is faint due to a lack of “an adequate number of trials.”41 
The same treatment measure may in some cases result in diverse effects 
owing to the idiosyncrasies of different patients. Thus, to physicians, “medical 
uncertainty is part of daily practice.”42 
On account of considerable uncertainty over therapeutic effects, the 
quality of medical care is normally measured by the performance rather than 
the result. That is to say, the contractual obligation that physicians owe to 
patients is an obligation of means instead of an obligation of results unless it is 
otherwise specified in the medical service contract. Whether this obligation 
of means is fulfilled or not should be assessed against the same due care 
standard under tort law (assuming the court sets due care equal to the 
efficient level of care) unless otherwise indicated. 
 
38 Arrow 1963, p. 951. 
39 Taylor 2015, p. 211. 
40 Arrow 1963, p. 951. 
41 Id. 
42 Taylor 2015, p. 192. 
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3.2.2. Information Asymmetry 
An evident characteristic of the physician-patient relationship is sharp 
differences between professionals and laymen in medical knowledge. While 
health care providers are medical professionals who have received years of 
medical education and training, most patients are laymen in medicine. 
Patients normally do not know the actual quality of medical care before going 
to hospital. In respect of this feature, medical services fall into the category of 
“experience goods” rather than “search goods.”43 In general, the quality of 
experience goods can only be known after the purchase. 
However, medical services are so special that even after being treated 
patients may still do not know whether they have received the appropriate 
quality of care. In practice, it is sometimes seen that well-administered 
treatment cannot prevent the deterioration of the patient’s serious disease 
whereas poorly-performed treatment does not lead to any adverse events. For 
this reason, the quality of medical care is usually assessed in the light of 
highly technical standards,44 which is beyond the capacity of most patients. 
Hence, medical customers generally have no information in relation to 
accident risks.45  
The imperfect information problem may be relieved by well-
performed regulation on information disclosure.46 However, medical 
knowledge is so complicated and the quality of care is so uncertain that most 
patients often do not know how to appreciate the safety of medical care or 
malpractice risks even when they are fully informed. Put another way, the 
imperfect information problem is caused by huge differences between 
physicians and patients in medical knowledge and aggravated by considerable 
uncertainty over the quality of medical care. Consequently, patients have to 
purchase medical services on the basis of their confidence placed in medical 
professionals rather than their self-assessment of the quality of care. This 
explains why medical services can also be regarded as a type of “confidence 
goods.”47 
3.2.3. Externalities 
The classic accident model assumes that the injurer’s activity only generates 
negative externalities to victims. Negative externalities, also termed external 
 
43 Nelson 1970, pp. 311-313; Van den Bergh 1993, p. 35. 
44 See generally Cave 1985. 
45 See generally Goldberg 1974. 
46 Faure 2004a, p. 28. 
47 Van den Bergh 1993, pp. 34-35. 
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costs, are the costs of the exchange imposed on third parties involuntarily.48 
In the health care sector, negative externalities normally include:49 
- infectious disease: untreated infectious disease will lead to higher 
population vulnerability to that disease on account of increased 
exposure; 
- environmental degradation: health care generates a great deal of 
chemical waste and emissions (ambulances, etc.), and, more critically, 
alters the natural ecological environment of bacteria; 
- antibiotic resistance: growing resistance to antibiotics of bacteria will 
reduce medical solutions available to others. 
When taking these negative externalities into account, strict liability seems 
more efficient than the negligence rule, since the lower the activity levels, 
the fewer the external costs.  
However, it is not surprising that many activities do not only generate 
negative externalities, but produce positive externalities as well.50 Positive 
externalities, also called external benefits, are the benefits of an exchange that 
spill over onto third parties.51 Apart from creating negligent externalities, the 
health care market generates huge positive externalities to society in general, 
such as:52 
- increasing wealth: providing healthier and more productive workers 
who create positive economic gains; 
- technology and information: increasing medical knowledge and the 
technological capacity of society; 
- vaccinations: herd immunity reducing the likelihood of contracting 
certain infectious diseases 
Both negative and positive externalities should be internalised to prevent a 
market failure.53  
 
48 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 39. 
49 Boundless 2015. 
50 See generally Gilead 1997. 
51 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 39. 
52 Boundless 2015. 
53 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 40. 
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3.2.4. Negligence versus Strict Liability 
When only the care level is taken into account, the classic model of tort law 
predicts that both negligence and strict liability are efficient. However, when 
it comes to both the care level and the activity level, strict liability appears 
more efficient than negligence since only the former will induce potential 
tortfeasors to engage in their activities at the socially optimal level.54 
Information asymmetry between health care providers and patients (and 
judges) may also constitute an argument in favour of strict liability.55 In 
practice, customary practices and regulatory standards may be relied on to 
relieve the problem of information asymmetry.56 
Also, there are several arguments against strict liability. First, insolvent 
tortfeasors will be under-deterred under strict liability whereas they will still 
be deterred under negligence because they will have to pay if they do not 
take optimal care and the cost of care taking is often lower than their total 
assets.57 Second, since the health care industry generates huge positive 
externalities, we should be very cautious about limiting activity levels by 
imposing strict liability on health care providers.58 Third, strict liability will 
impose on health care providers some costs of non-negligent iatrogenic 
injuries or even non-iatrogenic injuries due to considerable uncertainty over 
causation.59 This is “over-internalisation” rather than “full internalization.” 
Physicians may respond to this expansion of the scope of liability by 
practising negative defensive medicine – reducing activity levels (e.g. refusing 
to admit patients with potentially severe conditions or refraining from 
conducting experimental or innovative treatment measures).60 Fourth, some 
 
54 See supra Section 2.  
55 Faure 2004a, p. 15. 
56 See supra Section 3.3.3. 
57 Faure 2004a, pp. 15-16. 
58 See supra Section 3.2.3; Faure 2004a, pp. 16-17. 
59 Yang, J. 2013, pp. 52-53. 
60 See supra Section 3.3.3, infra Section 3.6.4. See also Wang 2006, p. 132. However, Weiler 
et al. held an opposite view and argued only strict liability is able to promote patient-
safety investments. They maintained that the above argument against strict liability is a 
“fallacy” because of its “static perspective” on the malpractice issue. Their central 
reasoning is that medical knowledge and techniques are evolving so rapidly that many 
iatrogenic injuries “that were considered unavoidable but acceptable risks at one time 
become readily avoidable and unacceptable just a few years later.” Therefore, imposing 
strict liability on providers would give them continual incentives to “invest in research 
and innovation in safer medical techniques.” Weiler et al. 1993, pp. 148-149. Be that as it 
may, the fault-based enterprise medical liability (EML) may also be able to induce 
providers to invest in patient safety continually. See infra Chapter 8, Section 3.2.2. The 
standard of care is also improving because of advances in medical science and technology. 
 
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even argued that negligence is abler than strict liability to convey the 
required information to the market, because it induces both parties to seek 
and gather relevant information in order to win the case.61 Such information 
is invaluable to the market in that it will focus on “disclosing the hidden 
actions and qualities” of health care providers.62 
After weighing up all these pros and cons of the two types of liability 
rules, it is highly likely that the negligence rule is fitter than strict liability for 
quality assurance in the health care sector. 
3.3. THE STANDARD OF CARE 
3.3.1. The Learned Hand Rule 
With respect to the standard of care, the traditional criterion for determining 
negligence in the US, i.e. the Learned Hand Rule,63 can be used to induce 
health care providers to make cost-justified investments in the avoidance of 
iatrogenic injuries.64 According to Judge Learned Hand, an injurer would be 
found negligent if the product of the probability of an accident (P) and the 
gravity of the accident (L) were larger than the burden of adequate 
precaution (B), i.e. B<PL. Brown compared costs and benefits at the margin 
and derived from Judge Hand’s formulation the Incremental Standard,65 
which is exactly equivalent to the social cost minimization solution as 
demonstrated in Section 2.2. Therefore, applying the Learned Hand Rule to 
the determination of due care in a malpractice setting should in theory 
generate efficient outcomes in terms of deterrence. 
In accordance with the Learned Hand Rule, the standard of due care 
varies with the capability of each injurer. The lower the costs of taking care 
which injurers bear, the higher the socially optimal level of care they have to 
live up to.66 Therefore, “blindness, lameness, or infirmity” may lower the 
standard of care while “strength, size, special knowledge, or professional skill” 
may increase it.67 If it is not difficult for courts to determine the varying costs 
of care taking among parties of the same group, i.e. tertiary costs are minimal, 
 
If providers do not fear to conduct experimental or innovative treatment measures, they 
may make more rapid progress in developing safer medical techniques. 
61 See generally Sher 2007. 
62 Id. 
63 U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
64 See Schwartz & Komesar 1978, pp. 1282-1283. 
65 See generally Brown 1973. 
66 Shavell 1987a, pp. 73-74. 
67 Shavell 1987a, pp. 75-76. 
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courts should set up the standard of due care individually.68 As far as medical 
malpractice is concerned, the costs of differentiating medical professionals 
who have superior knowledge from laymen are minimal. Hence, the benefits 
of classification in this case may greatly exceed the costs of classification.69 It 
is socially optimal to impose a higher level of due care on health care 
providers than on ordinary citizens. By the same token, in case of an 
emergency, the standard of due care should be lowered accordingly, due to 
increased costs of care. 
The other way around, if differentiation of the standard of care is very 
costly, i.e. tertiary costs are prohibitive, courts should employ a uniform level 
of due care as the standard for establishing negligence on the part of the 
parties of the same group.70 In many legal systems, a bonus pater familias or 
reasonable man criterion for the determination of negligence is adopted.71 
The optimal uniform level of due care is argued to be the “individually 
optimal level of care for some ‘representative’ individual” within the parties 
of the same group.72 This reasonable-person standard may be able to reduce 
administrative costs significantly and deter the inept from engaging in 
activities.73 
3.3.2. Prior Precautions and Competence 
Another relevant topic is prior precautions. Many prior precautions, such as 
obtaining information about risk, investing in the expertise needed to 
properly conduct treatment and maintaining medical equipment, affect 
health care providers’ ability to take care when they are treating specific 
patients later. If the costs of prior precaution are sufficiently low, and if the 
reduction in total accident costs, because of the prior precaution, is 
sufficiently high, it will be socially optimal to employ a prior precaution.74 In 
the event that the standard of due medical care also entails that health care 
providers should take optimal prior precautions, providers will be induced 
both to take optimal prior precautions and to exercise optimal care when 
engaging in their activity.75 Otherwise, they will find it extremely costly or 
impossible to exercise optimal care without taking prior precautions.76 
 
68 Shavell 1987a, p. 74. 
69 Faure 2004a, p. 19. 
70 Shavell 1987a, p. 74. 
71 Faure 2004a, p. 19; Boccara 2009, p. 351. 
72 Shavell 1987a, p. 74. 
73 Shavell 1987a, pp. 76-77; Faure 2004a, p. 2004; Posner 2011, p. 218. 
74 Shavell 1987a, p. 78. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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One significant dimension of prior precautions is investment in 
professional competence. In the health care sector, competence denotes “the 
skill and knowledge of a physician, reflecting both his training and his native 
ability,” whereas care only refers to “the effort and time” spent by a physician 
of given competence providing treatment.77 It is generally presumed that a 
qualified physician has sufficient competence to provide appropriate 
treatment. If a physician under-invests considerably in medical expertise, 
he/she will be considered a “bad apple” who does not care about patient 
welfare.78 
Both regulation and liability can be used to eliminate these “bad 
apples.” On the one hand, educational standards and tests for licensing are 
crucial measures to screen “bad apples” out.79 However, to update skills and 
knowledge regularly is critical to the maintenance and improvement of 
competence. This underscores the importance of regulation via a continuous 
re-appraisal of expertise. “Bad apples” should be identified and forbidden 
from engaging in certain or all activities.80 On the other hand, incentives 
generated by liability affect not only care but competence as well. Since “bad 
apples” are prone to commit medical errors, malpractice liability tends to 
improve competence in two ways: (a) physicians, if possible, may be highly 
motivated to acquire new skills and knowledge in order to decrease the 
likelihood of committing medical errors; or (b) they may choose to withdraw 
from practising certain fields of medicine altogether, if they are dubious about 
their capability.81 
The choice between regulation and liability82 should be based on the 
actual causes of medical errors. If most errors are committed by sufficiently 
competent but careless physicians, stricter incentives via liability rather than 
regulation are clearly more warranted. If, the other way around, the majority 
of errors are due to the incompetence of a small group of “bad apples,” stricter 
regulation (e.g. licensing) may be more desirable than liability. 
3.3.3. Uncertainty over the Standard of Care 
The deterrent effect of malpractice liability can be influenced by uncertainty 
over the standard of care. Setting due care equal to the efficient level of care 
 
77 Shavell 1978, p. 44. 
78 See generally Berwick 1989a. 
79 Shavell 1978, p. 44. 
80 Arlen 2014, p. 19. 
81 Shavell 1978, p. 45. 
82 For a more detailed comparison and contrast between liability and regulation, see infra 
Chapter 9. 
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in practice is easier said than done. Due to a lack of perfect information 
concerning the costs and benefits of injury prevention,83 it is very difficult for 
courts, even for medical experts, to determine the optimal level of care with 
certainty.84 If due care falls short of the efficient level of care, the problem of 
too many or too severe iatrogenic injuries will occur (under-deterrence). 
Conversely, if it is higher than the efficient level, the outcome is inefficient as 
well for more care is taken and scarce resources are wasted (over-deterrence). 
However, if due care is set so high that it is akin to strict liability, providers 
will simply choose the optimal level of care as it would be under strict 
liability. 
Moreover, even if there were no error in setting the due care, there 
could be a related error that courts might assess health care providers’ true 
levels of care wrongly due to imperfect information. First, in cases where 
courts systematically err in finding a party's negligence when in fact he/she 
has exercised due care, he/she will take socially excessive levels of care in 
order to reduce his chance of being found negligent by mistake.85 Second, if 
courts systematically err in exonerating a party from liability when in fact 
he/she has not exercised due care, he/she may take less care than the optimal 
level.86 Third, even where the likelihood of courts’ overestimating care is the 
same with that of courts’ underestimating care, i.e. the uncertainty is 
normally distributed about the efficient level of care, parties may still be 
induced to take more care than the optimal level of due care. This is because 
“raising the level of care reduces the chances of being found negligent by 
mistake.”87 Fourth, since health care providers are not legal experts, they 
normally do not know with certainty what standard of care will be applied by 
courts in a single case.88 Neither can they anticipate the distribution of this 
uncertainty. Hence, it’s more than likely that health care providers will react 
to the uncertainty by over-complying.89 As a result, the problem of defensive 
medicine will arise.90  
This problem of legal uncertainty is largely caused by the fact that 
courts usually do not have perfect information in relation to medical 
malpractice risks. Since this kind of information is normally assumed to be 
possessed by medical professionals, this may constitute an argument in favour 
 
83 See supra Section 3.2.2. 
84 Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012, pp. 32-33. 
85 Craswell & Calfee 1986, p. 280; Shavell 1987a, pp. 79-80. 
86 Id. 
87 Shavell 1987a, pp. 80-81. 
88 Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012, p. 33. 
89 Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012, p. 34. 
90 See infra Chapter 8. For the economics of defensive behaviour in the context of liability of 
public bodies, see generally De Mot & Faure 2016. 
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of strict liability for medical malpractice91 In the US, the traditional way to 
overcome this problem is by deferring to medical customary practice.92 
Specifically, a physician’s duty of care owed to his patients “requires him only 
to comply with customary standards of the medical profession in the area and 
speciality in which the doctor is practising.”93 Posner argued that recognising 
compliance with custom as a defence to malpractice is efficient, since patients 
are the physicians’ customers who are willing to pay higher prices for optimal 
treatment.94 Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock refuted Posner’s argument on two 
grounds:95 on the one hand, some customary standards might fall beneath the 
optimum level due to severe information asymmetry between health care 
providers and patients; on the other hand, widespread health insurance 
coverage might induce inefficiently excessive treatment.96 Overall, this may 
make some customary standards exceedingly higher than the optimum. 
Hence, they argued that compliance with customary standards may not 
necessarily lead to efficient outcomes. Empirical evidence shows that in 
recent years most legal systems, even including many states in the US, tend to 
adopt the reasonable-person standard of care instead of medical custom.97 
3.3.4. The Impact of Regulation 
The classic model assumes that liability rules are sufficient to induce optimal 
incentives to prevent accidents and that other regulatory measures are not 
needed. However, it is well-known that professional standards in the health 
care sector are often defined by safety regulations in the form of “rules.”98 
These “rules” are usually set by the public health authorities (public 
regulation) or by professional organisations (private regulation). These 
regulators are assumed to have an information advantage over the court – 
they have better information regarding patient safety and the quality of care 
than does the court. If the court can derive enough information regarding the 
optimal level of care from public or professional regulations and set due care 
properly, then court decisions on the basis of this information will “find their 
way into precedents and commentaries.”99 Eventually, these decisions on 
 
91 Faure 2004a, p. 15. 
92 Danzon 2000, p. 1347. 
93 Posner 2011, p. 219. 
94 Id. 
95 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 98. 
96 See infra Section 4. 
97 See generally Peters 2000; Oliphant 2013. 
98 Faure 2004a, p. 30. For more information about regulation, see infra Chapter 9. 
99 Schäfer & Müller-Langer 2009, p. 27. 
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optimal medical safety technology will become public information that is also 
available to health care providers with inferior information. 
Then, a big question which needs to be answered is what the 
relationship between safety regulations and due medical care should be for 
the sake of efficiency.100 Specifically, there are two sub-questions: Should a 
violation of the regulatory standard automatically result in a finding of 
negligence? Moreover, should compliance with the regulatory standard 
automatically exclude a finding of negligence?  
Shavell gave a negative answer to the first question.101 He argues that if 
failure to meet a regulatory standard automatically established negligence, 
then some injurers, who incur higher than usual costs of care or pose lower 
risks than usual, would be forced to comply with the standard even if it is 
inefficient for them to do so.102 However, Faure refused to apply this 
argument to medical malpractice without qualifications.103 After drawing an 
analogy between the regulatory standard and the bonus pater familias 
standard of care, Faure concludes that a single regulatory standard can be 
justified because it is extremely expensive for regulators to identify atypical 
injurers who must incur higher than normal costs of care.104 It is vital to note 
that medical professional standards, be it set by the public health authorities 
or professional organisations, are based on, or heavily influenced by, practices 
and opinions common to the medical profession. Therefore, these regulatory 
standards will “in most cases only be minimum levels of care.”105 Hence, as a 
rule, a violation of the regulatory standard should automatically establish 
negligence. The only exception to this rule can be made when it is not too 
costly for judges to identify an atypical injurer who will incur higher than 
normal costs to comply with a regulatory standard.106 For instance, in a life-
threatening emergent case, the standard of care required of a doctor may be 
reasonably lowered relative to a normal situation.  
In relation to the second question, the opposite is not true: as a general 
rule, compliance with the regulatory standard should not automatically 
exclude a finding of negligence. If injurers could escape liability by simply 
complying with a single unitary regulatory standard (a complete “compliance 
defence”), then some injurers, who incur less than usual costs of care or pose 
 
100 See generally Shavell 1984a. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Faure 2004a, pp. 38-39. 
104 Id. 
105 Faure 2004a, p. 39. 
106 Faure 2004a, p. 38. 
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higher risks than usual, would be induced to under-invest in care.107 As 
mentioned above, since the regulatory standards, especially when they are set 
or greatly influenced by the medical profession, will only reflect the 
minimum levels of care in most cases, exposure to liability is truly needed to 
induce injurers to take efficient precautions.108 Moreover, liability can be 
intended as a “stopgap” measure for cases where no regulatory standard is 
enacted,109 or as an additional deterrent when the regulatory standard is set 
too low.110 Hence, as a general rule, compliance with the regulatory standard 
should not constitute a full defence to negligence. Nonetheless, if it were 
clear that the regulator had taken into account all costs and benefits of 
iatrogenic injury prevention and set the regulatory standard as efficiently as 
an informed court could have done, then a judge should not second-guess the 
efficient regulatory decisions.111 However, this is only the exception rather 
than the rule. 
3.4. CAUSATION  
3.4.1. Causation in Fact 
Regarding causation, economists use positive tools from decision theory and 
statistics to define causation in fact on the one hand and normatively treat 
causation in law (proximate cause or scope of liability) as a tool to expand or 
restrict the scope of liability for the sake of optimal deterrence on the 
other.112 The test generally used in determining causation in fact is the ‘but 
for’ or “sine qua non” test that eliminates all non-necessary causes from 
consideration.113 As to causation in law, injurers should be held liable only for 
harm the likelihood of which would have been increased had they failed to 
take due care.114 
Since causation in law is more concerned with the scope of liability 
rather than the establishment of liability, it will be addressed in Section 3.6.3. 
 
107 See generally Shavell 1984a; Burrows 1999. 
108 Faure 2004a, p. 39. 
109 Rose-Ackerman 1992, p. 128. 
110 Faure 2004a, p. 39. 
111 Faure 2004a, p. 40. 
112 Ben-Shahar 2009, pp. 83-84. 
113 Shavell 1987a, p. 106. 
114 Shavell 1987a, pp. 106-107. 
 
 
230 Intersentia 
Part II. Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
3.4.2. Uncertainty over Causation in Fact115 
3.4.2.1. The Potential Inefficiency of the Threshold Approach 
Because of imperfect evidentiary information, it is not rare that there is 
considerable uncertainty about whether an injury suffered by the patient was 
caused by the provider’s faulty treatment (a negligent iatrogenic injury), a 
therapeutic risk that cannot be avoided by a properly given treatment but 
could be prevented by the best treatment (a non-negligent iatrogenic 
injury),116 or the patient’s pre-existing conditions (a non-iatrogenic injury).117 
There are two main approaches to the determination of causation: the 
threshold probability criterion and the proportional probability criterion. 
Under the threshold probability criterion (the “all-or-nothing” 
principle), injurers will not be held liable for harm done unless the 
probability of the causation between their actions and the accidents exceeds a 
given threshold.118 No matter how high the threshold is set, two types of 
problems may arise. On the one hand, if the actual likelihood of causation 
were systematically below the threshold, then injurers would never be held 
liable for harm done, i.e. they will face “a diminished burden of liability.”119 
This would lead to under-deterrence under negligence, since potential 
injurers would have no incentive to take care at all.120 On the other hand, if 
the actual likelihood of causation were systematically above the threshold, 
then causation would always be easily established. Under negligence, there 
would be a potential danger of over-deterrence. This could be explained by 
two reasons. First, since causation could be easily established, it would be 
much easier to hold injurers liable under negligence. Second, due to 
considerable information asymmetry in the health care sector, courts may set 
due care either higher or lower than the socially optimal level of care. In 
 
115 Section 3.4.2 is mainly based on Yu 2016. 
116 For example, a patient may die of an immune reaction even when the nurse had 
conducted the skin test and waited for a reasonably long time, e.g. 15 minutes, before 
injecting penicillin. Yang, J. 2013, p. 72. But this is still an iatrogenic injury since if the 
nurse had waited a long time, e.g. 5 hours, after the skin test, the immune reaction could 
have been avoided.  
117 An injury could not be avoided by the then best treatment available, and it would often be 
regarded as the natural progression of the patient’s pre-existing or underlying conditions. 
118 Shavell 1987a, p. 115; Schäfer & Ott 2004, p. 209. 
119 Shavell 1985a, p. 588. 
120 Id. 
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order to avoid being held liable erroneously, potential injurers may react to 
the uncertainty over the standard of care by over-complying.121 
3.4.2.2. The Efficiency of the Proportional Approach 
If information were perfect, i.e. the court set due care and applied the law 
correctly and injurers always complied with due care standards, then there 
would be no liability at all. However, quality uncertainty and information 
asymmetry are characteristics of the health care market.122 Hence, courts may 
sometimes err in setting due care and assessing the true levels of care and 
medical professionals may often commit errors inadvertently.123 In this sub-
section, we will examine the impact of causal uncertainty on accident 
prevention, given that negligence is already established. 
Under the proportional probability criterion, however, parties will 
always be held liable for harm done unless the probability of causation is 
almost zero; and the damages will amount to the victim’s losses multiplied by 
the probability of causation.124 Suppose the victim’s harm was either caused 
by the injurer’s negligence with a probability of p(x), which is the dependent 
variable of the level of care x, or by a natural causative factor125 with a fixed 
probability of q, which is not affected by the level of care x. Suppose, also the 
cost of care is C(x) and the magnitude of liability is L. If there were no causal 
uncertainty, we would assume L is equal to full harm (H). Hence, if injurers 
attempted to exercise care less than due care, the total accident costs faced by 
them in the absence of causal uncertainty are exactly described by the first 
part of Expression 2: T(x) = C(x) + p(x)H.126 In the case of causal uncertainty, 
total accident costs faced by the injurers would be as follows: 
T(x) = C(x) + (p(x) + q)L (Expression 3).127 
 
 
121 Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012, pp. 33-34. 
122 See supra Section 3.2. 
123 Shavell 1987a, p. 82. 
124 Shavell 1987a, p. 115; Schäfer & Ott 2004, p. 209. 
125 Under the negligence rule, this natural causative factor refers to either therapeutic risks 
that cannot be avoided by a properly given treatment or the natural progression of the 
pre-existing or underlying conditions. In short, a natural causative factor is beyond the 
influence of the optimal treatment.  
126 See supra Section 2.2. 
127 Because of the presence of natural causative factors such as pre-existing conditions, the 
probability that the accident will happen or that the injurer will be held liable is p(x)+q. 
Hence, the expected liability faced by the injurer is [p(x)+q] * L. 
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It is important to note that the probability of causation in case of causal 
uncertainty precisely denotes the conditional probability128 that the injurer’s 
negligence had caused the harm, given that the accident was already caused 
either by the injurer’s negligence or by a natural factor. Hence, the 
probability of causation under causal uncertainty can be expressed as: 
 
 
In case of causal uncertainty, if we adopted the proportional approach, we 
would set L not equal to H but identical with the product of the probability of 
causation as shown in Expression 4 and harm H, which is shown as follows:  
 
  
By substituting L in Expression 5 for L in Expression 3, we will get precisely: 
T(x) = C(x) + p(x)H (Expression 6). 
It turns out Expression 6 is identical with Expression 1, which indicates that 
if the court set the magnitude of liability equal to the product of the 
(conditional) probability of causation and the full harm in the case of causal 
uncertainty, the total accident costs faced by potential injurers would be 
identical with those accident costs in cases where there is no causal 
uncertainty, and “injurers will behave as they would in the absence of 
uncertainty over causation.”129 
To summarise, it is maintained that proportional liability should be 
applied where there is considerable uncertainty over causation.130 It would 
appear that, since causal uncertainty is prevalent and significant in medical 
malpractice cases, it may be socially efficient to apply the proportional 
probability criterion to medical malpractice liability. 
 
128 In statistics, conditional probability is normally defined as follows: “For events A and B, 
the conditional probability of event A, given that event B has occurred, is P(A | B) = (P(A 
and B)) / (P(B)).” Agresti & Franklin 2013, p. 231. 
129 Shavell 1987a, p. 82. 
130 Id. 
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3.5. PROOF RULES 
The classic model assumes that courts have sufficient information regarding 
the factual and legal issues of a dispute and can render a judgement without 
errors. However, tertiary costs due to searching and gathering evidence are 
not negligible in malpractice lawsuits. Therefore, errors in findings are 
committed from time to time. From the law and economics perspective, rules 
of evidence131 are needed in order to minimise tertiary costs of gathering 
evidence and of adjudicative errors.132 The efficient amount of evidence will 
be found where the marginal cost of searching evidence equals the marginal 
benefit of reduction in erroneous findings.133 Moreover, saving this kind of 
tertiary costs should also be weighed against the primary goal of injury 
reduction. 
What and how much evidence is needed in order for a claim to be 
established is governed by procedural rules of evidence, which may introduce 
“special incentives, risks, and strategic behaviours among litigants and other 
stakeholders.”134 Two of the most important aspects of rules of evidence are 
the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The burden of proof, also 
called onus probandi, refers to a litigant’s obligation to prove a disputed 
assertion on the basis of evidence.135 The standard of proof denotes the degree 
or level of proof that can convince the fact-finder of the litigant’s assertion.136 
In the light of the goal of tertiary cost avoidance, the allocation of the 
burden of proof should follow the “least-cost avoider” rule taught by 
Shavell137 by analogy – the burden of proof should be allocated to the type of 
parties who can give evidence at a lower cost.138 . In principle, plaintiffs have 
to bear the burden of proving their main claims because they are assumed to 
be able to acquire sufficient evidence more cheaply.  
In medical malpractice claims, however, it is widely assumed that 
plaintiff-patients encounter considerable difficulty in producing evidence on 
either negligence or causation for two reasons. First, a great deal of relevant 
 
131 The discussion of rules of evidence in this Section is based on the adversarial nature of the 
US civil procedure law. Although China is primarily a civil law country, the procedures of 
civil litigation in China have moved from the inquisitive tradition toward the adversarial 
direction. Hence, most of the analysis here can apply to China. 
132 Posner 2014, § 23.1. 
133 Id. 
134 Talley 2013, p. 305. 
135 Garner 2014. 
136 Id. 
137 Shavell 1987a, p. 17. 
138 For more advanced economic models of the burden of proof, see e.g. Hay 1997; Kaplow 
2012; Talley 2013. 
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evidence such as medical records is in the hands of health care providers. 
Plaintiff-patients may find it difficult to acquire these evidentiary documents 
or may obtain falsified evidence. Second, plaintiff-patients generally lack 
medical knowledge. Even if they acquired these documents, they would 
probably be unable to evaluate negligence and causation on their own. Since 
health care providers are trained medical experts and are in charge of relevant 
evidential documents, it seems that it is less costly for them to bear the 
burden of proof regarding negligence and causation. 
The above analysis appears to provide a prima facie case for the 
reversal of the burden of proof in medical malpractice cases. However, the 
reversal rule would become undesirable if we took into account more features 
of health care services. Due to imperfect information about the nature of 
diseases and the limits of modern medical technology, sometimes even 
trained medical experts may not be able to disprove either negligence or 
causation.139 Health care providers will risk bearing the costs of some 
potentially non-iatrogenic injuries or non-negligent iatrogenic injuries that 
cannot be currently prevented by making optimal investments in care. In 
effect, the reversal of the burden of proof as regards negligence will be akin to 
strict liability and that as regards causation will expand the scope of liability 
significantly.140 According to the classic accident model, under negligence, 
although an unrestricted scope of liability will not affect the care level, it will 
over-deter health care providers from engaging in their activity.141 
The reversal of the burden of proof may be more socially undesirable 
when positive externalities142 are considered. Since the provision of medical 
care is a public welfare undertaking in many countries, and the availability of 
medical service benefits the general public tremendously, we should be very 
cautious about imposing strict liability upon health care providers,143 let alone 
expanding the scope of liability unjustifiably. On balance, taking positive 
externalities into account, it is not optimal to adopt the reversal of the burden 
of proof as regards negligence or causation in malpractice cases. 
When it comes to the standard of proof, Posner favours the 
“preponderance of evidence” rule which can minimise error costs, because 
the costs of Type Ⅰ errors144 and Type Ⅱ errors145 will set off each other.146 
 
139 Yang, J. 2013, p. 149. 
140 See generally Young, Faure & Fenn 2004. 
141 See infra Section 3.6.3. 
142 For a list of positive externalities generated by the health care sector, see supra Section 
3.2.3. 
143 Faure 2004a, p. 17. 
144 Type I errors denote “false positives,” meaning finding the defendant liable erroneously. 
145 Type II errors denote “false negatives,” meaning denying a meritorious claim. 
146 Posner 2014, § 23.1. 
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As addressed before, however, when applying the threshold probability 
criterion to the determination of causation, problems of either over-
deterrence or under-deterrence may arise. Since the ex ante perspective of 
accident reduction may be preferable to the ex post perspective of mere error 
cost reduction,147 it may be socially more efficient to adopt the proportional 
probability criterion than the threshold one in the case of causal uncertainty.  
3.6. THE LAW OF DAMAGES 
3.6.1. Introduction 
Tort law is normally composed of two parts – liability rules and quantum 
rules (or the law of damages). While liability rules are primarily concerned 
with prescribing the requirements for claiming damages, quantum rules are 
employed to assess the magnitude of damage. From the perspective of 
deterrence, the former “determines which party in which circumstances will 
receive a behavioural incentive from the legal system,” while the latter 
“determines how large that incentive will be.”148  
This Section will examine how quantum rules should be constructed in 
order to induce potential injurers to take optimal precautions. To begin with, 
the significance of the principle of full compensation for optimal deterrence 
in Section 3.6.2. will be discussed. Then, detailed approaches to the measure 
of damage, especially non-pecuniary losses, will be addressed in the light of 
full compensation in Section 3.6.3. After that, Section 3.6.4 will introduce the 
offsetting benefits rule or the restated negligence rule into the classic model 
with a view to properly limit the scope of compensation, especially in medical 
malpractice cases. Finally, it will examine the impact of uncertainty over the 
size of harm on preventive incentives in Section 3.6.5. 
3.6.2. Full Compensation 
According to the classic accident model, injurers should be held liable for the 
whole magnitude of actual harm (H) done to victims.149 Otherwise, the 
negative externalities generated by injurers’ activity cannot be fully 
internalised. This assumption corresponds to the traditional tort principle of 
 
147 See generally Ben-Shahar 2009. 
148 Visscher 2015, p. 16. 
149 Shavell 1987a, pp. 127-128. 
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“full,” “fair” or “perfect” compensation.150 In the common law, a well-known 
expression of full compensation given by Lord Blackburn is as follows:151 
… [the damage would be] that sum of money which will put the party 
who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he/she 
would have been if he/she had not sustained the wrong for which he/she 
is now getting compensation or reparation. 
Also, almost all of Britain’s continental neighbours follow the principle of 
restitutio ad integrum – “the wrongdoer has to make good the entire damage 
he/she caused … as fully as possible.”152 In light of Mommsen’s “difference 
hypothesis,” damage is specifically measured by “the difference between the 
wealth of a person as it is at a given time, and the wealth as it would have 
been at that time if the damaging event had not occurred.”153 
In economic terms, to “make the victim whole” requires that the 
damages should be so full that the victim is indifferent between having an 
accident with damages on the one hand and having no accident on the 
other,154 which can be depicted by indifference curves in Figure 7.2. In this 
figure, we regard utility as a function of two independent variables – wealth 
and health.155 U0, U1 and U2 are three indifference curves that represent three 
different levels of utility – utility before suffering a medical condition, utility 
before receiving treatment but after suffering a condition, and utility after 
suffering a negligent iatrogenic injury – respectively. Specifically, the impact 
of negligence on the patient’s utility can be described by a downward shift 
from U1 to U2 in the patient’s indifference map. Hence, full compensation 
requires that the patient’s utility should be enhanced from U2 to U1.156 
Reparation can be paid in two forms: either (a) reparation in kind (restoring 
the status quo ante via e.g. repair or treatment) or (b) an equivalent amount of 
monetary compensation.157 Suppose the patient’s health remains at H* 
 
150 Friedman 1982, p. 81; Van Wijck & Winters 2001, p. 319; Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 191. 
151 Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App Cas 25. 
152 Magnus 2001a, p. 188. 
153 Mommsen 1855, p. 3, cited in Visscher 2015, p. 11. 
154 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 253. 
155 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 190. However, they did not provide a clear definition of health. 
For the purpose of full compensation, we accept WHO’s definition of health: “Health is a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity.” World Health Organisation 2006, p. 1. Hence, full compensation 
entails that non-pecuniary losses such as pain and suffering or emotional distress should be 
compensable as well.  
156 It will be explained that it is wrong to interpret full compensation as a shift from U2 to U0 
in the ensuing sub-section. 
157 Van Dam 2013, p. 348. 
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( ) after the remedial treatment, the defendant still needs to pay 
an additional amount of monetary damages (W**-W*) in order to make the 
patient whole. 
Figure 7.3: Iatrogenic Injuries and Damages 
 
The whole magnitude of harm consists of both pecuniary losses and non-
pecuniary losses. Whereas a pecuniary loss refers to a loss of the replaceable 
good, a non-pecuniary loss denotes a loss of irreplaceable good.158 An 
iatrogenic injury reduces the patient’s state of health and may cause 
consequential losses both pecuniary such as the costs of health care and loss 
of income and non-pecuniary such as pain and suffering and loss of 
amenities.159 The indifference curves presented above are perfectly fit for 
analysing compensation for pecuniary losses. However, it is rather difficult to 
employ them to analyse non-pecuniary losses that are hard to be 
 
158 Shavell 1987a, pp. 133-134. 
159 In most European legal systems, the loss of life and severe disability themselves are not 
regarded as within the category of the notion of non-pecuniary losses, because it is 
normally considered unethical to monetize the value of life or health. Therefore, 
compensation for death or bodily injury is actually consequential pecuniary losses (e.g. 
treatment costs, lost earnings) and/or non-pecuniary losses (e.g. pain and suffering). 
Magnus 2001b, p. 194; Van Dam 2013, p. 346. However, if we treated death or serious 
bodily injury as harm directly, they would be “non-economic losses” as well, for they are 
“irreplaceable at any price.” Hence, they are sometimes termed as “incompensable harms.” 
Cooter & De Pianto 2013, p. 439. 
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monetized.160 Nevertheless, the principle of full compensation requires that 
the magnitude of liability should amount to the sum of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary losses which corresponds to losses in social welfare, so that parties 
will be induced to take the optimal care.161 The incentives for parties to take 
care may be undesirably reduced particularly in the event that liability does 
not sufficiently reflect non-pecuniary losses.162 
Since pecuniary losses amount either to actual monetary losses or to 
the costs of replacing goods, they are relatively easy to assess.163 In marked 
contrast to pecuniary losses, non-pecuniary losses are normally difficult to 
measure in that they cannot be observed directly,164 and they have no ready 
market substitute.165 Therefore, in order to save tertiary costs, non-pecuniary 
losses would be better ignored if they are fairly trivial.166 The other way 
around, if non-pecuniary losses tend to be relatively large when pecuniary 
losses are small, courts should make their best endeavours to assess such losses 
in order to prevent under-deterrence.167 
3.6.3. Assessment of Damages 
3.6.3.1. Objective versus Subjective Methods 
Either an objective/abstract or subjective/concrete method can be used to 
assess the losses.168 In terms of saving tertiary costs, the former approach is 
obviously superior to the latter.169 Moreover, the latter method is not 
necessarily more efficient than the former as far as saving primary costs is 
concerned. If injurers were unable to anticipate the size of harm they might 
cause when making decisions, an accurate subjective/concrete assessment ex 
post would not affect their behaviour ex ante, which would be of no social 
value of deterrence.170 In such a case, only if damages were based on the 
average level of harm would injurers’ behaviour be the same as if harm were 
assessed precisely.171  
 
160 Cooter & De Pianto 2013, p. 445. 
161 Shavell 1987a, pp. 133-134. 
162 Id. 
163 Shavell 1987a, p. 134. 
164 Id. 
165 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 254. 
166 Shavell 1987a, p. 134. 
167 Id. 
168 Visscher 2009, p. 159. 
169 Id. 
170 Kaplow & Shavell 1996, p. 192. 
171 Kaplow & Shavell 1996, p. 194. 
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In the health care sector, it is normally difficult for health care 
providers to assess how much harm they will cause due to uncertainty over 
treatment. This fact suggests that if the average damages could be properly 
assessed, it would be more efficient to apply the objective than the subjective 
method to malpractice cases. 
3.6.3.2. Compensation for Wrongful Death 
Adverse events can be fatal, where a death is caused by negligence on the part 
of the provider. It is highly debated whether or how to provide a right of 
recovery for wrongful death. The most controversial issue is how to make a 
deceased patient who has died due to wrongful treatment, whole via 
compensatory damages.  
The traditional approach widely used in practice is to avoid 
compensating wrongful death directly but to compensate secondary victims 
(usually close relatives) the consequential pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses 
that they themselves suffer. In most European countries and the US, for 
example, the loss of life in itself is not compensable.172 The court cannot base 
damages on a human being’s market value, because markets for human beings 
are illegal and it is “repugnant” that a sum of money can be found so that e.g. 
“the parents are indifferent between having a dead child and the money, or 
having a living child and no money.”173 In addition, most people have 
religious, ethical or philosophical objections to comparing death to money.174 
Instead, close relatives of the deceased will be compensated as secondary 
victims for costs of funeral, loss of maintenance and non-pecuniary losses.175 
In the case of the death of young children, compensation for the loss of 
maintenance is normally non-existent, because there are no dependents who 
relied on the deceased for support.176  
This traditional approach to damages for fatal accidents was criticised 
as inefficient, for it leads to under-deterrence.177 Under-deterrence is due to 
under-compensation, because current tort law damages for wrongful death 
“do not include the welfare loss to the decedent.”178 For personal injuries 
concerning “the loss of a child or a limb, compensation simply cannot be 
 
172 Rogers 2001a; Posner 2014, § 6.12. 
173 Cooter 2003, p. 1098. 
174 Cooter & De Pianto 2013, pp. 444-445. 
175 Van Dam 2013, p. 366. 
176 Shavell 1987a, p. 134; Johnson & Gunn 2009, p. 202; Van Dam 2013, pp. 367-370. 
177 See generally Arlen 1985. 
178 Posner & Sunstein 2005, p. 598. 
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perfect.”179 However, the loss of life is a real accident cost that should be 
internalised by negligent injurers. Otherwise, potential injurers will not be 
induced to take enough precautions against wrongful death.  
In response, economists developed the notion of the “value of a 
statistical life” (VSL) in order to monetize risks of death.180 The central idea is 
that risks of fatal accidents are part of life and can be reduced by spending 
additional costs of prevention.181 Hence, “what actually is involved is 
determining the value that people place on avoiding small risks of death” 
rather than assessing the value of life itself.182 When balancing the costs and 
benefits of prevention, the product of the VSL and the marginal reduction in 
the probability of a fatal accident (∆p) should be equal to the marginal cost of 
care (∆C) – the reasonable person’s willingness to pay (WTP).183 Hence, the 
value of being alive can be estimated by the following formulation: VSL = 
∆C/∆p, which is referred to as Hand rule damages by Cooter and Ulen.184 It is 
further argued that Hand rule damages are fuller than court awards under the 
traditional approach, they can reduce variation in damages among similar 
cases and they would provide better incentives for injury prevention.185  
Implicit in the definition of the VSL is that all people should have the 
same value of being alive. Hence, the VSL does not make a distinction 
between old people and young people. However, Moore and Viscusi pointed 
out that “lives are extended, not permanently saved” and thus the more 
accurate assessment of the value of life should take into account “the duration 
of life involved.”186 Sunstein also maintained that a “program that saves 
younger people is better … than an otherwise identical program that saves 
older people.”187 Therefore, they argued that the “value of a statistical life 
year” (VSLY) that bases the calculation on the age of potential victims is 
better than the VSL. Some objected to the notion of the VSLY on account of 
concerns for age discrimination, for this approach implies that the life of the 
young is more valuable than that of the old.188 However, Sunstein argued that 
this criticism of the VSLY is misconceived for two reasons. First, “every old 
 
179 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 254. 
180 See e.g. Cooter 2003; Viscusi & Aldy 2003; Ashenfelter 2006; Posner 2011, p. 251; Cooter 
& Ulen 2012, pp. 254-256. 
181 Id. 
182 Posner 2014, § 6.12. 
183 Cooter 2003; Viscusi & Aldy 2003; Ashenfelter 2006; Posner 2011, p. 251; Cooter & Ulen 
2012, pp. 254-256. 
184 Cooter 2003; Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 255. 
185 Id. 
186 Moore & Viscusi 1988, pp. 369-370. 
187 Sunstein 2004, pp. 208-209. 
188 McKie, Singer & Richardson 1998, pp. 47-71. 
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man was once young,” and “the very people who lose when older also gained 
when younger.”189 Thus, there is no discrimination against the elderly. 
Second, younger people are more willing to pay more to reduce fatal risks 
than older people.190 Therefore, larger WTP should lead to higher VSL. In this 
regards, it is worth more to save a young life in terms of life years saved 
rather than the value of life itself.191  
Although the VSLY does take into account of the duration of expected 
life, it does not treat the health conditions of the decedent before a fatal 
accident as a determinant. Instead, some economists advocated the notion of 
“quality adjusted life years” (QALYs), which can be used to assess 
compensation for both wrongful death and pain and suffering.192 A QALY is 
“a measure of the value of living one year in a certain health condition,” 
which is “used as a proxy for quality of life during the year.”193 While VSLY 
years are employed to provide benchmarks against which the value of lost life 
years is assessed, QALYs specifically measure how much quality of life is lost. 
QALYs measure the value of living one year with a health indicator: “0.00” 
means death and “1.00” perfect condition.194 The health indicator “ranges 
from negatively valued aspects of life, including death, to the more positively 
valued aspects such as role function or happiness.”195 Suppose a QALY were 
quantified by  dollars per year, a deceased victim’s pre-accident health 
indicator was  ( .00) and his/her remaining life expectancy were 
 years. Then, damages for the loss of life would be equal to  
dollars.  
In the context of medical malpractice, recovery for wrongful death in 
the light of QALYs are much more efficient than through the traditional 
“incompensable” approach, and even more appropriate than via the VSL and 
VSLYs. On the one hand, the traditional approach ignores direct 
compensation for the loss of life, which will lead to under-compensation and 
eventually under-deterrence. For the protection of patient safety, it is always 
of critical importance to reduce the number and severity of adverse events in 
the first place. Therefore, it is essential to compensate the decedent for 
his/her loss of life directly in order to generate behaviour incentives to take 
optimal precautions. Damages awards would then be left to close relatives of 
the decedent as his/her estate. If the decedent has no close relatives or heirs, 
 
189 Sunstein 2004, pp. 209-210. 
190 Sunstein 2004, p. 210. 
191 Id. 
192 See e.g. Weinstein 2005; Bagenstos & Schlanger 2007; Adler & Posner 2008. 
193 Karapanou & Visscher 2010, p. 59. 
194 Visscher 2009, p. 162; Karapanou & Visscher 2010, p. 59. 
195 Guyatt, Feeny & Patrick 1993, p. 622. 
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it might be appropriate for the state to collect the damages as “fines” for the 
purpose of deterrence. On the other hand, QALYs seem better than the VSL 
and VSLYs, because the former take more determinants into account than the 
latter two. Specifically, young patients may be more willing to pay to avoid 
fatal risks than old patients. Hence, the VSL may be less desirable than VSLYs 
or QALYs. Since non-iatrogenic injuries due to patients’ pre-existing 
conditions should be excluded from the scope of liability, QALYs may be 
superior to VSLYs in that the former take into consideration pre-existing 
health conditions. 
3.6.3.3. Compensation for Non-pecuniary Losses in Non-Fatal Accidents 
It has already been demonstrated that full recovery for non-pecuniary losses 
is essential for the purpose of optimal deterrence. Non-pecuniary losses are 
harm which cannot be compensated and which does not have market prices. 
Loss of life is indeed the most severe form of non-pecuniary loss. Economists 
developed several methods to measure the value of the loss of life, which has 
been addressed in the previous sub-section. In non-fatal accidents, victims 
may suffer various types of non-pecuniary losses, such as “pain and suffering, 
anxiety, fear, emotional strain, physical and psychological reduction of health 
and loss of enjoyment of life.”196 Karapanou and Visscher described these 
non-pecuniary losses together as some reduction in victims’ quality of life.197 
In practice, most legal systems do recognise the necessity to provide 
recovery for non-pecuniary losses. For instance, it is known as immaterieller 
Schaden (immaterial damage) in German, dommage moral (moral damage) in 
France,198 “hedonic” damages and damages for “loss of consortium” in the 
US.199 It is generally accepted that the measure of non-pecuniary losses should 
be based on the severity and duration of the pain and suffering.200 In case a 
patient suffers an iatrogenic injury which affects him for the rest of his life 
(continuing damage), it is mainly his future loss of earnings due to damaged 
earning capacity plus pain and suffering that will be compensable by a lump 
sum or by a periodical payment.201 
In principle, damages for similar pain and suffering should not vary 
significantly at least within the same legal system. Otherwise, potential 
injurers facing similar accident costs may take different levels of precautions 
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against these similar risks. However, Karapanou and Visscher found that the 
amount of damages for similar non-pecuniary losses differs greatly both 
between and within most European countries.202 Hence, they criticised these 
legal frameworks as “inadequate to effect the proper assessment of pain and 
suffering damages.”203 Reliance on tables and schedules that summarise earlier 
case law or prescribe invalidity points may promote “equal treatment” from 
case to case.204 However, it does not mean that these tables and schedules will 
produce socially optimal amounts of non-pecuniary damages.  
Similar to compensation for wrongful death, recovery of non-
pecuniary losses in non-fatal accidents can also be justified. From the 
perspective of primary cost reduction, Faure maintained that “in case of 
unilateral accidents there is a reason to compensate non-pecuniary losses.”205 
However, the question as to how to provide recovery for non-pecuniary 
losses perfectly and consistently still needs to be answered. By analogy with 
the WTP approach to assessing the value of life, some economists advocated 
the application of an average ex ante WTP to the measure of non-pecuniary 
losses.206 Ex ante damages are superior to ex post damages, because the former 
“compensates the victim exactly for the amount he would have been willing 
to pay himself,” while the latter will result in over-deterrence.207 Schäfer and 
Ott held that recovery for pain and suffering due to non-fatal injuries should 
be some fraction of the value calculated in light of the WTP to prevent 
death.208 After reviewing empirical studies, they concluded that, for the sake 
of optimal deterrence, at least a doubling of the current awards for pain and 
suffering for severe injuries is required in Germany, and even a fourfold or 
sixfold increase in the amounts currently paid would still be well compatible 
with the predictions based on these studies.209 This finding suggests that the 
current legal framework for assessing non-pecuniary losses may 
systematically lead to under-deterrence. However, they did not clarify how 
the fraction should be properly set in the light of the VSL.  
Visscher and Karapanou filled in this gap by arguing that QALYs can 
be employed to assess pain and suffering properly.210 QALYs are fit for 
assessing non-pecuniary losses due to non-fatal injuries because “it has regard 
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to quality of life.”211 Suppose a QALY were quantified by Q dollars per year, a 
seriously injured victim’s health indicator before the accident was  and 
after the accident was  ( .00) and his/her remaining life 
expectancy was  years. Then, damages for non-pecuniary would be equal to 
 dollars. After discussing several concrete cases, 
Visscher and Karapanou found that the traditional method of calculating 
non-pecuniary damages will normally result in under-deterrence.212 Hence, 
the adoption of QALYs would enhance the efficiency of the current system of 
non-pecuniary damages. Visscher and Karapanou concluded that this can be 
done in at least two ways: first, lawyers representing the plaintiff could assess 
the amount of non-pecuniary damages in the light of studies on QALYs; and 
second, courts could substitute QALY-based non-pecuniary damages for the 
currently used tables and schedules.213  
Since the law of damages is applicable to medical malpractice cases in 
general, there is no special reason why QALYs cannot be applied to the 
evaluation of pain and suffering due to non-fatal iatrogenic injuries. Hence, 
for the purpose of optimal deterrence, health care providers should be 
induced to take appropriate precautions against fatal and non-fatal iatrogenic 
injuries. QALYs are socially desirable for they would be able to prevent 
under-deterrence. 
3.6.3.4. Collateral Benefits 
Traditional tort theories hold that tort law is intended to achieve restitutio in 
integrum but not to make victims more than whole.214 Hence, damages 
awards should be restricted by the principle of compensatio lucri cum damno 
(i.e. set-off of profit and loss).215 This rule (hereinafter the collateral-source 
set-off rule) is well known as Vorteilsausgleichung in Germany and 
réglementation du cumul d’indemnité in France.216 This doctrine requires that 
benefits which the victim receives because of the accident should be set off 
against losses that the victim suffers.217 Put another way, “insofar as the 
damage is reduced, the claimant does not have a claim.”218 In contrast, the 
opposite rule (the collateral-source rule) has been developed in the US since 
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the 19th century,219 although several US States abolished it by statute in 
medical malpractice cases in the 1970s and later in all tort claims in the 
1980s.220 Nonetheless, many states “have not changed the traditional rule and 
some that have changed it have had the statute overturned by state supreme 
courts.”221 The collateral-source rule is defined in the Re-statement (Second) 
of Torts as follows: “Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured 
party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability 
although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is 
liable.”222 
From the perspective of law and economics, Posner argued that the 
collateral-source (or collateral benefits) rule is normally more efficient than 
the collateral-source set-off rule.223 First, let us suppose the victim did not 
assign his/her right to tort claims to the insurer (subrogation). If the 
defendant-injurer were permitted to set up the victim’s insurance policy as a 
defence against the plaintiff-victim’s claim, there would be under-
deterrence.224 A “double recovery” is not “a windfall” to the victim, since 
he/she purchased the insurance policy at a premium amounting to the 
expected cost of his/her injury plus the overhead cost.225 Then, let us suppose 
the victim did assign his/her tort right to the insurer (subrogation). It is 
evident that the victim would not receive a “double recovery” at all, in view 
of the fact that he/she had already assigned his/her tort right to the insurer 
with a view to receiving a lower premium.226 The collateral-source set-off 
rule would not be applicable since the victim would not sue. There would be 
no under-deterrence either, because the insurer would file a claim against the 
defendant-injurer for the victim’s loss.227 Hence, the collateral-source rule is 
normally efficient. Nevertheless, to the extent that insurance is financed by 
the government (social insurance) rather than purchased by the victim 
(private insurance), the social insurance benefits should be deducted from the 
award of damages and then the government is entitled to file a claim against 
the defendant-injurer to recover them.228  
When it comes to medical malpractice cases, it seems that collateral 
benefits should be treated differently according to the type of the source. It is 
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likely to be socially desirable to apply the collateral-source rule if (health, 
unemployment, disability, etc.) insurance is purchased privately by the 
victim, and to apply the collateral-source set-off rule in the case of social 
insurance. 
3.6.4. The Off-setting Benefits Rule/Re-stated Negligence Rule (Scope of 
Liability) 
Due to the complexity of the pathogenesis of a disease and the uncertainty 
over treatment, there is a real possibility that the shift from U1 to U2 is caused 
by non-iatrogenic injuries, non-negligent iatrogenic injuries and negligent 
iatrogenic injuries simultaneously in the real world. Under traditional 
medical malpractice liability, only negligent iatrogenic injuries are 
compensable. The other two types of injury are within the scope of the 
patient’s own responsibility and should be deducted from the magnitude of 
liability that the provider involved has to pay.  
In the classic models, however, concerns for causation are usually left 
out and it is normally assumed that the injurer should be held liable for all 
the harm done once liability is established.229 This neglect of causation in the 
models was strongly criticised by Kahan.230 According to Kahan, injurers 
under negligence should only be held liable for accidents “that would have 
happened even if they had employed due care.”231 Porat referred to this rule 
as the off-setting benefits rule. Suppose that when the optimal (due) 
treatment is given, the patient still faces a therapeutic risk, i.e. p(x*)H. If the 
provider exercises care (x) less than the optimal (due) care level (x*= ), the 
patient will face an increased risk of p(x)H. The provider should only be held 
liable for the increased risk when negligent, i.e. he/she should be ex ante 
exposed to the increased accident cost:  
 (Expression 7). 
 
Then, the negligent provider’s magnitude of liability (L) could be expressed as 
follows:232 
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230 See generally Kahan 1989. 
231 Kahan 1989, p. 428. For a similar “off-setting benefits rule” applying to medical 
malpractice liability, see generally Porat 2007. 
232 Porat 2007, p. 251. 
Preventing Medical Errors through Tort Law – Theoretical Models 
Intersentia 247 
 
 
After deducting from the scope of liability the expected accident cost when 
the optimal level of care is taken, Kahan had demonstrated that the classic 
model is inferior to his causation-based negligence rule. His reason is that in 
cases where due care is set higher than optimal care the former will lead to 
over-deterrence (taking due care instead of optimal care) while the latter will 
still induce injurers to take optimal care (as under strict liability).233 The 
essential implication of this advantage is that the court can set due care 
relatively higher in order to “counteract uncertainty about the level of due 
care” and hence avoid under-deterrence.234 In the context of medical 
malpractice, Porat argued that this rule is conducive to the lessening of the 
problem of defensive medicine, because it reflects the true accident risks that 
are caused by provider negligence.235 
A model that resembles Kahan’s model was developed by Van Wijck 
and Winters, and it was termed by them as the re-stated negligence rule.236 
They agreed with Kahan on the opinion that injurers should not be held 
liable for harm that victims would have suffered if injurers had taken due 
care.237 One subtle difference between the two models is that while Kahan 
assumed that it is the probability rather than the magnitude of the harm 
which can be affected by care, Van Wijck and Winters believed that both the 
probability and the magnitude of the harm are affected by care.238 It seems 
that the latter assumption better reflects the reality than the former, 
especially in the context of medical malpractice. Although there are some 
rare cases where harm follows an “all-or-nothing” pattern,239 in most of the 
cases the extent of harm is likely to be strongly influenced by the level of care 
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excised.240 Be that as it may, the re-stated negligence rule does not alter the 
basic conclusion of Kahan’s model. Van Wijck and Winters also concluded 
that although both the standard negligence rule described by the classic 
models and the re-stated negligence rule lead to under-deterrence if due care 
is set lower than optimal care; the former will lead to over-deterrence 
whereas the latter will always induce injurers to take optimal care if due care 
is set higher than optimal care.241  
In addition, Van Wijck and Winters also took into account the impact 
of the re-stated negligence rule on activity levels. They demonstrated that the 
level of activity under the re-stated negligence rule will be much higher than 
the one under the standard negligence rule.242 The essential implication of 
this finding is that “the re-stated negligence rule gives better incentives for 
care, whereas the standard negligence rule gives better incentives for the 
activity level.”243  
In the context of medical malpractice, it seems that the re-stated 
negligence rule is superior to the standard negligence rule in terms of both 
care and activity levels. On the one hand, due to severe information 
asymmetry, the court may err and set due care either lower or higher than 
optimal care. Facing this uncertainty, health care providers are likely to 
respond by over-complying under the standard negligence rule244 than under 
the restated negligence rule. On the other hand, health care services generate 
considerable positive externalities to society at large.245 The level of health 
care activities should be encouraged rather than discouraged. Overall, if 
expected losses due to non-iatrogenic injuries and non-negligent iatrogenic 
 
240 In practice, however, the example mentioned in supra note 48 is only the exception rather 
than the rule. Empirical evidence shows that most adverse events are associated with 
surgical procedures and medications, and some are due to highly preventable diagnostic 
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therapies may be provided. 
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injuries are not deducted from the scope of liability, it is highly likely that the 
health care provider will be over-deterred.246 
The preceding analyses of the offsetting benefits rule or the re-stated 
negligence rule are also consistent with Shavell’s discussions on the scope of 
liability. Shavell demonstrated that an unrestricted scope of liability does not 
affect the level of care that parties would choose, because taking greater care 
would not reduce their liability for harm that would occur in any case.247 
Nevertheless, such restrictions are still necessary for two reasons stated as 
follows. First, an unrestricted scope of liability may over-deter injurers from 
engaging in their activity, since due to uncertainties and errors in the 
determination of due care, health care providers might be found negligent 
even if they had taken efficient care.248 Second, the causal restriction of the 
scope of liability tends to decrease tertiary administrative costs, since the 
volume of cases may be reduced and fewer issues of causation remain to be 
decided by courts.249 The other way around, if the scope of liability is too 
restricted, it suggests that not all the states of the world – where the care of 
health care providers could have reduced the probability of harm – have been 
taken into account.250 Then, the problem of under-deterrence will arise. 
To sum up, as far as the scope of liability is concerned, negligent 
providers should only be held liable for damages that are based on the 
increased risks of an accident arising from their negligence. Therapeutic risks 
that cannot be avoided by a properly given treatment or the natural 
progression of the patient’s pre-existing or underlying conditions should be 
within the scope of the patient’s own responsibility. Otherwise, the patient 
may be induced to practise defensive medicine and more tertiary costs may be 
incurred.  
3.6.5. Uncertainty over the Magnitude of Liability 
The above analysis of the re-stated negligence rule and different approaches 
to the assessment of compensation for iatrogenic injuries reveal the 
considerable complexity of disposing of medical malpractice claims. The 
measure of damages also suffers from imperfect information. On the one 
hand, courts may often find it difficult to distinguish iatrogenic and non-
iatrogenic injuries, leading to either expansion or contraction of liability 
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scope. On the other hand, it can be intellectually and technically challenging 
and administratively costly for courts to calculate future losses or the value of 
life or health precisely and fully.251 Hence, uncertainty over the magnitude of 
liability is almost impossible to eliminate in practice. If estimates were correct 
on average, however, courts would not have to determine the actual losses in 
fact.252 Since estimating uncertain elements may raise administrative costs, if 
excluding some uncertain elements do not reduce incentives for injurers to 
take great care, it may be socially desirable for courts to do so.253 If courts 
systematically under-estimate losses, there will not be adequate incentives for 
parties to take due care; the other way around, parties will take a socially 
excessive level of care.254  
3.7. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND TERTIARY COSTS 
The classic model assumes that health care providers will pay damages 
immediately they are found liable. However, the compensation process will 
not be initiated until victimised patients take some action. It is obvious that 
litigation costs cannot be zero in practice. The patients have to decide 
whether it is worthwhile to file a claim or whether to settle the case out of 
court in order to avoid litigation costs.255  
In order for a claim to be filed, a victim’s private expected benefits 
from making such a claim – the product of the subjective probability of 
winning a case and the payoff of the claim – must exceed his costs of making 
such a claim.256 The filing costs normally include the costs of retaining an 
attorney and paying the filing fee assessed by the court.257 A claim may never 
be filed if the filing costs are considerable relative to the expected value of the 
claim. Hence, claims with relatively minimal expected values, especially 
those cases where only trivial iatrogenic injuries are involved, may be 
systematically dropped in practice.  
Parties will go to trial only when the difference in the expected 
judgement of the two parties (relative optimism) exceeds the difference in 
costs between litigating and settling (the cooperative surplus).258 There will be 
relative optimism if the sum of the two parties’ subjective probabilities of 
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winning the case exceeds 100%.259 Thus, even though a claim is filed, the 
parties may choose to settle out of court, since the relative optimism is low. 
Theoretically, since bargaining takes place “in the shadow of the law,” a 
settlement could reach the same outcome as a trial, and thus litigation costs 
would be saved.260 Indeed, a settlement that can mirror the expected court 
judgement can enhance social welfare.261 In practice, however, the settlement 
payment will normally be less than damages awards that would otherwise 
have been granted by the court.262  
Overall, if many valid claims were not filed or were settled at sums 
considerably lower than damages awards that otherwise would have been 
granted by the court, health care providers would be under-deterred due to 
some reduction in the average magnitude of liability. This outcome would be 
inefficient, since too many or too severe iatrogenic injuries would be caused. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 7 has examined the desirability of applying the fault-based model of 
tort law to medical malpractice liability. This model is analysed with the 
intention of answering the question how Calabresi’s primary and tertiary 
accident costs could be minimised in terms of medical error through tort law, 
especially the working of the negligence rule and its sub-rules (the standard 
of care, causation, proof rules, quantum rules, and dispute resolution). In the 
ideal world, the negligence rule is socially optimal. However, when some of 
the prior assumptions of the model are relaxed and more features of health 
care services are taken into consideration, the fault-based model has to be 
modified. 
As far as the standard of care is concerned, it is socially optimal to 
impose a higher level of due care on providers than on ordinary citizens. To 
economise on tertiary costs, a uniform level of due care should be adopted for 
the same or similar group of providers. When the costs of prior precautions 
are relatively low, it is socially desirable to bring prior precautions into the 
dimension of due care. Uncertainty over the standard of care is likely to result 
in defensive medicine. One way to reduce this uncertainty is to rely on 
customary practices which are developed by the medical profession. 
However, this approach has been challenged by many legal systems. As a 
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rule, a contravention of regulatory standards automatically establishes 
negligence, whereas compliance with regulatory standards may not 
automatically exclude a finding of negligence. 
When it comes to causation, in cases where it is uncertain whether the 
provider’s faulty treatment or other non-tortious factors (therapeutic risks or 
pre-existing conditions) have caused the patient’s injury, proportional 
liability is more efficient than the traditional threshold approach. 
Regarding proof rules, a reversal of the burden of proof is akin to strict 
liability, which is socially undesirable when taking into account the 
considerable positive externalities generated by health care activities. As 
regards the standard of proof, the preponderance of evidence is efficient at 
minimising error costs; however, it should not be applied to cases where 
uncertainty over causation in fact is considerable, for a proportional approach 
is better.  
Full compensation is essential to the deterrent effect of tort liability. In 
order to save tertiary costs, damages should be assessed objectively rather 
than subjectively. With a view to better assessing the value of the loss of life, 
many innovative methods such as the value of a statistical life (VSL), the 
value of a statistical life year (VSLY), and quality adjusted life years (QALYs) 
are proposed, which appear more efficient than the traditional 
“incompensable” approach. New methods such as ex ante Willingness to Pay 
(WTP) and QALYs can also be employed to assess non-pecuniary losses. 
While the collateral-source set-off rule should be applied to cases where part 
of damages is paid under social insurance, the collateral-source rule should be 
applied to cases where part of the damages are paid under private health 
insurance. In light of the off-setting benefits rule, non-negligence iatrogenic 
injuries and non-iatrogenic injuries should be excluded from the scope of 
liability, which may lessen the problem of defensive medicine. Providers’ 
incentives to take care could be affected by severe uncertainty over the size of 
liability. 
Finally, a settlement that could mirror a court decision is socially 
desirable in that it saves tertiary costs. In practice, however, patients may 
receive significantly lower amounts of compensation in settlements than in 
court, which may lead to under-deterrence. 
All the foregoing conclusions are drawn on the basis of law and 
economics theories. Whether the fault-based model of malpractice liability 
actually works efficiently is also an empirical question, which will be 
answered in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
PREVENTING MEDICAL ERRORS THROUGH 
TORT LAW – EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
AND UPDATED MODELS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 8 is aimed at answering the questions whether the fault-based 
medical malpractice liability is efficient at deterring medical errors in practice 
and what implications there will be for the economic model of malpractice 
liability after reviewing relevant empirical evidence (part of Sub-question (2-
a)). Hence, in order to answer this question, it is essential to examine 
available empirical studies pertaining to medical malpractice issues.  
The majority of the studies reviewed in this Chapter are primarily US-
based. Several rounds of the “malpractice crisis” and tort reforms in the US 
have encouraged many scholars to research into medical malpractice issues. 
Hence, the largest category of the economic literature on malpractice is of 
empirical nature, which has developed considerably in the past two decades.1 
Since the malpractice system in both China and the US is a fault-based tort 
system, these empirical findings may have high referential meaning for 
China. Nonetheless, empirical studies in other legal systems may also be 
included in the analysis if relevant.  
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 will 
review empirical studies concerning the performance of the medical 
malpractice system. Section 3 will examine empirical evidence on the causes 
of iatrogenic injuries and point out its implications for the economic model of 
medical malpractice liability. The final Section 4 concludes. 
 
1 Garcia 2011, pp. 2-3. 
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2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: IATROGENIC INJURY, 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND 
DETERRENT EFFECT 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The question with regard to the performance of medical malpractice liability 
can be divided into three sub-questions. First, whether the input system 
(liability and quantum rules) is effective as a fact, i.e. whether all meritorious 
claims are filed (Section 2.3) and whether the court system is effective at 
sorting out meritorious claims from non-meritorious claims (Section 2.4). 
Second, whether behavioural changes do exist and whether it is attributed to 
the threat of medical malpractice liability (Section 2.5). Third, whether the 
deterrence benefits generated by the medical malpractice system justifies the 
costs of the system (Section 2.6). Before that, Section 2.2 will describe the 
epidemiology of iatrogenic injuries in order to provide a context for 
subsequent discussions. 
2.2. INCIDENCE, SEVERITY, AND COSTS OF IATROGENIC 
INJURIES 
2.2.1. Introduction 
Empirical evidence shows that iatrogenic or medical injuries are not rare 
events and many injuries result from substandard care in the US and 
elsewhere. Basically, empirical studies on the incidence and prevalence of 
iatrogenic injuries fall into two categories: first, general studies of patients 
suffering adverse events; second, studies of patients suffering medication-
related or other special errors.2 For the sake of illustrating the overall picture 
of the epidemiology of iatrogenic injuries, I will pay particular attention will 
be paid to major general studies. In the light of data collection methods, the 
vast majority of these studies are retrospective (based on data gathered by 
reviewing medical records) and a small minority are prospective studies 
(based on data gathered by direct observation during hospital stay). The 
advantage of direct observation over a review of records is that the former 
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may capture more adverse events (AEs) that would not be recorded in a 
written form for various reasons. Hence, the validity of data directly observed 
may be higher than that of data based on record reviewing. The aggregate 
costs of medical errors and adverse events were also reported by some studies. 
Section 2.2.2 and Section 2.2.3 will summarise retrospective and prospective 
studies respectively. Section 2.2.4 will address studies on the costs of AEs and 
medical errors. 
2.2.2. Retrospective Studies 
Currently available retrospective studies are summarised in Table 8.1 as 
follows: 
Table 8.1: Retrospective Studies on AEs in the US and Other Western 
Countries 
Studies by Year Sample Country 
Incidence Severity 
AEs Neg.*/AEs Minor  Permanent  Death 
Schimmel, 1964 
1,000 plus 
patients, 
Yale 
University 
Medical 
Service  
US 20% - 45.83% 47.50% 6.67% 
Pocincki, Dogger 
and Schwartz, 
1973 
800 medical 
records, two 
hospitals 
US 
at least 
7.50% 
29.00% 98.45% - 1.55% 
Mills, 1978 
(California 
Study) 
20,864 in 
hospital 
patient 
charts from 
23 
California 
hospitals 
US 4.65% 17.00% 86.50% 13.50% 
Steel et al., 1981 
815 patients 
admitted to 
a hospital 
US 36.00%  75.00% 14.66% 10.34% 
Harvard Medical 
Practices Study, 
1990 (Harvard 
Study) 
medical 
records of 
30,121 
patients 
from 51 
hospitals in 
New York 
US 3.70% 27.60% 71.00% 7.00% 14.00% 
Wilson et al., 
1995 
14,179 
admissions 
to 28 
hospitals 
Australia 16.60% 51.00% 77.10% 18.60% 4.90% 
Thomas et al., 
2000a 
15,000 
discharges 
in Utah and 
Colorado 
US 2.90% 
33.00% 
(Utah) 
27.00% 
(Colorado) 
93.00% 7.00% 
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Neale, 
Woloshynowych 
and Vincent, 
2001; Vincent, 
Neale and 
Woloshynowych, 
2001 
1014 
records 
from two 
acute 
hospitals 
UK 11.70% 48.00% 66.00% 25.00% 8.00% 
Schiøler et al., 
2001 
1,097 acute 
care 
admissions 
Denmark 9.00% 40.40% - - - 
Davis et al., 
2002a; 2002b 
6,579 
records in 
13 hospitals 
New 
Zealand 
11.20% 37.00% 85.00% 10.30% 4.70% 
Baker et al., 2004 
3,745 charts 
from 20 
hospitals 
Canada 7.50% 36.90% 64.40% 5.20% 15.90% 
Aranaz-Andres et 
al., 2008 
5,908 
patients  
Spain 8.40% 42.90% - - - 
Zegers et al., 
2009 
8,032 
records 
The 
Netherlands 
5.70% 39.60% 87.20% 5.00% 7.80% 
Soop et al., 2009 
1,967 
admissions 
from 28 
hospitals  
Sweden 12.30% 70.00% 88.00% 9.00% 3.00% 
Levinson, 2010 
a nationally 
random 
sample of 
780 
Medicare 
beneficiaries 
US 13.5% 44% - - - 
Landrigan et al., 
2010 
2341 
admissions 
from 10 
hospitals in 
North 
Carolina  
US 25.1% 63.1% 84.40% 13.20% 2.40% 
Classen et al., 
2011 
795 records, 
three large 
US tertiary 
care centres 
US 33.2% - - - - 
Sommella et al., 
2014 
1,103 
records 
from 2008 
discharges 
Italy 3.30% - - - - 
Sousa et al., 2014 
1,669 
records 
from three 
hospitals 
Portugal 11.10% 53.20% 61.00% 5.40% 10.80% 
* In these studies, negligent AEs are normally defined as preventable AEs. 
 
The foregoing retrospective studies generally reported a relatively high 
incidence of AEs (2.90% to 36.00%) and the percentage of negligent AEs over 
all AEs (17.00% to 70.00%). The variances in the incidence of AEs may be 
explained by the differences in the size of the samples. While studies based 
on small samples (less than 1,000 charts) such as Steel et al. (1981) and 
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Classen et al. (2011) reported 36.00% and 33.2% respectively, those based on 
large samples (more than 20,000 charts) such as Mills (1978) and Harvard 
Medical Practices Study (1990) reported 4.65% and 3.70% respectively. The 
variances in the proportion of negligent AEs to all AEs may reflect different 
levels of service quality in different regions, but they may also be caused by 
the differences in the size of samples. Be that as it may, these studies are 
sufficient to show that both AEs and negligent AEs are relatively wide-spread 
in the US and other Western countries.  
Data on the seriousness of iatrogenic injuries did not vary too 
significantly and reported similar results: the majority (45.83% to 98.45%) of 
AEs resulted in minor impairment whereas some (5.00% to 47.50%) led to 
permanent disability, and only a few (2.40% to 15.90%) ended in death. 
Combining two large-scale studies in the US (California & Harvard 
Study), it seems that adverse events occurred in about 4% of all 
hospitalisations and 25% of all adverse events suffered by hospitalised 
patients were due to substandard care. When extrapolating the adverse-
event-related death total to the U.S. population, it was estimated that there 
were over 150,000 iatrogenic fatalities annually, more than half of which are 
due to negligence. Then, iatrogenic injury “accounts for more deaths than all 
other types of accidents combined, and dwarfs the mortality rates associated 
with motor vehicle accidents (50,000 deaths per year) and occupation-related 
mishaps (6,000 deaths per year).”3 There were also more than 30,000 victims 
who suffered severe non-fatal iatrogenic injuries nationally, which was at 
least larger than the number of job-related disabilities.4 
Recently, Landrigan et al. conducted a multi-variate analysis and did 
not find significant changes in either the overall rate of harm or the rate of 
preventable harm, indicating that “harm remains common, with little 
evidence of widespread improvement.”5  
2.2.3. Prospective Studies 
Compared to an abundance of after-the-fact retrospective studies, prospective 
studies based on the method of direct observation are relatively rare.  
Andrews et al. conducted a prospective, observational study on the 
appropriateness of the care received by 1,047 patients admitted to a large, 
urban teaching hospital from around 1990.6 They argued that the 
retrospective approach primarily developed by the Harvard Study 
 
3 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 55. 
4 Id. 
5 Landrigan et al. 2010, p. 2124. 
6 See generally Andrews et al. 1997. 
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underestimates the error rate for three main reasons. First, only errors that 
led to iatrogenic injuries were considered. Second, only errors that were 
documented in medical records were included. Third, while only one expert 
witness is needed to testify before the court in the US, the two-physician 
standard of the Harvard Study might be more stringent than what is actually 
required in the court. Based on their prospective method, they reported that 
45.80% (n=480) of all the 1,047 patients had experienced at least one AE. 
17.70% of all the patients and 21.20% of all the AEs were associated with 
serious injuries. Although their incidence rate (45.80%) was much higher 
than that reported by the Harvard Study (3.7%), Andrews et al. still 
emphasised that their estimate was also an under-estimate. On the one hand, 
the seriousness of some cases was not mentioned by physicians discussing 
them. On the other, they might have missed some meetings that were not 
strictly scheduled.  
Outside the US, Michel et al. also carried out a study concerning the 
care received by 778 patients admitted to 7 hospitals in southwestern France.7 
They used both prospective and retrospective methods to collect data, which 
identified similar rates of iatrogenic injuries (70% and 66%, respectively). 
However, the prospective approach identified more preventable adverse 
events than the retrospective one (64% and 40%, respectively). Hence, they 
concluded that the prospective approach of data collection may be superior to 
the other approach in terms of disclosing the epidemiology of negligent 
iatrogenic injuries.  
Differences in the incidence of adverse events can be partly explained 
by various characteristics at hospital levels, different policies at national levels 
and the subtleties of variant approaches to the methodology.8 In spite of these 
variations in the incidence, the existing studies collectively demonstrate that 
the relatively high incidence and severity of adverse events, those 
preventable in particular, pose substantial risk to patient safety globally and 
considerable costs will be incurred. Tough preventive measures should be 
introduced and taken to reduce adverse events as much as possible. 
2.2.4. Costs of Medical Errors/AEs 
Some studies in the US reported the costs of medical errors or AEs, which are 
considerably high. The first large-scale study, the Harvard Study, estimated 
that the undiscounted cost of both initial illness and iatrogenic injury for the 
New York population to be $21.4 billion, consisting of $2.6 billion in lost 
 
7 See generally Michel et al. 2004. 
8 Runciman et al. 2000; Thomas et al. 2000b; Zegers et al. 2009. 
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wages, $3.4 billion in lost household production, and $15.4 billion in medical 
care expenditures.9 Overall, iatrogenic injuries accounted for $3.8 billion of 
the $20.3 billion medical costs incurred by adults.10 Extrapolating to the US 
population, the costs of medical injuries totaled about $50 billion nationally 
in 1984.11 The second large-scale study, the Utah and Colorado Study, 
reported that preventable medical errors accounted for $308 million of the 
$662 total injury costs.12 Extrapolated nationally, that would be roughly $37.6 
billion for adverse events and $17 billion for preventable errors.13 In 1999, the 
total national costs of preventable adverse events, including lost income, lost 
household production, disability and health care costs, were estimated by the 
US Institute of Medicine in its landmark report, To Err Is Human, to be 
between $17 and $29 billion per year.14 Recently, Milliman reported that the 
costs of medical errors were estimated to be $19.5 billion during the year 
2008 in the US.15 
2.3. MALPRACTICE CLAIMS FILED 
2.3.1. The Initiation of Malpractice Claims 
2.3.1.1. Theoretical Predictions 
The fundamental assumption underlying the classic model of malpractice 
liability is that tort law is a very effective deterrent for medical errors, which 
entails a correct initiation of claims – “that all negligently injured patients 
detect and file claims and that no non-negligently injured patients file 
claims.”16 When a claim has a valid factual basis, meaning the plaintiff-patient 
was indeed injured by negligence on the part of the provider, the claim is said 
to be meritorious.17 By definition, a negligent AE should correspond to a 
meritorious claim. If the vast majority of meritorious claims are initiated and 
most non-meritorious are not initiated, deterrence will come close to the 
optimum. A malpractice claim is defined more broadly than a legal suit filed, 
 
9 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 92. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See generally Thomas et al. 1999. 
13 Id. 
14 Kohn, Corrigan & Donaldson 2000, pp. 1-2. 
15 Shreve et al. 2010, p. 5. 
16 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 99. 
17 Id. 
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since many (perhaps more than 90%) malpractice disputes are settled out of 
the court.18 
In practice, however, physicians have long complained that many 
malpractice claims against them are frivolous,19 and one lawyer even 
criticised the malpractice system as “a capricious and unsatisfactory method 
of compensating … the distribution of losses … depend on a series of chance 
factors”20 more than four decades ago. At the other end of the spectrum, 
patients may often fail to initiate a meritorious claim either because they have 
not realised that there were medical errors or on account of considerable 
litigation costs even if their claims are meritorious. Hence, the realities of the 
malpractice system may deviate from optimal deterrence. It follows that 
empirical evidence is essential to the clarification of this debate. 
2.3.1.2. Empirical Findings 
There is a considerable deficit in the initiation of meritorious claims. In 
general, there is an epidemic of medical errors (medical malpractice),21 but 
there is no epidemic of malpractice lawsuits.22 Numerous empirical studies in 
the US show that most victimised patients with meritorious claims do not sue. 
The main findings of some retrospective studies are summarised in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2: Medical Malpractice Claims Initiated 
Studies by Year Location 
Claims Initiated 
(No.): Neg. AEs 
(No.) 
The Rate of 
Nonmeritorious Claims 
over the Claims Initiated 
Danzon, 1985a California  1:10 60% 
Danzon, 198823 California* 1:5 - 
Localio et al., 1991; Weiler 
et al., 1993 New York 1:7.6 82.98% 
Studdert, Brennan and 
Thomas, 2000 
Utah 1:5.1 - 
Colorado 1:6.7 - 
Studdert et al., 2006 four regions 
of the US 
- 39% 
Florida Centre for Health 
Information and Policy 
Analysis, 2012; 2013; 2014 
Florida 1:3.3 - 
 
18 Danzon 1985a, p. 23; Weiler et al. 1993, p. 66. 
19 Crane 2014. 
20 Ison 1967, pp. 28-29. 
21 See supra Section 2.2. 
22 Baker 2005a, p. 37. 
23 Cited in Weiler et al. 1993, p. 62. 
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* Observing a more than double increase in claim rate per doctor from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, 
Danzon adjusted the rate of claim made. 
 
According to these retrospective studies, about 3.3 to 10 negligent AEs would 
lead to one initiated medical malpractice claim. Data from California and 
recent data from Florida may suggest that more claims are initiated compared 
to all AEs. However, the number of negligent AEs still considerably 
outnumber the claims actually made. 
A prospective study after the mid-1990s also confirmed this 
conclusion, reporting that although more than 17% of patients suffered 
serious adverse events leading to longer hospital stays and more costs, only 13 
of the 1047 total patients (1.2%) made claims.24 Therefore, it is strongly 
contended that “the malpractice system is too inaccessible, rather than too 
accessible, to the victims of negligent medical treatment.”25 
Not all the claims initiated are meritorious. As a matter of fact, there is 
a large excess of non-meritorious claims initiated. According to the available 
evidence, between 39% and 82.98% of the claims initiated were non-
meritorious. Patients with non-meritorious causes of action nonetheless 
initiated claims either induced by short limitation periods or intending to 
investigate facts through formal procedures.26 Other evidence suggests that an 
excess of lawyers may make lawyers “accept more readily from the pool of 
potential medical malpractice cases.”27  
An excess of non-meritorious claims filed further provides the 
evidence that the real tort crisis may be that too few meritorious claims are 
actually made.28 
2.3.2. Trends in Medical Malpractice Claims Filed 
Some of the aforementioned data were from decades ago, and many readers 
may wonder whether more meritorious claims have been initiated relative to 
potentially negligent iatrogenic injuries in recent years. In this subsection, 
major studies on the trends in malpractice claims in the US are summarised.  
Medical malpractice litigation first appeared in the US in the late 18th 
century.29 However, malpractice claims were infrequent until the second half 
of last century. The 1960’s had witnessed a dramatic increase in both the 
 
24 See generally Andrews et al. 1997. 
25 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 76. 
26 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 99. 
27 Southwick & Young 1992, p. 989. 
28 Abel 1987, pp. 448-452; Weiler et al. 1993, p. 62. 
29 Danzon 1985a, p. 59. 
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frequency and severity30 of medical malpractice claims and there had been 
growing concern about a malpractice insurance “crisis” in the mid-1970’s.31 
According to the American Medical Association, about 1.6 claims were filed 
per 100 physicians during the period between 1956 and 1963, whereas this 
frequency rose to roughly 2.7 claims per 100 physicians by 1968.32 In 
California, there had been a rapid growth in both claim frequency and claim 
severity at an annual rate of roughly 10% since the 1960’s, which accelerated 
towards the end of the decade and into the 1970’s.33 The average growth rate 
was 20% in California during the whole period between 1969 and 1974; by 
1975, about 33 claims per 100 physicians were initiated.34 This surge in claim 
frequency and severity around 1970 immediately preceded the malpractice 
insurance crisis of 1975,35 with premium increases of up to 500% in some 
states.36 Malpractice claim frequency stabilised or even decreased in many 
states during the period from 1975 to 1978, although this rate began to rise 
steadily after 1978. The St. Paul Company reported a 55% surge in claim 
frequency from 10.5 claims per 100 physicians in 1980 to 16.3 claims in 
1984,37 and reached 17 claims in 1986, and then stabilised at an annual rate of 
roughly 15 claims thereafter.38 Empirical evidence confirms that the surge in 
claim frequency in the 1960’s and early 1970’s was significantly associated 
with wider use of surgical interventions and pro-plaintiff shifts in legal 
doctrines such as the abolition of the locality rule, the permission for expert 
witnesses from other states, the extension of hospital liability based on 
respondeat superior, and the reasonable patient standard under informed 
consent.39  
Later data show that claim frequency and severity in the US stabilised 
or even decreased. In order to deal with the medical malpractice crisis of the 
mid-1970’s and the 1980’s, the majority of states initiated tort reforms to 
restrict malpractice claim costs.40 Reform measures such as caps on awards or 
collateral source offset were adopted by 18 states before 1985 and by 23 states 
 
30 Danzon defined “severity” as “average dollar indemnity, per paid claim, including court 
awards and payments in out-of-court settlement.” Danzon 1984a, p. 115. 
31 See generally Danzon 1986; Olsen 1996. 
32 American Medical Association 1969, cited in Boccara 2009, p. 343. 
33 See generally Munch 1978. 
34 Danzon 1985a, p. 60. 
35 See generally Danzon 1986. 
36 Danzon 1985a, p. 97. 
37 Danzon 1986, p. 57. 
38 Bovbjerg 1995, cited in Danzon, 2000, p. 1355. 
39 Danzon 2000, p. 1355. 
40 See generally Danzon 1987; 1994a; Ottenwess et al. 2011. 
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from 1985 to 1990.41 By the end of June 2015, of all the 50 states and 
Washington D.C., 24 had modified or abolished the collateral source rule and 
23 had adopted caps on awarding non-economic damages.42 Empirical 
evidence shows that claim severity was reduced by 19% to 39% due to caps 
and by 11% to 50% due to collateral source offset respectively.43 Claim 
frequency was reduced by 8% due to one year off the statute of limitations 
and by 14% due to the adoption of the collateral source off-set rule 
respectively.44  
Recent data from Michigan, Texas, Florida and Missouri also confirm 
this stable or even downward trend in claim frequency, although claim 
severity appears to grow steadily. For the period from 2000 to 2007, claims 
filed in Michigan decreased considerably by 77%, resulting in a modest drop 
in insurance premiums.45 In Texas, claim frequency declined from 6.4 claims 
per 100 physicians annually during the period 1990-1992 to 4.6 per 100 
physicians annually during 2000-2002.46 Although claim severity rose during 
that period, the whole increase was argued to be the result of medical 
inflation and an increase in the number of “large” paid claims (at least $25,000 
in 1988 dollars).47 In Florida, although the absolute frequency of paid claims 
rose from 1990 to 2003, per capita claim frequency during 2000-2003 roughly 
amounted to that during 1990-1993.48 The average annual payouts increased 
during that period, largely due to rising medical costs or inflation.49 One 
striking finding was that the frequency of serious-injury claims jumped more 
than 5% in 2002-2003 over previous years.50 From 1990 to 2013 in Missouri, 
the number of newly-opened claims (except for an anomalous surge in 2005) 
and of closed claims (except for a surge in 2007) was roughly decreasing.51 
However, median indemnity per claimant was generally on the increase 
during the same period, with an annual growth rate of 7.25%.52 This increase 
in the size of claims was also claimed to be due to rising inflation and injury 
severity.53 
 
41 Kessler & McClellan 1993, p. 94; Danzon 2000, pp. 1355-1356. 
42 See generally American Tort Reform Association 2015. 
43 See generally Danzon 1984a; 1986; Zuckerman, Bovbjerg & Sloan 1990. 
44 Id. 
45 See generally Michigan OFIR 2009. 
46 See generally Black et al. 2005. 
47 Id. 
48 See generally Vidmar et al. 2005. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See generally Missiouri DIFP 2014. 
52 Id. 
53 Baker 2005b, p. 38. 
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All the data summarised in this and the previous sub-section 
demonstrate that there is no epidemic of medical malpractice liability in the 
US. The ratio of claims initiated to potentially meritorious claims is still low 
and claim frequency has been stable since the 1980’s. The increase in claim 
severity merely reflects rising inflation and a shift toward serious-injury 
claims. The real malpractice “crisis,” if any, may still be that too few 
meritorious claims are actually made.54 
2.4. ACCURACY OF CLAIMS RESOLUTION 
2.4.1. Defining Claim Accuracy 
The classic model of malpractice presupposes that the court has perfect 
information concerning legal standards and facts of a claim. Thus, the court is 
assumed to be able to adjudicate medical disputes without errors, which 
entails that all claims result in either “true positives” (patients with 
meritorious claims receiving payments) or “true negatives” (denying a non-
meritorious claim). However, many critics of the malpractice system contend 
that the outcome of the malpractice system is like the purchase of a “forensic 
lottery” which only benefits attorneys.55 Hence, there might be “false 
positives” (patients receiving payments when their claims are non-
meritorious) and “false negatives” (denying a meritorious claim) in practice. 
The relationship among different claim outcomes can be depicted in Table 
8.3. 
Table 8.3: Defining Claim Accuracy 
Claims Merit Payment No Payment 
Meritorious  
(substandard care) 
True positives 
False negatives (Type II 
Errors) 
Nonmeritorious  
(due care) 
False positives (Type I 
Errors) 
True negatives 
 
Therefore, the accuracy of meritorious claims can be measured by the 
percentage of the number of true positives relative to that of all meritorious 
claims (hereinafter TP%): the higher the percentage, the more accurate the 
outcome of meritorious claims. The other way around, the accuracy of non-
meritorious claims depends upon the ratio of the number of false positives to 
that of all non-meritorious claims (hereinafter FP%): the lower the ratio, the 
 
54 See supra Section 2.3.1.2. 
55 See generally Ison 1967; Brody 2004. 
Preventing Medical Errors through Tort Law – Empirical Evidence and Updated Models 
Intersentia 265 
more precise the outcome of non-meritorious claims. It is also possible to 
measure whether there is under- or over-deterrence by comparing the FP% 
and the ratio of the number of false negatives to that of meritorious claims 
(hereinafter FN%). 
2.4.2. Empirical Findings 
Then, it is imperative to know, in actuality, whether the civil liability system 
resolves medical malpractice claims accurately or not. Although it is well-
known that a complete absence of adjudicative errors in malpractice cases is 
not possible in the real world, several empirical studies show that most 
malpractice claims resolved by the court are reasonable in that there is a 
strong correlation between “the likelihood of receiving payment and the 
merits of malpractice claims.”56 The main findings of these studies are 
summarised in Table 8.4. 
Table 8.4: Percentage of True Positives versus Percentage of False Positives 
Studies by 
Year 
Samples TP%* FP%* FN%* Ratio** 
Ogburn et al., 
1988 
153 closed claims involving 
perinatal injury filed from 1980 
to 1982 with the St. Paul 
Company 
91% 55% 9% 1.65 
Cheney et al., 
1989 
1,004 closed malpractice claims 
for anaesthesia-related injuries 
from 17 insurance organisations 
throughout the US in 1988 
82% 42%  18% 1.95 
Rosenblatt 
and Hurst, 
1989 
54 claims involving obstetric 
injury closed by an insurance 
company during the 6.5-year 
from 1982 
95% 0% 5% - 
Farber and 
White, 1991; 
1994 
258 closed claims initiated from 
1977 to 1989 against a single 
large hospital 
89% 25% 11% 3.56 
Taragin et al., 
1992 
8,231 closed malpractice cases 
from the New Jersey Medical 
Inter-Insurance Exchange 
between 1977 and 1992 
91% 21% 9% 4.33 
Peeples, 
Harris and 
Metzloff, 2002 
81 closed claims files in North 
Carolina between 1991 and 
1995 
93% 15% 7% 6.20 
 
56 Boccara 2009, p. 353. 
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Cranberg, 
Glick and 
Sato, 2007 
42 closed malpractice claims 
against neurologists since 1986 
32% 4% 68% 8.00 
Studdert et al., 
2006 
1,452 closed claims from five 
liability insurers 
73% 27% 27% 2.70 
Harris, 
Peeples and 
Metzloff, 2008 
348 medical malpractice 
lawsuits filed in North Carolina 
between 1992 and 1995 
78% 33% 22% 2.36 
* The merit of these claims was determined through a peer review process, either conducted by 
physician reviewers in the research group or in the light of existing expert evaluations.  
** The “Ratio” denotes the ratio of TP% to FP%. 
 
The above studies generally conclude that the malpractice system functions 
effectively, since, except for one study, patients did receive payments in the 
vast majority (73% to 95%) of meritorious claims. Put another way, a plaintiff 
was roughly 2 to 8 times more likely to obtain compensation if the defendant 
had provided substandard care than if the defendant had not, which “should 
provide a significant deterrent effect, despite the high overall error rate in 
claiming.”57  
Moreover, some evidence shows that the law of damages also works 
well. There is a relatively strong correlation between claim disposition and 
injury severity: higher-injury claims are significantly more likely to be settled 
rather than denied.58 Based on two surveys of insurance company claims 
closed in 1974 and 1976, Danzon and Lillard reported that the mean award 
was over $100,000 while the median was under $50,000, indicating the 
underlying distribution of injury severity: while the vast majority of injuries 
were modest, a few were extremely severe.59 Large awards would probably be 
mitigated either by the judge after trial or on appeal.60 The existence of false 
positives and false negatives, however small they are, does suggest that the 
malpractice system is not perfect. However, the system is by no means a 
random lottery.61  
In 6 of all the above 9 studies, the percentage of false positives to non-
meritorious claims was larger than that of false negatives to meritorious 
claims. This finding suggests, other things being equal, that there might be 
considerable over-deterrence, since the court is more likely to commit Type 
Ⅰ errors (false positives) than Type Ⅱ errors (false negatives).62 However, 
 
57 Danzon 2000, p. 1358. 
58 See generally Farber & White 1991; Taragin et al. 1992. 
59 See generally Danzon & Lillard 1983. 
60 See generally Shanley & Peterson 1987. 
61 Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012, p. 38. 
62 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 100; Posner 2014, § 23.1. 
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this over-deterrent effect may be totally reversed when taking into account 
the relatively low claim frequency63 and settlement out of court. 
Many studies on malpractice claims reported that whereas only about 
10% of all claims filed are tried to verdict, roughly 90% are settled out of 
court.64 Since the vast majority of malpractice claims are settled out of court, 
bargaining seems more important than trials for the resolution of malpractice 
disputes. Bargaining is argued to occur “in the shadow of the law,” meaning 
“expectations about trials determine the outcomes of bargains.”65 If 
settlements were able to replicate trials, then the deterrent effect of the 
malpractice system would remain relatively unchanged. However, the fact 
that patients often receive lower payments in settlement of their claims than 
the amount of compensation that would otherwise have been payable at the 
trial renders the deterrence of the malpractice system doubtful.66 Danzon and 
Lillard reported that while the average award at verdict was $102,000, the 
one at settlement was merely $26,000.67 Studdert et al. found that average 
jury awards ($799,000) were almost twice the size of the average out-of-court 
settlement ($462,000).68 This “under-compensation” due to out-of-court 
settlements may reduce the deterrent effect of the malpractice system.69  
To conclude, the major problems plaguing the malpractice system are 
not that there are too many frivolous lawsuits or the system is an 
unpredictable “lottery,” but that too few patients file claims and there are 
both “false positives” and “false negatives.” Instead, the malpractice system is 
generally able to eliminate invalid claims. The efficiency of the malpractice 
system will be improved if these problems can be tackled. 
2.5. DOES MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY HAVE A 
DETERRENT EFFECT? 
2.5.1. Introduction 
The empirical evidence adduced in Section 2.4 generally confirms that the 
malpractice system is not a random lottery in that it is reasonably effective at 
 
63 See supra Section 2.4.2. 
64 Danzon 1985a, p. 23; Saks 1992, p. 1992; Avraham 2007, p. S187. 
65 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 399. 
66 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 100. 
67 See generally Danzon & Lillard 1983. 
68 See generally Studdert et al. 2006. 
69 It is also possible that patients may be over-compensated by jury awards and the settled 
award may reflect the true size of the harm. However, there is currently no empirical 
evidence to substantiate this claim.  
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eliminating invalid claims. With regard to the impact of malpractice liability 
on medical practice, the aforementioned empirical findings are mixed, 
however. Whereas the fact that the likelihood of committing “false positives” 
is higher than that of committing “false negatives” suggests over-deterrence, 
health care providers may also be induced to under-invest in precautions 
when too few patients sue or when under-compensation is characteristic of 
settlement out of court through which roughly 90% of all claims are resolved. 
By contrast, the classic model provides definite predictions. Due to 
imperfect information,70 it is highly likely that the resolution of malpractice 
disputes cannot be immune to “the use of inaccurate information, the 
inconsistent application of standards, and difficulties in determining correct 
standards.”71 Hence, according to the classic model of malpractice, it’s more 
than likely that health care providers will react to the uncertainty by over-
complying – “defensive medicine.”  
Even in a legal system where the customary practice standard for the 
determination of medical negligence is still prevailing, there are at least four 
factors associated with malpractice risks that can explain why physicians may 
deviate from professionally sanctioned practices.72 First, although the opinion 
of a “respectable minority” falls within the category of customary practices, it 
may nevertheless be rejected by the court as unreasonable.73 Hence, 
physicians may prefer the majority opinion to the minority approach with a 
view to minimising malpractice risk. Second, physicians tend to respond to 
the risk of adjudicative errors by ordering more tests or procedures to satisfy 
adjudicators’ expectations for highly technological treatment.74 Third, 
physicians may over-comply due to their unfamiliarity with applicable legal 
standards.75 Fourth, facing the financial and non-financial consequences of 
malpractice suits, physicians may become so risk averse that they adopt 
excessive precautions.76 
Moreover, not only an increased malpractice threat but also a lack of 
cost constraints may contribute to excessive treatment. Under the traditional 
fee-for-service health insurance,77 there may be excessive treatment due to 
 
70 See supra Chapter 7, Section 3.2.2. 
71 Shavell 1978, p. 49. 
72 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, pp. 106-107. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Fee-for-service (FFS) is a payment model where services are unbundled and paid for 
separately. In health care, it gives an incentive for physicians to provide more treatments 
because payment is dependent on the quantity of care, rather than the quality of care. FFS 
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moral hazard, that is, physicians are induced to “provide the best care without 
regard to cost.”78 
It is really an empirical question whether health care providers supply 
excessive treatment care by practising defensive medicine. Specifically 
speaking, it is important to know: (a) How is defensive medicine defined? 
(Section 2.5.2) (b) How extensive is defensive medicine? (Section 2.5.3) (c) 
What is the impact of tort reform on defensive medicine? (Section 2.5.4) 
2.5.2. Defining Defensive Medicine 
2.5.2.1. Defining Defensive Medicine 
Defensive medicine is a vague concept that is hard to pin down. In practice, 
many empirical studies do not define “defensive medicine” from an economic 
angle. The most commonly cited definition of defensive medicine is proposed 
by the US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA): “Defensive medicine 
occurs when doctors order tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid high-risk 
patients or procedures, primarily (but not necessarily solely) to reduce their 
exposure to malpractice liability.”79 OTA’s definition of defensive medicine 
differs from other versions in three aspects as follows:80 
- OTA’s definition does not exclude the case where physicians are not 
consciously incentivized by a threat of liability, but adhere to customary 
practice which was originally shaped by defensive purposes.  
- OTA’s definition does not exclude other motivations – such as to 
enhance effectiveness, or to reduce uncertainty over therapeutic effects 
or financial incentives – that eventually lead to defensive behaviour. A 
more stringent version that limits the purpose of defensive medicine 
solely to protect against future malpractice suits is not workable in 
practice, for it is extremely difficult to discriminate with confidence the 
fear of malpractice suits from other motivations.  
- OTA’s definition does not exclude those defensive practices that may be 
medically justified and appropriate. By contrast, the US Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) limited defensive medicine to 
tests or procedures that are “not medically justified.”81 OTA resisted this 
 
is the dominant physician payment method in the US, and it is becoming the major 
payment method in China as well. 
78 Project 1971, p. 946. 
79 US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994, p. 13. 
80 US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994, pp. 21-23. 
81 US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1971, p. 14. 
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limitation mainly on the grounds that it is impracticable to assess the 
appropriateness of all medical practices given the current state of 
medical knowledge. It is sometimes incredibly difficult to “draw a clear 
line between where good medical care ends and the purely selfish 
interests of the physician begin.”82 
From the perspective of law and economics, “defensive medicine” is usually 
defined as “over-deterrence” – the situation where the expected costs of care 
exceed expected benefits in injury reduction.83 In response to over-
deterrence, health care providers may order tests or procedures excessively, 
or refrain from practising some highly risky procedures or even leave for 
locations with lower chances of malpractice suits.84 From this perspective, 
OTA’s definition should be read with some reservations.  
Although OTA’s definition is workable, it can only be regarded as a 
rough measure of the extent of over-deterrence. First, OTA’s definition is too 
broad. It includes some “medically justified” practices, which may be cost-
justified as well. Then, these practices actually reflect the socially optimal 
level of care rather than over-complying. It even includes “insurance-induced 
waste” that may increase physicians’ income under fee-for-service 
insurance.85 Hence, the overall effect may be that OTA’s definition is likely to 
exaggerate the extent of over-deterrence. Second, OTA’s definition is not 
developed on the basis of efficient care. It only measures medically 
unjustified practices against the due care norm, which may be set either 
higher or lower than the optimal level of care. Therefore, even if empirical 
studies do find evidence of defensive medicine, that level of care might still 
fall short of the social optimum.86 
2.5.2.2. Positive versus Negative Defensive Medicine 
In the light of alterations in behaviour patterns, OTA also classifies defensive 
medicine into two categories: positive defensive medicine (hereinafter PDM) 
and negative defensive medicine (hereinafter NDM). PDM occurs when 
physicians “do extra tests or procedures primarily to reduce malpractice 
liability,” while NDM happens when they “avoid certain patients or 
procedures,”87 which was also referred to as “bias in patient selection.”88 It 
 
82 Bernzweig 1973, p. 39. 
83 See generally Shavell 1978; Sloan & Shadle 2009. 
84 Sloan & Chepke 2008, p. 11. 
85 Danzon 2000, p. 1368. 
86 See generally Sloan & Shadle 2009; Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012. 
87 US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994, p. 13. 
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should be noted that OTA’s definition of PDM excludes those behavioural 
changes that do not affect the rate of use of medical services, such as 
“spending more time with patients, giving more attention to careful 
documentation of the medical record, or making greater efforts to 
communicate or obtain informed consent.”89 However, from the law and 
economics perspective, some of these behavioural changes still entail greater 
costs of care, which nonetheless reflect over-complying. In this respect, 
OTA’s definition of PDM tends to understate the extent of over-deterrence. 
However, since OTA’s definition is so broad in many other aspects mentioned 
in the prior Section, the overall effect may still be an exaggeration of the 
actual extent of over-deterrence. 
2.5.3. The Extent of Defensive Medicine 
2.5.3.1. Different Approaches 
To measure the extent of defensive medicine, even the one defined as broadly 
as OTA’s version, can be exceedingly difficult. Nonetheless, numerous 
scholarly efforts have been made to assess defensive medicine in the past four 
decades. In terms of research methods, the available major literature on 
defensive medicine can be roughly grouped into two categories: (a) survey 
studies and (b) statistical studies.90  
Survey studies may be either direct physician surveys or clinical 
scenario surveys. Whereas the former attempted to measure the extent of 
defensive medicine by directly asking physicians how they altered their 
practice patterns in response to the threat of malpractice suits, the latter did 
so by asking physicians how they will respond to simulated clinical 
scenarios.91 The main problem with the former method is that physicians may 
not always disclose what they actually do honestly, while that with the latter 
is that their results are associated only with the specific, simulated scenarios 
and may not be generalised.92  
By contrast, statistical studies, also called multi-variate analyses, are 
aimed at examining the correlation between the utilisation of a test or 
procedure and the threat of malpractice suits.93 One advantage of statistical 
studies is that they rely on “more objective data, the potential for large sample 
 
88 Shavell 1978, p. 48. 
89 US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994, p. 22. 
90 Manner 2007. 
91 US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994, p. 41. 
92 US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994, pp. 41-42. 
93 US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994, p. 42. 
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sizes, and the ability to control for many different influences on physician 
behaviour.”94 Although having their limitations, multi-variate studies produce 
crucial evidence as regards the “incremental impact of differences in 
malpractice liability risk on physicians’ use of procedures.”95  
Direct physician surveys and clinical scenario surveys are summarised 
in the remaining part of Section 2.5.3, while statistical studies on PDM and 
NDM will be addressed in Section 2.5.4 and Section 2.5.5 respectively. 
2.5.3.2. Direct Physician Surveys 
OTA (1994) reviewed 32 direct physician surveys conducted between 1983 
and 1992. Of all the 32 surveys, whereas only half reported on PDM, 30 
addressed NDM.96 Of the 16 surveys into PDM, on average about half of all 
physicians reported that they had ordered extra tests or procedures due to 
concerns about malpractice suits.97 By contrast, on average about 30% of 
physicians of the 30 surveys indicated that they imposed restrictions on their 
practices (NDM) in order to avoid malpractice suits.98 In relation to the 
reasons for excessive tests or procedures, most physicians only deemed the 
threat of malpractice suits as a relatively minor influential factor in 
comparison with other considerations such as inexperience, habit, pressure 
from colleagues, preference for laboratory tests instead of clinical 
judgement.99 
Several direct survey studies after 1992 reported similar results. Weiler 
et al. administered a survey of 739 physicians and asked about changes in 
their pattern of practice.100 Most physicians indicated that the malpractice 
threat affected their pattern of practice – they would order more tests or 
procedures, or reduce the number of patients seen; but these changes did not 
have greater influence than hospital quality assurance programs on 
maintaining or improving the actual quality of care.101 Later, a mail survey of 
824 physicians was conducted in Pennsylvania in 2003.102 Almost all (93%) of 
the physicians reported defensive practices, 92% of which belong to 
“assurance behaviour” – ordering extra tests or procedures, or referring 
 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994, pp. 44-46. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See generally Weiler et al. 1993. 
101 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 126. 
102 See generally Mello et al. 2005; Studdert et al. 2005. 
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patients for consultation.103 In addition, 42% of the physicians indicated that 
they had taken steps to restrict their practice by avoiding complication-prone 
procedures or patients in the previous 3 years.104 Recently, Carrier et al. 
undertook a nationally representative mail survey of US physicians.105 A vast 
majority (60%~78%) of the physicians, even those who practice in relatively 
low-risk environments, expressed concern about malpractice suits.106 
Emergency physicians and obstetrician-gynaecologists indicated deeper 
concern than psychiatrists or general paediatricians.107 
Although, overall, these studies disclose the prevalence of defensive 
medicine their results may be exaggerated due to two reasons. First, the 
physicians’ subjective perception of malpractice risk may not be accurate. 
Empirical evidence shows that physicians tend to over-estimate malpractice 
risks and some physicians in lower-risk specialties or regions even have 
greater concern for malpractice suits.108 Second, the data collection method of 
direct physician surveys may skew the results. As criticised by OTA, direct 
physician surveys “invariably prompt responding physicians to consider 
malpractice liability as a factor in their practice choices.”109 As a matter of 
fact, several studies that intended to assess the impact of court decisions on 
the practice patterns found only a minimal or desirable deterrent effect rather 
than over-deterrence.110 
2.5.3.3. Survey Studies using Clinical Scenarios 
The Duke Law Journal Project was perhaps the first comprehensive study 
into defensive medicine in the US.111 The Project sent questionnaires asking 
about the use of procedures in simulated clinical scenarios to 827 randomly 
selected physicians in California and North Carolina.112 The Project 
concluded that “positive defensive medicine is not extensively practised and 
does not have as significant an impact as previously alleged.”113 In 8 out of 11 
hypothetical scenarios, about 20% of physicians indicated that they would 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See generally Carrier et al. 2010. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 124. 
109 US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994, p. 5. 
110 See generally Wiley 1982; Givelber, Bowers & Blitch 1984; Robertson 1984; 1991; 2003. 
111 See generally Project 1971. 
112 Id. 
113 Project 1971, p. 959. 
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sometimes practice PDM.114 But only about 20% of physicians in half of these 
8 scenarios reported that they would practice PDM more than half of the 
time.115 
Following the Project’s approach, OTA conducted a series of 
comprehensive studies using hypothetical clinical scenarios.116 In all the 9 
selected scenarios, 5% to 29% of all physicians indicated they would choose 
the malpractice threat as one motivation for defensive clinical actions.117 
However, in 6 out of the 9 scenarios, less than 10% of all physicians regarded 
the malpractice threat as the primary reason for defensive clinical actions.118 
Since the selected scenarios were deliberately designed to reflect defensive 
medicine, it is reasonable to deduce that only a minority of diagnostic 
procedures (less than 8%) may be the result of concern about malpractice 
suits.119 Many physicians, motivated by medical indications rather than by the 
malpractice threat, would choose to provide excessive treatment.120  
Since surveys using clinical scenarios overcome the methodological 
shortcoming of direct physician surveys, their results may be more reliable 
than those reported by direct surveys. As a result, it is reasonable to infer that 
defensive medicine is not practised so prevalently as many direct surveys or 
anecdotal evidence suggest. Nonetheless, clinical scenario surveys are still 
methodologically limited in that they are based on self-reports rather than on 
data on actual use of procedures. 
2.5.4. Statistical Evidence on the Extent of PDM 
2.5.4.1. Introduction 
Statistical studies into PDM attempt to confirm or falsify the hypothesis that 
physicians with greater exposure to the malpractice risk will practice more 
PDM than those with lower exposure. There are mainly two groups of these 
studies: one group tested the hypothesis in a specific clinical setting of 
obstetrics, while the other in a general ailment setting. Obstetrics was chosen 
because it is among the specialties with the highest levels of exposure to the 
malpractice threat and Caesarian sections may minimise malpractice risks.121 
 
114 Project 1971, p. 957. 
115 Id. 
116 See generally US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994; Klingman et al. 1996. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See generally Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012. 
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In the next, I will summarise statistical studies on PDM in the context of 
obstetrics in Section 2.5.4.2 and those in a general or other contexts in Section 
2.5.4.3. 
2.5.4.2. Statistical Studies on PDM in the Speciality of Obstetrics 
The major statistical studies on PDM, as far as obstetrics is concerned, are 
summarised in Table 8.5. 
Table 8.5: Statistical Studies on PDM in the Speciality of Obstetrics122 
Studies by 
Year 
Data 
Cause 
(Independent 
Variable) 
Effect 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Results 
Goyert et 
al., 1989 
1,533 affluent 
women at low 
risk of 
obstetrical 
complications in 
a community 
hospital 
claims history 
caesarian-
section rate 
no effect 
Tussing and 
Wojtowycz, 
1992 
a 1986 data set 
concerning 
68,847 obstetric 
deliveries in 
New York State 
excluding New 
York City 
claims history 
caesarian-
section rate 
negative: a negative 
relationship between fear 
of malpractice and 
Caesarian section use* 
Localio et 
al., 1993 
60,490 deliveries 
at 31 hospitals in 
New York State 
in 1984 
malpractice 
premiums 
caesarian-
section rate 
positive 
positively 
associated 
(OR**, 3.00) 
physician-
perceived risk 
positively 
associated 
(OR, 1.96) 
claims history 
positively but 
not 
significantly 
associated 
(OR, 1.15) 
Baldwin et 
al., 1995 
the use of 
services in low-
risk prenatal 
cases in 
Washington in 
1989 
claims history 
caesarian-
section rate 
no effect 
 
122 This table is modelled on Van Dijck 2015, pp. 290-292, Table 1. 
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Sloan et al., 
1997 
a survey of 963 
women who had 
given birth in 1987 
in 31 counties in 
Florida 
malpractice 
lawsuit rate 
caesarian-
section 
rate 
no effect 
Tussing and 
Wojtowycz, 
1997 
58,441 obstetric 
deliveries in New 
York State outside 
New York City for 
1975 through 1986 
fear of 
malpractice 
(claims 
history) 
caesarian-
section 
rate 
positive: large effect: 
caesarean-section rate 
increased by 33% 
Dubay, 
Kaestner 
and 
Waidmann, 
1999 
national birth 
certificate data 
from 1990 through 
1992 
malpractice 
premiums 
caesarian-
section 
rate 
positive: small effect 
Grant and 
McInnes, 
2004 
data on the practice 
behaviour of a 
panel of 
obstetricians in 
Florida during the 
period 1992-1995 
claims 
history 
caesarian-
section 
rate 
positive: small effect: 
Caesarean rates increased 
by about 1% 
Kim, 2007 
a national data set 
of malpractice 
claims resolved for 
the period 1990-
2005 
claims 
history 
caesarian-
section 
rate 
no effect 
Murthy et 
al., 2007 
data on singleton 
births in Illinois for 
the period 1998-
2003 from the 
National Centre for 
Health Statistics 
malpractice 
premiums 
caesarian-
section 
rate 
positive: an annual 
$10,000 premium 
increase was associated 
with an increase in 
Caesarean rate by 15,7 
per 1,000 for nulliparous 
women and by 4.7% per 
1,000 for multiparous 
women 
Currie and 
MacLeod, 
2008 
data from national 
vital statistics 
natality files on 
births for the 
period 1989-2001 
caps on non-
pecuniary 
damages 
caesarian-
section 
rate 
negative: imposing caps 
associated with more use 
of Caesarean sections 
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Yang et al., 
2009 
data on births 
from the 
Natality Detail 
File in the US 
for the period 
1991-2003 
malpractice 
premiums 
caesarian-
section 
rate 
positive 
a $10,000 
decrease in 
premiums was 
associated with a 
decrease of 0.15 
percentage 
points in 
Caesarian rate 
Caps on non-
pecuniary 
damages and 
screening 
panels 
slightly 
correlated 
Dranove 
and 
Watanabe, 
2009 
patient 
discharge data 
from 1994 
through 2000 
with physician 
claims data for 
the period 
1979-2003 from 
Florida 
claims history 
caesarian-
section 
rate 
complicated results rather 
than simply positive or 
negative 
* The results were reversed by Tussing and Wojtowycz, 1997. 
** OR stands for “odds ratio.” 
 
Overall, the results concerning the impact of the risk of malpractice on 
Caesarian rates provided by the above studies are mixed. Many studies 
confirmed that physicians respond to greater malpractice risk by performing 
more Caesarian sections.123 However, a few studies on obstetrics reported no 
significant association between the Caesarian rate and exposure to 
malpractice risk.124 More strikingly, a small minority of studies even reported 
a negative association between malpractice risk and Caesarian rates.125  
Nevertheless, most of the studies did find a positive association, be it 
statistically significant or not. Results of a negative association are 
comparatively rare. Interestingly, there was a study reporting complex results 
rather than simply saying “yes or no.” Dranove and Watanabe (2009) 
concluded that personal and local experiences of malpractice suits had only a 
“small and short-lived” implication for Caesarian rates and were limited to 
obstetricians with no previous claim experience.126 This finding indicates that 
 
123 See generally Localio et al. 1993; Tussing & Wojtowycz 1997; Dubay, Kaestner & 
Waidmann 1999; Grant & McInnes 2004; Manner 2007; Yang et al. 2009. 
124 See generally Goyert et al. 1989; Baldwin et al. 1995; Sloan et al. 1997; Kim 2007. 
125 See generally Tussing & Wojtowycz 1992; Currie & MacLeod 2008. 
126 See generally Dranove & Watanabe 2009. 
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obstetricians over-responded to their first experience, and they “rapidly 
discover that the litigation process is neither costly nor particularly 
painful.”127 Therefore, according to Dranove and Watanabe, at least 
obstetricians who have never experienced malpractice claims will perform 
more Caesaiean sections due to fear of malpractice claims. Whatever the 
results of the foregoing studies were, they only apply to obstetrics and cannot 
be generalised to the whole medical practices. 
2.5.4.3. Statistical Studies on PDM in the General Ailment Setting or Other 
Specialities than Obstetrics 
Many studies on PDM did not pay particular attention to a single speciality 
such as obstetrics. In general, they attempted to measure the extent of PDM 
by examining the relationship between malpractice risk with costs of practice 
changes. The underlying hypothesis is that greater malpractice risk leads to 
higher health care costs. The major studies are summarised in Table 8.6. 
Table 8.6: Statistical Studies on PDM in a General Ailment Setting or Non-
Obstetrics Specialties 
Studies by 
Year 
Data 
Cause 
(Independent 
Variable) 
Effect 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Results 
Greenwald 
and Mueller, 
1978 
cross-sectional 
data by state from 
1970 
malpractice 
premiums 
costs or use 
of medical 
care 
positive: a 100% 
growth in physicians’ 
premiums was 
associated with a 
2.3% increase in 
physicians’ fees and 
an 8% increase in use 
of physician service, 
and an 4.1% increase 
in hospital prices 
Reynolds, 
Rizzo and 
Gonzalez, 
1987 
data from the 
American Medical 
Association’s 
Socioeconomic 
Monitoring 
System 
costs of 
malpractice 
liability and 
practice changes 
costs of 
medical 
care 
positive: costs of 
liability and practice 
changes accounted 
for 57% to 63% of 
the growth in 
physician fees 
US Office of 
the 
Technology 
Assessment 
(OTA), 1994 
1,540 physicians 
in New Jersey for 
the period 1977-
1992 
claims history 
physicians’ 
use of 
resources 
no effect 
 
127 Dranove & Watanabe 2009, p. 92. 
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Kessler and 
McClellan, 
1996; 2002a; 
2002b 
data on all elderly 
Medicare 
beneficiaries with 
serious heart 
disease 
tort reforms 
aiming at 
reducing the 
level of 
compensation 
costs of 
medical 
care 
positive: tort reforms 
reduced medical 
expenditures without 
significant 
implications for 
patient health 
outcomes 
Baicker and 
Chandra, 
2005a 
data sets from 
several sources 
state-level 
increases in 
malpractice 
costs 
the use of 
procedures 
no effect 
Hellinger 
and 
Encinosa, 
2006 
relatively recent 
data from several 
sources 
caps on 
payments 
costs of 
medical 
care 
positive: statutes 
imposing caps on 
payments reduced 
health care 
expenditures by 3 to 
4 percentage points 
Baicker, 
Fisher and 
Chandra, 
2007 
data from 
Medicare for the 
period 2000-2003 
malpractice 
premiums 
costs of 
medical 
care 
positive: an 60% 
growth in premiums 
resulted in an 
increase of more than 
$15 billion in total 
Medicare 
expenditure 
Sloan and 
Shadle, 2009 
US longitudinal 
data from the 
National Long-
Term Care Survey 
combined with 
Medicare claims 
for the period 
1985-2000 
tort reforms 
(caps on 
damages, 
abolition of 
punitive 
damages, and 
collateral source 
set-off) 
costs of 
medical 
care 
no effect 
Thomas, 
Ziller and 
Thayer, 2010 
thirty-five clinical 
specialities 
malpractice 
premiums 
costs of 
medical 
care 
positive: a 10% drop 
in premiums led to 
less than 1% decrease 
in total medical care 
costs, small impact 
Smith-
Bindman et 
al., 2011 
a national sample 
of 8,588 women 
patients in 10 US 
states between 
1992 and 2001 
tort reforms 
(periodic 
payments or 
collateral source 
off-set) 
neurologic 
imaging 
rates 
positive: mandated 
periodic award 
payments or specified 
collateral source 
offset rules had a 
roughly 40% lower 
likelihood of imaging 
relative to states 
without tort reforms; 
the total number of 
reform laws was 
significantly 
associated with the 
odds of imaging 
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As shown in Table 8.6, the foregoing results generated by studies on settings 
other than obstetrics are mixed as well. Many studies reported a positive 
association.128 In contrast, a few studies reported results contradictory to the 
foregoing positive results.129 However, the number of studies reporting 
positive results is relatively larger than that of studies with no significant 
effect. More importantly, in contrast to studies into obstetrics, studies 
addressed under this sub-heading had not reported negative associations.  
2.5.4.4. Summary 
Existing empirical evidence on the extent of PDM, either in the speciality of 
obstetrics or in the general setting or other settings, is mixed. However, the 
number of studies reporting positive results (n=13) is slightly larger than that 
of studies reporting no effect (n=7) or even negative effect (n=2). Of course, 
we could not confirm the existence of PDM by simply counting and 
comparing the number of studies. But it is also inadvisable to ignore the many 
studies with positive results and deny the prevalence of PDM.  
2.5.5. Statistical Evidence on the Extent of NDM 
2.5.5.1. Statistical Studies on NDM in the Specialty of Obstetrics 
Statistical studies on the extent of NDM in the context of obstetrics are often 
measured by changes in activity levels. Four studies are summarized in Table 
8.7. 
 
128 See generally Greenwald & Mueller 1978; Reynolds, Rizzo & Gonzalez 1987; Kessler & 
McClellan 1996; 2002a; 2002b; Baicker & Chandra 2005a; Hellinger & Encinosa 2006; 
Baicker, Fisher & Chandra 2007; Thomas, Ziller & Thayer 2010; Smith-Bindman et al. 
2011. 
129 See generally US Office of the Technology Assessment (OTA) 1994; Baicker & Chandra 
2005a; Sloan & Shadle 2009. 
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Table 8.7: Statistical Studies on NDM in the Specialty of Obstetrics 
Studies by 
Year 
Data 
Cause 
(Independent 
Variable) 
Effect 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Results 
Rosenblatt 
and 
Wright, 
1987 
685 members of 
the Washington 
Academy of 
Family Practice 
in 1985 
malpractice 
premiums 
obstetric 
practice 
positive: of the 266 
respondents not 
currently practising 
obstetrics, 38.5% had 
discontinued 
obstetric practice 
within the past five 
years due to 
malpractice risk 
US Office 
of the 
Technology 
Assessment 
(OTA), 
1994 
self-reported 
data from a 1987 
national survey 
of member of 
ACOG, state-
level data on 
premiums and 
other kinds of 
data 
claims history 
obstetric 
practice 
positive: OB/GYNs in 
states with greater 
malpractice threat 
and who reported 
higher personal 
malpractice claims 
exposure were more 
likely to be practising 
obstetrics and had 
higher volumes of 
obstetric care* 
Dranove 
and Gron, 
2005 
hospital in-
patient use data 
provided by the 
Florida State 
Centre for 
Health Statistics 
malpractice 
premiums 
obstetric 
practice 
no effect: a surge in 
premiums did not 
increase travel times 
of women undergoing 
high-risk deliveries** 
Yang et al., 
2008 
AMA Physician 
Masterfile for 
1994-2004 
malpractice 
premiums/tort 
reforms 
supply of 
obstetrician-
gynecologists 
no effect: the supply 
of OB/GYNs was not 
significantly 
associated with 
premiums or tort 
reforms 
* It is assumed that the worse the liability climate, the less other providers of obstetric are (e.g. family 
practice physicians and nurse-midwives). 
** It is assumed that the higher travel times, the more obstetric care services.  
 
The above results regarding the extent of NDM pertaining to obstetrics are 
mixed. Hence, it is hard to say whether the malpractice risk truly affects 
obstetric practice.  
2.5.5.2. Statistical Studies on NDM in the General Ailment Setting 
In contrast to the mixed results of statistical studies on NDM in the specialty 
of obstetrics, the vast majority (5 out of 7) of studies into NDM in a general 
setting or other specialties than obstetrics confirmed the hypothesis that 
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greater malpractice risk is associated with less supply of care. These studies 
are summarised in Table 8.8. 
Table 8.8: Statistical Studies on NDM in the General Setting 
Studies by 
Year 
Data 
Cause 
(Independent 
Variable) 
Effect 
(Dependent 
Variable) 
Results 
Gius, 2000 
data from the 
1990’s 
malpractice 
premiums 
state-level 
physician 
supply 
positive: higher premiums 
were correlated with 
lower physician supply at 
the state level 
Kessler, 
Sage and 
Becker, 
2005 
data on the 
supply of 
physician 
services in the 
US for the 
period 1985-
2001 
direct tort 
reforms 
physician 
supply 
positive: physician supply 
was increased by 3.3% 
three years after 
implementing direct tort 
reforms 
Encinosa 
and 
Hellinger, 
2005 
county-level 
data from all 
fifty states for 
the period 
1985-2000 
caps on 
damages 
physician 
supply 
positive: a cap on damages 
had 2.2% more physicians 
per capita and rural 
counties had 3.2% more 
relative to their 
counterparts in other 
states 
Baicker 
and 
Chandra, 
2005b 
data from 
several 
different 
sources 
malpractice 
premiums 
physician 
supply 
no effect: increases in 
premiums do not seem to 
have an effect on the total 
number of physicians in 
each state 
Klick and 
Stratmann, 
2007 
AMA data on 
the number of 
doctors 
nationally for 
the period 
1980-2001 
tort reforms 
physician 
supply 
positive: only caps on 
non-economic damages 
were significantly 
correlated with the per 
capita number of 
physicians; this effect was 
more powerful on those 
specialities facing the 
greatest exposure to 
malpractice suits 
Matsa, 
2007 
a data set on 
county-level, 
specialty-
specific annual 
accounts of 
physicians for 
the period 
1970-2000 
caps on 
damages 
physician 
supply 
mixed: although caps on 
damages resulted in a 10% 
to 12 % increase in the 
supply of frontier rural 
specialist physicians, caps 
had no implications for 
physician supply for the 
average resident 
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Helland 
and 
Showalter, 
2009 
data from the 
Physician 
Practice Costs 
and Income 
Survey for the 
period 1983-
1988 
claims 
history/tort 
reforms 
working 
hours 
positive: an estimated 
elasticity of hours worked to 
exposure to malpractice 
liability of -.285 for all 
physicians and of -1.224 for 
physicians 55 or older, 
suggesting that greater 
malpractice risk resulted in 
fewer hours worked 
 
2.5.5.3. Summary 
Although existing evidence on NDM in the speciality of obstetrics is mixed, 
most empirical studies on NDM in the general ailment setting reported 
positive results. Overall, it is highly likely that greater malpractice risks 
decrease the supply of physician services. 
2.5.6. Summary and Evaluation 
After summarising the extensive body of empirical findings concerning 
defensive medicine from Section 2.5.3 to Section 2.5.5, it can be concluded 
that existing evidence on the association between malpractice risk and 
practice changes is not definitive. Statistical results of studies on PDM with 
regard to either obstetrics or general ailments and on NDM as regards 
obstetrics were somewhat mixed. Nevertheless, the vast majority of survey 
studies on defensive medicine and statistical studies on NDM in the general 
ailment setting suggest that defensive medicine may be prevalent and greater 
malpractice risks are highly likely attributable to more defensive medicine, 
though the association may be modest. Hence, it is more than likely that the 
deterrent effect of malpractice liability does exist, at least in some ailment 
settings. Overall, there may be some degree of over-deterrence and 
malpractice liability reforms in the US may help reduce defensive medicine 
and save health care costs.130 
 
130 However, Van Dijck had a different view about these results. He questioned the validity of 
several measures such as “malpractice insurance premiums (not necessarily related to 
malpractice claims and malpractice payments), physician supply (extreme result, possible 
database accuracy issues), research that lacks a comparison group (causality concerns), and 
studies that rely on self-reporting (measurement concerns).” Accordingly, he argued that 
“defensive medicine merely or predominantly exists in the minds of people.” Van Dijck 
2015, pp. 302-303. In this regard, more well-designed future studies are expected.  
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2.6. IS THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM COST-
EFFECTIVE? 
2.6.1. Costs of the Medical Malpractice System 
The economic rationale behind the classic model of malpractice liability is 
that optimal deterrence entails savings due to injury reduction that exceed 
the primary costs of injury prevention at the margin. Tertiary costs should 
also be added to the cost side of the scales. In general, the costs of the 
malpractice system are composed of direct costs (insurance premiums, 
insurance overheads and litigation costs) and indirect costs (mainly defensive 
medicine).131 Under this sub-heading, several studies attempting to measure 
the costs of the malpractice liability system are summarised. The weighing of 
deterrence benefits against costs will be addressed in Section 2.6.2.  
Several studies have reported direct costs of the malpractice system. 
Using data from the AMA’s Socio-economic Monitoring System, Reynolds, 
Rizzo and Gonzalez (1987) estimated that the cost of medical liability was 
between $12.1 and $13.7 billion, roughly 15% of the total health care 
expenditure in 1984.132 Rubin estimated that malpractice insurance premiums 
constitute less than 1% of total health care expenditure.133 By contrast, the 
absolute amount of the premiums – roughly $10 billion – were by no means 
minimal.134 Recently, Hyman and Silver (2013) reported that the direct costs 
of malpractice liability reached $20 to $30 billion per year in the US. 
Regarding the proportion of litigation costs to malpractice premiums, 
Danzon reported that of each one-dollar malpractice insurance premium, 
roughly 40 cents will be received by plaintiff-patients as compensation, about 
40 cents will be spent on litigation costs and the remaining 20 cents are 
insurance overheads.135 Hence, the loading charge for compensation through 
the malpractice system is about $1.5 per one-dollar compensation, which 
substantially exceeds that for large group first party insurance – less than 10 
cents per one-dollar compensation.136 If the sole purpose of the malpractice 
system were compensation, then it would be exceedingly inefficient relevant 
to alternative compensation mechanisms such as first party insurance.137 The 
 
131 Hyman & Silver 2013, p. 503. 
132 See generally Reynolds, Rizzo & Gonzalez 1987. 
133 Rubin & Mendelson 1993, as cited in Danzon 2000, p. 1369. 
134 Id. 
135 Danzon 1985a, p. 31. 
136 Danzon 2000, p. 1369. 
137 Id. 
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comparatively high loading charge can only be justified if deterrence benefits 
are much higher.138  
In addition to malpractice premiums and the costs of litigating and 
defending malpractice claims, there are some other direct administrative 
“transaction costs.” Based on the data collected by Zuckerman139 and the US 
General Accounting Office (GAO),140 Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock estimated 
that the foregone income of physicians was due to lost working days (2.7 days 
on average) and spending on defence (about $70 million in the US in 1984).141 
Given the then best available estimates,142 Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock also 
roughly calculated the public costs of providing court, judges and juries to 
resolve malpractice disputes: about $3.7 million per year in the US.143 Besides 
direct monetary costs, some concomitant psychological burden such as 
anxiety and loss of reputation was not negligible.144 
The second group of studies was focused on indirect costs attributable 
to defensive medicine.145 The results of the available evidence are mixed. 
Several early studies found considerably high costs of defensive medicine. 
Based on cross-sectional data by state from 1970, Greenwald and Mueller 
estimated that the 400% growth in malpractice premiums from 1970 to 1975 
ultimately resulted in a total of $2.3 billion increase in health care 
expenditures in the US.146 Using data from the Socio-economic Monitoring 
System survey in 1984, Reynolds, Rizzo and Gonzalez claimed additional 
costs of between $8.4 and $12.1 billion were incurred due to increased 
malpractice risk in the US for that year.147 By extrapolating their data to all 
ailments in the US, Kessler and McClellan estimated that “direct reforms 
could lead to expenditure reductions of well over $50 billion per year without 
serious adverse consequences for health outcomes.”148 Based on Kessler and 
McClellan’s study, the Department of Health & Human Services reported that 
tort reform “would save $70-$126 billion in health care costs per year.”149 
Mello et al. estimated that the overall annual medical liability system costs 
 
138 Id. 
139 See generally Zuckerman 1984. 
140 US General Accounting Office 1987, p. 26. 
141 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 112. 
142 Kakalik & Robyn 1982, p. 65; Danzon 1985a, p. 31; US General Accounting Office 1987, p. 
22. 
143 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 112. 
144 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 126; Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 112; Danzon 2000, p. 1369. 
145 For the impact of malpractice risks on changes in practice patterns, see generally supra 
Section 2.5. 
146 Greenwald & Mueller 1978, p. 83. 
147 Reynolds, Rizzo & Gonzalez 1987, p. 2780. 
148 Kessler & McClellan 1996, p. 386. 
149 US Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation 2003, p. 11. 
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were $55.6 billion in 2008 dollars (2.4% of total health care expenditures), 
while $45,6 billion were costs of defensive medicine.150  
Remarkably, several recent studies reported insignificant results or low 
costs associated with defensive medicine.151 Nevertheless, the extensive 
evidence of prevalent defensive medicine as summarised in Section 2.5 does 
suggest that the costs added by defensive practice patterns should not be 
negligible. Taken together, the direct and indirect costs of the malpractice 
system tend to be considerable. Tort reforms aiming at limiting compensation 
may be conducive to the reduction in the costs of defensive medicine.  
2.6.2. Deterrence Benefits Compared to the Costs 
It has been demonstrated that malpractice liability can generate (often 
excessive) deterrent effects on practice patterns of physicians.152 However, it 
remains to be seen whether these deterrent effects eventually lead to a 
reduction in iatrogenic injuries. The deterrence benefits of malpractice 
liability crucially depend on to what extent these practice pattern changes 
improve the quality of medical care.153 However, empirical evidence on the 
benefits of malpractice deterrence is rare. 
One credible study using econometric analysis was conducted by 
Weiler et al.,154 which estimated the correlation between the negligent injury 
rate and claims per negligent injury across 49 hospitals in New York state. 
They used a standard econometric technique to resolve the problems of 
measurement errors and instrumental variables.155 After controlling for many 
other variables such as age, race, insurance status, hospital status and per 
capita income, Weiler et al. reported that more malpractice suits led to a 
lower number of negligent iatrogenic injuries, although this effect was not 
statistically significant.156 Based on these data, Weiler et al. estimated that the 
then malpractice system in New York could have reduced the negligent 
iatrogenic injury rate by 29% (from 1.25 without liability to 0.89 with 
liability) and the overall iatrogenic injury rate by 11% (from 3.7 without 
liability to 3.3 with liability).157 
 
150 See generally Mello et al. 2010. 
151 See generally US Congressional Budget Office 2004; Sloan & Shadle 2009; Thomas, Ziller 
& Thayer 2010; Paik et al. 2012. 
152 See supra Section 2.5. 
153 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 109. 
154 See generally Weiler et al. 1993. 
155 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 123. 
156 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 129. 
157 Id. 
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Several other studies attempted to assess deterrence benefits in a 
specific speciality setting or the impact of tort reforms on defensive medicine 
and ultimately on injury rates. They generally reported minimal or no effect 
on the quality of care. Sloan et al. attempted to examine the effect of changes 
in malpractice risk on birth outcomes and found that only decreases in foetal 
deaths were associated with greater malpractice risk in one of the many data 
sets.158 Hence, they concluded that, overall, there was no systematic 
improvement in birth outcomes when malpractice risk was increased. Using 
data on all elderly Medicare beneficiaries with serious heart disease, Kessler 
and McClellan consistently found that direct tort reforms aiming at reducing 
the level of compensation reduced medical expenditure without significant 
implications for patient health outcomes.159 Although Dubay, Kaestner and 
Waidmann found that malpractice liability pressures may lead to defensive 
medicine, they failed to find any evidence that PDM would produce better 
outcomes or that NDM would adversely affect infant health.160 Yang et al. 
(2012) used a longitudinal research design to examine millions of individual 
births in the US for the period 1991-2002 and reported that adverse birth 
outcome rates were not correlated with premium level or tort reform 
measures.161 Therefore, the implementation of liability-limiting reforms 
would only eliminate defensive medicine without damaging the desirable 
deterrent effect of malpractice liability.162 One study even reported mixed 
results. Currie and MacLeod (2008) found that not all tort reform measures 
resulted in the same outcome: while the reform of the Joint and Several 
Liability rule (setting a 50% faulty contribution threshold for 100% liability) 
reduced complications associated with a delivery, caps on non-economic 
damages increased them.163 
However, it ought to be noted that the fact that liability-limiting tort 
reforms have no significant effect on injury rate does not necessarily mean 
that the malpractice system has no deterrence benefits. The foregoing 
evidence points at the possibility that reduced malpractice risk via tort 
reforms successfully eliminates defensive medicine without harming the 
desirable deterrent effect of malpractice liability. Put another way, the 
increased health care costs due to PDM such as additional tests and 
procedures are socially wasteful and do not enhance the quality of medical 
care. Changes in the supply of services do not affect patients’ health adversely 
 
158 See generally Sloan et al. 1995. 
159 See generally Kessler & McClellan 1996; 2002a; 2002b. 
160 See generally Dubay, Kaestner & Waidmann 1999; 2001. 
161 See generally Yang et al. 2012. 
162 Id. 
163 See generally Currie & MacLeod 2008. 
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either, indicating that physicians withdraw from a particular practice or 
location due to incompetency. Therefore, the results of these studies can 
better be used to offer support for traditional tort reforms aiming at limiting 
liability rather than to negate the deterrence benefits of malpractice liability. 
Moreover, taking into account the extensive evidence on defensive 
medicine,164 and the fact that the elderly or uninsured patients, who suffered 
a higher proportion of negligent injuries, are exactly those “whose liability to 
sue is likely to pose the lowest threat to their providers,”165 it is reasonable to 
conclude that at the margin the malpractice system does have a deterrent 
effect on injury prevention that is socially beneficial,166 though the effect may 
be modest and still remains to be studied.  
Deterrence benefits should be weighed against the costs of the 
malpractice system. As Danzon argued, “if the tort system deters at least one 
injury of comparable severity for every injury currently compensated, the 
deterrence benefits outweigh the additional costs of the liability system.”167 
Taking the data generated by the Harvard Study as an example, patients 
obtained compensation in roughly 2.24 claims per 100 negligent AEs.168 
According to Danzon, only a 2.24 percent reduction in the rate of negligent 
AEs is sufficient to justify the costs of the tort system as far as litigation costs 
are concerned.169 When taking other costs such as “defensive medicine, public 
costs of operating the courts, time and psychological costs of litigation to 
patients and providers” into account, Danzon estimated that the malpractice 
system would generate positive net benefits if it could reduce negligent 
iatrogenic injury rates by at least 20%.170 The results of the Harvard Study 
reported by Weiler et al. – 29% – clearly met Danzon’s 20% threshold. 
Although tertiary costs of the malpractice system are considerable,171 this 
estimation of positive net benefits is plausible given the empirical finding that 
only a small minority of patients that suffered negligent iatrogenic injuries 
initiate claims.172 Total administrative costs are measured by the product of 
the number of claims and the costs per claim.173 Only when a claim is filed are 
tertiary costs incurred. Therefore, “a modest percentage reduction in injury 
rates is sufficient to offset reasonable estimates of overheads and defensive 
 
164 See supra Section 2.5. 
165 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 132. 
166 See generally Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012. 
167 Danzon 1985a, p. 226. 
168 See supra Section 2.3.1.2. 
169 Danzon 1985a, p. 226. 
170 Id. See also Danzon 2000, p. 1371. 
171 See supra Section 2.6.1. 
172 See supra Section 2.3.1. 
173 Shavell 1987a, p. 262. 
Preventing Medical Errors through Tort Law – Empirical Evidence and Updated Models 
Intersentia 289 
medicine costs.”174 Combining all the foregoing evidence together, it is more 
than likely that the marginal benefits of the current malpractice system 
outweigh the costs. Nonetheless, many agree that the search for marginal 
improvements or more cost-effective alternatives regimes still remains 
open.175 
3. A NEW EMPIRICALLY-GROUNDED MODEL 
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
An economic model is a “simplified system used to simulate some aspects of 
the real economy.”176 The classic model of the fault-based medical malpractice 
liability is intended to predict the complex relationship between the 
negligence rule and health care providers’ behaviour. The more features of 
health care services are included in the model, the higher the predicative 
power of the model. When economists such as Shavell and Posner who 
developed the classic model of medical malpractice liability around the 1980s, 
empirical evidence on medical malpractice was either unavailable or 
unsophisticated. Today, we have a wealth of empirical evidence. When new 
empirical evidence discloses new features regarding medical malpractice, the 
classic model needs to be updated accordingly in order to better reflect the 
real world.  
Section 3 will introduce readers to a new empirically-grounded model 
of medical malpractice liability which was mainly developed by Arlen and 
MacLeod.177 In Section 3.2, some new evidence on the causes of iatrogenic 
injuries is presented. After that it will describe how the classic model was 
updated by Arlen and MacLeod for the purpose of achieving a better 
deterrent effect of medical malpractice liability. 
 
174 Danzon 2000, p. 1371. 
175 See generally Danzon, 2000; Sloan & Chepke 2008; Van Velthoven & Van Wijck 2012. 
176 Black, Hashimzade & Myles 2012, pp. 275-276. 
177 See generally Arlen & MacLeod 2003; Arlen & MacLeod 2005; Arlen 2006; Arlen 2010; 
Arlen 2013; Arlen 2014. 
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3.2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE CAUSES OF 
IATROGENIC INJURIES 
3.2.1. Risk Factors 
In an attempt to find out the causes of iatrogenic injuries, researchers 
considered a wide range of risk factors in relation to patients, providers and 
treatment characteristics. As far as patient characteristics are concerned, 
patients age, lower payment status and income levels were said to be 
associated with a higher incidence rate of iatrogenic injuries.178 This result 
implies that patients in a weaker position of health or wealth may receive 
lower quality of care than other groups of patients. Since elderly, uninsured 
or poor patients are less likely to be able to file meaningful malpractice 
claims, the fact that they suffer disproportionately large numbers of 
iatrogenic injuries is “suggestive of the preventive value of malpractice 
litigation.”179 
Regarding provider characteristics, both the injury rate (0.2% to 7.9%) 
and the negligent injury rate (1% to 60%) varied dramatically from one 
hospital to another.180 This suggests that the quality of care is not evenly 
distributed through the community. Although university teaching hospitals 
had a higher rate (4.1%) of adverse events than did voluntary non-teaching 
hospitals (2.3%), only 10.7% of adverse events at university hospitals were 
due to substandard care which was lower than that (26.9%) at non-teaching 
hospitals.181 In-patients were more likely to be said to commit errors than 
attending doctors.182  
When it comes to treatment characteristics, most adverse events were 
relevant to surgical procedures (31.6% to 48%) and medications (19% to 
27.6%).183 One striking fact is that although diagnostic errors or mishaps 
accounted for only a small portion of all adverse events (6.9% to 8%), a high 
percentage of them (75% to 93.8%) were considered to be preventable or 
negligent.184  
Although the ideal goal of quality assurance is to prevent all iatrogenic 
injuries, many non-negligent iatrogenic injuries are unavoidable given the 
 
178 Weiler et al. 1993, pp. 45-47. See also generally Mills 1978; Classen et al. 2011. 
179 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 58. 
180 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 47. 
181 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 50. 
182 See generally Andrews 2005. 
183 See generally Weiler et al. 1993; Thomas et al. 2000a; Landrigan et al. 2010. 
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current state of medical knowledge.185 As far as the classic model of 
malpractice is concerned, it is not adequate to simply list risk factors that may 
contribute to iatrogenic injuries in general. Instead, the causes of negligent 
iatrogenic injuries – medical errors – should be carefully examined in order to 
optimise the deterrent effect of malpractice liability. 
3.2.2. Deliberate or Accidental Negligence? 
The classic model of malpractice pre-supposes that providers are fully 
informed of the costs and benefits of care and the optimal level of care (due 
care). If providers choose to be negligent, they will do so either by under-
investing in care knowingly in order to reduce patient-specific costs or they 
are “bad apples” who do not care about patient welfare or who know they are 
too incompetent to provide due care. Put another way, their deviation from 
due care is “deliberate.”186 This approach to the understanding of medical 
negligence has its roots in the Theory of Bad Apples – health care quality can 
be best assured by identifying “bad apples” and removing them from the 
medical profession.187 This theory predicts that sub-optimal care is 
attributable to poor intentions by bad apple physicians – “their venality, 
incompetence, or insufficient caution.”188 According to this theory, quality 
will be improved if deterrence can be precisely targeted at these small groups 
of bad apples.189  
Health care providers, who are trained to provide careful treatment 
competently, are perhaps among the most conscientious professionals in 
society.190 They are normally expected to be infallible and function without 
error.191 However, empirical evidence shows that preventable adverse events 
occur frequently and often lead to severe personal injuries.192  
One significant reason why providers nevertheless err is not because 
they are “bad apples” but because it is exceedingly difficult for them to handle 
human error when it does occur.193 Health care providers are simply unable 
to bring all aspects of patient care under control.194 Although professional 
 
185 Weiler et al. 1993, p. 58. 
186 See supra Chapter 7, Section 2. 
187 See generally Berwick 1989a. 
188 Id. 
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190 See generally Leape 1994. 
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192 See supra Section 2.2. 
193 See generally Hilfiker 1984; Christensen, Levinson & Dunn 1992; Leape 1994. 
194 See generally Berwick 1989b; Leape 1994. 
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standards dictate error-free patient care, it is widely admitted in the health 
care sector that inadvertent mistakes are inevitable.195  
Empirical evidence also shows that many, if not most, medical errors 
are committed accidentally by relatively competent physicians.196 First, 
momentary slips or lapses cannot be eliminated.197 Fatigue and sleep loss due 
to overwork or other forms of stress may divert providers’ attention and lead 
to momentary slips or lapses during the largely automatic, routine 
performance.198 Second, many preventable adverse events are due to 
diagnostic errors.199 Providers may also confront novel situations for which 
they have no pre-packed solutions and the trial and error method is 
inevitable.200 If they fail to update their expertise regularly, they may lack 
sufficient information to make correct diagnoses. Moreover, many human 
errors are precipitated, activated, or amplified by system failures.201 
Therefore, many medical errors are indeed accidental rather than deliberate. 
Providers often err when they do not know that they are providing sub-
optimal treatment.202 
3.2.3. Human Errors and System Failures 
One major feature of modern health care is that providers usually practise 
within complex institutional settings and collaborations among providers and 
between providers and hospitals are essential. Providers’ behaviour is shaped 
by what task they undertake and where they work.203 Either human errors or 
system failures may contribute to medical errors. Andrews et al. found that 
while 37.8% adverse events were caused by an individual (e.g. by poor 
technical performance, poor judgement, or failure to act on or to obtain 
information), 25.4% were due to either interactive factors (e.g. the failure of a 
consultant team to communicate adequately with the requesting team) or 
administrative factors (e.g. defective or unavailable equipment or inadequate 
staffing).204 
In many cases, system failures may play a leading role in inducing 
medical errors. Leape et al. studied 264 preventable adverse drug events 
 
195 See generally Leape 1994. 
196 See generally Arlen 2014. 
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198 See generally Reason 1995. 
199 See generally Weiler et al. 1993; Thomas et al. 2000a; Arlen 2014. 
200 See generally Reason 1995. 
201 See more in the next subhead. 
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(ADEs) and reported that the major systems failure in the dissemination of 
drug knowledge accounted for 29% of all 334 errors and the deficiency in the 
availability of patient information (e.g. lab tests results) led to 18% of 
errors.205 In total, systems failures accounted for 78% of the errors.206 
Gawande et al. conducted interviews with 45 surgeons from three teaching 
hospitals between 2000 and 2001.207 They found that the vast majority of 
errors involved contributions from more than one clinician and failures in 
judgement or vigilance occurred in more than half of the adverse events.208 
They also reported that systems factors contributed in 84% of these events.209 
For example, errors in judgement were closely associated with inadequate 
supervision.210 Due to more chances of inexperience, communication 
breakdown, lack of supervision, heavy workloads and fatigue, adverse events 
happened more frequently in emergency rooms than in other wards.211  
More often than not, medical errors are caused by human errors and 
system failures jointly. Mello and Studdert found that individual factors often 
appeared in concurrence with system factors. Individual factors were fairly 
widespread, leading to injuries in 96% of the 889 cases with error. Judgement 
errors were the most frequent (70%) among all individual factors.212 System 
factors were less prevalent, but still accounted for injuries in 56% of the 
cases.213 The most prevalent ones among all system factors were teamwork 
problems and other communication breakdowns (40%).214 On average, an 
injury was caused by three different contributing factors, and more than a 
third of all injuries resulted from four or more contributing factors.215 The 
majority (60%) of injuries were associated with two or more clinicians, and a 
quarter involved three or more.216 Their data confirmed the assertion that 
“when large systems fail, it is due to multiple faults that occur together in an 
un-anticipated interaction, creating a chain of events in which the faults 
grow and evolve.”217  
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Furthermore, Mello and Studdert concluded that it is a mosaic “causal 
web” rather than a linear “causal chain” that leads to medical injury, i.e. 
multiple individual and system factors, while interacting with one another, 
independently contribute to medical injuries.218 They further found that 
individual failures appear to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
iatrogenic injuries to happen – in most of the cases, individual failures are 
“precipitated, activated, or amplified by system failures.”219 Individual factors 
alone accounted for only 30% of iatrogenic injuries, whereas both individual 
and systemic factors contributed to almost 70%.220 
Finally, there were “amplification effects,” meaning the occurrence of 
system failures aggravates an injury due to individual failures. This can be 
evidenced by the fact that cases involving both system and individual factors 
led to more severe injuries and were thus associated with larger damages than 
those involving only individual factors.221 System failures such as lack of 
supervision, hand-over problems and excessive workload might have 
precipitating effects, meaning that they create “an environment in which 
inexperienced trainees are set up to do damage.”222 
3.3. UPDATING THE CLASSIC MODEL OF MALPRACTICE 
LIABILITY 
3.3.1. Patient Safety Investments 
The traditional view of “deliberate” medical negligence has been fiercely 
attacked by Arlen and MacLeod.223 Extensive empirical evidence summarised 
in the previous Section has demonstrated that medical negligence is normally 
accidental and system failures often play a leading role in contributing to 
medical errors. Mcclanahan, Goodwin and Perlin even put forward a 
“formula” for medical errors: “Good People + Bad Systems.”224 Adverse events 
are more often the result of error-prone situations and error-prone activities 
instead of error-prone providers.225 Therefore, the classic model of 
malpractice cannot be relied upon to design sound policies to prevent medical 
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errors, because “it fails to capture the leading cause of medical 
error.”226Relatively competent providers often commit errors inadvertently 
because they fail to update their expertise regularly or lack proper supervision 
so that they sometimes fail to make correct diagnoses and provide optimal 
treatment.227 System failures also increase the likelihood of human errors or 
fail to prevent providers from erring accidentally.228  
Accidental medical errors can be reduced by continuously investing in 
updating expertise or competence that is essential especially for proper 
diagnoses and treatment choice and perfecting system fail-safe designs at the 
institutional level – organisational leadership, centralised planning, and the 
mobilisation of resources.229 The management of competence can be regarded 
as a system issue as well, since “training, selection, continuing development, 
and life-long competency checking” are often conducted at the hospital 
level.230 These investments are referred to as “patient safety investments,” 
which are different from patient-specific investment in care – effort, caution 
and time taken by a physician in a single case.231 Patient safety investments 
are regarded as “collective care” because they benefit all patients by 
increasing the likelihood that providers will make correct diagnoses and 
treatment choices and provide optimal treatment.232 
Following this line of reasoning, a new empirically-grounded model of 
malpractice liability is proposed.233 Under this new model, malpractice 
liability should be used not only to induce informed providers to choose 
optimal treatment but also to incentivize providers to invest optimally in 
patient safety so as to ensure that the information needed to make optimal 
treatment choice is available.234 It does not matter whether the court 
incorporates patient safety investments within the standard of medical care. 
Even if the standard of care is entirely based on treatment choice, providers 
will nonetheless be induced to invest optimally in patient safety in order to 
reduce the probability of accidental negligence.235 Malpractice liability will 
incentivize the provider to make optimal investment in patient safety so long 
as the provider’s expected damages for accidental negligence amount to the 
full expected cost to the patient of being given erroneous rather than the 
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optimal treatment.236 The optimal amount of damages for accidental 
negligence should be less than the actual magnitude of harm done to the 
patient ex post; otherwise, providers will over-invest in patient safety due to 
excessive incentives to prevent accidental errors.237 
3.3.2. Enterprise (Hospital) Liability 
3.3.2.1. Direct Hospital Liability and Vicarious Liability 
The classic model of malpractice liability mainly places the locus of liability 
on individual health care providers (typically doctors and nurses), because 
they provide the vast majority of treatment services and they are assumed to 
be in the best position to prevent medical errors.238 In the US, for instance, 
malpractice liability is mainly imposed upon the individual physician.239 
Nevertheless, the classic model does not exclude the possibility that an 
institutional health care provider (typically a hospital) can be involved in the 
problems of malpractice.240  
In most legal systems, hospitals are usually held liable for iatrogenic 
injuries in two scenarios – direct hospital liability or vicarious liability. On 
the one hand, patients may suffer iatrogenic injuries from pure system 
failures such as unhygienic conditions, poorly maintained or defective 
equipment and inadequate personnel or equipment. Even when physicians do 
not commit any medical error, hospitals should be held liable for iatrogenic 
injuries resulting from their own failures alone in many European countries 
based on either contractual liability or tort liability.241  
On the other hand, hospitals may be held liable for injuries caused by 
negligence on the part of individual health care providers who practice under 
the auspices of the hospitals. If individual providers are hospital employees, 
hospitals will be subject to vicarious liability in most legal systems.242 The 
hospital may also be held liable for the physician’s malpractice even when the 
physician is not an employee, based on either agency liability or corporate 
liability in the US243 or on Article 7:462 of the Dutch Civil Code (making the 
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hospital jointly liable for any failure of treatment performed in the hospital) 
in the Netherlands.244 The negligence on the part of individual providers is 
normally a prerequisite to the imposition of vicarious liability. Even in the 
case where it is difficult to identify the specific physician whose negligence 
was the cause of the patient’s iatrogenic injuries, vicarious liability may apply 
regarding “anonymous fault.”245 Once the physician’s negligence is 
established, the physician and the hospital are normally subject to joint and 
several liability. 
The fundamental, economic analysis of vicarious liability is largely 
based on principal-agent models.246 The basic intention to impose vicarious 
liability on the principal is to deal with the problem of judgement-proof 
agents, who may have insufficient personal assets to pay compensation to 
third party victims.247 If the agent’s assets are limited, his incentive to take 
care will be diluted.248 Imposition of vicarious liability will incentivize the 
principal to urge the agent to take due care supposing that it is possible for 
the principal to observe and control the actor’s behaviour.249 If the principal 
can monitor the agent’s care-taking better than the court, vicarious liability 
will induce greater care levels than a regime of purely personal liability under 
which only the agent is held liable.250 In the absence of vicarious liability, the 
principal would have almost no incentive to urge the agent to exercise greater 
care,251 and the problem of too little care or too much activity would arise. 
The other way around, the principal will be induced to urge the agent to 
exercise optimal care if vicarious liability is imposed.  
From the perspective of law and economics, vicarious liability imposed 
upon institutional health care providers can be justified on three grounds:252 
First, an individual provider’s assets are so limited that the problem of 
under-deterrence may arise due to insolvency.253 Insolvency is less of a 
problem under negligence since the provider will still take due care as long as 
the cost of taking care is less than his/her total assets.254 However, if a 
physician’s assets are considerably limited, under-deterrence will still arise 
even under negligence. Modern hospitals are normally public or private 
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enterprises with sufficient capital assets. Hence, imposing vicarious liability 
on hospitals will not lead to under-deterrence resulting from insolvency. By 
contrast, the physician’s incentives to take optimal care will be maintained by 
internal monitoring and disciplinary sanctions rather than by external 
malpractice litigations, since it is generally believed that hospitals are better 
able than the court to control the agent-physician’s care-taking. The 
principal-hospital is assumed to have more information concerning the 
malpractice risk and safety standards and is better suited to the job of 
preventing medical errors and identifying and disciplining error-prone 
physicians.  
Second, when the problem of “multiple agents” arises,255 i.e. when the 
victimised patient cannot identify which of the hospital’s physicians has 
deviated from the standard of care even when one of them is clearly 
negligent, the principal-hospital is the easier target of liability. The principal-
hospital is presumed to be able to identify the specific negligent physician or 
at least to reduce the likelihood of medical errors via training programs or 
screening measures.256 
Third, the principal-hospital may be better informed than the agent-
physician concerning accident risks or preventive measures. Based on 
empirical evidence, Mello and Studdert point out that preventive 
interventions should be implemented at the organisational level rather than 
the individual level – “organisational leadership, centralised planning, and the 
mobilisation of resources” are essential to prevent system failures.257 On the 
one hand, the organisational approach recognises the presence of system 
failures that significantly contribute to iatrogenic injuries. On the other, even 
in cases where individual factors contribute substantially, the optimal 
intervention may still lie in organisational measures. Hence, “tort deterrence 
is best targeted at the institutional, not individual, level in medical 
malpractice law.”258 Although individual physicians de facto cause many 
iatrogenic injuries, they are not the party who can prevent injuries at least 
cost.  
In practice, one notable example of vicarious liability imposed on 
hospitals can be found in the first paragraph of Article 7:462 of the Dutch BW 
(Civil Code), which reads as follows: 
If, in the implementation (performance) of the medical treatment 
agreement, activities are performed in a hospital which is not a party to 
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that agreement, the hospital shall bear joint liability for any failure to 
comply with the medical treatment agreement as if it was a party to that 
agreement itself. 
Hence, once a medical services contract is executed in a hospital, the hospital 
is nonetheless jointly and severally liable for any non-performance even if it 
is not a party to the contract. This is referred to as “central liability,” the 
rationale behind which is “to identify the defendant to enable the patient to 
claim damages.”259 If a victimised patient only files a claim against the 
hospital, the latter, after paying damages, may have recourse against liable 
doctors.260 
3.3.2.2. Enterprise Medical Liability 
Recently, a radical regime of enterprise liability for medical malpractice or 
enterprise medical liability (hereinafter EML) was proposed in the 1990s in 
the US.261 Under this regime, the individual physician will be entirely 
immune from malpractice litigation – the locus of liability will be completely 
transferred from the individual physician to an enterprise such as a hospital, 
HMO or health plan.262 This rule is rather similar to channelling of liability, 
under which liability is exclusively imposed on one responsible tortfeasor.263 
Those proponents of EML argue that it would improve deterrence via better 
system fail-safe designs and reduce litigation costs through holding the 
hospital as the sole defendant.264  
However, the advantage of EML over vicarious liability may not be so 
considerable as those proponents contended. First, holding the principal-
hospital vicariously liable for the agent-physician’s negligence already 
improves deterrence relative to agent liability.265  
Second, the savings in litigation costs could be small, since individual 
providers would still be required to testify as the primary witness in court and 
they may still feel “burdened by the prospect of having to defend their 
actions in court.”266Third, there are still some dimensions of medical errors 
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that are due to pure human errors and sometimes both individual factors and 
system factors play a role in causing iatrogenic injuries. The exclusive model 
of enterprise liability may lead to separate liability insurance arrangements, 
fragmented incentives and inefficiency in defending claims.267 In contrast, an 
arrangement of channelling is promising, under which hospitals take full 
responsibility for the purchase of malpractice insurance to cover their 
physicians, hence insulating them from malpractice liability financially, if not 
legally.268  
That being said, EML is particularly desirable when taking into 
account patient safety investments, many of which can only be made at the 
institutional level such as investments in supervision, procedures for 
transferring responsibility for patients, staffing, sanitation procedures, 
medical technology and rules regulating the working hours of providers.269 
Under vicarious liability, if system failures account for an iatrogenic injury, 
hospitals may be able to escape liability providing that individual providers 
comply with due care under the circumstances. As a result, hospitals may 
under-invest in patient safety systems without liability, although they are 
largely responsible for the injuries.270 For this reason, it is important to impose 
liability directly on medical entities in order to effectively induce sufficient 
investments in patient safety systems.  
Of course, this may be achieved by the combined use of vicarious 
liability and direct hospital liability as is adopted in many legal systems today. 
However, it is often difficult for the court to draw a clear line between the 
cases where vicarious liability should apply and where direct hospital liability 
should apply in practice, which may send confusing signals to health care 
providers. Unifying vicarious liability with direct hospital liability may save 
tertiary costs considerably by sending clear deterrent signals.  
Also, it is of vital importance to encourage patient safety investments, 
especially those at the institutional level, in order to respond to the ever-
increasing complexity of modern health care systems and risk of iatrogenic 
injuries. Hence, a systematic arrangement of placing the locus of liability on 
hospitals appears more efficient in terms of injury prevention. Individual 
providers’ incentives to take care will not necessarily be diluted, given that 
either they will be regularly monitored and disciplined by hospitals where 
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they practice, or hospitals are granted a right of recourse against negligent 
practitioners.271 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The Chapter has reviewed empirical evidence concerning the deterrent effect 
of the fault-based medical malpractice liability and discussed the modification 
of the classic model of medical malpractice liability in the light of new 
evidence pertaining to the causes of iatrogenic injuries.  
Empirical evidence shows that the real crisis is not that there are too 
many frivolous claims but that patients with meritorious claims often do not 
sue or are denied compensation. Tort liability is not a “random lottery,” 
because it is relatively effective at eliminating non-meritorious claims.272 The 
deterrent effect of tort liability does seem to exist. The prevalence of 
defensive medicine may suggest over-deterrence. Although the costs of the 
malpractice system are very high, the huge deterrence benefits of reduced 
iatrogenic injuries are highly likely to pay for the expenses incurred by the 
malpractice system. Be that as it may, this conclusion does not exclude the 
possibility that the current malpractice system can be further enhanced or 
that alternative plans may be more desirable. 
New empirical evidence supports the view that medical negligence is 
mostly accidental rather than deliberate and most medical errors can be 
better prevented at the institutional level instead of the individual level. The 
updated and empirically-grounded model of malpractice liability requires that 
health care providers should be induced to invest in both care and patient 
safety and the locus of liability should be placed on institutional providers 
alone. 
It should be noted that the vast majority of empirical evidence on 
medical malpractice in this Chapter has its origins in the US. One may 
wonder whether the findings of these empirical studies are directly applicable 
to China. The transferability of these empirical findings to China will be 
addressed later.273 
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CHAPTER 9 
PREVENTING MEDICAL ERRORS  
THROUGH ALTERNATIVE REGIMES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although the fault-based malpractice system appears to be cost-effective at 
preventing medical errors (i.e. its deterrence benefits slightly exceed its costs 
as the American data show),1 the existence of considerable costs of defensive 
medicine and administrative costs lead us to the question whether there is 
any alternative regime to the tort system that will achieve greater efficiency 
(part of Sub-question (2-a)). In the literature, two alternative regimes are 
often discussed – the contractual approach2 and regulation.  
At one extreme, proponents of the contractual approach emphasise 
that informed patients will only purchase the desired level of care (or risk of 
medical malpractice) in their best interests, and social welfare will be 
maximised in a free health market. The contractual approach is relevant for 
China in that a small part of the Chinese health care system is based on the 
free market – services provided by for-profit private hospitals.3 However, this 
approach does not seem fit for the part of the health care sector where 
services are provided by not-for-profit hospitals and prices are normally 
regulated.  
At the other extreme, proponents of regulation do not believe 
individuals can make informed decisions in their best interest, and some 
 
1 See supra Chapter 8, Section 2.6. 
2 It should be noted that the notion of the “contractual approach” as used in this dissertation 
does not simply mean the doctor-patient relationship is based on a service contract. 
Instead, it specifically means contractual waivers of malpractice liability or contractual 
variations in the standard of care, irrespective of whether malpractice liability is 
contractual liability as adopted in the Netherlands and Germany or tort liability as 
employed in the common law systems. 
3 For more information on private hospitals, see supra Chapter 2, Section 2.2. 
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government interventions seem theoretically justified. This approach is 
highly relevant for China, since China has a deep-rooted tradition of strict 
governmental regulation and a regime of regulating health care provision has 
been developing in China for decades.4 
This Chapter will review arguments for and against the contractual 
approach (Section 2) and quality regulation (Sections 3-6), and conduct a 
critical evaluation of them against Calabresi’s goals of accident cost avoidance. 
Section 3 will provide a general overview of the regulation of the medical 
profession. Licensing and quality/safety regulation will be examined 
separately in Section 4 and Section 5. The pros and cons of public regulation 
and self-regulation will be addressed in Section 6. The final Section 7 
concludes. 
2. THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH: A 
DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVE? 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The contractual approach was proposed against a background of the medical 
malpractice crisis in the US. In view of the deficiencies of the fault-based 
malpractice system, some scholars turned their gaze to contracts. Basically, 
there are two types of contractual approaches to medical malpractice liability. 
One group of scholars maintained that contracting out of or over malpractice 
liability5 between individual patients and health care providers may enhance 
social welfare.6 The other group of scholars paid more attention to enterprise 
liability and managed care, proposing that contracting with entities rather 
than individual providers is more desirable.7 Since managed care – the 
currently dominant form of health care provision in the US – is somewhat 
alien to China, and there is no sign that China will adopt this form of health 
care system in the near future, the second type of contractual approach will 
not be discussed here. 
 
4 For more information on the regulation of health care in China, see supra Chapter 2, 
Section 4. 
5 Here, “malpractice liability” may be either contractual liability or tortious liability. 
6 See e.g. Epstein 1976; 1977; 1978; Havighurst 1983; Epstein 1986; Havighurst 1986; 
Robinson 1986; Epstein & Sykes 2001; Thaler & Sunstein 2008; Epstein 2013. 
7 See e.g. Weiler et al. 1993; Abraham & Weiler 1994; Sage, Hastings & Berenson 1994; 
Danzon 2000. 
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2.2. THE CASE FOR THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH 
Professor Richard Epstein strongly advocated a libertarian approach to 
medical malpractice issues.8 In his groundbreaking article “Medical 
Malpractice: The Case for Contract,” Epstein criticised the traditional medical 
malpractice system, legislative innovations aiming to limit malpractice awards 
and medical no-fault insurance.9 Instead, Epstein pointed out that courts 
overlook “the possibility, indeed the desirability, of having the rules that they 
have laid down varied by the agreements between the parties.”10 Hence, 
Epstein proposed a contractual approach to medical malpractice issues – social 
welfare will be enhanced if patients and health care providers are permitted 
to negotiate ex ante on the level of care to be exercised and the price to be 
paid without government intervention.11 
The rationale behind the contractual approach is that the best rules 
should be those that approximate to what “the parties themselves would 
choose to govern their own relationship.”12 Under contract law, the parties 
should be encouraged to stipulate a set of individuated clauses in response to 
their practical needs.13 From the perspective of externalities, there is “no 
systematic external loss to offset the joint gains” by providers and patients.14 
Accordingly, Epstein proposed two basic types of contracts: first, parties may 
agree on no protection – waiver of liability claims;15 and second, parties may 
agree on some but not full contractual liability protection.16 Since the 
statutory standard of care required of physicians – due care level – is removed 
or reduced, patients will receive a quid pro quo reduction in the prices of 
 
8 Epstein 1976. Epstein has been vigorously defending his liberalist approach for decades 
since 1976. See Epstein 1977; 1978; 1984; 1986; 1988; 1995; Epstein & Sykes 2001; Epstein 
2013. This contractual approach is also advocated by Havighurst 1986; Robinson 1986 and 
recently by Thaler & Sunstein 2008. 
9 Epstein 1976, pp. 95-96. 
10 Epstein 1976, pp. 94-95. 
11 See generally Epstein 1976. 
12 Epstein 1976, p. 95. 
13 Id. 
14 Epstein 1986, p. 202. 
15 Epstein 1978, p. 256. It should be noted that waiver of tort liability is in effect equivalent 
to caveat emptor (no liability) under Shavell’s market-based accident model. According to 
Shavell, caveat emptor is efficient only if customers have perfect knowledge of accident 
risks. See supra Chapter 6, Section 7.1.3. 
16 Id. Parties may agree that providers are liable only for wilful infliction of harm or gross 
negligence, that the use of the doctrine of informed consent or res ipsa loquitur is 
restricted, or that medical customary practices, even one respectable school of thought, 
should be taken as standards of care.  
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medical services.17 Put another way, the needy may benefit more from a 
combination of lower-cost treatment and lower prices for care than from that 
of higher-cost treatment and higher prices for care.18 For those who benefit 
more from the standard malpractice liability, they can simply replicate it by 
contract with a higher price for care.19  
Recently, Thaler and Sunstein, in their well-known behavioural 
economics book “Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness,” put forward an even more radical proposal – “patients should be 
presumed to be permitted to sue only for intentional or reckless wrongdoing 
– and not for mere negligence.”20 According to their approach, waivers of the 
right to sue for mere negligence would be the default option and patients 
would have to pay higher prices for more protection.21 They predicted that if 
patients were fully informed, some of them would purchase more protection 
in the form of the right to sue for negligence, while most of them would be 
willing to “take their chances.”22 The rationale behind this prediction is that 
the costs of the malpractice system are too high and the whole system is a 
“lottery”, and is a poor fit between malpractice claims and negligent 
iatrogenic injuries and highly erratic injury awards.23 Hence, many patients 
may not be willing to buy such “high-level” protection, which is a form of 
compulsory insurance via tort law, from which they do not believe they can 
benefit very much.24 The utility of those patients who do believe they can 
benefit from tort liability would not be affected since they could easily choose 
to purchase the statutory protection by paying more.25  
In many jurisdictions, however, contracting out of or over malpractice 
liability may be blocked by the doctrines of unequal bargaining power, 
contracts of adhesion, economic duress, and unconscionability.26 Also, under 
the Dutch Civil Code, a waiver of malpractice liability is “plainly invalid.”27 
Epstein objected to this judicial restriction for three reasons: first, this judicial 
attitude directly violates the principle of freedom of contract; second, it 
 
17 Epstein 1978, p. 259. 
18 See generally Epstein 1986. 
19 Id. 
20 Thaler & Sunstein 2008, p. 213. This approach is in line with their idea of “libertarian 
paternalism,” i.e. a type of paternalism aiming at influencing people’s choices in a way that 
will make them better off without any coercion. See also generally Sunstein & Thaler 
2003; Thaler & Sunstein 2003. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Thaler & Sunstein 2008, pp. 209-212. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Epstein 1978, p. 255; Hondius 2010b, pp. 18-19. 
27 Dutch BW, art. 7:468. See also Hondius 2010a, pp. 156-157. 
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shares the same shortcoming with public regulation, namely that regulators 
often find that they make wrong estimations about what private parties 
actually need and the complexities of legal rules; and third, while errors made 
in private contracts can be corrected by alternative agreements, erroneous 
public orders cannot be corrected by private agreements.28 Thaler and 
Sunstein also pointed out that this judicial restriction is unacceptable to 
libertarians, because it denies providers and patients “the freedom to make 
contracts as they see fit.”29 
2.3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONTRACTUAL 
APPROACH 
2.3.1. Information Problems 
Opponents of the contractual approach maintained that patients are usually 
not fully informed of or unable to assess malpractice risks and thus it is 
virtually impossible for them to negotiate directly with physicians on liability 
in their own best interests.30 Product uncertainty and information asymmetry 
are characteristic of the health care market.31 Due to this information 
problem, if the contractual approach were allowed, many patients would opt 
out of malpractice liability even when they could be better off if they opted 
for liability.32 If consumers misunderstand the odds of product failure, sellers 
will produce the wrong products in the absence of government 
interventions.33  
Consumers are often not well-informed because they do not have 
sufficient expertise and resources to examine the quality of products, 
especially those infrequently purchased ones.34 Hence, consumers may be 
systematically optimistic about accident risks as a result of their inability to 
process data rather than due to insufficient data.35 Empirical evidence also 
shows that people who are relatively healthy tend to be unrealistically 
optimistic about accident risks – they believe their own odds of suffering 
injury are lower than that of others.36 
 
28 Epstein 1978, p. 255. 
29 Thaler & Sunstein 2008, p. 209. 
30 Calabresi 1978, p. 234; Arlen 2006; Baker & Lytton 2010. 
31 See generally Arrow 1963. 
32 Arlen 2006, p. 263. 
33 Spence 1977, p. 561. 
34 Schwartz & Wilde 1983, p. 1426. 
35 Id. 
36 See generally Weinstein 1982. 
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It is also argued that many patients under-state malpractice risks 
because they place great trust in their physicians and believe physicians will 
deliver the best care possible irrespective of regulation or liability.37 They 
may fail to recognise the important role of liability in quality assurance. 
In addition, people may have the self-control problem of immediate 
gratification, which is that we often cannot resist the temptation to 
experience pleasure without delay which in the long run we do not 
appreciate.38 This cognitive bias might lead patients to overvalue the 
immediate gains of price reduction, which they would avoid were they fully 
informed.39 
It follows from the preceding explanations that without government 
intervention, it is highly likely that many, if not most, patients would get 
hurt if they opted out of tort liability, because they tend to under-estimate 
malpractice risks, under-state the deterrent benefits of imposing liability on 
providers, and over-value the choice of opting out of tort liability. 
2.3.2. Other Arguments against Waivers of Statutory Liability 
Even if the information problem could be perfectly resolved by e.g. 
regulation on information disclosure, the contractual approach would not 
necessarily be superior to tort liability. Typically, Arlen maintained that 
many patients would get fewer benefits, at greater costs, from the contractual 
approach than from statutorily defined malpractice liability, even if they 
were fully informed.40 The primary reason is that contractual arrangements 
for liability cannot replicate the same deterrent effects generated by statutory 
liability.41  
Specifically, Arlen discovered three problems additional to imperfect 
information that would render contractual waivers of liability inferior to 
state-enforced liability:42 
- The Free-Rider Problem. Malpractice liability is needed to incentivize 
providers not only to invest time and effort in treating a single patient, 
but also to make patient safety investment in expertise, staffing, 
technology, equipment, clinical protocols, and administration for all 
 
37 Arlen 2006, p. 264. 
38 See generally O’Donoghue & Rabin 2000. 
39 Baker & Lytton 2010, p. 234. 
40 See generally Arlen 2006; 2010. 
41 Id. 
42 Arlen 2006, pp. 257-262; 2010. 
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their patients.43 Since patient safety investment benefits all patients 
non-rivalrously, it can be regarded as a public good. The incentive to 
make collective patient safety investment cannot be induced by 
individual contracts,44 because a patient to a contract would only 
purchase the amount of safety that benefits him/her alone. In the health 
care sector, the contractual approach is inefficient in that it would 
create the free-rider problem that patients are induced to opt out of 
malpractice liability all together, decreasing their well-being 
collectively.  
- Failure to Induce Optimal Pre-contractual Care. Malpractice liability 
can induce providers to make patient safety investment before, during 
and after any treatment continuously, because providers expect that this 
investment affects the safety of each treatment in the future. Therefore, 
under malpractice law patients usually do not have to worry about 
whether providers take sufficient prior precautions before they enter 
into a medical service contract. Proponents of the contractual approach 
argue that patients could receive more benefits if they were allowed to 
choose their desired level of safety. However, it is difficult in practice 
for high-quality providers to signal their pre-contractual quality level to 
patients through an offer to bear liability at a higher price for two 
reasons. First, malpractice liability is not experience-rated and it is 
difficult for patients to evaluate the quality of care of different providers 
before treatment. Second, it should be noted that what prior precautions 
have been made is already fixed before parties enter into a contract. This 
implies that waiving malpractice liability by means of the contract 
would not affect pre-contractual care.  
- Adverse Selection. Patients are heterogeneous in terms of their 
willingness to purchase high-quality care. Patients with more 
complicate pre-existing or underlying conditions or litigious patients are 
expected to value malpractice liability most and are most likely to opt 
for more protection. Since providers do not have perfect information 
about patients’ pre-conditions or litigiousness, they would surcharge all 
those who opt for tort liability an average price. Consequently, the 
problem of adverse selection would arise – lower-cost patients would 
waive malpractice liability and the average price would rise eventually. 
Those patients who value liability would have to choose either (a) to 
pay higher prices than they would pay under state-enforced liability to 
 
43 See also supra Chapter 8, Section 2.2.1. 
44 Be that as it may, it is possible that a group of patients who are in need of the same level of 
service quality may induce providers to invest in patient safety on the basis of a collective 
contract (e.g. via health insurance). 
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obtain that protection or (b) to opt out of liability and obtain lower-
quality care than what they would like to purchase. Either way, those 
patients would be worse off. 
Furthermore, Danzon pointed out patients would have little incentive to opt 
for no liability if a significant part of their medical expenses had been already 
covered by health insurance and the reduction in out-of-pocket fee would be 
trivial.45 In the US, exactly as Danzon estimated in the 1980s, a waiver of 
malpractice coverage of a medical service costing $100 would only reduce the 
out-of-pocket fee from $20 to $19.46 Hence, in legal systems where social 
security is well developed, the contractual approach will become less 
attractive to patients.  
2.3.3. Other Arguments against Contractual Variation in the Standard of 
Care 
In addition to waivers of malpractice liability, proponents of the contractual 
approach also maintained that allowing parties to negotiate on the standard of 
care that meets their needs best would be socially more desirable than tort 
liability since it would result in the optimal degree of variation in the 
standard of care.47 Arlen refuted the foregoing argument and maintained that 
allowing parties to negotiate on the standard of care would lead to “more 
variation in the standard of care than is socially optimal,” because a patient in 
an individual contract would not take into account the benefits of 
standardised care to providers and other patients.48 
Arlen held that health care providers can obtain learning and network 
benefits when they adhere to commonly recognised and practised standard of 
care.49 Learning benefits in the health care sector include: (a) that providers 
will deliver health care more quickly and appropriately if they can rely on 
what they have learned from their past school education and training and 
clinical protocols; (b) that uncertainty over the standard of care will be 
greatly reduced if they follow commonly accepted professional standards; (c) 
that medical professionals will collaborate more closely and better coordinate 
their practices if they have the same understanding of the standard of care; 
 
45 Danzon 1985a, pp. 210-211; 2000, p. 1382.  
46 Id. 
47 Havighurst 1983, p. 33; Epstein 2005, p. 507. 
48 Arlen 2010, p. 1021. 
49 Arlen 2010, pp. 1018-1020. 
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and (d) that best medical practices can be developed by researchers if they 
share the same “desired goal of medical treatment.”50  
Network benefits result from the expectation that all other providers 
are using or new entrants will use the same standard of care 
contemporaneously.51 Their expertise will be enhanced through single-
minded dedication to a common goal.52 It is evident that the cost of care is 
greatly reduced when providers observe the same standard of care rather than 
individualised standards of care.53 As mentioned before, improved collective 
care is a public good. Therefore, standardization also confers positive 
externalities upon all patients at large.54  
The “switching costs” would be prohibitive if providers had to deliver 
different standards of care tailored to each individual patient’s needs, because 
these learning benefits and network benefits to providers and the resulting 
positive externalities to all patients would be eliminated altogether.55 Hence, 
Arlen concluded that an individual patient would seek more variation in the 
standard of care through private contracts than is socially optimal, because 
he/she would only be willing to purchase the level of safety to his/her own 
best interests and would externalise switching costs to providers and other 
patients.56  
It follows from the foregoing analyses that the standardisation of care 
under the state-enforced malpractice liability is more efficient than variation 
in the standard of care by private contracts. 
2.4. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
Proponents of the contractual approach criticised the traditional fault-based 
malpractice liability as an expensive “lottery” that has little deterrent benefit. 
Instead, they maintained that fully informed parties should be allowed to 
negotiate on the extent of liability by private contracts, for they know better 
than others what is best for themselves. However, their fundamental 
assumption that parties have perfect information concerning malpractice risks 
is directly challenged by many opponents because serious quality uncertainty 
and information asymmetry is characteristic of the health care sector.  
 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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Moreover, opponents also raise objections to the contractual approach 
even when parties were fully informed. Patients would be systematically 
worse off if they opted out of statutory liability or varied the statutory 
standard of care. This is because a patient would only care about his/her own 
best interests in a private contract, neglecting the benefits of collective care to 
other patients, and learning and network benefits to providers and the 
resulting positive externalities to other parties. The availability of extensive 
social welfare provision in some legal systems may render the contractual 
approach less attractive. 
As far as primary cost avoidance is concerned,57 although under the 
contractual approach the cost of care for a given treatment might be lowered, 
collective investments in patient safety would become very difficult. The 
contractual approach might greatly increase primary accident costs in two 
ways. First, it would increase the cost of collective care since it would become 
more difficult to make patient safety investments. Second, there would be 
more medical errors since both the level of care and patient safety 
investments would be reduced. 
Regarding tertiary cost avoidance, indeed, the contractual approach 
would save many costs because the expensive malpractice litigation could be 
avoided. However, it would achieve this goal at the expense of primary and 
secondary cost avoidance.  
After weighing up the pros and cons of the contractual approach, it is 
hard to believe that it would be necessarily more efficient than malpractice 
liability even in a free health care market. Needless to say, the contractual 
approach is indeed unfit for a health care system where service prices are 
heavily regulated by the government since providers are not allowed to 
charge different prices. 
 
57 This Chapter is primarily concerned with prevention; hence, compensation is not touched 
upon. From the perspective of secondary cost avoidance, the contractual approach is 
barely efficient. If many patients opted for less protection in order to reduce expenses 
because they could not afford high medical expenses, then eventually those poor patients 
would be more likely to suffer more severe injuries due to physicians’ lower level of care. 
Then, secondary costs would be more considerable, because more patients who are needy 
and risk-averse would be left uncompensated. 
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3. REGULATION: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
“Regulation” is an ambiguous term that can be used in different senses.58 In its 
loose sense, regulation is the “act or process of controlling by rule or 
restriction.”59 This control can be exercised by either the government or 
private entities. Accordingly, there is public regulation (or direct government 
regulation, meta-regulation or command-and-control regulation) as well as 
private regulation (or self-regulation).60 A classic definition of public 
regulation is “sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over 
activities that are valued by a community.”61 In contrast, self-regulation can 
be described as “regulation by organisations or associations in a field of 
society,”62 which specifically refers to “an organisation’s or industry’s control, 
oversight, or direction of itself according to rules and standards that it 
establishes.”63 
From the perspective of law and economics, the goal of regulation is to 
induce actors to comply with regulatory standards in order to generate the 
optimal level of quality and safety against certain risks where the marginal 
costs of improving quality and safety amount to the marginal benefits of risk 
reduction.64 This goal is in line with Calabresi’s primary accident cost 
reduction. Since regulation has no compensatory function, the secondary cost 
reduction goal will not be addressed in this section. Nonetheless, tertiary cost 
reduction ought to be considered since a regulatory regime cannot be 
efficient if it incurs too high administrative costs. 
The delivery of health care is heavily regulated in most legal systems. 
Although both public regulation and self-regulation are jointly employed 
widely, each country gives its own preference to direct government 
regulation or indirect professional regulation. While countries such as the US 
 
58 For instance, regulation at present may be understood as: (a) a specific set of commands 
(promulgating and enforcing regulatory rules); (b) deliberate state influence, including 
both command-based regimes and other modes of influence such as taxes or subsidies, 
contractual powers, tort law etc.; (c) all forms of social or economic influence, consisting 
of both state-based and non-state-based mechanisms (e.g. markets, self-regulation). See 
e.g. Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2013, p. 3. 
59 Garner 2014, p. 1398. 
60 See generally Coglianese & Mendelson 2010. 
61 Selznick 1985, p. 363. 
62 Eijlander 2005, p. 2. 
63 Garner 2014, p. 1398. 
64 Ogus 2007, p. 378. 
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and the UK rely more on self-regulation but less on state structures to 
regulate the medical profession,65 continental countries such as Germany and 
France have central health care authorities responsible for the regulation of 
the medical profession and embed self-regulatory professional institutions 
deeply in the state legal structure.66 
In the health care sector, regulatory interventions can be classified as 
output controls and input controls.67 Output controls refer to quality 
regulation, under which the public agency will exercise the control over 
goods/services quality directly through setting and enforcing “regulations”68 
or regulatory standards governing the safety and quality of these activities.69 
Since it is often difficult for regulatory authorities to set a minimum quality 
standard due to imperfect information,70 the authorities also will tend to 
control input variables that are claimed to affect quality levels. Input controls 
are defined as the regulation of input variables that are believed to produce 
high-quality physicians.71 Three options are normally available for controlling 
input variables: (1) to set minimum education standards for entrants, (2) to 
outlaw behaviour deemed to be unprofessional,72 and (3) registration, 
certification and/or licensing.73 
This Section will first answer the question why the health care 
industry needs to be regulated in Section 3.2. Then, I will summarise the pros 
and cons of input controls and output controls and make a critical evaluation 
respectively in Section 3.3. and Section 3.4. After that, public regulation will 
be compared with self-regulation in Section 3.5. A summary and an overall 
evaluation will be made in Section 3.6. 
 
65 See generally Curran 1993; Moran 2002; Swain 2010, pp. 31-34. 
66 De Vries et al. 2009, pp. 37-39; Taylor 2010, pp. 75-76. 
67 Curran 1993, pp. 52-59. 
68 Whereas regulation denotes the act of control, regulations refer to official rules or orders 
by means of which the public agency exercises the control.  
69 Faure 2007, p. 400; Ogus 2007, p. 377. 
70 See also infra Section 3.3. 
71 Curran 1993, pp. 52-56. 
72 Id. 
73 Friedman 1962, p. 144. 
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3.2. ARGUMENTS FOR REGULATING HEALTH CARE 
PROVISION 
3.2.1. Introduction 
Economists are not unanimous in how to theorise regulation. There are 
basically three major types of economic theories of regulation: the public 
interest theory, the “capture” theory and the public choice theory.74 The 
latter two are often described together as the private interest approach.75 The 
“public interest” theory suggests that regulation is instituted to correct market 
failure mainly for the protection and benefit of the public or some large sub-
class of the public.76 In contrast, according to the capture theory, the 
regulatory process is “captured” by the profession and is used to restrict entry 
and to increase the incumbent providers’ earnings.77 Proponents of the public 
choice theory often recognise the fact that both consumer groups and the 
medical profession have implications for the existence and form of medical 
professional licensing.78 Empirical evidence in the US generally seems to 
support the public choice theory.79 
Be that as it may, this section will only pay attention to the public 
interest theory and ignore the complications introduced by the private 
interest approach in this Section for two reasons.80 First, the basic analytical 
framework adopted in this Chapter is Calabresi’s primary and tertiary costs, 
which is incompatible with the private interest approach. Second, these 
private interest theories of regulation developed in a highly democratic 
society like the US does not seem to fit in with the Chinese political reality.81 
 
74 Den Hertog 2000; Olsen 2000, pp. 1021-1022.  
75 See generally Den Hertog 1993; Philipsen 2003, pp. 9-27. 
76 Stigler 1971, p. 3; Posner 1974; Dewees, Mathewson & Trebilcock 1983. 
77 See generally Friedman 1962. 
78 See generally Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983. 
79 Olsen 2000, p. 1027. See also generally Leffler 1978; Graddy 1991. 
80 This stance is consistent with Shavell 1984a, p. 358. 
81 Public hospitals, which play a dominant role in the Chinese health care system, are owned 
by the state, and most individual providers are employees of public hospitals. In other 
words, almost the entire medical profession is directly controlled by the state (and 
ultimately by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)). It is thus odd to believe that either 
the medical profession or patient groups (virtually non-existent in China) would be able to 
“capture” or greatly influence the National People’s Congress (NPC) or the CCP. It is de 
facto the CCP that makes final decisions for both the medical profession and patients. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the medical profession may try to bribe high-ranking 
officials of the CCP to enact policies that are intended to benefit the medical profession 
only. In other areas, for example, Shen’s study show that some local public officials impose 
 
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Hence, in this Section, only the public interest theory will be employed to 
justify the regulation of the medical profession.  
By and large, there are four sources of market failure that may justify 
regulation: informational asymmetries, externalities, public goods, and 
market power.82 We will examine the applicability of these arguments to the 
health care market in Section 3.2.2.  
3.2.2. Public Interest Arguments for Health Care Regulation 
3.2.2.1. Asymmetric Information 
Health care services are typical “confidence goods,” for due to severe 
asymmetric information consumers place confidence in physicians rather 
than do quality assessment on their own. Where confidence goods are 
concerned, regulation is argued to be superior to market competition, for 
regulation can lower search costs, improve service quality and enhance social 
welfare by reducing risks faced by risk-averse consumers.83  
Health care providers and their clients establish a relationship of 
trust.84 If providers could be trusted, then the problems of asymmetric 
information (adverse selection and moral hazard) would be resolved.85 As 
Akerlof demonstrated, adverse selection would lead to the deterioration of 
product/service quality.86 In addition, asymmetric information might result in 
a moral hazard that professionals would provide more services than 
consumers would have purchased if fully informed (demand generation).87 
Moreover, consumers may “lack the education level, or even the intelligence, 
 
stringent requirements on the cross-border establishment of companies in order to make it 
easier to take bribes. See Shen 2016, pp. 230-231. However, there is currently no empirical 
evidence that either the NPC delegates or high officials of the CCP decided to implement 
the licensing system for doctors because of rent-seeking. And in China, the medical 
profession is not self-regulatory, which reduces the possibility of pursuing the private 
interest of the profession through licensing. However, if the Chinese medical profession 
were allowed to self-regulate itself in the future, then the private interest approach would 
become relevant. See supra Section 6. 
82 Cooter & Ulen 2012, pp. 38-42. Of course, regulation is not the only form that can remedy 
market failures. For example, in cases where there is the problem of negative externalities, 
other forms of remedies may include individual bargaining based on the Coase Theorem, 
liability rules and lawsuits, corrective taxes on producers, and a market for externality 
rights. See e.g. McConnell, Brue & Flynn 2009, pp. 341-346. 
83 Van den Bergh 1993, p. 35. 
84 Van den Bergh 1993, p. 36. 
85 Id. 
86 See generally Akerlof 1970. 
87 Philipsen 2003, p. 16. 
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to process all available information on products and services in a correct way” 
due to bounded rationality.88 
Devices such as trademarks economise on transaction costs so long as 
providers do not “abuse the confidence” given by their clients through 
strategic behaviour which may damage their clients’ interests.89 In a free 
market of health care, trademarks are signals of service quality. It would be 
easier for patients to find a good provider if they could place a trust in the 
“trademarks” of hospitals/physicians (if there were trademarks) than if they 
would have to figure out the quality of care of each provider on their own (if 
there were no trademarks). Disclosure of information on the quality of care 
through advertising does not seem to apply to experience goods. In the health 
care sector, licensing, whereby low-quality providers are eliminated at the 
outset, could also alleviate the problem of information asymmetry if quality 
levels were truly raised by input controls.90 However, licensing alone may not 
be able to prevent licensed providers from abusing the confidence. Hence, 
output controls through setting and enforcing safety regulations may be 
indispensable. 
Therefore, some government intervention in the health care sector is 
justifiable and necessary because preventing the quality of care from 
deteriorating and ultimately reducing primary accident costs is in the interest 
of the public. 
3.2.2.2. Negative Externalities 
Another reason in support of medical safety regulation is in response to the 
presence of negative externalities. Economists normally describe damage 
outside private contracts as an external cost, or simply an externality.91 The 
general public will be adversely affected by the injuries attributable to low-
quality professional services (e.g. spreading diseases through unclean 
equipment).92 Given external costs, if potential injurers only take into account 
their own private marginal cost rather than the marginal social costs, there 
will be inefficient oversupply and more injuries will be created, leading to a 
deadweight loss.93 
 
88 Philipsen 2003, pp. 16-17. 
89 Id. 
90 Curran 1993, p. 54. 
91 Faure 2004a, p. 5; Boccara 2009, p. 341. 
92 Curran 1993, p. 51; Philipsen 2003, p. 19. 
93 Parkin 2014, p. 396. 
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As an important source of market failure, externalities must be 
internalised.94 An externality is said to be internalised when potential injurers 
take external costs into account before engaging in activities.95 In theory, 
these externalities may be internalised through private contracts, if the costs 
of contracting were adequately small.96 However, if there is an outbreak of an 
infectious disease, potential patients may be so dispersed or numerous that 
the costs of individual contracting over liability would be prohibitive.97 There 
would be no private contracting possible and the market might nonetheless 
fail.98 
Hence, regulation can be justified in that it may induce health care 
providers to internalise those external costs by enforcing them to comply 
with regulatory standards, with a view to reducing iatrogenic injuries and 
eliminating the deadweight loss.99 In so doing, the interest of the general 
public is protected. 
3.2.2.3. Public Goods 
Public goods (e.g. national defence) generally refer to a commodity, which is 
both non-rivalrous (consumption by one does not reduce availability to 
others) and non-excludable (non-paying consumers cannot be prevented 
from using it).100 The private supplier of public goods faces the problem of 
free riders, who use the public goods without paying for the costs.101 The 
government may remedy this problem by either subsidising the private 
provider or undertaking the provision of the public good directly.102 
However, although medical services have a public goal of promoting public 
health, and may generate positive externalities, the problem of free riders 
“does not seem to occur in the market for professional services”103 since 
patients usually have to pay to receive treatment services. Hence, this third 
source of market failure does not appear relevant to the medical profession. 
 
94 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 40. 
95 Id. 
96 Coase 1960. 
97 Baumol & Oates 1988, p. 10. 
98 Id. 
99 Dewees, Mathewson & Trebilcock 1983, p. 11. 
100 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 40. 
101 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 41. 
102 Id. 
103 Philipsen 2007, p. 115. 
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3.2.2.4. Market Power 
Market power results from monopoly or cartel-like behaviour.104 Where there 
is a monopoly, the price will be too high, and the quantity will be too low in 
light of efficiency.105 As far as the health care market is concerned, 
competition law should be employed to fight against any “cartel-like 
behaviour and abuse of dominant positions by … professional associations.”106 
Natural monopolies such as public utilities may not be a problem, but the 
government should regulate their prices.107  
3.3. SUMMARY 
In the light of the public interest theory, regulation can be a legitimate 
instrument for the promotion of public interest. Regulation may be able to 
remedy the four sources of market failure: asymmetric information, 
externalities, public goods, and market power. While asymmetric 
information, externalities, and market power are relevant for the health care 
market, public goods do not seem to be a valid argument for regulating the 
medical profession. As far as quality assurance is concerned, asymmetric 
information and externalities seem more relevant than market power. Both 
asymmetric information and externalities may result in a lower quality of 
care, whereas market power is more likely to only affect the price and 
quantity of medical services. Both input and output regulation of the medical 
profession have the potential to be an alternative mechanism (or a nice 
complement) to medical malpractice liability. 
Be that as it may, the question of whether these forms of regulation are 
likely to, or do actually, induce medical professionals to invest optimally in 
patient safety generally and in care specifically, will be addressed in Sections 
4-5. Section 6 is concerned with the question of who is the best regulator of 
the medical profession.108 Since regulation is not intended to compensate 
victims, only goals of primary and tertiary cost avoidance will be adopted to 
evaluate regulation. 
 
104 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 38. 
105 Id. 
106 Philipsen 2007, p. 116. 
107 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 39. 
108 Although the medical profession is regulated directly by the government, it is still 
interesting to examine the pros and cons of self-regulation in the sense that China may 
alter its approach to the regulation of the medical profession in the future. Hence, the 
discussion on self-regulation may be helpful in the sense of a recommendation. 
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4. INPUT CONTROLS: IS LICENSING A 
DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVE? 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Friedman defined three levels of input control: registration, certification and 
licensing.109 Under registration, physicians are only required to inform the 
government of their intent to practice and no restrictions are placed on 
entry,110 though it ought to be noted that the term “registration” in Europe 
may be used differently from the one used in the US.111 Under certification, 
the government (or sometimes a private organisation) allows a member of an 
occupation to use a title if he/she meets certain standards (e.g. a combination 
of education, on-the-job experience, and passing an examination), but does 
not exclude other uncertified members from practising.112 In contrast, 
licensing should be carefully distinguished from registration and certification. 
Under licensing, no one is allowed to enter the medical profession unless 
he/she has a license, and whoever is practising without a license may be 
subject to a fine or a jail sentence.113 The primary assumption for licensing is 
that the control of input variables (prior patient safety investments in 
professional competence) will raise the quality level of output services 
(patient-specific care).114  
In practice, the most prevalent form of input controls in the health 
care sector is licensing. In the US, the regulatory power of initial medical 
licensure is delegated to the medical board in each State and the entry 
requirements vary markedly from one State to another.115 In Europe, while 
health authorization offices (e.g. Ministry of Health) are responsible for 
registration and licensing in some countries such as the Netherlands, Finland 
 
109 Friedman 1962, pp. 144-145. 
110 Id. 
111 In Europe, “registration” is normally defined as “all the processes associated with the 
issuing of licenses/authorizations to practice medicine and ensuring that the professional 
activities carried out under this authority maintain the professional standards on which it 
is based.” It seems that “registration” plus “licensing” together in Europe function 
equivalently as “licensing” (or “licensure”) alone in the US. See e.g. Rowe & García-
Barbero 2005, p. 2. 
112 Friedman 1962, pp. 144-145. 
113 Id. 
114 For the distinction between patient safety investments and patient-specific care, see supra 
Chapter 8, Section 2.2.1. 
115 Federation of State Medical Boards 2016. 
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and Denmark, medical chambers are in charge of this task in e.g. the UK, 
Austria and Spain.116 In addition, in Belgium, Germany and Italy, health 
authorization offices and medical chambers work together to complete the 
whole process of registration and licensing.117 Licensing authorities or medical 
boards normally not only have the power to set prior requirements for 
obtaining a license, but also have the authority to demand remedial actions if 
an incompetent practitioner is identified. 
In the next section, there will be a brief review of theoretical 
arguments for licensing in Section 4.2. Thereafter, there will be consideration 
of some arguments against licensing in Section 4.3. A summary and 
evaluation of licensing will be made in Section 4.4. 
4.2. ARGUMENTS FOR LICENSING 
To begin with, licensing is able to relieve the problem of asymmetric 
information. Licensing helps consumers to minimise their uncertainty over 
service quality and hence it will increase consumers’ demand for that 
service.118 Licensing reduces consumers’ costs of information in that a central 
information agency gathers information on aspiring practitioners by virtue of 
economies of scale.119 
Secondly, licensing induces practitioners to invest in profession-
specific human capital before they begin their careers. Licensed providers can 
recoup the whole returns to their investment given the fact that no low-
quality substitutes for their services are allowed to be provided by unlicensed 
competitors.120 In this way, licensing may reduce the risk of imposing external 
costs to third parties.  
Thirdly, licensing may reduce the marginal cost of providing care. 
Shapiro demonstrated the proposition that “human capital and quality are 
complements,” i.e. “higher levels of training (human capital investment) 
reduce the marginal cost of providing quality.”121 The likelihood of under-
 
116 Kovacs et al. 2014. 
117 Id. 
118 Arrow 1963, p. 966; 1971, pp. 208-210. 
119 Trebilcock 1983, p. 95. 
120 Shapiro 1986, p. 850. 
121 Shapiro 1986, p. 844. Shapiro believed this assumption is in tune with both common sense 
and the characteristics of professional services, since “a well-trained professional knows 
more easily what to do, finds it easier to keep up-to-date with changing technology and 
knowledge, and can do a good job with less effort than his less well-trained colleague.” Id. 
p. 846. 
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investment in precautions is decreased because it is less costly for well-
trained physicians to provide high-quality care.122  
4.3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST LICENSING 
4.3.1. Is Licensing an Optimal Way to Provide Information? 
Many opponents of licensing dispute the foregoing points for licensing. To 
begin with, licensing is not the only way to provide consumers with 
information. Besides licensing, some other ways of obtaining information 
may include direct observation of providers’ behaviour, providers’ reputations 
that are tested and re-tested by consumers, and advice and direction from 
others such as referring physicians, friends and family members, along with 
speciality board certification.123 Direct observation may be highly impractical 
in the health care sector since patients obviously lack relevant expertise to 
evaluate physicians’ performance.124 Reputation would not be successful in 
providing information in cases where there are numerous providers (esp. in 
large cities), because search costs for consumers would be considerable.125 
Nonetheless, certification may be an acceptable alternative to licensing. 
Under certification, consumers have the freedom to purchase low-quality 
goods or services given their limited income or special taste, while at the 
same time they can obtain as much information under certification as under 
licensing.126 The “identification of qualified personnel” is not a sufficient 
justification for licensing, since this can be achieved via certification.127 
In contrast, although both licensing and certification can provide 
consumers with information, licensing generates more social costs than 
certification. By restricting medical practice to high-quality physicians only, 
licensing may increase the quality of care received by customer-patients, but 
it may also decrease the overall quality of care in other ways. On the one 
hand, service prices will rise with the reduction in the number of providers 
due to licensing (monopoly), which will tend to reduce the average service 
quality received by consumers.128 The choices for consumers will also be 
 
122 Shapiro 1986, p. 856. 
123 Svorny 2000, pp. 302-303. 
124 Id. 
125 See generally Pauly & Satterthwaite 1981. 
126 See generally Friedman 1962; Leland 1979. However, certification is not perfect either, 
because it will induce over-investment when professionals want to utilise investments as 
signals of their quality. Shapiro 1986, p. 856. 
127 Svorny 2000, p. 297. 
128 Kleiner 2000, p. 197. 
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reduced due to this monopoly effect. On the other hand, the overall quality of 
medical care received by all consumers may be decreasing even though the 
average quality of care provided by professionals is increasing.129 This can be 
explained by the substitution effect that when facing higher prices, poorer 
consumers may substitute into lower cost services such as self-service or do-
it-yourself remedies, because low-quality doctors are denied entry into the 
market.130 Some empirical evidence also shows that substitution into self-
provided services does exist.131 
4.3.2. Is Licensing an Optimal Way to Ensure Quality? 
In practice, it is questionable whether licensing requirements can ensure a 
desirable level of professional competence or service quality.  
First, it is questionable whether students or training institutions are 
induced to provide the socially optimal amount of education and training.132 
Students only want enough education to pass the examination and training 
institutions want to maximise profits (either through high tuition or through 
high volume).133 Many members of the medical profession themselves do not 
believe the examination is an effective tool to eliminate incompetent 
professionals,134 and some empirical evidence in the US suggests that 
academic grades are a strong predictor of learning ability but not of 
professional competence.135 The American Medical Association (hereinafter 
AMA) has long criticised that most “new or unorthodox training programs” 
are not intended to train high-quality professionals.136 Better and perhaps 
more effective ways that can be used to evaluate physician competence may 
include actual assessment of aspiring applicants’ performance in the course of 
 
129 Trebilcock 1983, p. 97; Curran 1993, p. 57. This argument does not seem to fit into the 
classic accident models, since it treats as “medical accidents” cases where patients cause 
damage to themselves when performing self-remedies. Evidently, it is impossible for 
physicians to prevent these “medical accidents” out of their reach. However, this 
unfavourable substitution effect should not be ignored when designing legal instruments 
aiming at preventing medical malpractice. In other words, a legal regime primarily aiming 
at accident prevention may result in prohibitive adverse distributional consequences as 
side-effects. Such a regime should not be treated as desirable, unless these distributional 
consequences could be better tackled by other mechanisms such as social security. See 
Calabresi 1970, pp. 78-80. 
130 Id. 
131 See generally Muris & McChesney 1979; Carroll & Gaston 1981. 
132 Curran 1993, p. 58. 
133 Id. 
134 Hogan 1983, p. 122. 
135 See generally Price et al. 1964; McClelland 1973. 
136 Id. 
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residency training. In addition, governmental restrictions on entry into the 
training business may not be effective at tackling the problem, since schools 
may “use their relationship with the government to lobby for increases in 
educational requirements not justified by the quality needs of the licensed 
occupation.”137 
Second, a good education and training level do not necessarily result in 
a high quality of services provided.138 To begin with, since human capital 
depreciates over time, this assumed correlation will become weaker over the 
provider’s career.139 As Friedman put it long ago, “A man’s ability to pass an 
examination twenty or thirty years earlier is hardly assurance of quality now 
…”140 Nevertheless, license renewal, which is subject to certain conditions 
such as mandatory periodic revaluation or continuing medical education 
(CME), may relieve this problem.141 Empirical evidence shows that CME is 
especially successful when specific problems that were identified in practice 
are the main focus of the education.142 In other words, there should be a 
connection between the requirements of input regulation and the 
examination of actual performance.143  
Third, even if licensing could guarantee physician competence, it 
could not ensure that competent physicians will not betray the trust of 
patients. Licensing per se cannot disclose all information on providers’ (esp. 
subsequent) competence and service quality to patients, and hence in the long 
run the problem of information asymmetry cannot be fully tackled through 
licensing alone. Due to any remaining asymmetric information, providers 
may still be able to lower the quality of services by sending false market 
signals.144  
4.4. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
Section 4 examined the most widely adopted form of input controls regarding 
the regulation of the medical profession. Proponents of licensing defend the 
idea that licensing can ensure service quality by resolving the problems of 
asymmetric information, externalities, and quality deterioration. First, it 
resolves the imperfect information problem by providing consumers with 
 
137 Curran 1993, p. 59. 
138 Trebilcock 1983, p. 96; Curran 1993, p. 58. 
139 Id. 
140 Friedman 1962, p. 158. 
141 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 126. 
142 See generally Chassin & McCue 1986; Davis et al. 1990. 
143 See generally Brown & Uhl 1970. 
144 Curran 1993, p. 59. 
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some information about physician competency. Second, it prevents external 
costs from being spread to third parties by ensuring a minimum level of 
professional competency. Third, it lowers the marginal cost of providing 
service. The aforesaid case for licensing is normally applicable to cases where 
health care is provided in a free market. However, even in a non-market-
based health care system, licensing is useful because, at least, it does purport 
to guarantee a minimum level of professional competence. 
Besides these benefits yielded, licensing may have several drawbacks. 
First, it may lower the aggregate quality of care due to the substitution effect 
and decrease the choices for consumers due to the monopoly effect. Second, 
licensing requirements may have little connection with professional 
competency or service quality. Third, agency costs are high because licensing 
cannot effectively guarantee that providers will not cease investing in 
patient-specific treatment at the expense of uninformed patients.145 
After weighing up the pros and cons of licensing, Trebilcock remarked 
that  
These weaknesses of an occupational licensing system are formidable and 
suggest that licensure should be reserved for professional markets 
characterized by high costs of error by providers, high information costs 
faced by consumers, and/or substantial and widespread negative third-
party effects not fully compensable in damages, and for situations where 
there is a reasonably high correlation between prescribed training inputs 
and desired service outputs.146 
In view of Trebilcock’s foregoing criteria, the benefits of licensing as a 
mechanism to ensure service quality may exceed its social costs in the health 
care market. First, the costs of medical errors are considerable relative to that 
of errors in other types of professional markets, since disability or death is 
often the consequence of medical errors. Second, information costs 
confronted by patients are also prohibitive because quality uncertainty and 
asymmetric information are characteristic of the health care market. Third, 
the potential negative externalities to third parties such as an epidemic of 
diseases due to low-quality medical services can be very substantial and 
widespread. Fourth, substantial investment in medical expertise is essential to 
the provision of optimal treatment. It is virtually impossible for a poorly 
trained professional to provide high-quality medical services. Therefore, 
licensing does serve the purpose of reducing primary accident costs.  
 
145 In this last respect, output regulation or liability rules that are intended to ensure the 
quality of care directly may be indispensable. 
146 Trebilcock 1983, p. 99. 
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Given the goals of primary and tertiary cost avoidance together, it 
appears that licensing can be a potentially useful complement, to rather than 
a perfect substitute for, tort liability. On the one hand, it is a nice 
complement in the sense that it can reinforce medical professionals’ 
incentives to invest substantially in human capital before and after they begin 
their careers. Obviously, initial investment in human capital is the prior 
condition for obtaining a license. Licensed professionals will also be induced 
to make subsequent investment in human capital, because of periodic re-
licensing147 or because their licenses may be suspended or revoked by 
regulators for professional incompetence,148 although in practice disciplinary 
sanctions may be less effective due to low rates of identification and 
enforcement.149 Without a license, anyone practising medicine may be subject 
to criminal penalties.150 Although tort liability can also induce health care 
providers to make extensive investment in patient safety, which includes but 
is not limited to professional expertise, it may incur more administrative costs 
than licensing and re-licensing.151 On the other hand, licensing is not a 
perfect substitute for tort liability. Although licensing reduces the marginal 
cost of providing optimal treatment, it does not necessarily ensure that 
providers will exercise sufficient patient-specific care. Besides inducing 
providers to make investments in patient safety, tort liability also incentivizes 
providers to exercise optimal care in a single treatment, which is beyond the 
 
147 Of course, as mentioned before, to set passing periodical evaluations or taking continuing 
medical education as the conditions for re-licensing may be a potential way to generate 
continuing incentives to update professional expertise. However, these measures may not 
be very effective at improving quality if they are not problem-oriented.  
148 For instance, the usual grounds for revocation of license in the US may include 
“professional incompetence, bad character, immorality, professional misconduct, 
dishonourable conduct, conviction of criminal offence, and gross negligence.” USLegal 
2016. In should be noted that revocation can not only be used to ensure subsequent 
professional competence, but also have punitive effects on doctors who, deliberately or 
accidently, committed gross medical negligence even if they are relatively competent. 
Hence, on the one hand, revocation of license is part of input regulation; on the other 
hand, it can be viewed as a sanction under output regulation. The double role of 
revocation of license itself can be explained by the fact that licensing is intended to ensure 
professional competence, which is in turn aimed at guaranteeing the minimum level of 
service quality.  
149 See supra Section 3.3.4.C. 
150 In the US, for example, practising medicine without a license is illegal in all states and 
anyone who commits such a crime may be subject to imprisonment and fines. See 
generally e.g. Suszek 2016; Theoharis 2016. 
151 It should be noted that the imposition of disciplinary sanctions such as suspension or 
revocation of a license is ex post in nature, which is the same as tort law. Thus, although 
ex ante (re)licensing may have a cost advantage over tort liability administratively; 
disciplinary sanctions do not seem to have this advantage over tort liability. 
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reach of licensing. The foregoing analyses suggest that it may be socially 
optimal to use the licensing system and tort liability jointly. 
5. OUTPUT CONTROLS: IS QUALITY 
REGULATION A DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVE? 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
While the major target of input regulation is to ensure professional 
competence, output regulation focuses on how to “ensure individual 
compliance with pre-determined standards.”152 Quality regulation – the 
typical form of output regulation – usually refers to the regulator’s control 
over goods/service quality directly through prescribing and enforcing safety 
rules by either public regulatory agencies or delegated professional bodies.153  
In order for quality assurance to be effective, three requirements must 
be satisfied: (1) appropriate “norms, standards, and criteria” should be 
developed in order to ensure an efficient level of care; (2) practitioners who 
are below “acceptable minimum quality standards” should be identified; and 
(3) sanctions should also be appropriate and effective.154  
The following section will outline the theories of quality regulation 
and relevant empirical evidence. In Section 5.2, I will contrast ex ante 
regulation with ex post regulation and try to answer which is more desirable 
in the context of medical quality regulation. In Section 5.3, I will explore the 
question as to how to design an optimal regime of sanctions for medical 
quality assurance. A summary and evaluation will be given in Section 5.4. 
5.2. THE FORMS OF QUALITY REGULATION 
5.2.1. Introduction 
In order to ensure a minimum level of quality, the state or professional bodies 
should set regulatory standards that medical professionals have to comply 
 
152 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 131. 
153 Curran 1993, p. 51; Van den Bergh 1993, pp. 37-43. Sometimes, tort liability is also 
regarded as a way of regulation. In this dissertation, we distinguish the medical 
malpractice litigation system from safety regulation of the medical profession which is 
administered by regulatory bodies rather than courts. 
154 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, pp. 131-134. 
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with.155 In terms of precision, regulatory standards can be either “rules” or 
“standards.”156 “Rules” denote those standards the content of which is 
specifically defined ex ante through collective decisions (e.g. the head should 
be covered), whereas the content of “standards” is determined ex post by an 
adjudicator (e.g. what behaviour adversely affect the reputation of doctors).157 
Their distinction is significant in that while the former is intended to be used 
as the means of ex ante (safety) regulation which is triggered before any 
accident occurs, the latter tends to be treated as the way of ex post regulation 
which is activated after an accident happens.158  
In the health care sector, “rules” often manifest themselves in various 
professional codes of conduct, practice rules, and clinical guidelines.159 
Theoretically, it is possible that regulatory agents (or delegated professional 
bodies) may identify those providers who contravene safety standards 
(“rules”) before any accident occurs and levy an act-based 
administrative/disciplinary sanction (e.g. a warning, suspension/revocation of 
the license, or a civil penalty) on them.  
In the literature, ex post regulation is often understood as (fault-based) 
liability in tort,160 under which judges resolve claims filed by victims through 
the civil procedure and damages awarded to victims are considered as 
“sanctions” levied on tortfeasors. Nonetheless, ex post regulation may also be 
administered by regulatory agents (or delegated professional bodies) via the 
administrative procedure under which harm-based administrative/-
disciplinary sanctions (e.g. a warning, suspension/revocation of the license, or 
a civil penalty) may be imposed.  
Criminal law is also relevant to regulation. In case of severe 
contraventions, either ex ante or ex post regulation may be backed up by 
criminal penalties (e.g. fines or imprisonment) which are imposed by the 
court through criminal proceedings. Criminal penalties are unique in that 
they “may be imposed if no harm is done or conditional on its occurrence.”161 
Those serious violations of regulatory standards are often labelled as 
 
155 Curran 1993, p. 52. 
156 For legal or economic analyses of “rules” and “standards,” see generally e.g. Ehrlich & 
Posner 1974; Diver 1983; Schlag 1985; Kaplow 1992. In ought to be noted that quotation 
marks are used to emphasise the distinction between “rules” and “standards” in order to be 
precise, while regulatory standards (without quotation marks) can refer to both “rules” and 
“standards.” 
157 Kaplow 1992, p. 559. 
158 Shavell 1987a, p. 278; Posner 2014, § 14.1. 
159 See e.g. Taylor 2010, pp. 75-76. 
160 See e.g. Shavell 1984a; 1984b; Charles, Thomas & Gary 1990; Hiriart, Martimort & Pouyet 
2004; Innes 2004. 
161 Shavell 1987a, p. 279. 
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“regulatory offences,”162 “public-welfare offences”163 or “administrative 
crimes”164 in the common law systems. 
The preceding forms of quality regulation can be presented in Table 
9.1 as follows: 
Table 9.1: Ex Ante and Ex Post Regulatory Measures for Quality Assurance165 
How initiated 
When applied 
Ex ante Ex post 
By victims 
- Liability: 
- breaching the standard of 
care 
- causing harm 
- harm-based damages 
By the state 
Safety regulation by regulators: 
- contravening “rules” 
- causing no harm but risks 
- act-based administrative 
sanctions 
Ex post regulation by 
regulators: 
- contravening “standards” 
- causing harm 
- harm-based administrative 
sanctions 
Victims or the 
state 
Criminal sanctions: 
- contravening “rules” 
- conduct of serious risks 
(“conduct crimes”) 
- act-based penalties 
Criminal sanctions: 
- contravening “standards” 
- serious result (“result 
crimes”) 
- harm-based penalties 
 
The next Section 5.2.2 will only discuss the respective desirability of ex ante 
and ex post regulation. The choice among various sanctions will be addressed 
in Section 5.3. 
5.2.2. Ex-Ante versus Ex Post Regulation by Regulators 
In the light of Calabresi’s goals of primary and tertiary cost avoidance, ex ante 
and ex post regulation by regulators can be contrasted in several aspects: 
- Ensuring compliance. Generally, “rules” are better than “standards” at 
inducing potential injurers to comply with regulations, since “rules” 
make a clear distinction between what is forbidden and what is 
 
162 Brown 1992, p. 692. 
163 See generally Sayre 1933; Borre 1961. 
164 See generally Schwenk 1943. 
165 Table 9.1 is built upon Shavell 1987a, p. 278, Table 12.1. 
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permitted.166 The ex-ante approach makes legal obligations that 
potential injurers have to discharge easier to understand and hence 
probably promotes “better compliance (fewer inadvertent violations).”167  
- Enactment costs. “Rules” can be “centrally designed” by a single 
administrative agency once and for all, while “standards” have to be 
crystallised by many adjudicators in a decentralised adjudication 
system.168 Hence, the cost of promulgating a “rule” ex ante is easily 
“outweighed by the benefit of having avoided additional costs 
repeatedly incurred” in applying a “standard” ex post on a case-by-case 
basis.169  
- The insolvency risk. As far as monetary sanctions are concerned, ex ante 
regulation will be less affected by the lawbreaker’s insolvency risk than 
ex post regulation, because a “rule” can be enforced by “light penalties” 
(equal to expected rather than actual harm).170 However, when non-
monetary sanctions are employed, the lawbreaker’s insolvency risk will 
become irrelevant.171  
- Enforcement costs. Since the cost of enforcing “standards” is normally 
incurred only after a loss was caused by an accident while the cost of 
enforcing “rules” is incurred whenever there is non-compliance, there 
will be an enforcement cost advantage of “standards” over “rules.”172  
When it comes to the choice between ex ante and ex post regulation of safety 
and health, Posner maintained that the dominant form of regulation of 
treatment should be ex post regulation, because in an individual case only one 
patient is likely to be injured and it is “not feasible to require physicians to 
seek approval from a regulatory agency for every procedure they perform.”173 
However, as summarised above, ex ante regulation seems superior to ex post 
regulation in the first three aspects, whereas the latter may be better than the 
former in the fourth aspect. Hence, it can be argued that the joint use of ex 
ante and ex post regulation in the health care sector may be optimal. While 
ex post regulation is indispensable as a “fail-safe” device against the failure of 
ex ante regulation, ex ante regulation should be encouraged insofar as the 
 
166 Schlag 1985, p. 384. 
167 Posner 2014, § 14.1. 
168 Id. 
169 Kaplow 1992, p. 563. 
170 Posner 2014, § 14.1. 
171 Shavell 2004, p. 510. 
172 See also Shavell’s fourth criterion in supra Section 3.4.3. 
173 Posner 2014, § 14.1. 
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conditions of patients and their responses to medications are homogeneous in 
order to improve regulatory efficiency. 
5.2.3. Regulation versus Liability 
5.2.3.1. Ex-Ante Safety Regulation versus Liability 
Shavell conducted a thorough economic analysis of the relative desirability of 
liability and safety regulation in terms of the maximisation of social welfare 
and proposed four criteria for safety regulation.174 This model was frequently 
applied and expanded by later scholars.175 Shavell’s four criteria are briefly 
presented as follows: 
- Information asymmetry. If regulators (e.g. those who are selected from 
the profession) possessed better information than private parties or the 
court, then regulation would be superior to liability in that errors in 
setting regulatory standards would be minimised. 
- Insolvency risk. Under liability, insolvent parties may take less than the 
optimal level of care due to limited assets. Under regulation, it would be 
irrelevant whether private parties are insolvent or not, since if they 
failed to take required precautions they could be sanctioned by non-
monetary penalties. 
- The threat of liability suits. If the threat of suit were lowered due to 
various factors,176 then the incentives for parties to take optimal care 
would be diluted. However, it would not affect (ex-ante) safety 
regulation, since it is solely activated by non-compliance with a 
 
174 See generally Shavell 1984a; 1984b. 
175 For the application of this model to environmental damage, see e.g. Faure & Grimeaud 
2003, pp. 40-42. For the application of the same model to damage caused by medical 
malpractice, see e.g. Faure 2004a, pp. 31-35. For an extension of the same model, see e.g. 
Epstein 2013, pp. 609-611. Epstein extended Shavell’s criteria from four determinants to 
six factors: (1) differential knowledge, (2) private parties’ funds, (3) number of victims, (4) 
number of tortfeasors, (5) the detection rates, and (6) soundness of the regulators and 
courts. To be fair, Epstein’s addition of two factors has not fundamentally altered Shavell’s 
model, for Epstein’s third, fourth and fifth factors seem to be a decomposition of Shavell’s 
third determinant.  
176 Possible reasons that defendants may escape liability include: (1) that damage is widely 
dispersed (can be cured through class actions), (2) that damage manifests itself a long 
period of time after the accident (evidence stale or potential tortfeasors out of business), 
and/or (3) that there is great uncertainty over causation due to non-tortious factors or 
indeterminate defendants.  
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regulatory standard irrespective of whether a particular harm was 
caused by a risk-creator.  
- Administrative costs. Liability, as a form of ex post regulation, may save 
more administrative costs than safety regulation, since it is triggered 
infrequently (only when damage occurs). This enforcement cost 
advantage of liability over safety regulation implies that the examination 
of behaviour under fault-based liability could be more detailed than 
under regulation, even if regulation is enforced on the basis of 
probability.177  
After applying Shavell’s four criteria to the context of medical malpractice, 
Faure maintained that “liability rules alone cannot suffice to prevent harm” 
because all the first three of the four criteria point to safety regulation in the 
health care sector.178 Therefore, “some form of (government regulation)” of 
medical practice is necessary.179 Although the first three criteria imply a 
strong preference for ex ante regulation of medical quality, the fourth 
criterion still suggests that liability has an enforcement cost advantage over 
safety regulation even in the context of medical malpractice. Hence, in order 
to better control malpractice risks, an optimal solution should combine 
liability and regulation together. 
5.2.3.2. Ex Post Regulation by Regulators versus Liability 
Ex post regulation by regulators is not necessarily superior to liability; vice 
versa. On the one hand, regulatory adjudicators (esp. self-regulated 
disciplinary boards) may have an information advantage over judges. On the 
other hand, judges are supposedly more impartial, authoritative, and better 
able to administer an adversarial system of justice. It follows that, in cases 
where ex ante regulation failed, it would economise more on administrative 
costs if duplicate decisions on the same issue – whether the physician 
concerned has breached the standard of care – could be avoided. 
There are for example several alternative arrangements that may be 
well worth considering: (1) that courts recognise prior regulatory decisions as 
prima facie evidence for establishing (gross) negligence unless persuasive 
contradictory evidence is produced;180 (2) that regulators recognise judicial 
 
177 Shavell briefly addressed this point in 1984 and later thoroughly demonstrated it in 2013, 
see Shavell 2013. 
178 Faure 2004a, pp. 34-35. 
179 Id. 
180 In many countries such as France, the Netherlands and Spain, although disciplinary 
decisions are not directly binding on courts, judges often make reference to medical codes 
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decisions as conclusive evidence for (gross) negligence which constitutes 
cause for disciplinary sanctions;181 or (3) that regulators and courts may work 
together in deciding the standard of care.182 Other issues such as the 
imposition of disciplinary sanctions upon providers and the award of damages 
to victimised patients should be left to regulators and courts respectively. 
5.3. THE CHOICE OF SANCTIONS 
5.3.1. Introduction 
Deterrence may be generated either by monetary sanctions (e.g. fines) or by 
non-monetary sanctions (e.g. imprisonment or revocation of a license). In 
most western countries, the traditional form of regulation of medical practice 
is self-regulation. Hence, medical practitioners whose performance falls 
beneath professional standards are primarily subject to disciplinary sanctions: 
suspension or revocation of a license.183 Licensing sanctions are primarily 
employed both to ensure subsequent professional fitness for medical practice, 
and to induce licensed practitioners to invest optimally in patient-specific 
 
of conduct or practice guidelines when deciding medical malpractice. See e.g. Rubio & 
Garcia 2010, p. 171; Taylor 2010, p. 76; Hondius 2010a, p. 136. Nonetheless, it is 
conceivable that judges will make a decision more easily and faster when they are 
provided with a disciplinary determination that has already presented persuasive 
arguments and evidence for that particular decision than when they themselves have to 
weigh the evidence and arguments from the beginning.  
181 For instance, in the UK, medical practitioners’ tribunals hear evidence and decide whether 
a doctor’s fitness to practice is impaired. The tribunal must accept a certificate of a 
conviction or determination as “conclusive evidence that the offence was committed, or 
that the facts are as found by the determination.” General Medical Council 2016, p. 34. 
182 For example, it may be the case that medical disciplinary boards invite judges to assist in 
deciding malpractice issues before any litigation is initiated. Then, this disciplinary 
determination will become much more admissible to the court. It may also be the case that 
disciplinary boards send some members to audit in the trial and provide the judge with 
expert testimony about medical malpractice.  
183 For instance, in the UK, a doctor’s registration may be suspended (for up to 12 months) if 
he/she e.g. seriously breaches good medical practice but this is not fundamentally 
incompatible with his/her continued registration, while his/her name may be erased from 
the medical register if s/he e.g. seriously departs from good medical practice which is 
fundamentally incompatible with being a doctor or he/she shows a deliberate or reckless 
regard for good medical practice or s/he does serious harm to others deliberately. General 
Medical Council 2016, pp. 28-32. In the US, adverse licensure actions normally include 
limitations, suspension, surrender or revocation of a medical license. “Negligence” 
accounted for 9% of all the specified reasons for medical board actions for the period 
2010-2014. Harris & Byhoff 2016. In France, the sanctions available against medical 
practitioners include “a warning, a blame, a temporary ban from practising, or striking off 
the register.” Taylor 2010, p. 76. 
 
 
334 Intersentia 
Part II. Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
treatment. Besides licensing sanctions, we can also see in many legal systems 
that physicians who cause fatal medical accidents due to (gross) medical 
negligence begin to be subject to criminal penalties. It should be noted that 
fines can also be a “civil penalty” which is imposed simply for a violation of a 
statute or regulation (a civil wrong) rather than for a crime.184 
From the perspective of optimal deterrence, it will be socially optimal 
if the enforcement of regulatory standards in the health care sector can 
effectively reduce the incidence of (preventable) adverse events without 
incurring too high costs of safety precautions (Calabresi’s primary goal), while 
at the same time it economises on administrative costs (Calabresi’s tertiary 
goal). Specifically, the social welfare objective is to minimise the total social 
costs due to non-compliance, which is the sum of “damages, costs of 
apprehension and conviction, and costs of carrying out the punishments 
imposed.”185 The next section will address how the size of sanctions should be 
set and then compare the relative desirability of applying fines, licensing 
sanctions and imprisonment to quality regulation. 
5.3.2. Optimal Size of Sanctions 
The costs of correcting market failure and preventing accidents through 
regulation should be smaller than the benefits of the regulation. Various 
forms of sanctions generate different levels of deterrence and incur different 
sizes of costs. Hence, both the magnitude and the type of sanctions are 
relevant to efficient regulation. 
When it comes to the size of sanctions, if employed alone, the optimal 
magnitude of fines should be determined on the basis of actual factors. First, 
if lawbreakers can be identified with certainty at zero cost, it is socially 
optimal to set fines equal to harm (or expected harm in the case of act-based 
enforcement).186 Second, if the probability of identification is fixed in 
practice, the magnitude of fines should be increased to offset the likelihood of 
escaping sanctions.187 Third, if the probability of identification also needs to 
be optimally determined, then it will be socially desirable to choose a low 
probability-high sanction enforcement strategy, with a view to economising 
on enforcement costs without diluting the deterrent effect.188 
If employed alone, the optimal magnitude of imprisonment can be 
determined in a way that is similar to that of fines, because the cost of 
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imprisonment – “the discounted sum of the earnings foregone and the value 
placed on the restrictions in consumption and freedom” – can be converted 
into monetary values.189 Hence, it can be found that the cost of imprisonment 
is positively correlated to what the lawbreaker could earn outside prison and 
for the length of the sentence.190 Another implication is that when sanctions 
are non-monetary, fault-based liability is superior to strict liability, because 
under the former less actual imprisonment will be imposed.191 It is socially 
costly to impose non-monetary sanctions.192 Since deterrence can be 
generated by less frequent enforcement of sanctions under fault liability than 
under strict liability, the fault system economises on enforcement costs more 
than strict liability.193 
By the same token, if employed alone, the optimal magnitude of 
license suspension can be designed in a similar way to fines. Thus, the cost of 
license suspension can be adjusted in line with the lawbreaker’s earning 
capability and the length of suspension. In contrast, the magnitude of license 
revocation is fixed to each provider – the loss of all future earnings his or 
his/her job will yield. Hence, the deterrent effect generated by license 
revocation is normally greater than license suspension.  
As far as the choice of sanctions is concerned, regulation should not 
limit market entry or competition too much. As Philipsen maintained, 
“regulation should be both justified (in order to cure the problem at hand) 
and proportional.”194 Hence, when licensing sanctions work, one should not 
impose criminal sanctions. This is consistent with the idea of marginal 
deterrence. Other things being equal, “it is socially desirable that 
enforcement policy creates marginal deterrence, so that those who are not 
deterred from committing harmful acts have a reason to moderate the amount 
of harm that they cause.”195 Hence, “sanctions should rise with the magnitude 
of harm” and “most sanctions should be less than maximal.”196 
The next part will discuss the choice among licensing sanctions, fines, 
and imprisonment. 
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5.3.3. Licensing Sanctions 
An ideal regime of licensing should not only induce aspiring physicians to 
make sufficient investment in human capital before entering the health care 
market by meeting certain ex ante requirements, but also ensure that licensed 
physicians keep the currency of their professional competency after they 
begin their careers through disciplinary sanctions. Once a practitioner is 
identified as unfit to practice, some remedial programs or procedures should 
have to be taken in order to ensure patient safety.197 If the detected 
practitioner is not systematically incompetent, disciplinary boards may 
suspend his/her license for a certain period and order him/her to take 
Continuing Medical Education (CME). This action is optimal if and only if, as 
calculated by the regulator, the marginal benefit of enforcing CME – reduced 
future adverse events – exceeds the marginal cost of implementing CME.198  
CME may dilute the deterrent effect of suspension of a license, for the 
lawbreaker may feel the “sting of the sanction may be lessened” because 
he/she will “learn valuable skills” during the process.199 In this case, an 
appropriate amount of civil penalty may be needed to supplement the 
deterrence. Nevertheless, the deterrent effect of revocation of a license, as 
examined in the next sub-section, remains intact. In other words, s/he will 
take CME and expertise promotion seriously for fear of losing his or her 
license for good. If after reassessment his/her competence has been promoted 
to the required level, then the restriction on his/her license may be removed. 
In contrast, if a licensed practitioner is regarded as systematically unfit 
to practice even after taking CME, meaning he/she has an unchanging 
propensity to commit medical errors,200 he/she should be prohibited from 
practising medicine. Revocation of a license may serve as a deterrent to those 
practitioners who are not systematically incompetent. It is intended to induce 
them to promote their professional expertise continuously. Obviously, 
providers benefit from licensing, because they can enjoy high profits and 
returns to investments in medical training.201 If their licenses are terminated, 
they will lose these benefits immediately.202 Hence, from the perspective of 
deterrence, revocation of a license will induce providers to make subsequent 
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investment in professional expertise continuously given that they are not 
systematically unfit to practice.  
5.3.4. Administrative Sanctions versus Criminal Penalties 
Licensing sanctions and civil penalties belong to the category of 
administrative (or disciplinary) sanctions, whereas fines and imprisonment 
are criminal penalties.203 Administrative sanctions differ from criminal 
penalties in two aspects. First, the former can economise in administrative 
costs, since it is much more difficult, costly, and time-consuming to pursue a 
criminal prosecution.204 The enforcement of imprisonment also consumes 
considerable social resources, whereas the imposition of licensing sanctions 
incurs very few costs (similar to fines). Second, “a criminal conviction carries 
a stigma, even when the only punishment is a fine, that may impair the 
defendant’s human capital, as well as trigger collateral consequences such as 
being banned from future employment.”205 In contrast, administrative 
sanctions only impose a restriction or ban on medical practice or a loss of 
certain amount of money. Even when a medical practitioner is expelled from 
the health service market, he/she may well get a new job in other 
occupations. In view of tertiary cost avoidance, it is normally more efficient 
to impose administrative sanctions than criminal penalties. 
Sometimes, however, administrative sanctions may fail to deter non-
compliance. License revocation may fail to deter those practitioners who 
themselves know they are so incompetent that their expertise cannot be 
promoted by taking any CME but who wilfully do not quit the market in 
order to enjoy the benefits of being a medical professional. It is impossible for 
those people to respond to any deterrent incentives generated by licensing 
sanctions, for the consequence of quitting the market voluntarily and that of 
being deprived of a license involuntarily are the same – losing the benefit the 
medical profession yields. Without other forms of sanctions, they may well 
choose to stay in the market instead of quitting the market voluntarily.  
Suppose licensing sanctions fail to deter non-compliance, we need to 
consider the possibility of fines (a civil penalty or a criminal fine) or 
 
203 In common law systems, licensing sanctions are part of the disciplinary proceeding, 
meaning an “action brought to reprimand, suspend, or expel a licensed professional or 
other person from a profession or other group because of unprofessional, unethical, 
improper, or illegal conduct.” Garner 2014. In civil law systems, licensing sanctions may 
be one form of “administrative sanctions,” which denotes those “sanctions imposed by the 
regulator without intervention by a court or tribunal.” Lynott & Cullinane 2010. 
204 Lynott & Cullinane 2010. 
205 Posner 2014, § 7.1. 
 
 
338 Intersentia 
Part II. Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
imprisonment. The use of fines and imprisonment has already been fully 
examined in the literature.206 The general conclusion is that it is not socially 
advantageous to imprison someone until fines fail to deter undesirable acts in 
that it is almost costless for the state to collect fines.207 Fines can be imposed 
either by regulatory agents or criminal courts. While a civil penalty incurs 
lower tertiary costs than a criminal fine, the latter may generate greater 
deterrent effects since more stigma is attached to the latter than the former. 
However, non-monetary sanctions may be more desirable when fines per se 
cannot adequately deter socially undesirable acts in cases where the 
lawbreaker is insolvent.208 Therefore, non-monetary sanctions seem only fit 
for medical quality regulation in cases where both licensing sanctions and 
fines fail to deter. 
When it comes to the criteria for criminal penalties, it seems that they 
should be based on fault rather than strict liability in order to avoid 
considerable enforcement costs.209 It is generally agreed that criminal law is 
intended “to constrain certain behaviour that could not otherwise adequately 
be controlled,”210 because criminal penalties are exceptionally costly and 
harsh. It would be significantly disproportional to impose criminal penalties 
in cases where liability or administrative sanctions already suffice. Of course, 
any provider, who wilfully contravenes regulatory standards and does severe 
harm to patients deliberately, is punishable in criminal law. However, this is 
a case of murder, not of malpractice in the course of providing treatment. As 
far as medical malpractice is concerned, the more proper question is how 
should the mens rea of a negligent provider be set. For primary cost 
avoidance, criminal penalties may be levied on licensed practitioners who 
themselves know that they are systematically incompetent but still want to 
stay in the market in order to enjoy the benefit of being a practitioner, but 
who do not intend to murder patients. This requirement implies that the 
mens rea should be at least “recklessness”211 rather than merely (gross) 
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negligence. It follows that licensed medical practitioners who merely 
inadvertently contravene a regulatory standard should not be sanctioned by 
criminal law. 
The optimal choice of various sanctions is summarised in Table 9.2 as 
follows: 
Table 9.2: Optimal Sanctions for Medical Quality Regulation 
Medical errors committed by providers 
who: 
Consequence Sanctions 
- are relatively competent but 
inadvertently committed errors 
- Adverse 
events 
- Liability for 
compensation 
- Near misses - None 
- failed to maintain subsequent 
competency but their expertise can be 
enhanced 
- Adverse 
events 
- Liability for 
compensation 
- License suspension 
(CME)* 
- Near misses 
- License suspension 
(CME) and a civil 
penalty 
- failed to maintain subsequent expertise 
but also fail to enhance expertise after 
taking CME 
- Adverse 
events 
- Liability for 
compensation 
- License revocation* 
- Near misses - License revocation 
- know they are systematically incompe-
tent but still wilfully choose to stay in the 
market, but who do not intend to murder 
patients 
- Adverse 
events 
- Liability for 
compensation 
- License revocation 
- Fines or 
Imprisonment** 
- Near misses 
- License revocation 
- Fines or 
imprisonment** 
* If the liable provider is supposed to pay damages to the victim, a civil penalty should not be imposed 
in order to prevent over-deterrence. 
** Imprisonment should not be imposed unless the liable provider is insolvent. 
 
5.4. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
Section 5 addressed the question of whether quality regulation is a desirable 
alternative to malpractice liability. Quality regulation can be either ex ante 
regulation based on “rules” or ex post regulation based on “standards.” “Rules” 
are detailed regulatory standards that are enacted collectively before any 
accident occurs, whereas “standards” must be determined by an adjudicator 
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after an accident occurs. “Rules” are likely to be more efficient than 
“standards” in that the former promote greater compliance,212 economise on 
costs of enactment (centrally designed), and are more resilient to insolvency 
risks (enforced ex ante). In contrast, “standards” are superior to “rules” as far 
as enforcement costs are concerned. Hence, ex ante and ex post regulation 
should be jointly used. In the light of information asymmetry, insolvency 
risk, and the threat of liability suits, ex ante regulation is more efficient than 
malpractice liability. In contrast, regarding administrative costs, malpractice 
liability is more desirable than ex ante regulation. Hence, ex ante regulation 
and malpractice liability should be jointly used.  
For the purpose of primary cost avoidance, both monetary sanctions 
(fines) and non-monetary sanctions (license suspension/revocation or 
imprisonment) can be employed and their joint use might be socially 
desirable. Licensing sanctions are preferable to criminal sanctions in most of 
the cases. Nonetheless, in the case where license suspension may not be 
enough to deter, civil penalties may be warranted. In the case where licensing 
revocation may fail to deter, fines (civil or criminal) or imprisonment may be 
necessary. Fines should always be employed before imprisonment. However, 
if insolvency risks are high, imprisonment is more desirable. Fault liability is 
more efficient than strict liability for imposing criminal penalties on 
providers. It will be socially desirable if the mens rea is set at least equal to 
“recklessness” (in the common law systems) or “advertent negligence” (in the 
civil law systems). Where the liable provider is not systematically 
incompetent, then a civil penalty should be avoided if he/she is supposed to 
pay compensation to the victim.  
6. PUBLIC REGULATION VERSUS SELF-
REGULATION 
Self-regulation is characteristic of the medical profession in most legal 
systems.213 The level of care required of a physician is normally determined 
by professional associations and backed by disciplinary sanctions.214 Why do 
not the governments in these countries regulate the quality of medical care 
directly?  
 
212 Potential injurers may find it easier to comply with “rules” than with “standards.” 
However, if the behaviour of potential injurers is not properly monitored or “rules” are 
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This can be explained by two limitations imposed on direct 
government regulation, which may prevent the government from regulating 
health-service quality effectively and optimally. First, it is not easy to 
prescribe regulatory safety standards optimally. Although regulatory agencies 
have the advantage of data gathering, statistical calculation capacity, and 
centralised decision-making power over courts,215 they still suffer from the 
problem of imperfect information in the health care market. One problem is 
that the cost and benefit analysis is easier said than done.216 Causation or the 
probability of the accident is hard to predict and the costs and benefits of 
precautions are difficult to calculate.217 For instance, placing a monetary value 
on lives saved is a daunting task and can incur considerable administrative 
costs.218 Another problem is that safety standards are dynamic rather than 
static.219 Due to “bureaucratic resistance to the evolution of new standards,” 
direct regulation is likely to “introduce undesirable rigidities” into medical 
quality assurance, because medical knowledge and technology are developing 
and improving rapidly in modern times.220 Consequently, safety standards 
prescribed by the government may become “obsolete” very soon.221 
Second, it is also very demanding to enforce regulatory standards cost-
effectively. One problem is that it is usually difficult to monitor quality of 
care sufficiently on account of considerable transaction costs faced by 
regulators of monitoring “a multitude of widely diverse services.”222 For 
example, regulators, who are monitoring medical practice from a distance, 
may feel it virtually impossible to observe accurately how much time and 
effort each physician invests in treatment or how sophisticated the physician 
is when making medical judgements.223 If regulators intervened in routine 
medical practice too much by closer observation, more practice reviews or 
quality audits, it would not only incur prohibitive administrative costs, but 
would also do great harm to the trust patients placed on providers.224 
Consequently, only a limited number of areas, which may not have the 
greatest implications for quality assurance, can be effectively monitored by 
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regulators, and providers may therefore be induced to over-invest in those 
areas.225 
The foregoing disadvantages of public regulation may call for self-
regulation, which can be a potential alternative to public regulation. Miller 
argued that self-regulation has three advantages. First, self-regulated 
professions have the best information about the quality of services and the 
costs and benefits of accident prevention, because they can obtain the 
required information at lower costs than regulatory agencies and the 
combined role of the regulator and the expert save costs.226 Second, self-
regulation is more flexible in that ineffective and inefficient old rules will be 
altered more quickly and hence it facilitates innovation and provides more 
consumer choices.227 And last but not least, self-regulation economises on 
government expenditures, since the costs of self-regulation are fully borne by 
the professions themselves and self-regulators are induced to minimise the 
costs of both enforcement and compliance.228 
However, Miller’s case for self-regulation has its limitations. Curran 
maintained that Miller’s arguments are not compelling theoretically for three 
reasons. First, Miller neglected the possible costs of the rent-seeking in self-
regulation, since public interest will be harmed due to both wealth transfer 
from the general public to the profession and the costs of rent-seeking.229 
Second, the rent-seeking also makes the flexibility of self-regulation 
problematic, because rent-seeking reduces market competition and more 
efficient rules will be resisted by the rent seekers.230 Third, the costs of self-
regulation may not be split efficiently between providers and purchasers on 
account of the absence of continuous monitoring from consumers.231  
In addition to the foregoing concerns over serious agency costs, 
Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock pointed out another difficulty with self-
regulation: the “development of professional norms and allegiances” may 
discourage disciplinary boards from enforcing regulatory standards actively 
since the revelation of gross misconduct will damage the reputation of the 
medical profession as a whole.232  
It follows from the above analyses that neither public regulation nor 
self-regulation alone is perfect for quality assurance. From the perspective of 
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public interest and primary cost avoidance, it would be more efficient if the 
two mechanisms could be optimally combined. A mixed regulatory structure 
would be optimal if it could be sensitive to two conflicting tensions 
simultaneously: “(1) the need for objective decisions made in the public’s 
interest and (2) the need for decision-making based on the best available 
technical expertise.”233  
7. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
7.1. DETECTION OF NON-COMPLYING PROVIDERS 
Ideally, in the absence of administrative costs, if every substandard or 
negligent provider could be identified and sanctioned, professional 
competency and service quality of the whole profession would be perfectly 
ensured.234 In practice, the optimal rate of identification is less than 100% in 
order to reduce enforcement costs. Neither should it be too low, because the 
efficacy of enhancing expertise through CME and discouraging non-
compliance depends upon a relatively high rate of apprehension. 
Since it is virtually impossible for only a handful of members of a 
licensing board to monitor each and every provider within its jurisdiction, 
the only workable way is to rely on information collected elsewhere. For 
instance, some available sources of information concerning substandard 
providers in the US include individual reporting, courts and malpractice 
insurance companies, medical societies, hospital review committees, and peer 
review organisations (PROs).235 However, the efficacy of these sources of 
information has their limitations. Based on available empirical studies, some 
of the problems faced by these reporting measures are summarised as 
follows:236 
- Individual reporting is not practically efficacious. First, due to 
asymmetrical information, the lay public are often unable to detect a 
substandard practitioner when they do meet one.237 Second, sometimes 
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those patients who do identify an incompetent provider may not know 
to whom they could make a complaint.238 A 1976 New York survey 
showed that the lay public often do not know that they could file a 
complaint against their physicians to the medical licensing board.239 
Third, the lay public are not incentivized to report simply because 
patients would not obtain compensation through the incident reporting 
procedure.240  
- The association between malpractice claims and physicians’ fitness to 
practice is relatively low. Empirical evidence shows that many, if not 
most, medical errors are committed accidentally by physicians who are 
not systematically incompetent.241 Therefore, records of malpractice 
claims, although they may reflect practitioners’ potential proneness to 
commit medical errors to some extent,242 are not good indicators for lack 
of professional fitness to practice.243  
- Practitioners are understandably reluctant to report sub-standard 
colleagues. First, practitioners may not be subject to any penalty if they 
fail to report. Sometimes the reporting is mandatory, but no penalty has 
been prescribed.244 Second, practitioners may be discouraged from 
reporting their colleagues for fear of being sued by those who they are 
supposed to report.245 One solution to relieving this problem is to 
provide practitioners with evidentiary privilege and immunity from 
defamation.246 Empirical evidence in Arizona showed that the 
introduction of such an immunity increased the incidence of reporting 
fourfold.247 Nonetheless, practitioners still hesitate to report their 
colleague’ mistakes on account of the fear that “they are sending their 
colleague to ‘gaol’.”248 Third, the professional culture in the health care 
sector may prevent practitioners from reporting peers. Reporting 
violations of clinical protocols to a superior may be regarded by medical 
professionals as “a threat to their professional autonomy,” and “whistle 
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blowing is taboo.”249 In addition, other common barriers to reporting 
include time constraints, unsatisfactory processes, inadequate feedback, 
etc.250  
- Hospitals systematically fail to report data on substandard practitioners. 
In 2009, Public Citizen published an extensive report on hospital 
incident reporting.251 This report disclosed that hospitals in the US 
systematically under-report substandard practitioners to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).252 For instance, since the end of 2007, 
about half of US hospitals had never submitted a single report on 
hospital privilege sanctions to the NPDB.253 The average number of 
annual reports to the NPDB for the period 1990-2007 was only 650, 
which is roughly one-eighth of the government estimate (5,000) and 
one-sixteenth of the industry estimate (10,000).254 To avoid reporting, 
hospitals bypass the law in many ways, such as imposing shorter 
disciplinary periods that do not need to be reported, or changing their 
bylaws or having practitioners take “leave of absence.”255 Peer review 
and discipline of sub-standard physicians may be blocked for the reason 
that hospitals earn handsome profits from surgeries performed by those 
physicians.256 Consequently, many hospital clinical privilege sanctions 
will not be reported to licensing boards.257 The report found that about 
1,000 sub-standard practitioners who had been subject to clinical 
privilege sanctions at least twice were not sanctioned by licensing 
boards subsequently.258 
Hence, although incident reporting is widely used in many systems, it misses 
“the vast majority of events and cannot provide stable estimates of the true 
underlying defect rates.”259 Recently, in order to better detect adverse events, 
more and more innovative methods, such as chart review, direct observation, 
patient interviews, combined modalities, automated detection systems, and 
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cognitive frameworks, have been developing in the US.260 Although these 
new methods look promising, they are not the focus of this thesis.  
7.2. LICENSING SANCTIONS 
Remedial actions against substandard or negligent practitioners may be less 
than optimal in that they are much less effective than expected. There are 
basically two types of remedial actions: (1) if possible, license suspension 
together with CME should be taken with a view to promoting the 
professional competence of the identified sub-standard provider to the 
desired level; or (2) if there is evidence of egregious misconduct that displays 
a systematically low level of professional competence which is unlikely to be 
improved, the identified substandard provider’s practice should be banned 
(e.g. revocation of a license) by licensing boards.261 Empirical evidence shows 
that both types of remedial action may call for further improvement: 
- Sub-standard practitioners who are identified may fail to improve their 
professional competence through CME. First, sometimes it may not be 
set as a mandatory obligation to take CME.262 Under such a regime, 
there would be little incentive for sub-standard practitioners to upgrade 
their expertise through educational programs. Second, if it were 
mandatory for incompetent practitioners to upgrade their expertise 
through educational programs, such CME programs would be 
ineffective if they did not clearly target specific problems.263 
- Disciplinary actions are extremely rare. Although it is estimated that 
between 2% and 10% of all US physicians are unfit to practice,264 a 1971 
study reported that disciplinary actions taken by Medical Boards were 
“insignificant in terms of the universe of practising physicians,” and 
“data indicate a tendency toward leniency even in the relatively few 
cases that result in formal board action.”265 For the period 1969-1981, 
less than 0.14% of all licensed US doctors had been disciplined.266 A 
recent study by USA TODAY indicated that this situation had not been 
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improved: (1) for the period 2001-2011 in the US, although about 6,000 
doctors’ clinical privileges had been restricted or revoked by their 
hospitals, more half of them had never been disciplined by Medical 
Boards; (2) and roughly 250 of them were regarded as an immediate 
threat to health and safety, but they were still allowed to practice.267 
Some similar evidence in Canada also shows that the low rate of 
disciplinary action is not unique to the US.268  
Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock summarised several reasons that may explain 
the foregoing deficiencies in remedial action:269 first, medical boards are 
unwilling to impose severe sanctions such as suspension or revocation of a 
license, especially when physician misconduct is not extreme;270 second, 
medical boards lack sufficient resources to investigate and prosecute all 
substandard practitioners;271 third, disciplinary procedures may incur 
considerable administrative costs due to the length of time, higher standards 
of proof (requiring clear and convincing rather than a preponderance of 
evidence) and complexity in medical judgements;272 and fourth, the 
dominance of medical professionals siting on medical boards may reduce the 
effectiveness of monitoring.273 
To summarise, although in theory suspension/revocation of a license is 
a socially desirable mechanism to ensure subsequent investment in 
professional competence and in care, it is far from being optimal in practice 
due to extremely low rates of identification and enforcement.  
7.3. CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
In many legal systems, negligent providers may not only be financially 
responsible for compensating injuries suffered by patients, but also be subject 
to criminal penalties in cases where there are severe consequences.  
In some common law systems, although the criteria for imposing 
criminal penalties on providers is gross negligence,274 empirical evidence 
 
267 See generally Eisler & Hansen 2013. 
268 See generally Coyte, Dewees & Trebilcock 1991. 
269 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996 p. 131. 
270 Brook, Brutoco & Williams 1975, p. 1224. 
271 Derbyshire 1983, p. 199; Kusserow, Handley & Yessian 1987, p. 820. 
272 Kusserow, Handley & Yessian 1987, p. 823. 
273 Law & Polan 1978, pp. 46-48. 
274 In England, doctors who commit egregious medical errors that lead to the patient’s death 
may be convicted of gross negligence /manslaughter. See generally e.g. Quick 2006; 
Brazier et al. 2007; Quick 2007. In New Zealand, since 1997, the level of negligence for a 
conviction of manslaughter has followed the English criterion. See NZ-CA 1961, Section 
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shows that many, if not most, providers who were convicted of manslaughter 
merely committed errors due to ordinary negligence. Ferner and McDowell 
identified 85 doctors charged with manslaughter in England for the period 
1795 and 2005, and found that the number had dramatically increased since 
1990.275 Of all the 85 doctors, 60 (70.59%) were acquitted, 22 (25.88%) were 
convicted, and 3 pleaded guilty.276 A significant proportion (63.53%) of the 
doctors were charged due to mistakes (n=37; 43.53%) or slips (n=17; 20%), 
whereas the remaining were on account of deliberately violating rules (n=16; 
18.82%).277 Ferner and McDowell supported the prosecution of doctors who 
clearly violate safety rules but argued against the criminalization of medical 
errors since unconscious errors are hard to prevent.278 By 2004, ten providers 
in New Zealand had been charged with manslaughter for alleged negligence 
and in the majority of the cases the level of negligence was very low.279  
In the US, however, medical malpractice cases are typically handled by 
civil courts. Recent evidence suggests that the number of US physicians facing 
criminal charges over wrongful drug prescription is growing.280 However, the 
overall rate of criminal charges against physicians is relatively low. For the 
period 2001-2011, only 37 criminal charges against physicians were 
reported.281 Some precedential authority in the US indicates the test for 
punishing physicians in criminal law is not ordinary negligence but “reckless 
and wanton and of such character as shows an utter disregard for the safety of 
others under circumstances likely to cause death.”282  
Whereas common law systems set the mens rea for prosecuting 
physicians as gross negligence or recklessness, civil law systems are inclined 
to criminalise ordinary medical negligence. In civil law countries, doctors 
may be charged with crimes of homicide due to negligence283 or bodily 
injuries due to negligence.284  
 
150A (amended by NZ-CAA 1997, Section 2(1) and NZ-CAA 2011, Section 6). See also 
Merry 2007, p. 78. 
275 Ferner & McDowell 2006, p. 309. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Ferner & McDowell 2006, p. 314. 
279 Merry 2007, p. 74. 
280 See generally Baynes 2011; Join Together Staff 2011. 
281 Id. 
282 State v. Weiner, 194 A.2d 467, 469-70 (N.J. 1963). See also Van Grunsven 1997, pp. 52-54; 
US Model Penal Code, § 2.02(3). 
283 See e.g. German StGB, § 227; French C. pén., art. 221-6; Italian C.p., art. 43, para. 3 & art. 
575; Spanish C.P., art. 142, para. 3. 
284 See e.g. German StGB, § 229; French C. pén., arts. 222-19 and 222-10; Italian C.p., art. 43, 
para. 3 & art. 582; Spanish C.P., art. 152, para. 3. 
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As a notable example in Europe, a rise in criminal lawsuits was 
reported in Spain. Rodriguez-Vazquez reviewed a total of 297 criminal cases 
where doctors were concerned for the period 2000-2004.285 Of all the 297 
cases, 31% were associated with charges of negligent homicide, while 54% 
with charges of negligent injuries (the remaining 15% with other charges).286 
The number of total charges increased from 44 in 2000 to 90 in 2004, with an 
average growth rate of almost 20%.287 In about 12.5% of all the cases, 
defendant-doctors were convicted.288 The most striking example of 
criminalising medical malpractice in the world is perhaps Taiwan, where “the 
judges, using criminal law in 79% of the medical disputes, punish physicians 
in addition to the money damages.”289 For the period 2000-2007, of all the 74 
cardiac surgical specialists in Taiwan, 6 had been prosecuted and the rate of 
conviction was 16.7%.290 This unique phenomenon can be explained by the 
fact that criminal litigation costs are borne by the state and victims have an 
increased access to evidence.291 
It follows from the foregoing descriptions that most common law 
systems (except the US) set the criteria for mens rea as gross negligence, 
whereas most civil law systems take ordinary negligence as the criteria for 
both civil malpractice liability and criminal penalties. Civil law systems tend 
to impose criminal penalties on providers more readily than common law 
systems. It was also argued that the rising trend of criminal charges against 
providers had contributed to the problem of defensive medicine,292 and the 
more criminal charges the more administrative costs. Hence, more primary 
and tertiary accident costs may be incurred due to the low level of negligence 
for criminal penalties. In this regard, the American test for mens rea – 
recklessness – appears more efficient.  
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter, has examined two alternative regimes to the fault-based 
malpractice liability as far as quality assurance (prevention of medical errors) 
is concerned – the contractual approach and regulation. The general 
 
285 See generally Rodriguez-Vazquez 2006. 
286 Rodriguez-Vazquez 2006, p. 425, Figure 2. 
287 Rodriguez-Vazquez 2006, p. 425, Figure 1. 
288 Id. 
289 Lin 2009, p. S376. 
290 Lin 2016, p. 1. 
291 Ger 2009, p. S137. 
292 Rodriguez-Vazquez 2006, p. 419; Lin 2016, p. 3. 
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conclusion is that neither of them is a perfect substitute for malpractice 
liability. The contractual approach is likely to be inferior to malpractice 
liability whereas regulation may be a desirable complement to, rather than a 
substitute for, malpractice liability. The contractual approach is less efficient 
than malpractice liability, not only because its key assumption of perfect 
information is often not valid in the health care sector, but also in that a shift 
from tort liability to the contractual approach would not replicate the same 
deterrence benefits which the tort system generates but would incur much 
greater social costs. The reason why regulation is merely a complement 
instead of an alternative to tort liability is that neither of them is better than 
the other in all aspects. Hence, a joint use of regulation and malpractice 
liability would be socially optimal. 
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CHAPTER 10  
THE FAULT-BASED COMPENSATION 
MECHANISMS FOR IATROGENIC INJURIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike the previous three chapters (7-9) where particular attention is paid to 
prevention of medical malpractice (primary and tertiary cost avoidance), this 
chapter (and also the next) is intended to answer Sub-question (2-a) from the 
perspective of compensation (secondary cost avoidance). While this chapter is 
concerned only with the fault-based compensation mechanisms (tort law 
alone, the fault-liability-insurance system, and self-insurance), the next 
Chapter 11 will deal with compensation instruments that are not based on 
fault (first-party insurance, no-fault compensation funds, and social security).  
Secondary costs are defined as “the social dislocation costs of the 
accident,”1 “the costs of social and economic dislocations which all too often 
follow the immediate accident, especially if the initial cost burden is left 
unspread,”2 or simply “the societal costs resulting from accidents.”3 Although 
the secondary goal is sometimes referred to as compensation, it is different 
from the legal notion of “corrective compensation.”4 According to Calabresi, 
not only the costs of accident reduction should be reduced in the first place, 
 
1 Calabresi 1965, p. 714. 
2 Calabresi 1968, p. 429. 
3 Calabresi 1970, p. 27. 
4 In Continental legal systems, compensation is often stressed as the primary function of tort 
law. Van Gerven, Lever & Larouche 2000, p. 19; Van Dam 2013, pp. 346-348. Lawyers 
tend to interpret the function of tort law in terms of corrective justice – “by awarding 
compensation the law aims to restore and redress the balance of fairness or justice which 
the tortfeasor has upset by negligence or by creating a risk of injury.” Cane 2006, p. 421. 
See also Schwartz 1997. Hence, this legal understanding of the function of tort law is 
sometimes stressed as “corrective compensation.” Cane 2006. Id. Corrective compensation 
implies perfect compensation, whereas secondary cost reduction does not necessarily 
imply perfect compensation. 
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but the secondary costs resulting from accidents which nonetheless occur 
need to be reduced as well.5 However, the pursuit of secondary cost reduction 
may adversely affect the primary goal of accident law. The preventive 
incentives generated by tort liability may be diluted by the presence of 
various compensation instruments.6 Hence, the issues of prevention and 
compensation are often intertwined. 
In addition, the benefits of primary and secondary cost avoidance must 
be counter-balanced by tertiary costs – “those costs involved in regulating 
primary and secondary costs.”7 In practice, tertiary costs may include 
litigation costs and the costs of operating courts and prisons, regulatory 
bodies, and various institutions that are in charge of risk spreading (e.g. costs 
incurred by insurance companies when investigating the damage).8 The goal 
of tertiary cost reduction is equally important because if primary or secondary 
cost reduction “costs more than it saves,” there will be a waste of scarce social 
resources.9 Social optimum will be obtained if the sum of all the three costs, 
together with the costs of precaution, is minimised.10 
There are many instruments that can be employed to compensate 
victims of medical malpractice. This Chapter will focus on compensation via 
tort law, liability insurance, and self-insurance. All these instruments are 
fault-based. No-fault compensation mechanisms (first-party insurance, 
compensation funds, and social security) will be addressed in Chapter 11. The 
next will first describe the basic theories regarding secondary cost avoidance 
in Section 2. Then, it will discuss the desirability of compensation via tort law 
alone in Section 3. Thereafter, compensation via liability insurance will be 
examined in Section 4. After that, the question of whether self-insurance is a 
perfect alternative to liability insurance will be explored in Section 5. The 
final Section 6 concludes. 
2. BASIC THEORIES OF SECONDARY COST 
AVOIDANCE 
Calabresi maintained that secondary costs can be reduced by loss spreading in 
that it is socially desirable to place one large loss on many people rather than 
 
5 Calabresi 1970, pp. 26-28. 
6 Schäfer & Ott 2004, p. 122. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Calabresi 1970, p. 28. 
10 Schäfer & Ott 2004, p. 123. 
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on one person.11 He further claimed that the foregoing proposition is based on 
the “diminishing marginal utility of money theory” and firmly believed that 
as long as “a five-dollar loss divided among five people necessarily hurts less 
than the same loss placed on one person, the basic justification for loss 
spreading remains strong.”12 A variant of the proposition is the “deep pocket” 
notion – secondary costs could be better reduced if the rich, who are “least 
likely to suffer substantial social or economic dislocations,” were required to 
bear those costs.13 Thus, the deep pocket approach suggests that sometimes 
“partial spreading can reduce secondary costs better than total spreading if 
the right people are made to pay.”14 
In light of the expected utility theory, later economists treat secondary 
cost reduction as a problem of “the allocation of risk”15 or “risk spreading.”16 
In this context, the “risk” exactly refers to the possibility of suffering 
secondary costs. In a market setting, risk spreading is achieved primarily 
through insurance. Ideally, social welfare optimum will be achieved and 
hence secondary costs are reduced if “the sum of the insurance premiums that 
its members are willing to pay for an uncertain loss is at least equal to the 
expected value that each would receive in the event of the loss (plus 
administrative costs).”17  
The fundamental assumption underpinning insurance is that most 
people are risk averse – they prefer to suffer a certain loss with a small 
magnitude than to suffer an uncertain loss with a large magnitude.18 The 
attitude of risk aversion is strictly equivalent to an increasing utility of wealth 
function with a diminishing marginal utility of wealth.19 The extent of risk 
aversion is normally affected by both personal assets and personal needs. Put 
another way, when facing the same magnitude of losses, the poor in need of 
money may be treated as risk averse whereas the rich may be considered as 
risk neutral.20 Social welfare will be improved if the risk faced by the risk-
averse can be somehow reduced or eliminated. 
In terms of risk aversion, Calabresi’s methods of loss spreading and 
deep pocket can be justified as welfare-enhancing mechanisms. On the one 
hand, loss/risk spreading is normally efficient because if risks are shared 
 
11 Calabresi 1970, p. 39. 
12 Calabresi 1970, pp. 39-40. 
13 Calabresi 1970, p. 40. 
14 Calabresi 1970, pp. 40-41. 
15 Shavell 1987a, pp. 186-191. 
16 Schäfer & Ott 2004, pp. 117-122. 
17 Schäfer & Ott 2004, p. 117. 
18 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 45. 
19 Schäfer & Ott 2004, p. 118. 
20 Shavell 1987a, p. 189. 
 
 
354 Intersentia 
Part II. Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
among the risk averse, the magnitude of losses confronting each of them is 
reduced, supposing there are no significant differences in their marginal 
utility of wealth.21 Social welfare (the sum of parties’ expected utilities) will 
be enhanced if loss/risk spreading can be achieved through e.g. a risk sharing 
agreement.22 In addition to interpersonal loss spreading, inter-temporal loss 
spreading – spreading losses “over the victim’s past and future earnings” – 
may sometimes be more desirable if interpersonal spreading is impossible or 
more costly.23 On the other hand, the deep pocket method is also desirable 
because the same magnitude of losses will reduce the expected utility of the 
risk averse greater than that of the risk neutral (or from more to the less risk 
averse), given that they have the same marginal utility at the beginning.24 
Hence, social welfare will be raised if risks are moved from the former to the 
latter through e.g. insurance.25 Specifically, the primary systems of accident 
loss distribution may include “social insurance, private risk pooling 
(insurance), and enterprise liability.”26 
The above analysis appears applicable to secondary cost reduction in 
the context of iatrogenic injuries. The classic model of malpractice liability 
assumes that parties are risk neutral. The available empirical evidence – the 
fact that patients with fewer personal assets suffer disproportionately large 
numbers of iatrogenic injuries,27 the extensive purchase of malpractice 
liability insurance,28 and the prevalence of defensive medicine29 – does 
suggest that many, if not most, health care providers and patients may be risk 
averse rather than risk neutral.30 Hence, the methods of risk spreading 
discussed above are fit for the health care sector.  
 
21 Shavell 1987a, p. 190. 
22 Id. 
23 Calabresi 1970, p. 42. 
24 Shavell 1987a, p. 190. 
25 Id. 
26 Calabresi 1970, p. 45. 
27 See supra Sub-Section 8.2.1. 
28 See infra Chapter 11, Section 2.3. 
29 See supra Sub-Section 8.1.5. 
30 Whether most people are risk neutral or risk averse is ultimately an empirical question. 
Available empirical literature suggests that risk aversion may be more prevalent than risk 
neutrality in everyday life. Binswanger conducted an experimental work in rural India 
and reported that “at high payoff levels, virtually all individuals are moderately risk-averse 
with little variation according to personal characteristics.” Binswanger 1980. With a 
different research design, Kachelmeier and Shehata conducted several experiments in 
China and concluded that risk aversion increases with the prize value. Kachelmeier & 
Shehata 1992. Smith and Walker examined subjects’ risk preferences in the context of the 
first price sealed bid auction and found “an overwhelming tendency for subjects to bid 
above the risk-neutral prediction (as if risk averse).” Smith & Walker 1993. After 
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3. COMPENSATION VIA TORT LAW ALONE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Tort law is unique in that it is a mixed system that is aimed at both accident 
prevention and victim compensation.31 The preventive function of tort law is 
fulfilled by the workings of liability rules that are intended to ex ante induce 
risk-creators to exercise optimal precautions to avoid accidents in the first 
place. As shown in Chapters 7-9, tort liability is still critically important for 
the goal of primary cost reduction. 
Be that as it may, the essential role played in prevention does not 
necessarily mean that tort law can perform the function of compensation 
equally well. The desirability of reducing secondary costs through tort law 
alone will be examined in this sub-section. To begin with, it will explore the 
question of whether enterprise liability promotes secondary cost avoidance in 
Section 3.2. After that, the desirability of treating tort law as an insurance 
mechanism will be evaluated in Section 3.3. A summary will be provided in 
Section 3.4. 
3.2. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY  
Broadly speaking, enterprise liability refers to the tort doctrine that “losses to 
society created or caused by an enterprise or, more simply, by an activity, 
ought to be borne by that enterprise or activity.”32 In the context of an 
individual (e.g. a doctor) acting on behalf of an enterprise (e.g. a hospital), 
“enterprise liability” specifically denotes that “the enterprise is liable while 
the agent is not.”33 As far as medical malpractice is concerned, the notion of 
“enterprise medical liability” (hereinafter EML) was proposed to describe a 
regime where “health care organisations bear responsibility for medical 
malpractice … instead of individual health professionals.”34 As demonstrated 
 
observing subjects’ choices under both low- and high-money payoffs, Holt and Laury 
found that even under low-money payoffs (below $4.00), the vast majority (two-thirds) of 
the subjects still exhibit risk aversion. Holt & Laury 2002. Their findings were also 
consistent with the previous three studies in that when payoffs are raised risk aversion 
rises dramatically. 
31 See generally Calabresi 1970, pp. 239-243; Schwartz 1997. 
32 Klemme 1976, p. 158. 
33 Kornhauser 1982, p. 1345. 
34 Sage 1997, p. 159. See also generally Abraham & Weiler 1994; Sage, Hastings & Berenson 
1994. 
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before, for the purpose of minimising primary and tertiary costs, EML is more 
desirable than individual physician liability.35 
In the light of secondary cost reduction, Calabresi maintained that two 
types of the so-called “enterprise liability” can be employed to achieve wide 
spreading of accident risks. The first type places losses on those categories of 
parties who are most likely to insure or ablest to self-insure against secondary 
losses. In contrast, the second type places losses on those who are in the best 
position to pass losses on to consumers or factors of production (e.g. labour 
and capital).36 In the light of this analysis, it appears that EML could reduce 
secondary costs more than individual provider liability. First, health care 
organisations are usually more solvent than individual providers, so that they 
are more able to purchase insurance or self-insure. Second, health care 
organisations have a larger number of consumers, so that they are able to pass 
added costs on to consumers through the price mechanism (decreased output 
and higher prices) in a free health market. As employers, they may also 
respond to added costs by “lower payments to, and decreased use of, those 
resources giving rise to the extra cost.”37 
Enterprise liability cannot be justified only by its function as a regime 
of “semi-compulsory spreading,” for social insurance can achieve the broadest 
possible loss spreading (and deep pocket) much more cheaply.38 Conversely, 
enterprise liability is primarily intended to achieve optimal primary cost 
reduction in that society decides to place losses specifically on those who are 
more able to prevent accidents.39 Hence, enterprise liability can induce 
optimal incentives to take care, and it aims at reducing secondary costs to 
some extent at the same time. Moreover, the radical demand for enterprise 
liability, which is more compulsory than private insurance, indicates that 
“people do not individually insure voluntarily to the degree necessary to 
provide for the spreading of losses that collectively they consider best for 
society.”40  
As demonstrated above, in the absence of first-party or third-party 
insurance, both types of enterprise liability predict that health care 
organisations themselves can achieve loss spreading either through self-
insurance or by acting as an “insurer.” It suffices here to say that EML is 
superior to individual liability in that the former better facilitates effective 
 
35 See supra Chapter 8, Section 2.2.2. 
36 Calabresi 1970, pp. 50-54. 
37 Calabresi 1961, p. 519; 1970, p. 513. 
38 Calabresi 1970, pp. 53-54. 
39 Calabresi 1970, p. 54. 
40 Id. 
The Fault-Based Compensation Mechanisms for Iatrogenic Injuries 
Intersentia 357 
self-insurance. Whether it is desirable to treat medical liability itself as 
insurance will be examined in the next sub-section.  
3.3. OPTIMAL COMPENSATION 
3.3.1. The Insurance Theory 
It is worth examining how EML works as a way of “semi-compulsory 
spreading.” Due to a lack of universal coverage of first party patient 
insurance,41 tort liability is often regarded as a way to provide those 
uninsured patients with some protection against at least negligent iatrogenic 
injuries. If exculpatory agreements are forbidden, the tort system can be seen 
as a system of “compulsory insurance,” which is publicly administered via 
court decisions concerning liability and quantum rules.42 Accordingly, the 
optimal magnitude of liability should be determined by insurance theories. 
According to Shavell, optimal compensation for iatrogenic injuries should be 
determined in the light of the following criterion: 
Whether publicly or privately provided, compensation for a medical 
accident ought to reflect the insurance coverage against the accident that a 
rational, well-informed individual with a socially acceptable level of 
income would have bought … the determination of optimal compensation 
ought to reflect a hypothetical decision about the purchase of insurance.43 
Hence, some argued that victims should receive optimal compensation 
instead of full compensation and optimal compensation usually would not 
make a victim whole.44 In other words, they believe full compensation is 
normally socially inefficient regarding either deterrence or compensation, at 
least in the case where the victim suffered severe disability.45  
According to this model, a rational patient would like to choose a level 
of coverage  to maximise his/her expected utility. The utility of money to 
an individual depends on his or his/her life style. It may increase, decrease, or 
remain unchanged, after the individual suffers a personal injury.46 If an 
accident does not lead to a permanent disability that may affect the patient’s 
life style, meaning the utility of money to him/her will not be affected by the 
 
41 See infra Chapter 11, Section 2.3. 
42 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, pp. 112-113. 
43 Shavell 1978, p. 37. 
44 See e.g. Cook & Graham 1977; Spence 1977; Shavell 1978; Danzon 1984b. 
45 Id. 
46 Shavell 1987a, p. 228. 
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accident, it will be optimal for him or her to purchase a level of coverage  
which equals pecuniary losses.47 If the utility to the patient increases after the 
patient suffered a modest disability (that is, he/she is badly in need of money), 
he/she will choose a level of coverage  which is somewhere between 
pecuniary losses and full compensation, i.e. the sum of full pecuniary losses 
and some non-pecuniary losses.48 However, if the utility of money to him/her 
decreases due to severe disability (e.g. because he/she is in a vegetative state 
and unable to enjoy the basic aspects of life), he/she will choose  which falls 
short of even pecuniary losses.49 Therefore, from the perspective of secondary 
cost reduction, the full compensation principle is unlikely to be optimal, 
especially in cases where seriously disabling injuries constitute “irreplaceable 
losses.”50 Given the fact that the loading on malpractice insurance is high, 
optimal compensation tends to be lower.51  
In the above insurance model, although non-pecuniary losses are 
actual harm, there is normally no need for recovery of such losses, since 
“non-pecuniary losses do ex post not create a demand for additional money, 
the victim has no willingness to pay a premium to cover for this non-
pecuniary loss ex ante.”52 Conversely, empirical studies show that injuries are 
most likely to reduce the marginal utility of wealth, i.e. victims gain less from 
the same amount of money.53 In such a case, people would not be willing to 
purchase insurance against non-pecuniary losses before the accident, because 
“the premium costs more utility than the expected coverage yields.”54 Other 
empirical evidence also suggests that full compensation of tort law “far 
exceeds the coverage people are prepared to pay for.”55 However, this 
conclusion may be inconsistent with the goal of primary cost avoidance.  
3.3.2. Decoupled Liability 
If optimal compensation falls short of full compensation, a problem of under-
deterrence may arise from the perspective of deterrence.56 To resolve this 
problem, some scholars proposed to employ a regime of “decoupled” liability, 
where “the plaintiff is awarded an amount different from what the defendant 
 
47 Shavell 1978, p. 57. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Cook & Graham 1977; Spence 1977; Danzon 2000, p. 1372. 
51 Id. 
52 Faure 2000, p. 151. 
53 Viscusi & Evans 1990, p. 371; Sloan et al. 1998, p. 489ff. 
54 Visscher 2015, p. 19. 
55 Danzon 1984b, p. 524. 
56 See supra Sub-Section 7.3.5.3. See also Faure 2000, p. 152. 
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is made to pay.”57 Specifically, the government should impose on the 
defendant an optimal deterrence fine, which is equal to the victim’s 
uncompensated loss after receiving optimal compensation. This would be in 
addition to the compensatory award.58 Given optimal compensation, the 
magnitude of the optimal deterrence fine will be decided by patients’ 
willingness to pay for injury reduction.59 In general, the more the medical 
prices internalise patients’ willingness to pay for injury reduction, and the 
more defendants fear uninsurable non-financial malpractice risk, the larger 
the magnitude of the optimal deterrence fine.60 The state should collect the 
fine and then spend it on the health care system, with the intention of 
maintaining “appropriate relative prices.”61  
Be that as it may, decoupled liability is not flawless. This approach was 
looked upon with disfavour by some economists because it would “even 
worsen the position of the victims: they pay an increased price (because the 
injurer is liable for the non-pecuniary losses), but they do not receive 
coverage!”62 Instead, they maintained that the ex ante willingness to pay 
(hereinafter WTP) to avoid non-pecuniary losses forms a better basis to 
measure recovery for non-pecuniary losses than the insurance theory on two 
major grounds. On the one hand, the insurance theory does not always hold 
true.63 First, although the victim’s marginal utility after the accident may not 
change or even decrease, the victim may still want to insure against non-
pecuniary losses because receiving money after suffering non-pecuniary 
losses may enhance the victim’s overall utility to some extent.64 Second, the 
victim’s marginal utility of wealth does not necessarily decrease after the 
accident since her “baseline utility” may be too low.65 Third, there may be 
some demand for insurance against non-pecuniary losses, but no insurers 
want to provide such insurance due to problems of adverse selection or moral 
hazard.66 Fourth, there may be no demand for such insurance precisely 
because tort damages already include non-pecuniary losses in practice.67 On 
the other hand, the ex ante WTP “shows how many resources the victim 
 
57 Polinsky & Che 1991, p. 562. 
58 Danzon 2000, p. 1372. 
59 Id. 
60 See generally Spence 1977; Danzon 2000, p. 1372. 
61 Id. 
62 Visscher & Karapanou 2015, p. 8. 
63 Visscher 2015, pp. 19-20. 
64 Croley & Hanson 1995, pp. 1827-1830. 
65 Croley & Hanson 1995, p. 1815. 
66 Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein 1988, p. 934. 
67 Avraham 2006, p. 89. 
 
 
360 Intersentia 
Part II. Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
found equivalent (ex ante) to suffering the loss.”68 To victims themselves, 
their utility would indeed be reduced in the future, if they were willing to 
pay to avoid non-pecuniary losses before the accident.69  
3.3.3. Inefficiencies of Treating Tort Law as an Insurance Scheme 
Theoretically speaking, liability rules alone give no guarantee that losses 
suffered by victims will be sufficiently compensated when compared with 
market insurance. First, there may be no swift compensation. The 
compensation function of liability rules may work better under strict liability 
while it does not work well under the negligence rule, for victims have to 
prove the fault of injurers.70 In contrast, benefits under a (first-party) 
insurance plan are normally paid once an insured risk materialises. A 
considerable delay “creates another source of secondary costs based on the 
delay itself.”71 Second, there may be no sufficient compensation. If the 
insolvency risk is high, it is less likely that victims’ losses will be sufficiently 
compensated.72 Nevertheless, it would be less problematic if EML were 
employed, since health care organisations are normally considered to be more 
solvent than an individual provider.  
Based on the available empirical evidence, Dewees, Duff and 
Trebilcock also concluded that although “distributive inequality and market 
failures appear to justify some form of compensation for the victims of 
medical injuries, civil liability is not an optimal instrument for accomplishing 
this objective.”73 Empirically speaking, the inefficiency of tort liability as an 
insurance system can be explained by several factors. First, there is no optimal 
deterrence fine in practice to cure the problem of under-deterrence. Second, 
many eligible patients with meritorious claims do not sue or are denied 
compensation.74 Third, administrative costs are very high.75 Fourth, there is a 
regressive character to tort compensation (paying same premiums, receiving 
different compensation corresponding to income levels).76 Therefore, it is 
reasonable to conclude that “no rational consumer would voluntarily 
 
68 Visscher 2015, p. 22. 
69 Id. 
70 Faure 2004a, p. 43. 
71 Calabresi 1970, p. 278. 
72 Faure 2004a, p. 43. 
73 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 117. 
74 See supra Sub-Sections 8.1.2, 8.1.3 and 8.1.4. 
75 See supra Sub-Section 8.1.5.2. 
76 See supra Sub-Section 7.2.2.6. 
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purchase the insurance that is implicitly offered through the civil liability 
system.”77 
3.4. SUMMARY 
Traditional tort theorists, familiar with the notion of corrective justice, treat 
compensation (loss shifting) as the primary function of tort law.78 In contrast, 
economists normally stress the deterrence function of tort law. The primary 
goal of accident law is to reduce the number and severity of accidents in the 
first place. Be that as it may, economists also pay attention to the secondary 
goal of reducing the social and economic dislocations of victims due to 
accidents that nonetheless happen.  
Tort law could be designed to reduce secondary costs if EML were 
employed. Two types of enterprise liability are available. The first type shifts 
losses to those who are most able to self-insure (or insure), while the second 
type spreads losses to consumers by treating the tort system as insurance. 
Although treating the tort system alone as an insurance regime does reduce 
some secondary costs, it achieves this goal at the expense of the goals of 
primary and tertiary cost avoidance. Hence, it may be better to employ EML 
in the sense that it better facilitates self-insurance. Tort damages should be 
determined in light of the victim’s ex ante WTP, which takes into account 
both primary and secondary cost avoidance. In contrast, insurance systems 
may outperform tort law regarding optimal secondary cost reduction, and this 
will be addressed in the remaining sections.  
4. COMPENSATION VIA LIABILITY INSURANCE 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters, we have demonstrated that tort law alone can be 
justified primarily on its deterrence function,79 which has been corroborated 
by empirical evidence.80 In the previous section, we have also shown that tort 
law could not be fully justified if its sole function were compensation, 
although EML, which places losses on hospitals because they are able to self-
 
77 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 117. 
78 Of course, there are lawyers who stress the deterrent function of tort law as well. Faure 
2004a, p. 7. 
79 See supra Chapter 7. 
80 See supra Chapter 8. 
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insure, may induce hospitals to take optimal self-insurance plans to reduce 
secondary costs. Hence, more efficient instruments that can achieve greater 
levels of secondary cost reduction through e.g. interpersonal loss spreading 
may be warranted.  
As far as iatrogenic risks are concerned, private insurance can be either 
(third-party) medical liability insurance (hereinafter MLI) or (first-party) 
patient insurance. In this Chapter, we will only examine MLI, which is 
traditionally the dominant form of compensation in the health care sector. 
First-party patient insurance will be discussed in Section 5.  
In many legal systems, the medical malpractice system is the “fault-
liability-insurance” system (hereinafter FLIS), under which the negligence 
rule and MLI are jointly used.81 Under the MLI scheme, the insurer provides 
cover in respect of the insured’s tort liability for harm done to third parties.82 
In other words, claims for medical malpractice are determined by tort law 
while damage awards are ultimately paid by liability insurers. From the 
perspective of law and economics, MLI primarily serves to offer protection 
for risk-averse injurers whereas potential victims are only protected 
indirectly.83 Nevertheless, from the perspective of victims, losses due to 
medical malpractice will be transferred from them to the negligent health 
care provider and eventually spread to all the insured providers through the 
insurance mechanism (loss spreading).84 In this way, secondary costs resulting 
from negligent adverse events are reduced via the FLIS. Without MLI, 
secondary costs of negligent iatrogenic injuries may not be reduced due to the 
injurer’s insolvency risks. It should, however, be noted that under the FLIS, 
secondary losses not resulting from medical malpractice, i.e. risks of non-
negligent iatrogenic injuries or non-iatrogenic injuries, are not covered by 
MLI. These risks fall within the patient’s own scope of responsibility. 
Nonetheless, risk-averse patients may purchase first-party insurance to cover 
these non-malpractice risks in particular or the risk of suffering personal 
injuries in general. 
The following section will first examine the economic rationale behind 
private insurance and discuss the desirability of applying it to risk spreading 
in the health care sector in Section 4.2. Since the FLIS is based on the 
negligence rule, more attention will be paid to the classic model of liability 
insurance under negligence. Then, empirical evidence concerning the FLIS 
will be reviewed in Section 4.3. A summary will be made in Section 4.4. 
 
81 OECD 2006, p. 10. 
82 Faure 2004a, p. 55. 
83 Faure 2004a, p. 47. 
84 Cane 2013, p. 44. For a thorough discussion on the relationship between tort law and 
liability insurance, see e.g. Schwartz 1990. 
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4.2. THE RATIONALE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
4.2.1. Loss Distribution and Private Insurance 
From the perspective of society, (private) insurance such as MLI is an 
economic instrument for accident loss distribution. It is meant to reduce 
secondary accident costs through risk spreading, the predominate form of 
which is pooling – “combining a sufficient number of homogeneous 
exposures into a group to make the losses predictable for the group as a 
whole.”85 Insurance is socially appealing because it is politically the “freest” 
way of risk spreading.86 Two features are characteristic of insurance: first, it is 
a combination of inter-temporal and inter-personal loss spreading; and 
second, unless the government intervenes, it does not reflect the aim of the 
deep pocket method (i.e. the rich pay more premiums than the poor).87 
Insurance is a method of inter-temporal loss spreading to the extent that all 
those insured have an equal risk potential.88 Similar to saving, those insured 
pay premiums in advance, in return for future insurance benefits when 
accidents occur.89 However, insurance is more than just saving.90 It can also 
achieve limited interpersonal loss spreading insofar as there are some 
differences among the insured. On the one hand, it spreads risk from those 
who face greater accident costs to those who face fewer accident costs.91 On 
the other hand, it spreads risk from those who suffer accidents sooner to 
those who suffer accidents later.92  
4.2.2. The Demand for Insurance 
4.2.2.1. Risk Aversion and Insurance 
From the perspective of individuals, Insurance is a special kind of contract, 
which is “an exchange of money now for money payable contingent on the 
occurrence of certain events.”93 As previously demonstrated,94 many injurers 
 
85 Vaughan & Vaughan 2008, p. 41. 
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94 See supra Section 2. 
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are averse towards a risk with a substantially large magnitude when it occurs, 
although the probability of its occurrence may be relatively low. In the 
health care sector, risk-aversion can be assumed as a general attitude of 
medical professionals, since even those “who are modestly wealthy and earn 
well above average would be ruined financially if confronted by an obligation 
to compensate victims for severe personal injuries.”95 Such a risk creates 
disutility for risk-averse health care providers, which is inefficient. Hence, 
they have a high demand for risk shifting or risk sharing. Theoretically, risk-
averse injurers prefer to pay a certain small amount of money (insurance 
premiums) in exchange for shifting the possibility of a larger loss to risk-
neutral insurers, which increases the former’s utility.96 
According to the theory of diminishing marginal utility of wealth, “it 
is fair to assume risk-aversion as a general attitude of human beings.”97 Health 
care providers and patients are not exceptions. For instance, the extensive 
practice of defensive medicine implies that physicians are averse towards 
malpractice risks.98  
4.2.2.2. Demand for MLI under the Negligence Rule 
Be that as it may, according to the negligence-based malpractice model, there 
should have been no demand for MLI given perfect information concerning 
due care.99 It would be less costly to escape liability by simply exercising due 
care than to purchase MLI because premiums would be too high due to all 
negligently acting providers.100 Traditionally, however, MLI is used to provide 
protection for risk-averse health care professionals, who take out almost 
complete insurance against malpractice liability.101  
This apparent paradox can be explained by several factors as follows. 
First, information about the standard of care is highly uncertain, and risks 
may nevertheless be imposed on health care providers if due care is set higher 
than optimal care.102 Also, real-life judges may erroneously find providers 
liable due to their personal inclination towards plaintiff-patients, hindsight 
bias, and errors in applying the economic calculus.103 Moreover, to err is 
 
95 Wagner 2009, p. 378. 
96 Borch 1961; Shavell 1987a, p. 190. 
97 Wagner 2009, p. 378. 
98 See supra Chapter 8, Section 1.5.1.3. 
99 Shavell 1978, p. 47; Danzon 1985b, p. 310. 
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101 Danzon 1985b, p. 310. 
102 Shavell 1978, p. 48. 
103 Wagner 2009, p. 380. 
The Fault-Based Compensation Mechanisms for Iatrogenic Injuries 
Intersentia 365 
human, and many physicians may inadvertently breach their duty to exercise 
due care.104  
Consequently, the risk of being held liable for iatrogenic injuries 
erroneously or accidentally committing errors is not insignificant even 
though physicians make their best endeavours to provide optimal treatment. 
It follows that, even under the negligence rule, physicians may be willing to 
insure against potential malpractice liability.105 
4.2.2.3. Institutional Providers 
In most legal systems, hospitals may be held liable either directly due to their 
own fault or vicariously due to fault on the part of their medical staff 
members.106 Hospitals would be the sole defendant if EML were employed.107 
Hence, it is questionable whether healthcare organisations such as hospitals 
have a demand for MLI. 
As enterprises, hospitals normally have relatively large assets compared 
to physicians. While it is fairly reasonable to regard individual providers as 
risk-averse parties, it is somewhat strange to believe enterprises are risk-
averse. The whole idea of EML is that hospitals are “deep pockets” that do not 
hurt very much when losses are placed on them instead of on physicians.108 
They may simply choose self-insurance which is less expensive than market 
insurance and spread risks through the price mechanism.109 However, 
practice shows that “even large firms favour market insurance over self-
insurance.”110 This phenomenon can be explained by three reasons. First, 
enterprises normally rely on the expertise of liability insurers in handling 
claims,111 which reduces transaction costs.112 Second, they may also want to 
reduce the variance in enterprise performance by purchasing liability 
insurance.113 Third, although firms may be risk-neutral, firm managers are 
usually risk-averse towards losses that may ultimately reduce their own 
salaries.114 According to the above analysis, it is highly likely that hospitals 
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have a demand for MLI as well. Nonetheless, there is a trade-off between the 
demand for MLI and that for self-insurance.115 
4.2.2.4. Coverage for Non-Pecuniary Losses 
Many economists maintain that risk-averse parties do not have a demand for 
insurance against non-pecuniary losses.116 Some scholars, however, do not 
endorse this argument.117 Under the FLIS, insurance coverage usually takes 
the scope of liability as the upper limit. Since recovery for non-pecuniary 
losses can be justified from the perspective of optimal deterrence and the ex 
ante WPT, there is no reason to exclude non-pecuniary losses from liability 
insurance coverage. Indeed, scope of liability and hence MLI coverage is an 
issue that “must be solved by legislation in the area of tort law and not within 
the sphere of insurance law.”118  
4.2.3. The Supply of Insurance 
4.2.3.1. Pooling, Re-insurance, and Co-Insurance 
The previous subsection explained why there is a demand for MLI. The next 
question is why insurers are willing to take on the insured’s risks. As profit-
maximisers, they must be able to ensure that the risk is insurable, and their 
operation is profitable; otherwise, the private insurance market would not be 
sustainable.  
The usual technique employed by insurers to spread risks is pooling,119 
meaning the spreading of losses suffered by the few over the entire group of 
homogeneous and independent people insured.120 The larger the group, the 
fewer risks faced by each insured member of the group on average.121 Another 
reason why the group should be sufficiently large is that the larger the 
number, the more accurate the estimate and thus the insurability of the 
risks.122 The method of pooling generally applies to both MLI and patient 
insurance. 
 
115 See supra Section 5. 
116 See supra Section 3.3.1. 
117 See supra Section 3.3.2. 
118 Wagner 2009, p. 381. 
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Unlike individuals, insurance companies can predict future losses 
within a particular group of the insured based on the Law of Large 
Numbers.123 According to this Law, “as the number of trials of a random 
experiment increases, the percentage difference between the expected and 
actual numbers of successful outcomes goes to zero.”124 In practice, the 
underlying probability can be obtained a posteriori by observing past 
accidents that have occurred, making use of statistical inference.125 Hence, 
pooling can transform “the uncertainty of outcome in every single trial into a 
certainty with regard to the sum of all trials” and the “risks have cancelled 
each other out.”126 
With the help of the Law of Large Numbers, an insurer is able to 
calculate insurance premiums. Apart from administrative costs, the insurer 
may pay its way by charging the insured the actuarially fair premium, which 
is equal to the expected value of payment under the policy.127 In practice, 
there will be loading costs (an additional charge for overhead costs).128 Also, 
the profit-maximizing insurer will add a profit margin to the premium.129 
Therefore, the insurance premium is normally larger than the actuarially fair 
rate. However, since the risk-averse insured person “has a strict preference 
for the actuarially fair policy over assuming the risks himself, he/she will still 
have a preference for an actuarially unfair policy,” provided that “it is not too 
unfair.”130 
Sometimes, insurers still face some residual risks even after pooling in 
that the real outcome may depart from their predictions.131 In response, the 
insurance markets have developed some non-pooling mechanisms such as re-
insurance132 and co-insurance.133 
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4.2.3.2. The Insurability of the Medical Malpractice Risk 
Elements of Insurability. As mentioned in the prior sub-section, insurers will 
often not sell an insurance policy unless they consider the risk concerned is 
insurable. A sufficiently large number of homogeneous exposure units is only 
one of several elements of the notion of insurability. Insurability is described 
by Wagner as “a term of art in insurance economics and insurance practice,” 
denoting “the minimum requirements a certain category of risk must satisfy 
in order to be eligible for coverage.”134 In a rough sense, insurability refers to 
the extent to which a risk can be foreseen and calculated.135 Specifically, an 
insurable risk must be accidental, determinable and measurable, independent, 
and non-catastrophic.136  
As far as the malpractice risk is concerned, the last of the foregoing 
four elements can be easily satisfied. Evidently, unlike catastrophic losses due 
to e.g. a natural disaster or war that may well lead to a financial catastrophe 
for an insurer, an iatrogenic injury resulting from a wrongful treatment is 
non-catastrophic. However, it is hard to meet the other three elements 
perfectly.  
Accidental nature of malpractice risks. The risk of an accident may be 
affected by moral hazard and adverse selection. Iatrogenic injuries are by 
definition unintended harm that is due to medical errors committed by 
physicians accidentally. Medical malpractice liability is based on the law of 
negligence rather than intentional torts. Hence, MLI excludes coverage for 
losses due to intentional torts. Be that as it may, MLI coverage may raise the 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, both of which suggest that 
part of the probability of loss may be affected by the insured’s behaviour.137 
The insured’s incentives to take care may be reduced once he/she obtains 
coverage (moral hazard) and low-risk insureds may choose not to buy any 
insurance (adverse selection), both of which will increase the probability of 
loss. However, this may not make the malpractice risk uninsurable; 
otherwise, there would be no MLI available in practice.138  
Determinability and measurability of malpractice risks. This 
requirement is also difficult to be fulfilled. First, the pool of potential 
policyholders may be relatively small, so that it would be difficult to predict 
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the frequency of malpractice claims accurately.139 Second, there may be 
considerable volatility in the frequency and severity of malpractice claims.140 
Third, there may be the well-known problem of the “long tail on losses.”141 
Fourth, some special liability sub-rules may make liability risks less 
predictable as well.142 
One may wonder whether there is a real long tail problem in the MLI 
market, since e.g. most surgical injuries are apparent after the treatment. 
However, some treatment injuries may “take a longer time to manifest 
themselves, as many as several years in some cases.”143 Also, although most 
“negligent mistakes become apparent to patients or their families shortly after 
they occur, a few remain undiscoverable for an extended length of time.”144 
Even after injuries and errors are identified, it may take several more years 
for victims to win the case through the litigation system.145 If liability for 
these injuries is covered by insurance on an occurrence basis, then the 
insurers have to bear “all risk arising from socio-legal and financial trends 
affecting future claims.”146 This problem will make it extremely difficult for 
insurers to calculate premiums. Many insurers in the US “found themselves 
paying 1970 losses with 1950 premiums.”147  
All these problems will lead to the so-called problem of “insurer 
ambiguity.”148 However, ambiguity does not necessarily mean uninsurability. 
Where there is ambiguity regarding the probability or magnitude of the loss, 
insurers will charge an additional “risk premium” to off-set against the 
unpredictability.149 The insurer should at least have some information to 
“make more than an educated guess concerning the risk premium he/she has 
to charge.”150 However, due to the competitive nature of the medical liability 
insurance market, the insurer may still be willing to provide liability 
insurance even when it is not possible to charge the risk premium.151 
Nonetheless, many insurers “would prefer not to provide insurance against 
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risks where there is considerable ambiguity and uncertainty.”152 Indeed, if the 
risk premium were too considerable, the insurance premium would well 
exceed “the price potential customers are willing to pay.”153 
A specific way to tackle the long tail problem is to move from 
occurrence policies to claims-made policies. Occurrence policies “provide 
coverage for insured events occurring during the policy period, regardless of 
the length of time that passes before the insurance company is notified of the 
claim.”154 In contrast, claims-made policies “provide coverage for insured 
events occurring on or after the specified policy’s retroactive date, when the 
insured events are reported during the policy period.”155 Hence, a claims-
made policy will effectively transfer the risk associated with the long tail on 
losses from the insurer to the insured, which makes it easier to calculate 
premiums accurately.156  
Independence of malpractice risks. Some malpractice risks are not 
independent. Adverse events normally occur on a case-by-case basis. Hence, 
malpractice risks are basically independent of one another. It is highly 
unlikely that many physicians in the same pool would simultaneously cause 
negligent iatrogenic injuries. However, “multiple claims against an individual 
physician are not independent, to the extent that they arise out of systematic 
characteristics of his practice.”157 More problematic is the fact that “claims 
against physicians as a group are not independent.”158 For instance, changes in 
legal doctrines may affect each patient’s incentive to file a claim and 
eventually the magnitude of damage awards.159 Also, due to the long tail in 
malpractice claims, risks may accumulate and materialise simultaneously.160  
When it comes to cumulative risks, several strategies can be employed 
to render these risks insurable. For instance, re-insurance can be used by the 
insurer to transfer part or all of the potential losses to the re-insurer, who is 
then responsible for the payment of these losses.161 Instead of re-insurance, 
primary insurers may also share the risks among themselves by co-insurance 
– the “pooling of risks and premiums in a common fund run in the name of 
all insurance companies which participate.”162 Moreover, as mentioned above, 
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a shift from occurrence policies towards claims-made policies reduces the 
cumulative risks due to long tails in malpractice claims.  
4.2.4. Informational Problems in the Insurance Market 
4.2.4.1. Moral Hazard 
Since the insured injurers can shift their risks of tort liability to insurers via 
the purchase of liability insurance, the insureds’ incentives to invest in 
precautions may be reduced. This concerns a well-known problem of “moral 
hazard,”163 meaning the insured injurers’ motive to prevent injury will be 
altered if the risk is shifted to an insurer.164 This behaviour alteration is “a 
result not of moral perfidy, but of rational economic behaviour.”165 The cause 
of moral hazard is information asymmetry – the insurer does not have perfect 
information concerning the insured’s behaviour.166 This problem is not 
unique to the private insurance relationship but is characteristic of the 
principal-agent relationship.167 
Regarding liability insurance, Shavell contended that injurers’ 
preventive incentives will not necessarily be diluted, since insurers in a 
competitive market will incorporate within their insurance policies “an 
appropriate substitute (but not necessarily equivalent) set of incentives to 
reduce accident risks,”168 i.e. making the premium accurately reflect the 
insured’s expected loss.169 Faure also argued that if moral hazard is perfectly 
controlled, the insured injurer will again behave as if there were no insurance 
while his disutility imposed by risk can still be removed.170 Basically, two 
partial solutions to the problem of moral hazard are proposed:171 (a) 
monitoring the insured injurer’s level of care and (b) exposing the insured 
injurer to risk. 
 
163 In mainstream insurance textbooks, a hazard is usually defined as a condition that may 
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The first best solution is that insurers can ideally overcome the 
insured’s adverse incentives through detailed control of the insured’s 
behaviour.172 In the real world, however, this ideal control is impracticable 
because it is very costly to observe the injurer’s care level accurately.173 In 
practice, nevertheless, two operable measures based on risk differentiation 
have been developed to monitor the insured’s care as accurately as possible: 
ex ante screening and ex post experience rating.174 Ex ante screening 
associates a higher premium for certain groups of the insured with higher 
risks before the sale of insurance policies.175 Ex post experience rating alters 
the premium according to the insured’s past claims or loss experience.176 
When care concerns risk-reducing activity that is variable (e.g. driving) 
rather than an expenditure on assets that fixed (e.g. smoke detectors), ex post 
experience rating is preferable to or as good as ex ante screening.177  
The second best solution is to expose the insured injurers to risk 
through partial coverage.178 Partial coverage makes sure that only part of the 
insured’s risk is removed. The insured injurers will still have some incentives 
to prevent injury. This approach is “second best” because the insured’s 
liability risks are not fully covered by insurance.179 The most widely used 
devices to implement incomplete coverage are deductibles and co-
insurance.180 A deductible subtracts a certain amount from the insurance 
benefits that insurers would otherwise have to pay, whereas co-insurance 
requires the insured to pay a certain percentage of each covered loss.181 
These two solutions may be optimally used in combination. How to 
combine the use of both monitoring and exposing the insured to risk depends 
on upon two factors: information costs and the value of the insurance 
policy.182 One the one hand, if information costs are high, it may be better to 
adopt more deductibles.183 On the other hand, if the value of the insurance is 
high, the insurer may be induced to make a “nicely tailored insurance 
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policy.”184 The control of moral hazard is not only beneficial to the parties but 
to society as well, for it will guarantee the insured’s incentives to risk 
prevention.185 
4.2.4.2. Adverse Selection 
A second problem in the insurance market is adverse selection.186 Adverse 
selection denotes the phenomenon that when the average premium in a risk 
pool is relatively high because the pool is constructed so broadly, low-risk 
members of the pool will be forced to leave the group.187 Adverse selection is 
also the result of information asymmetry between insurers and the 
insureds.188 The insured may “fail to disclose their true risk profile 
appropriately” which may prevent the risk group from being constructed as 
narrowly as possible.189 Should insurers have perfect information and be able 
to distinguish precisely between high-risk insureds and low-risk insureds, 
then insurers could charge the insureds in the light of their risk categories, 
and eventually adverse selection could be prevented.190 Adverse selection may 
be remedied “by discriminating between different groups of insureds and by 
setting the premium in proportion to the risk represented by the average 
member of the different groups.”191 In so doing, the risk pools could be 
constructed as narrowly as possible.192 
4.2.4.3. Risk Differentiation 
The problems of both moral hazard and adverse selection may be cured by 
risk differentiation.193 If it were possible to connect policy terms to the risk 
profile of individual insureds, the problem of moral hazard would be 
controlled.194 If low-risk insureds and high-risk insureds could be perfectly 
distinguished, adverse selection would never arise.195 An appropriate risk 
differentiation should provide remedies to moral hazard and adverse selection 
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since the more the risk is differentiated, the easier it is for injurers to narrow 
the risk group and to set the premium that can reflect the risk of the average 
member of the pool.196  
The efficiency of liability insurance is also based on the assumption 
that “there is perfect competition within the insurance market.”197 If 
monopolistic premiums can be set under the context of a high concentration 
on insurance markets, insurers will have fewer incentives to match their 
premiums to the risk profiles of the insureds.198 In that case, the moral hazard 
problem cannot be cured, and more accidents may occur.199 
It is widely argued that experience rating can redress the moral hazard 
problem plaguing malpractice insurance.200 Boccara explained that experience 
rating is based on the bonus-malus principle – if the insured health care 
provider exercises due care the premium will decrease (bonus) whereas if 
he/she deviates from due care the premium will increase (malus).  
4.2.5. Impact of Special Liability Sub-Rules on Insurability 
4.2.5.1. Causal Uncertainty 
The issue of causal uncertainty has been addressed in Chapter 7201 and 
elsewhere.202 In medical malpractice cases, it may be tremendously difficult to 
establish causation because there is often “scientific uncertainty concerning 
the causal relationship”203 between a faulty treatment and an iatrogenic 
injury. Besides faulty treatments, injuries suffered by patients may result from 
two non-tortious factors: (1) the normal outcome of the patient’s underlying 
or pre-existing medical condition, or (2) therapeutic risks inherent in 
treatment beyond physicians’ control.204 Hence, it is often uncertain whether 
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or to what extent the faulty treatment or the pre-existing condition has 
contributed to the victim’s injury, which makes it very hard for insurers to 
predict the likelihood and magnitude of malpractice liability. It is highly 
likely that, at the end of the day, insurers would not only have to cover the 
losses of their own insured parties but also the losses that might have been 
caused by other factors,205 i.e. the patient’s pre-existing conditions in the 
context of health care. Hence, in the case of causal uncertain, liability risks 
would become less insurable, especially under a so-called rule of reversal of 
the burden of proving causation.206 There would be no such problem of being 
unable to find insurance if proportional liability were adopted to tackle causal 
uncertainty issues.207 
4.2.5.2. Channelling under EML 
If EML were employed, then the locus of liability would be exclusively placed 
on hospitals, and joint and several liability would not apply.208 In other words, 
the sole defendant in medical malpractice cases would become hospitals, 
although the plaintiff-patient’s injury was caused by a physician. This 
particular arrangement is also called “channelling of liability.” Unlike joint 
and several liability, “under channelling the liability is attached to one party 
who then becomes fully liable for the damage … [t]he victim can only sue the 
‘channelled injurer’ and not another party who might have contributed to the 
loss as well.”209 This channelling would be inefficient if the channelled injurer 
could not monitor the behaviour of another party who could affect the 
accident risk or if there were no right of recourse, because the third party 
would have no incentive to take care in the absence of liability.210  
As far as medical liability is concerned, channelling is not necessarily 
inefficient. If there were an employment contract between hospitals and 
physicians, “a liability could be passed on the basis of contract” and “such a 
reallocation complies with the principles of the Coase theorem.”211 If the 
physician were an independent contractor who utilizes the facilities and staff 
members of the hospital, the law could grant the hospital a right of recourse 
against physicians at fault alongside the imposition of enterprise liability. 
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Will channelling improve the insurability of malpractice risks? If the 
channelled injurer and the third party are totally independent of each other, 
channelling will make the former’s liability risks less insurable because it 
shifts the latter’s liability risks to the former.212 In other words, channelling 
“creates a greater risk exposure for the operator and therefore creates higher 
uncertainty for the insurer.”213  
In the context of EML, however, the conclusion may be reversed. On 
the one hand, hospitals and physicians work within hospital facilities are not 
completely independent of each other. In many cases, hospitals have the 
opportunity to monitor treatment procedures, implement clinical guidelines 
and treatment protocols, provide training, coordinate the work of medical 
teams, and so on. Hospitals are in a better position to prevent system failures 
that may account for a significant proportion of human errors. In this respect, 
channelling does not seem to generate a greater exposure risk for hospitals 
since these individual malpractice risks are not completely separate from 
hospitals’ under-investment in patient safety. The group of third parties 
associated with each hospital is relatively certain and the aggregate 
malpractice risks of all physicians within a hospital are much more 
predictable than individual malpractice risks. 
On the other hand, hospitals are “better able than physicians to 
manage the volatility of insurance premiums and better able to obtain 
insurance or to make alternative risk transfer arrangements under even the 
most difficult market conditions.”214 Baker even argued that if EML were to 
be rejected, “enterprise insurance” could be employed which would “provide 
much of the deterrence benefit of an enterprise liability regime.”215 Therefore, 
it seems that the insurability of malpractice risks may be enhanced rather 
than decreased by the adoption of channelling under EML. 
4.2.5.3. Retroactive Liability 
Retroactive (or retrospective) liability refers to the situation where new 
liability rules apply to accidents which occurred earlier and were not 
considered as torts in the light of then liability rules.216 In medical 
malpractice cases, it is often seen that an iatrogenic injury will not be 
discovered until after several years. One important implication of this 
“potential long time between the wrongful event and the damage is that this 
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may result in retrospective liability.”217 Retroactive liability is inefficient 
because imposing liability according to new rules ex post will not provide 
potential injurers with incentives to take precautions ex ante.218  
One important element of insurability is that the risk should be 
predictable. Retroactive liability will make long-tail risks less insurable, 
because 
if the insurer were not aware that the behaviour of this insured party 
might potentially have been considered wrongful, no premium would 
have been charged for this risk, no preventive measures would have been 
required in the policy conditions and no reserves against losses would 
have been set aside.219 
Although when facing “insurer ambiguity” insurers may charge an additional 
risk premium to cover the risk of changing liability rules, this risk is so 
unpredictable that insurers in practice normally do not take it into account ex 
ante when designing policies.220 Hence, retroactive liability is socially 
undesirable in the light of either deterrence or insurability. 
4.2.5.4. Financial Limits on Liability 
Lawyers argue that there is a necessity of imposing financial caps on the 
amount of compensation if the injurer is relatively poor or the amount of 
compensation is tremendously large.221 In such a case, it would be unjust to 
hold the injurer fully liable for harm done.222 However, from the perspective 
of primary cost avoidance, setting damages lower than full harm will lead to 
under-compensation and eventually under-deterrence.223 Hence, caps on 
liability will undesirably dilute potential injurers’ incentives to take 
precautions.224 Another problem of caps is that they constitute “an indirect 
subsidy of that particular industry,” for this industry enjoy the “benefit of 
limitation of liability.”225 This is an indirect subsidy because “if caps are set 
lower than the actual damage, the latter will have to be covered by public 
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funds.”226 Be that as it may, caps can be justified if “injurers are risk averse and 
no liability insurance is available.”227 
One may wonder whether caps on liability will help guarantee the 
insurability of liability risks. Economists have demonstrated that “it is usually 
not the amount of the expected damages that causes uninsurability of risks, 
but more often the unpredictability of certain risks.”228 Facing unpredictable 
risks, injurers would be “ambiguous and averse towards these risks,” and may 
respond by “requiring an additional risk premium.”229 The amount of liability 
is also not a problem because competitive insurance markets have developed 
various instruments such as re-insurance, co-insurance, or pooling of risks to 
deal with large risks.230 Hence, the considerable amount of losses itself “does 
not make certain industrial accidents uninsurable per se.”231 In this regard, 
caps on liability do not seem to enhance the insurability of risks too much 
while they usually bring about under-deterrence.  
Even if available insurance coverage in the market is limited, it is not 
necessarily true that caps on liability are warranted. It can be the case that 
partial coverage which is available is purchased and the uninsured part of 
liability will induce potential injurers to take at least some care.232 Thus, an 
alternative – limiting the duty to insure – is more desirable: “to introduce a 
duty to insure up to the available amount of insurance coverage, but to keep 
the liability of the injurer unlimited.”233 Also, unlimited liability is essential 
for making potential injurers partially liable for the risk, which is considered 
as a device to control moral hazard. If caps are imposed on liability, it would 
be difficult for insurers to control moral hazard.234 
4.2.6. Compulsory Insurance 
4.2.6.1. The Case for Compulsory Liability Insurance 
The previous discussion has shown that there are many problems with the 
free MLI market on account of uncertainty over the pricing of insurance and 
imperfect information concerning potentially liable parties’ malpractice risks. 
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As Calabresi warned long ago, “free individual decisions about insurance are 
not likely to bring about the amount and type of loss spreading we 
collectively want” and “private insurance gives inadequate risk spreading.”235 
Hence, compulsory liability insurance is often argued in the literature as a 
potential remedy to the problems of the free insurance market.236 The most 
essential three arguments for compulsory insurance are summarised as 
follows: 
- The possibility of under-estimating the risk. Individuals often do not 
have perfect data on how risky their activities are and how much harm 
they may suffer or be held liable when accidents happen.237 Hence, 
potentially liable parties may not be able to evaluate liability risks they 
are exposed to and the benefits of purchasing liability insurance.238 
There is a great danger that potential injurers may under-estimate the 
risk of liability payment and thus wrongfully decide that it is not 
necessary to purchase liability insurance.239 The introduction of a 
general duty to insure would paternalistically protect the best interest of 
the insureds who under-rate liability risks.  
- Judgement-proof injurers. Lawyers often maintain that compulsory 
insurance is an effective guarantee of compensation to victims, because 
victims will have little hope of obtaining compensation if injurers are 
insolvent and uninsured.240 Also, from the perspective of secondary cost 
avoidance, there will be greater loss spreading if the law mandates that 
every potential injurer should buy liability insurance.241 In addition, 
without insurance, the judgement proof problem will lead to under-
compensation and thus under-deterrence.242 If liability insurance is 
available, potential injurers who have limited assets will only purchase 
liability insurance up to the size of their assets.243 Hence, there will be 
under-insurance which in turn will not completely eliminate the risk of 
under-deterrence.244 In other words, in cases where insolvency risks are 
highly possible, compulsory insurance might be socially desirable. 
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- Adverse selection. Under the compulsory liability scheme, every 
potential party is required by law to purchase liability insurance. Hence, 
low-risk injurers have no choice but to participate in the same pool with 
high-risk injurers. In this way, “compulsory insurance eliminates the 
dynamic workings of adverse selection and thus prevents the failure of 
the private insurance market.”245 It is indeed questionable “why the 
good risks should stay to give a subsidy to the bad risks.”246 This may be 
explained by the goal of secondary cost reduction – social welfare will 
be enhanced if “the man who has above average accident costs spreads a 
portion of them to the man who has fewer than the average” in a 
sufficiently large insurance pool.247 
4.2.6.2. Some Warnings 
Be that as it may, there are a few warnings against the use of compulsory 
insurance. First, there may be the problem of moral hazard.248 Under 
compulsory insurance, deductibles are usually not allowed.249 If the 
monitoring of the insured's behaviour is administratively costly, the problem 
of moral hazard will not be controlled.250 Second, the problem of moral 
hazard may be worse if there is concentration on insurance markets.251 
Indeed, monopolistic insurers would be less incentivized to set premiums in 
the light of the individual insured’s behaviour, and hence “there is less 
control of the moral hazard problem.”252 Third, compulsory insurance would 
make the insured more dependent on the insurance industry.253 There may be 
an undesirable situation where “the legislator would introduce a duty to take 
out compulsory insurance, but that the market would refuse to provide such 
coverage.”254 It is highly problematic to make “the availability of insurance 
coverage a pre-requisite” for market entry, because insurers would de facto 
become the licensor of the profession, especially in a monopolistic market.255 
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4.3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
4.3.1. Rating and Partial Coverage 
4.3.1.1. Risk Differentiation in Practice (Experience Rating) 
Although experience rating is a first-best solution to the problem of moral 
hazard in the malpractice insurance market,256 malpractice premiums in 
practice are generally not experience-rated. In Canada, the CMPA 
membership fees are determined on the basis of the type of work and the 
region.257 In the US, although some insurance firms have implemented 
experience rating schemes, the majority of them have either completely 
abandoned experience rating or only maintained a plan of limited scope.258 In 
most cases, malpractice insurance rates are “a multiplicative function of limits 
of coverage (for example, $1 million per occurrence, $3 million total for the 
policy year); medical speciality; and geographic location.”259 In contrast, 
hospital insurance premiums in the US are often experience rated to some 
extent (up to 20-25% above or below the average premium).260 Also in 
Piedmont of Italy, each hospital has to pay premiums to a regional 
malpractice liability fund for all public hospitals depending on its claims 
history.261 
Some argued that there should be more experience rating because the 
distribution of malpractice claims is not random. Several studies found that a 
small proportion of insured physicians account for a large number of 
claims.262 This result contradicts the hypothesis that “malpractice claims are 
randomly distributed among the physicians within each specialty class.”263 
Therefore, the heterogeneity of physicians within the same specialty provides 
the case for experience rating. To insurers, this heterogeneity may lead to 
several problems. First, placing highly heterogeneous insureds in the same 
pool will make it harder to predict the average liability risk.264 Second, it will 
be unfair on physicians with relatively low risks to make them subsidise those 
 
256 See supra Subsection 10.3.4.1. 
257 CMPA 2016. 
258 Sloan, Bovbjerg & Githens 1991, p. 176; Salvi 2006, p. 561; Vine 2006, p. 427. 
259 Danzon 2000, p. 1360. 
260 Mello & Studdert 2006, p. 14. 
261 Amaral Garcia, Bertoli & Grembi 2015, p. 1052. 
262 Rolph 1981b, pp. 249-253; Nye & Hofflander 1988, pp. 155-156. 
263 Rolph 1981b, p. 259. 
264 Sloan, Bovbjerg & Githens 1991. 
 
 
382 Intersentia 
Part II. Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
relatively high-risk physicians.265 Third, without experience rating, there may 
be the problem of adverse selection.266 In the extreme, adverse selection may 
give risk to the “unravelling” of the insurance market.267 Last but not the 
least, there may be the problem of moral hazard that dilutes loss prevention 
incentives.268 
4.3.1.2. Why Is Detailed Risk Differentiation Not Widely Accepted? 
If experience rating is theoretically desirable, why do insurance firms 
normally hesitate to systematically implement it in the field of individual 
physician liability? This puzzling fact can be explained by several reasons as 
follows.  
First, although the frequency of malpractice claims has risen sharply in 
the past, it is still “far too small for what would be considered necessary for 
actuarially sound experience rating.”269 Ellis, Gallup and McGuire found that 
five years of experience would move prices only modestly towards the 
actuarially fair premium on average.270 
Second, the distribution of malpractice claims may not be a good 
predictive index of a physician’s care level. The distribution may be affected 
not only by the care level of individual physicians but also by “treatment 
procedures, the severity of the injuries when they occur, the likelihood that 
lawyers can be found to bring suit, and the readiness of jurors to uphold 
claims against doctors and to assess generous damages.”271 For instance, the 
frequency of claims per physician for surgeons may far exceed that for non-
surgeons. However, this difference in the rate of claims does not seem to 
suggest that surgeons are systematically less careful than non-surgical 
physicians. Rather, it may be explained by the fact that “surgical errors are 
more likely to be severe, and causal connections to treatment are more 
obvious.”272 
Third, past claims history is not a reliable predictor of accident-
proneness in the future. In Florida, for instance, it was found that “more than 
half the individual doctors in the early highest-risk category had no claims at 
all in the second period, during which time they would be paying a hefty 
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surcharge under a hypothetical experience-rating program.”273 Rolph also 
found that 5 years’ prior claims experience is only a modest predictor of 
future claims experience.274 
Fourth, non-malpractice costs associated with defending malpractice 
claims may already provide sufficient incentives to take care. Physicians will 
lose several working days and thus suffer financial costs if they have to 
respond to malpractice claims. In addition, they may suffer reputational harm 
and psychological stress when defending in the court. For this reason, “an 
experience-rated program that eventually adds a finite surcharge to 
malpractice premiums is not likely to alter fundamentally the incentives 
already felt by doctors under the present flat-rate system.”275 
In order to better rate malpractice risks, some proposed that 
independent reviews should be conducted instead of relying on court 
decisions on malpractice claims.276 This peer review scheme is advantageous 
in that it provides “a better informed appraisal of a particular incidence of 
malpractice as well as the broader practice pattern of the physician.”277 
However, independent reviews may be very difficult to conduct, since health 
care providers themselves may not be willing to accept the idea of risk 
differentiation, because it “may be desirable for the medical profession to 
keep the ‘bad apples’ hidden.”278 “A detailed individualization of premiums 
which would show which professionals are the good and which are the bad 
risks, would be contrary to the independence and dignity of professionals.”279 
In addition, commercial insurers may not feel that they are competent to 
monitor members of “a respectable profession.”280 Self-regulated professions 
may utilize their monopolistic positions to protect their own interests rather 
than public interest.281 In other words, hospitals may hesitate to disclose 
information on “bad apples” to insurers with a view to avoiding the 
information from being publicised. Without real data from hospitals, insurers 
would find it tremendously difficult to implement any meaningful risk 
differentiation. 
Others argued that there may be greater demand for “community-rate” 
policies which can be employed to insure against “the risk of error by 
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claimants, the courts and the settlement process.”282 Some evidence shows 
that community-rate policies may not adversely affect the deterrent effective 
of liability rules. For instance, recently Amaral Garcia, Bertoli and Grembi 
assessed the impact of an increase in malpractice pressure (premiums of 
hospital liability insurance) on obstetrics and found that “an increase in 
malpractice pressure decreases the average incidence of C-sections by 7% to 
11.6%.”283 
4.3.1.3. Partial Coverage 
Although economic theories predict that partial coverage through deductibles 
or co-insurance is a second-best solution to the problem of moral hazard, it is 
a mystery that in practice malpractice liability insurers seldom employ partial 
coverage to control moral hazard.284 Danzon provided four reasons to explain 
this puzzle. First, physicians have to suffer uninsurable costs of time, anxiety 
and damage to reputation associated with being sued.285 Second, the 
possibility that the court grants damages awards which exceed the policy 
limit, generates additional uninsured risk.286 Third, since liability insurance 
covers both costs of defence and indemnity payments, the implementation of 
a deductible would dilute the insurer’s incentives to “defend claims that could 
be settled within the limits of a deductible.”287 Fourth, classifying physicians 
into groups can be used as a crude form of experience rating, as long as “lower 
priced insurers with stringent underwriting standards reject physicians with 
bad prior claims experience.”288 
4.3.2. A Typical Case: The American Malpractice Crisis 
The United States offers a classic example of how a free health care market 
has been hit by several rounds of medical malpractice crises and what the 
many US States have done to tackle the crisis. The first crisis erupted in the 
middle of the 1970s, involving both a dramatic surge in malpractice 
premiums (up to 500 percent) in some states and the withdrawal of some 
commercial insurers from the market entirely.289 Compared with erratic 
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premium rises, the “contraction of availability” was more serious.290 Hence, 
the 1970s were described as “a crisis of availability.”291 Danzon argued that 
the primary cause of the sudden increase in premiums from 1974 to 1975 was 
the increasing claim costs over the previous five years and the inability to 
raise premiums accordingly.292 He/she also maintained that the direct cause of 
the availability crisis was state interventions that held rates below the 
adequate level and denied the move towards claims-made policies.293  
In order to ease the crisis, many states implemented legislative 
reforms: traditional tort reforms and the reform of insurance provisions.294 
Tort reforms will be addressed in the next subsection. Let us first look at what 
reforms were put in place in the insurance market:295 
- Allowing physician-owned carriers. In many states, physicians were 
allowed to establish their own carriers such as mutuals or reciprocals 
and hospitals chose to self-insure and to establish captives or special 
pooled trusts, by which state insurance regulation could be 
circumvented. Although mutuals are inferior to commercial carriers in 
terms of loss spreading, they have comparative advantages in two areas: 
reducing claim costs and decreasing uncertainty over pricing. The key 
difference between mutuals and commercial carriers is that the 
incentives to monitor and control physician behaviour are greater when 
the policyholders are shareholders of mutuals as well. 
- Allowing claims-made policies. Whereas occurrence policies cover all 
claims resulting from accidents that happened in the policy year, claims-
made policies only cover claims filed during the policy year. Since long-
tail claims are commonly seen in medical malpractice cases, claims-
made policies will greatly reduce the uncertainty over pricing and 
effectively shift the risk of uncertain future claims from the insurer to 
the insured. In addition, claims-made policies facilitate individual rating 
and may help tackle the problem of moral hazard. 
- Creating joint under-writing associations. Non-profit joint under-
writing associations (JUAs) are a pooling arrangement that consist of 
commercial carriers in the state, which had been established in several 
states and are run on a self-sustaining basis. JUAs may be an effective 
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solution for availability crisis, but they may not be a desirable solution 
for the cost problem. 
In the second half of the 1970s, both claim costs and insurance premiums 
began to decrease.296 However, malpractice premiums increased dramatically 
again in the mid 1980s.297 This second crisis was often called the crisis of 
affordability.298 Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock found that the average real cost 
of basic malpractice coverage for American physicians tripled, from $6,350 in 
1974 to around $17,000 in 1988.299 Viscusi et al. reported that “malpractice 
premiums escalated by 56% from 1984 to 1985 and an additional 26% from 
1985 to 1986.”300 They also maintained that “this two-year period accounted 
for 62% of the total growth in medical malpractice premiums from 1981 to 
1990.”301 The second crisis led more states to adopt tort reforms aiming at 
limiting malpractice insurers’ costs.302 
After an “unusually long period of flat or modest increases in premium 
rates and widespread availability of insurance,”303 the third crisis occurred in 
the early 2000s.304 As Danzon found, the average premium increase from 0-
2% in 1996-97 to 17-18% in 2003, even reaching 60% in some states in 2001-
02.305 Some of the largest malpractice insurers such as St. Paul Travellers, 
PHICO and Frontier Insurance Group decided to withdraw from the 
market.306 Thorpe also illustrated that the median surge in malpractice 
premiums ranged between 15 and 30 percent.307 Rate increases in e.g. 
Pennsylvania ranged from 26 to 73 percent in 2003.308  
To conclude, it is often claimed that the three malpractice crises that 
occurred in the US can be explained as follows: “the increasing number of 
claims entail increasing damage awards which entail increased malpractice 
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premiums.”309 Hence, it is essential to examine whether traditional tort 
reforms are fit for overcoming the malpractice crisis. 
4.3.3. Traditional Tort Reforms 
4.3.3.1. Content of the Reforms 
In order to deal with the malpractice crisis, most US states have implemented 
tort reforms.310 The fundamental goal of these traditional tort reforms is to 
“reduce the overall costs of malpractice litigation.”311 The most common 
reforms adopted by states are listed as follows:312 
- statutes of limitation: to limit the amount of time a patient has to file a 
malpractice claim, typically to two or three years; 
- attorney contingency-fee reform: to limit the amount of a malpractice 
award that a plaintiff’s attorney may take in a contingent-fee 
arrangement; 
- pre-trial screening panels: to establish pre-trial screening panels to 
review a malpractice case at an early stage and provide an opinion about 
whether a claim has sufficient merit to proceed to trial; 
- caps on damages: to limit the amount of money that a plaintiff can take 
as an award in a malpractice suit, which may apply to non-pecuniary 
damages, total damages or only punitive damages; 
- collateral-source rule reform: to eliminate the traditional rule that if an 
injured plaintiff receives compensation for her injury from other sources 
such as insurance, that payment should not be deducted from the 
damage award; 
- joint-and-several liability reform: to limit the financial liability of each 
defendant to the percentage fault of that defendant; 
- periodic payment: to allow insurers to pay out malpractice awards over 
a long period of time instead of a lump sum. 
In addition, there are less commonly employed tort reforms by some states, 
such as to limit the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, to clarify the 
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informed consent doctrine, to eliminate the ad damnum clause, to impose a 
locality rule, and to allow for binding arbitration.313 
4.3.3.2. Impact of the Reforms 
Literature on the effect of tort reforms on the frequency and size of claims 
and on malpractice premiums is extensive. Mello conducted a detailed review 
of the available studies314 and reached several conclusions:315 
- Aside from caps on damages, most of these reforms have had limited 
efficacy. 
- The efficacy of caps on damages has been hotly disputed, and much of 
the evidence used in the policy debate is not based on rigorous analysis. 
- Good evidence shows that caps on damages reduce average award size 
by 20-30 percent, but there is no evidence that they decreased claims 
frequency. 
- The best studies suggest that caps are associated with a small increase in 
physician supply. 
- The most recent controlled studies show that caps moderately constrain 
the growth of premiums. 
Recently, Paik, Black and Hyman conducted an in-depth study on the effect 
of damage caps adopted in the 1990s and 2000s on malpractice claim rates and 
payouts.316 They pointed out that most prior studies do not allow for the 
gradual phase-in317 of damage caps, which normally applies only to claims or 
injuries filed after the reform’s effective date.318 Once allowing for phase-in, 
they found strong evidence that damage caps reduce both frequency and 
severity of malpractice claims, and more stringent caps have a larger impact 
on large claims.319 Nevertheless, they also found a receding tide of malpractice 
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claims in all states and tort reforms cannot explain why malpractice claims 
are decreasing in no-cap states as well.320 This finding suggests that some 
other factors may account for the malpractice crisis better than claim costs. 
Even if it could be demonstrated that caps on damages would help 
decrease malpractice premiums significantly, financial limits on liability are 
socially disadvantageous from the perspective of deterrence.321 As Danzon 
pointed out, most of the traditional tort reforms are intended to “reduce 
measurable claim costs,” which may at best simply shift costs from health care 
providers to patients and taxpayers.322 At worst, “total social costs may 
actually increase if, for example, deterrence incentives are weakened.”323 
4.3.4. Other Causes of the Malpractice Crisis 
Priest argued that the adverse selection process due to an information 
asymmetry between the insurer and the insured led to the malpractice crisis 
in the American liability insurance market.324 Long tails of liability faced by 
various medical specialities had so expanded the variance of malpractice 
liability risks that defeated any meaningful risk differentiation.325 Eventually, 
insurers found it difficult to distinguish between good risks and bad risks.326 
Facing high premiums, good risks would leave the pool and ultimately there 
would be a total unravelling of risk pools.327 The final crisis of unavailability 
of malpractice insurance would lead to a negative redistribution – although 
premiums were increased primarily due to higher income groups, lower 
income groups were harmed more greatly by the crisis.328 
However, other economists did not agree. Some studies indicated that 
litigation behaviour and malpractice claim payments did not alter 
significantly between 1970 and 1975, between 1981 and 1986, or between 
1996 and 2001.329 Danzon, Epstein and Johnson also found that “state-specific 
premium rate increases are not significantly related to prior increases in state-
specific losses paid or incurred.”330 Baker found that there had been changes 
in insurance market conditions, the investment and cost projections which 
 
320 Id. 
321 See supra Subsection 10.3.2.5.4. 
322 Danzon 2000, p. 1371. 
323 Id. 
324 Priest 1987, pp. 1582-1587. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. 
329 See e.g. Nye & Gifford 1988; Vidmar et al. 2005. 
330 Danzon, Epstein & Johnson 2004, p. 88. 
 
 
390 Intersentia 
Part II. Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
account for part of malpractice premiums.331 In other words, insurers who 
“had offered low prices based on rosy scenarios in 1970, 1981, and 1996 
switched to high prices based on pessimistic scenarios in 1975, 1986, and 
2001.”332 Hence, Baker argued that the medical malpractice crisis in the US is 
an insurance crisis rather than a tort crisis. The real problem is not the total 
cost of malpractice premiums but the “disruptive effect of rapid price 
increases, and the related unfairness of asking a few, hospital-based speciality 
groups … to bear the brunt of those increases.”333  
The cyclical occurrence of the malpractice crisis can be better 
explained by the insurance under-writing cycle, denoting “alternating periods 
in which insurance is priced below cost (a ‘soft’ market) and periods in which 
insurance is priced above cost (a ‘hard’ market).”334 Two reasons may account 
for the severity of this cycle: first, there is a long tail – the period between the 
date when premiums are paid and the date when the insured malpractice 
claims are filed; and second, malpractice losses are much more difficult to 
predict than many other types of losses.335 Baker pointed out that changes in 
the investment climate may also contribute to the underwriting cycle, since 
when interest rates decline, the insurer’s investment income falls.336 Danzon, 
Epstein and Johnson also found that “premium increases were positively 
related to upward revisions of reserves following initial under-reserving and 
that firms with large prior forecast errors were more likely to exit.”337 A 
malpractice insurance crisis occurs “when insurers are too optimistic about 
future losses for too long.”338 Consequently, insurers fail to charge enough 
premiums. When future losses exceed what insurers expected, insurers will 
attempt to increase their reserves dramatically.339 When premiums are 
increased, insurers will ultimately reduce the amount of insurance supply.340 
To conclude, the American malpractice crisis is more an insurance 
crisis than a medical liability crisis. The medical malpractice insurance under-
writing cycle may not be a bad thing at all, since it “may promote patient 
safety by drawing attention to the problem of medical malpractice in a 
manner that makes medical liability more salient and induces greater efforts 
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to prevent medical injuries.”341 Recently, Rodwin, Silverman and Merfeld 
asked why the medical malpractice crisis persists even when malpractice 
insurance premiums fall.342 According to them, two reasons may account for 
this phenomenon: first, physicians mistakenly perceive a crisis; and second, 
key actors such as the AMA, politicians, and many journalists have an interest 
in maintaining the perception of a crisis.343 
4.4. SUMMARY 
Section 4 examined the question whether compensation via liability 
insurance is a socially optimal compensation device in the context of medical 
malpractice. In many legal systems, MLI is employed to cover the risk of 
malpractice liability. Hence, MLI works together with the fault-based 
malpractice liability system, which covers only the risk of negligent 
iatrogenic injuries. This implies that the risk of non-negligent iatrogenic 
injuries and non-iatrogenic injuries should be borne by patients or be covered 
by other first-party insurance schemes. 
MLI can be used to reduce secondary accident costs in that it helps 
promote both inter-personal and inter-temporal loss spreading. There is a real 
demand for MLI because many, if not most, practitioners are risk averse and 
there is great uncertainty over the standard of care under negligence. 
Hospitals may also be in need of MLI on account of operational reasons. 
Although proponents of the traditional insurance theory do not believe that it 
is efficient for MLI to cover the risk of liability for non-pecuniary losses, 
opponents argue that cover for non-pecuniary losses is justified in light of 
optimal deterrence and the ex ante WPT. 
The supply of MLI is possible in that insurers rely on the technique of 
pooling and the Law of Large Numbers. Sometimes when pooling is not 
possible, insurers may nonetheless provide coverage with the help of re-
insurance or co-insurance. For a risk to be insurable, it must be accidental, 
determinable and measurable, independent, and non-catastrophic. Various 
instruments, such as risk differentiation, claims-made policies, re-insurance, 
and co-insurance, have been developed to guarantee the insurability of 
malpractice liability risks. 
Informational problems – moral hazard and adverse selection – may 
have adverse implications for the MLI market. Moral hazard may dilute the 
insured’s incentives to take precautions. The first best solution for MLI may 
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be ex post experience rating. The second best solution may be deductibles or 
co-insurance. Adverse selection may lead to the breakdown of the MLI 
market. The common solution to moral hazard and adverse selection is risk 
differentiation, especially through experience rating. 
Regarding some liability sub-rules, the proportional approach in the 
case of causal uncertainty and channelling of liability under EML may 
enhance the insurability of MLI without adversely affecting the deterrent 
function of malpractice liability. In contrast, retroactive liability is inefficient 
regarding either deterrence or insurability. Caps on liability would not 
enhance insurability too much but they would lead to under-deterrence.  
Compulsory MLI may be warranted in three cases where potential 
liable parties underestimate the risk of malpractice liability, where potential 
liable parties are judgement-proof, and where the risk of adverse selection is 
considerable.  
Empirical evidence from North America shows that neither experience 
rating nor partial coverage is adopted by MLI insurers. Three rounds of 
malpractice crisis occurred in the US in the mid-1970s, the mid-1980s, and 
early 2000s. Both the insurance market and the malpractice system have been 
reformed in order to resolve the malpractice crisis. However, recent evidence 
shows that the costs of malpractice claims are not the main cause of crisis. 
The malpractice crisis is more an insurance crisis due to the underwriting 
cycle than a malpractice liability crisis. 
5. SELF-INSURANCE: A PERFECT ALTERNATIVE 
TO MARKET MLI? 
5.1. INTER-TEMPORAL LOSS SPREADING AND SELF-
INSURANCE 
An important way of achieving inter-temporal spreading is self-insurance,344 
which is widely used by many firms in risk management programs.345 Broadly 
speaking, self-insurance denotes retention, meaning that “the firm retains 
part or all of the losses that can result from a given loss.”346 A narrowly 
defined self-insurance (or self-funding) is “a special form of planned retention 
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by which part or all of a given loss exposure is retained by the firm.”347 
Typically methods used for paying losses include (1) current net income, (2) 
an unfunded reserve (a bookkeeping account) and (3) a funded reserve (the 
setting aside of liquid funds).348 Although constituting “a nice word,” self-
insurance lacks the essential feature of traditional market insurance – 
(interpersonal) “loss spreading after an accident happens.”349 Hence, “self-
insurance is not an insurance scheme, but a system whereby potentially 
responsible parties make reserves for future losses.”350  
The ability to self-insure constitutes a strong argument for EML. The 
justification for the first type of EML is that losses should be placed on those 
who are abler to (self-)insure risks. Hence, the locus of medical liability ought 
to be placed solely on health care organisations (usu. hospitals), because they 
are in a better financial position than individual providers. When EML is less 
available, many hospitals, e.g. in the Netherlands, have moved to self-
insurance.351 Even in legal systems such as the US where EML is not 
systematically adopted, medical professionals, if they find MLI difficult to 
obtain or too expensive to buy in the market, are allowed to form new 
mutuals, risk retention groups or captive insurers to self-insure their liability 
loss exposures.352 Although self-insurance is not insurance proper, it 
nonetheless constitutes a way of reducing secondary costs. 
5.2. SELF-INSURANCE VERSUS MARKET MLI 
Market insurance re-distributes income (ultimately consumption 
opportunities) towards the less well-endowed states353 of the world, and self-
insurance redistributes income in a similar way.354 In the case of “full 
insurance,” incomes would be equalised both in the state of the world with 
the accident and in the one without the accident given diminishing marginal 
utility of income, and hence, the insured would be indifferent as to which 
state happened.355 Facing rare losses, potentially liable parties would be less 
incentivized to self-insure than to purchase market insurance, because “the 
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loading factor of self-insurance is larger for rare losses.”356 More importantly, 
they demonstrated that market insurance and self-insurance are substitutes to 
each other – an increase in premiums would decrease the demand for market 
insurance and enhance the demand for self-insurance.357 
Self-insurance has a major advantage over market insurance in that it 
may economise on more tertiary costs. First, the premium of market 
insurance normally exceeds actuarially fair value of the risk, because the 
insurer usually charges loading costs to “cover the administrative functioning 
of its service.”358 Second, the process of negotiating the insurance coverages 
may incur considerable costs of time and effort.359 All these costs could be 
avoided if potentially liable parties made their own reserves for future losses. 
Another reason why self-insurance is desirable to them is that these reserves 
(also called “captives”) are made for future compensation claims so that they 
will not be taxed as hidden profit.360 
However, self-insurance is normally inferior to market liability 
insurance for four reasons.361 First, self-insurance does not guarantee against 
the insolvency risk, unless regulatory measures can guarantee that the 
reserved money is sufficient for paying future compensation.362 Second, self-
insurance does not have the advantage of “economies of scale” by a risk 
spreading, while under liability insurance the insurer may gather similar but 
unrelated risks together which increase the expected utility of all the insured 
who are risk averse.363 Third, self-insurance does not have the advantage of 
efficient insurance policies which may lead to an optimal reduction in 
medical malpractice risk whereas, under efficient insurance policies, 
specialised insurers may encourage health care providers to take efficient 
precautions using policy provisions.364 Fourth, self-insurance may lead to 
problems of re-distribution. For example, public hospitals may pass the costs 
on to taxpayers instead of those who enjoy benefits from the health service, 
which may distort the market completion between public and private 
hospitals.365 
When applying the above analysis to the health care sector, it is 
important to note that the type of losses is highly relevant. It would be more 
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appropriate to employ self-insurance if loss frequency and severity were 
relatively low while market insurance would be more suited for low-
frequency, high-severity losses.366 In the first case where both loss frequency 
and loss severity are low, it may be cheaper to retain the expected loss than to 
purchase costly market insurance.367 In the second case, although loss severity 
is high, low less frequency suggests that purchasing insurance is financially 
feasible.368 Moreover, risk spreading is needed to insure against catastrophic 
loss.369 Given the fact that physicians are not sued frequently and that 
damages awards may be very considerable,370 it seems to be more efficient to 
purchase MLI than to self-insure.  
However, whether it is feasible to purchase market MLI also depends 
on market conditions. For instance, some argued that the medical malpractice 
crisis in the US is not a malpractice lawsuit crisis but a medical malpractice 
insurance crisis.371 There is an under-writing cycle, meaning the “cyclical 
pattern in under-writing standards, the amount of premiums charged, and 
profitability in the industry.”372 In a “hard” market where insurers face 
declining profits, they will increase premiums. Consequently, it will be very 
expensive or difficult to obtain market insurance.373 In contrast, in a “soft” 
market where profitability is improving, insurers will reduce premiums, and 
hence it will be less expensive or easier to purchase market insurance.374 In 
this regard, if the current malpractice insurance market were “hard,” health 
care institutions would have no choice but retain some risks of malpractice 
claims. Nonetheless, they may still choose to combine the use of both 
instruments by self-insuring most risks but purchasing “excess insurance for 
high amounts” given such an insurance market does exist.375 Without 
interpersonal loss-spreading, small losses in the aggregate can be so sizable 
that they exceed potentially liable parties’ assets (insolvency risk).376 
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5.3. SUMMARY 
To sum up, although self-insurance is not insurance proper, it is a legitimate 
instrument for reducing secondary costs. However, although self-insurance 
saves on tertiary costs, it is by and large inferior to market insurance, because 
it does not spread losses and hence cannot prevent against insolvency risks 
given that losses due to medical malpractice are normally highly severe. 
Nonetheless, self-insurance can be justified in cases where market insurance 
is too expensive or hardly available. In such a case, a combined use of self-
insurance (against small losses) and market insurance (against large losses) 
may be socially optimal. In any case, “self-insurance can only be considered 
an effective financial security if guarantee can be provided through regulation 
that the reserves set aside will effectively be used for the potential losses for 
which they are meant.”377 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 10 examined the question of whether tort law per se, MLI and self-
regulation can be socially optimal devices for compensating damage due to 
medical malpractice The first conclusion is that tort law per se is an 
undesirable instrument for compensation in that insurance can achieve faster 
compensation without incurring too many tertiary costs. Nevertheless, it 
would be optimal to place the locus of liability on hospitals rather than 
physicians had EMI been employed. Hospitals are more able than physicians 
to self-insure or buy MLI. However, it is inefficient to treat the tort system as 
an insurance scheme because it may result in under-deterrence. 
The second conclusion is that MLI per se is a socially optimal 
instrument to spread the risk of negligent injuries. MLI is superior to the tort 
system in that it achieves a wider degree of loss spreading and protects the 
victim against a judgement-proof defendant and it does not necessarily dilute 
the deterrent effect of malpractice liability. The malpractice crisis that 
occurred in the US may be better explained by the insurance underwriting 
cycle than by the costs of claims.  
The third conclusion is that although self-insurance is not insurance 
proper, it is a legitimate mechanism of inter-temporal risk spreading. Self-
insurance is not a perfect substitute for but a nice complement to MLI. If MLI 
were available and affordable, self-insurance is inferior to MLI because the 
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latter can achieve a greater degree of interpersonal loss spreading. However, 
in a hard market where MLI is unavailable or unaffordable, self-insurance is a 
second best solution. 
It ought to be noted that both MLI and self-insurance work on the 
basis of the fault-based liability system. Hence, the heavy costs incurred by 
the tort litigation system should be taken into consideration when comparing 
MLI or self-insurance to other no-fault compensation mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 11  
MEDICAL COMPENSATION MECHANISMS 
NOT BASED ON FAULT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It has previously been demonstrated that the fault rule can be justified as a 
relatively efficient mechanism in that the deterrence benefits that it generates 
are likely to exceed the tertiary costs that it incurs.1 As far as compensation is 
concerned, however, the fault-based malpractice liability alone is inefficient 
because it cannot guarantee swift and sufficient compensation whenever a 
patient suffers an iatrogenic injury.2 Many eligible victimised patients do not 
sue and many patients who did file a claim may still face tremendous 
difficulties in establishing fault and causation and may not obtain 
compensation until several years later. 
There are also deficiencies in compensation mechanisms relying on the 
tort regime such as self-insurance and liability insurance, not only because of 
the deficiencies of the traditional malpractice liability but also because they 
have problems of their own.3 While self-insurance does not work well in the 
case of insolvency risks, liability insurance suffers from problems such as 
moral hazard, adverse selection, and severe underwriting cycles. Hence, one 
may wonder whether there is any alternative mechanism that can achieve the 
three goals of accident law simultaneously: (1) optimal deterrence (primary 
cost avoidance), (2) optimal compensation (secondary cost avoidance), and (3) 
being administratively cost-effective (tertiary cost avoidance). 
For this reason, many scholars proposed and several legal systems have 
already developed the so-called “no-fault” compensation system (or scheme) 
(hereinafter NFCS) as an alternative to the traditional fault-based malpractice 
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liability regime. Broadly speaking, NFCSs denote insurance programs that 
“provide compensation on proof of loss without any need to identify another 
party that caused the loss or prove their fault.”4 Two common features are 
characteristic of these no-fault schemes: first, victimised patients normally do 
not have to prove providers’ fault to obtain compensation; and second, costly 
malpractice lawsuits can usually be avoided. In a broad sense, no-fault 
schemes include first-party patient insurance, a special compensation fund 
covering iatrogenic injuries or social security that provides benefits for 
patients and the disabled in general.5 In practice, however, an NFCS 
specifically refers to a compensation fund that provides cover for personal 
injuries or iatrogenic injuries.6 
The NFCS should be distinguished from strict liability. Strict liability is 
usually described as “liability without fault,” meaning that the defendant will 
be held liable for any damage that he/she has caused irrespective of whether 
he/she was at fault or not.7 Hence, no-fault schemes are similar to strict 
liability insofar as the element of fault is not required for claiming 
compensation. However, no-fault schemes differ from strict liability in at 
least two significant ways. First, strict liability is one form of tort liability 
which should be enforced through the tort litigation system, whereas no-fault 
schemes are normally detached from the tort system.8 Second, victims under 
strict liability are usually compensated by injurers, while those under no-fault 
schemes are normally paid by various insurance funds directly.9  
This chapter will review theoretical and empirical studies regarding 
no-fault compensation schemes. Specifically, it will examine the basic 
features of the three typical forms of no-fault schemes – first-party insurance 
(Section 2), compensation funds (Section 3), and social security (Section 4) – 
respectively, and evaluate how efficient they are in achieving optimal 
deterrence and compensation without incurring considerable tertiary costs. 
Section 5 will examine NFCSs in several legal systems and check whether 
these NFCSs are structured in light of efficiency. The final Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE 
2.1. THE RATIONALE OF FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE 
Since there are deficiencies in self-insurance (i.e. insolvency risks) and 
liability insurance (i.e. moral hazard, adverse selection, and severe 
underwriting cycles), alternatives such as first party patient insurance may be 
well worth considering. Under (third-party) liability insurance, the insurer 
provides coverage in respective of the insured health care provider’s tort 
liability for negligent iatrogenic injuries done to third parties (patients).10 
Under (first-party) patient insurance, however, the insurer directly 
compensates iatrogenic injuries suffered by the insured (patients) provided 
that it is the insured risk that causes the injuries.11 Hence, a shift from 
malpractice insurance towards patient insurance entails a potential expansion 
of coverage. While under malpractice insurance only liability for negligent 
iatrogenic injuries is insured, under patient insurance both negligent and 
non-negligent iatrogenic injuries are directly covered. Another difference is 
that first-party insurance is purchased directly by victims (patients), whereas 
third-insurance is bought by potential injurers (health care providers) for the 
purpose of compensating patients for their injuries. Since both third-party 
insurance and first-party insurance are market insurance, much of the core 
rationale of liability insurance described in Chapter 10 applies to first-party 
insurance. 
First-party patient insurance differs from the malpractice liability in 
several ways. First, under the former it is free for patients to choose the 
amount of coverage they desire, whereas under the latter the amount of 
coverage is normally determined by the court in light of malpractice liability 
rules.12 Second, the former normally requires the insured to bear part of the 
loss through an upper limit (or ceiling) or a deductible, while the latter is 
intended to provide full compensation.13 Third, the former does not require 
negligence on the part of the insured, whereas the latter does.14 Fourth, non-
pecuniary losses are rarely covered by the former but usually covered by the 
latter.15  
 
10 Faure 2004a, p. 55. 
11 Id. 
12 Cane 2006, pp. 295-299. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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First-party insurance has a comparative advantage over third-party 
insurance in terms of saving tertiary costs. First-party insurance enables a 
better risk differentiation than the latter because “the victim can signal all his 
characteristics on whether he/she is a high or a low-risk individual directly to 
the insurer.”16 In contrast, it is tough for insurers to predict ex ante the risk 
that their insureds will harm a third party, which is highly uncertain when 
considering the long tail problem.17 In other words, it is easier and more 
accurate to calculate the actuarially fair premium by the risk of iatrogenic 
injuries than by negligent iatrogenic injuries. Also, third-party insurance is 
expensive because it relies on the tort system to determine eligibility for 
coverage, which incurs considerable legal and administrative costs.18 
Therefore, in an ideal world, patient insurance alone should be more efficient 
than the fault-liability-insurance system (FLIS) regarding tertiary cost 
reduction. 
From the perspective of victimised patients, they may not necessarily 
be able to receive compensation more easily under patient insurance than 
under malpractice insurance. It is true that patients do not have to establish 
health care providers’ fault in order to claim insurance benefits. However, 
they still have to show that their losses resulted from the provision of health 
services, i.e. they suffered iatrogenic injuries rather than non-iatrogenic 
injuries due to their pre-existing conditions. This requirement of causation is 
essential because the “compensation system should not be constructed in such 
a way that the patient is compensated as soon as he/she is dissatisfied with the 
result of the medical treatment.”19 Without this requirement, the borderline 
between patient insurance and health insurance would be blurred. 
2.2. THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FAULT-LIABILITY-
INSURANCE SYSTEM (FLIS) 
Bearing in mind the differences between first-party insurance and the FLIS 
above, we now discuss the relationship between them in three scenarios:20 
- Scenario 1: Suppose the FLIS were totally replaced with the first-party 
insurance scheme. To the patient, he/she will receive compensation 
with more certainty, because he/she will not be supposed to prove 
 
16 Faure 2005, p. 245. See also Priest 1987, pp. 1557-1559. 
17 Faure & Grimeaud 2003, p. 218. 
18 See supra Chapter 8, Section 1.5.2. 
19 Faure 2004a, p. 56. 
20 Faure 2004a, pp. 56-57. 
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negligence on the part of the health care provider although he/she will 
still have to prove the causal link. Secondary accident costs will be 
reduced more quickly and more extensively under patient insurance 
than under MLI. Although the amount of compensation he/she could 
receive is normally lower than full compensation under tort law, this 
result is still optimal since the amount under patient insurance 
represents the victim’s willingness to insure against her own losses. 
However, from the perspective of primary accident cost avoidance, 
eliminating the FLIS is inefficient, because the health care provider’s 
incentives to take precautions may be diluted. On balance, it is socially 
undesirable to substitute first-party insurance for the FLIS, unless the 
provider’s preventive incentives can be largely maintained by 
alternative mechanisms such as regulation. 
- Scenario 2: Suppose both the FLIS and patient insurance are retained 
and parallel to each other, but there is no subrogation. To the patient, 
he/she will receive compensation both from the health care provider (or 
the liability insurer) and from her own insurer, which will lead to a 
cumulation of insurance. This result is inefficient not because it does not 
reduce secondary costs but because it reduces secondary costs too much 
(double compensation) and incurs more tertiary costs. However, in light 
of deterrence, to retain both systems is efficient since the provider’s 
preventive incentives are kept. On balance, the joint use of the two 
systems may be more efficient than using the FLIS alone. The increase 
in tertiary costs may be well exceeded by the benefits of reduction in 
primary and secondary costs. Hence, patient insurance can be used as a 
complement to rather than a substitute for MLI. 
- Scenario 3: Suppose both the FLIS and patient insurance are retained 
and parallel to each other, and there is subrogation. Under the principle 
of subrogation, the first-party insurer that has paid benefits to a 
victimised patient under a patient insurance policy is entitled to all the 
rights and remedies belonging to the insured patient against the health 
care provider that treated the patient. To the patient, he/she will not be 
allowed to file a claim against the provider for any injury that has been 
compensated for by the first-party insurer. Hence, the problem of 
double compensation will not arise. To the provider, he/she (or her 
liability insurer) will have to pay full damages either to the patient or 
the patient’s first-party insurer (through subrogation). From the 
perspective of primary cost avoidance, the result is efficient because the 
provider’s incentives to take precautions will not be diluted. As far as 
secondary cost avoidance is concerned, the result is socially desirable in 
that patients are able to obtain adequate compensation quickly. When it 
comes to tertiary cost avoidance, however, the result is undesirable 
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since more administrative costs are incurred due to the cumulation of 
insurance. 
It seems that none of the above three scenarios are socially optimal when 
Calabresi’s three costs are considered at the same time. Notwithstanding, it is 
not difficult to find that the third scenario is the most efficient one among all 
the three scenarios.  
2.3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE 
(VOLUNTARY) FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE MARKET 
According to the classic model of malpractice liability, not all risks of 
iatrogenic injuries are borne by health care providers. From the perspective of 
society, it is sometimes too costly to eliminate a certain risk. Under the 
negligence rule, patients have to endure the costs of non-negligent iatrogenic 
injuries in order to enjoy the benefits of medical care.21 Empirical evidence 
also shows that many patients with meritorious claims either do not sue or 
are denied compensation.22 Therefore, many costs of negligent iatrogenic 
injuries are actually borne by patients due to the imperfect operation of the 
malpractice system in practice. Theoretically, risk-averse patients would 
enhance their utility if they insured against the risk of suffering an iatrogenic 
injury without any compensation from health care providers.23  
In practice, such an insurance market, where patients fully insure 
against (non-negligent) iatrogenic injuries, is not universally developed in the 
US or other legal systems. Exceptionally, first-party patient insurance, which 
covers iatrogenic injuries in general, has been developing in some countries 
such as New Zealand and Sweden for decades.24 However, this no-fault 
approach has not been widely accepted in most legal systems.25 Dewees, Duff, 
and Trebilcock provided several reasons to explain why the objective of 
universal coverage is impeded. On the one hand, due to limited purchase 
power, imperfect information, and a persistent tendency to understate the 
risk of accidents with low probabilities, patients’ demand for both Medical 
Adversity Insurance and Accidental Death and Disability Insurance may not 
be strong enough.26 On the other hand, due to imperfect information, the 
 
21 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, pp. 112-113. 
22 See supra Chapter 8, Sections 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4. 
23 Shavell 1978, p. 36; 1987a, p. 212. 
24 OECD 2006, pp. 348-349. 
25 Koch & Koziol 2004, p. 417. See also infra Chapter 11, Sections 3 and 4. 
26 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, pp. 112-113. 
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supply side of the market is only willing to provide incomplete insurance.27 
For this reason, these kinds of insurance may not be universally available. 
Some evidence also indicates that people are more willing to purchase 
liability insurance than personal accident insurance.28  
2.4. SOLUTION: A COMPULSORY FIRST-PARTY 
INSURANCE SCHEME? 
As demonstrated previously, it may be socially desirable to use first-party 
patient insurance as a complement to the FLIS (the foregoing Scenario 3). 
However, it is also shown in the preceding subsection that the market for 
private patient insurance has not been universally developed yet. One may 
wonder whether compulsory first-party insurance is more desirable than 
voluntary first-party insurance. Compulsory patient insurance may be 
justified on two grounds. First, due to imperfect information potential victims 
may underestimate major medical risks.29 Hence, this information problem 
may justify regulatory intervention through compulsory first-party insurance 
(or social security).30 People are more averse towards large risks (e.g. paying a 
hospitalisation bill) than small risks (e.g. paying for a visit to the doctor).31 
Hence, compulsory insurance should be restricted to cover larger risks instead 
of smaller risks.32 Second, uninsured patients who e.g. are unable to pay the 
medical bill after receiving highly costly treatment may externalise their costs 
to society at large.33 Therefore, in order to tackle the information problem 
and to avoid externalities, the purchase of patient insurance should be 
mandated. 
Nevertheless, two caveats deserve careful consideration. On the one 
hand, there may be a negative redistribution of benefits from the good risk 
(those who have smaller demand for all-inclusive coverage) to the bad risk 
(those who have larger demand for all-inclusive coverage).34 On the other 
hand, adequate competition and the control of moral hazard are also essential 
to the efficiency of first party insurance.35  
 
27 Id. 
28 Calabresi 1970, p. 56. 
29 Faure 2005, p. 246. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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2.5. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
First-party patient insurance has advantages over the FLISs in terms of 
secondary and tertiary cost reduction. Under patient insurance, victimised 
patients could obtain compensation much more extensively (covering both 
negligent and non-negligent iatrogenic injuries) and more quickly (in the 
absence of a duty to establish the provider’s negligence). Patient insurance 
economises on tertiary costs more than the FLIS in that the former facilitates 
better risk-differentiation and avoids costly tort litigation procedures.  
However, the use of patient insurance alone is inefficient because it 
may dilute health care providers’ incentives to take precautions and increase 
primary accident costs dramatically. Hence, it may be socially optimal to use 
patient insurance as a complement to the FLIS although it would incur high 
tertiary costs due to a cumulation of insurance mechanisms.  
On account of imperfect information and concerns for externalities, 
compulsory patient insurance may be warranted, especially for covering large 
risks.  
Be that as it may, one may still wonder whether there is any 
alternative mechanism that could better guarantee fair and efficient 
compensation while it would not dilute providers’ incentives to take 
precautions and would not incur too many tertiary costs. 
3. THEORIES OF COMPENSATION FUNDS 
3.1. DEFINING COMPENSATION FUNDS 
Since the traditional fault-and-liability system fails to provide victimised 
patients with adequate compensation efficiently36 and it is difficult for first-
party insurance schemes to maintain deterrent incentives,37 one may wonder 
whether there is any other alternative regime that can provide fair and 
efficient compensation while keeping deterrent incentives at the same time. 
Compensation funds are thus proposed as such a potentially fair and efficient 
alternative compensation instrument.38  
 
36 See generally supra Chapter 10. 
37 See supra Chapter 11, Section 2. 
38 Faure 2004a, p. 57. 
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A fund is usually defined as “a sum of money or other liquid assets 
established for a specific purpose.”39 In practice, funds may take various forms 
and have different functions. Faure summarised four types of widely used 
funds as follows:40 
- Limitation funds. A limitation fund applies to the situation where serial 
or mass damage (e.g. DES) is caused by similar products or services. It 
has three essential features. First, the liable enterprise’s liability is 
limited to a certain amount. Second, there is no risk spreading with 
other potential injurers and the fund is only financed by the liable 
enterprise. Third, it is intended to “have an adequate instrument to 
divide the available proceeds among the victims in case of serial 
damage.”41 Thus, the limitation fund plays a bigger role in compensating 
serial damage caused by pharmaceuticals, but less a role in compensating 
medical injuries caused by malpractice. 
- Advancement funds. An advancement fund is constructed for “long-
lasting civil procedures and insurance coverage issues that can last much 
longer than the life of the victim.”42 Especially in the case of asbestos 
victims, Faure argued that “it is highly unfair that (relatives of) victims 
only receive compensation post mortem because of the relatively short 
time between the discovery of the illness and their death.”43 In contrast, 
compensation funds are often proposed on the grounds that some risks 
are uninsurable or victims find it difficult to obtain compensation under 
liability rules rather than on account of long-lasting procedures. In this 
sense, advancement funds are insufficient to cure the above problems. 
- Guarantee funds. A guarantee fund is meant to “protect victims against 
the possible insolvency of a liable injurer or his insurer.”44 It only 
intervenes if all other compensation schemes have failed. For instance, it 
can be employed to protect victims against excess risk – “the risk for 
which in the specific case for various reasons no insurance coverage is 
available.”45 
- A general medical compensation fund. It is intended as a substitute for 
the traditional FLIS. Under this scheme, a sum of money will be 
established specifically for compensating eligible accident victims.  
 
39 Garner 2014. 
40 Faure 2004a, pp. 58-59. 
41 Faure 2004a, p. 58. 
42 Faure 2004a, p. 59. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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This last type of compensation fund is actually what most no-fault 
compensation schemes are concerned with. In the remaining part if this 
section, we will primarily touch upon the general medical compensation 
fund, and examine whether it can provide fair and efficient compensation. 
3.2. FAIR AND EFFICIENT COMPENSATION 
In order for a compensation fund to be fair and efficient, Faure maintained 
that it must follow three principles:46 
- Principle 1: the incentives for health care providers to prevent medical 
malpractice should not be undermined. In other words, “a duty to 
compensate should in principle only rest upon the one who actually 
contributed to the risk.”47 If potentially liable parties did not have to 
bear any accident costs, their incentives to take precautions might be 
diluted significantly.  
- Principle 2: the duty of contribution should also correspond with the 
extent to which the risk has been caused by the specific treatment or 
hospital. This principle is enshrined in the causation requirement under 
tort law. The collectivization of compensation entails that injurers only 
contribute financially to the collection in proportion to the weight their 
wrongful treatment contributed to the risk. Hence, risk differentiation 
(through e.g. experience rating) is needed in order to guarantee that bad 
risks pay a higher contribution than good risks with a view to avoiding 
negative redistribution. 
- Principle 3: as a matter of principle, “only those who actually 
contributed to the risk should contribute to the fund.” On the one hand, 
however, the difficult issue of causation will become a barrier to the 
building of an efficient compensation fund. On the other hand, if the 
fund were financed by the State (eventually by the general taxpayers), it 
would be questionable why victims of a specific type of accident 
(medical malpractice) should be treated better than victims of other 
types of accidents. Hence, how to define compensable events and how 
to finance the fund are questions that cannot be easily answered.  
Faure argued that these principles are beneficial to both the efficiency goal 
(keeping incentives) and the fairness goal (avoiding negative redistribution).48 
 
46 Faure 2004a, pp. 60-61. 
47 Faure 2004a, p. 60. 
48 Id. 
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Therefore, the ability to obtain sufficient information on risk profiles (aiming 
at a differentiation of the contributions due) and to establish causation 
(insuring that the fund only intervenes in case of malpractice) really 
matters.49 Since compensation funds are defined as a way of loss spreading 
that is aimed at secondary cost avoidance, Faure’s three principles are mainly 
meant to maintain the deterrent function in cases where the tort-liability-
insurance system is replaced by a compensation fund.  
Apart from efficiency in reducing primary costs, Faure also stressed the 
importance of avoiding unfairness (negative redistribution). Although 
accident law is less an appropriate instrument to redistribute income than 
progressive taxation, a compensation fund that leads to severe negative 
redistribution is socially undesirable. However, since risk differentiation 
cannot be perfect in practice, a certain level of effects arising from 
redistribution may be tolerable as long as the compensation fund can achieve 
a high level of efficiency.  
3.3. CAUSATION: HOW SHOULD IATROGENICITY BE 
DEFINED? 
3.3.1. Defining Iatrogenic Injuries 
Under a no-fault compensation fund, the eligibility of a victim for 
compensation is based on causation rather than fault. In medical cases, there 
may be multiple causes that lead to final injuries, because “the patient who 
enters a hospital is already suffering from an underlying illness, which may 
itself be capable of producing the disabling losses in question.”50 Hence, as a 
baseline, compensable events should be limited to injuries that are 
attributable to medical intervention.51 In other words, injuries that were 
wholly or substantially caused by other factors than medical intervention 
should not be covered by a special compensation fund for iatrogenic injuries. 
By analogy with workers’ compensation plans, some proposed that the test for 
compensable events should be the injury “arose out of and in the course of” 
medical treatment.52  
However, this test is not desirable, because not all consequences of 
medical treatment should be compensable under a no-fault plan. Hence, the 
fact that the patient’s injury was caused by medical intervention is not 
 
49 Id. 
50 Weiler 1991, p. 140. 
51 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 137. 
52 Williams 1984, p. 583; Starr 1989, p. 812. 
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sufficient. Iatrogenic injuries must be interpreted as “unintended or 
unexpected result of treatment.”53 This stricter requirement of iatrogenicity is 
to prevent no-fault compensation for “purely medical injuries” from 
becoming “a general insurance scheme for disability however caused.”54 
Against this benchmark, injuries such as the following cases should be 
regarded as attributable to the underlying conditions rather than to medical 
interventions:55 
- temporary disability for a medically obligatory period of convalescence 
after surgery, 
- permanent disability associated with a medically necessary removal of a 
limb or an organ, or 
- commonly encountered side effects that are medically necessary to treat 
the patient's underlying condition. 
However, temporary disability lasting for a period longer than minimally 
required after a surgery and permanent disability as a result of unnecessary 
removal of a limb or an organ are examples of iatrogenic injuries.56 
To summarise, adverse events will become compensable iatrogenic 
injuries “when they are more severe than expected,”57 or “when they 
represent the random manifestation of a serious low-probability risk inherent 
in a medically necessary method of treatment.”58 
3.3.2. Iatrogenicity versus Due Care 
The test of iatrogenicity differs from a fault standard in two ways. On the one 
hand, while the standard of care is measured against customary practice or 
reasonable man under fault liability, a standard of medical possibility applies 
to no-fault schemes.59 On the other hand, whereas only information available 
before the treatment is relevant to the determination of due care under fault 
liability, an event will be compensable if subsequent information after the 
treatment reveals that the procedure concerned was unnecessary or 
inappropriate.60 
 
53 Weiler 1991, p. 141. 
54 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 137. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Epstein 1976, p. 146. 
58 Harvard Medical Practices Study 1990, Chapter 5, p. 14. 
59 Epstein 1978, p. 260. 
60 Weiler 1991, pp. 140-141. 
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3.3.3. Iatrogenicity and Omissions 
Iatrogenicity may involve both active medical interventions and omissions. 
An omission occurs “when a disability is caused or aggravated by a failure to 
prevent or minimise the patient's condition at a stage when it was medically 
possible to do so.”61 For instance, the failure to diagnose and treat avoidable 
blindness from glaucoma or a curable cancer can be regarded as iatrogenic 
injury rather than as a natural progression of the pre-existing condition.62 
However, “if diagnosis is medically impossible until the condition is virtually 
untreatable (or if the patient fails to seek medical attention until corrective 
measures are no longer possible),” the outcome is a non-iatrogenic injury.63 
One reason that Epstein argued against a no-fault plan for medical 
injuries is that the no-fault plan cannot eliminate the negligence issue.64 An 
omission already implies a duty of performance and the defendant would try 
to prove that the treatment was non-negligent in order to demonstrate that 
the real cause of the injury is more likely to be the patient’s pre-existing 
condition.65 However, a standard of medical possibility should be 
distinguished from due care in cases where an omission is involved. Under 
no-fault schemes, an injury is compensable as long as the patient’s condition 
could have been diagnosed and treated medically, no matter how high the 
cost of the treatment (the highest care level).66 In contrast, under fault 
liability the fault on the part of the defendant would not be established if the 
condition could not have been diagnosed and treated at a socially optimal cost 
(efficient care level).67 Hence, the “causal question of whether a correct 
diagnosis could have been made is conceptually distinct from the normative 
question of whether an accurate diagnosis should have been made.”68 
3.3.4. Causal Uncertainty 
Since medical science is often probabilistic in nature69 and iatrogenicity is 
typically only one element in a complex causal chain leading to the patient’s 
injury, any injury suffered by the patient may be attributable both to the 
 
61 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 137. 
62 Epstein 1976, p. 145; Weiler 1991, pp. 140-142. 
63 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, pp. 137-138. 
64 Epstein 1978, p. 262. 
65 Id. 
66 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 138. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Havighurst & Tancredi 1973, p. 133. 
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medical intervention and to the patient’s pre-existing condition.70 One may 
wonder to what extent patients can claim compensation from the 
compensation fund in cases where there is uncertainty over causation. 
Epstein was concerned that the complexities of establishing causation would 
not be substantially reduced by changing from the fault rule to a no-fault 
plan.71 
Two solutions may be well worth considering: 
- Solution 1: It can be required that medical care is both “a probable cause 
of the adverse outcome” and “a significant or material cause of the 
resulting disability.”72 For example, it can be provided that only costs 
incurred by the patient after a fixed period (perhaps six months 
following the treatment) are compensable.73 However, it still remains a 
difficult issue that how to define “significance” or “materiality.” 
- Solution 2: Since no-fault plans are similar to strict liability in that all 
costs of iatrogenic injuries are internalised by the health care industry, 
the proportional approach to causation may well apply to no-fault 
schemes. If the proportional approach were employed, health care 
providers would react as if there were no uncertainty over causation.74 
In so doing, either over-deterrence or under-deterrence may be 
avoided. 
From the perspective of primary cost avoidance, the second solution is more 
efficient than the first “or-all-nothing” approach. In the case of causal 
uncertainty, patients should only obtain compensation to the extent that the 
injury was due to medical interventions rather than to pre-existing 
conditions. 
3.4. FUNDS VERSUS INSURANCE 
Faure compared funds vis-à-vis insurance in terms of risk differentiation and 
costs respectively.75 As far as risk differentiation is concerned, there is no 
reason why compensation funds should be preferred to the tort-liability-
insurance system when both of them cover the same risk.76 If there is 
 
70 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 138. 
71 Epstein 1978, p. 261. 
72 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 138. 
73 Harvard Medical Practices Study 1990, Chapter 8, p. 6. 
74 See supra Chapter 7, Section 3.2. 
75 Faure 2004a, pp. 61-62. 
76 Faure 2004a, p. 61. 
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competition in insurance markets, liability insurance should be preferred.77 
Insurers are better able to conduct risk differentiation since they are 
specialised in such issues.78 In contrast, in the absence of competition in 
insurance markets (shortage of supply of coverage or excessively high 
premiums), a preference for compensation funds managed by governmental 
administrators may be justifiable.79 Nonetheless, it would be still questionable 
whether administrators are able to recognise good and bad risks in order to 
properly carry out risk differentiation.80 If “highly technical risks” are to be 
differentiated and health care providers are in a much better position than 
the insurers to monitor each other, a regime of mutual risk sharing (e.g. 
MediRisk in the Netherlands) may be preferred.81 Where compensation funds 
and liability insurance cover different risks, there is no need to compare them 
because they are not alternative to each other.82 
Regarding costs, if compensation funds were run by regulatory 
authorities, insurance would be less costly than compensation funds for three 
reasons. First, liability insurance policies are concluded for a whole set of 
risks, not for only one risk. Second, the costs of risk spreading incurred by 
insurers (who are specialised in risk differentiation) may be lower than by 
compensation funds. Third, liability insurance may reduce transaction costs 
more than compensation funds do, because insurers and the insureds are able 
to negotiate on risk distribution ex ante.83 If, on the other hand, 
compensation funds were run by private entities, market competition is 
needed to provide incentives to reduce costs.84 Those compensation funds 
(e.g. limitation funds or guarantee funds) that are intended to complement 
rather than replace liability insurance, may save more costs.85 
3.5. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 
A carefully designed and well-functioning no-fault plan offers excellent 
potential for achieving fair and efficient compensation without incurring too 
much administrative cost. Regarding primary cost avoidance, risk 
differentiation would link the cost of iatrogenic injuries to risk-creators so 
 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Faure & Van den Bergh 1995, p. 76. 
80 Faure 2004a, p. 61. 
81 Faure 2004a, p. 62. 
82 Id. 
83 See e.g. Skogh 1989b. 
84 Faure 2004a, p. 62. 
85 Id. 
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that their incentives to invest in care would be maintained. In this regard, no-
fault schemes are more efficient than either first-party insurance or social 
security. Moreover, because doctors would rarely be sued before the court 
under no-fault plans, they would no longer react by over-complying. Hence, 
unnecessary costs of defensive medicine could be avoided. In this respect, no-
fault schemes might save more primary costs than the tort system.  
Be that as it may, this advantage of saving primary costs may be 
mitigated to some extent by the fact that many iatrogenic injuries that are 
currently unavoidable at a socially optimal cost (medical mishaps) would be 
covered by no-fault schemes as well. Although holding providers liable for 
currently unavoidable injuries would not alter their incentives to take care, 
they would react to increased accident costs by reducing their activity levels. 
Since health care services generate considerable positive externalities that 
benefit society as a whole, it would be socially undesirable if the health care 
industry suffered a severe contraction. However, Weiler et al. maintained 
that in the long run it makes economic sense to impose the costs of some 
currently unavoidable injuries on the health care industry.86 As they argued, 
the development of medicine is dynamic and currently unavoidable risks will 
become readily avoidable in the future.87 Hence, providers would be 
incentivized to continually invest in research and innovation.88  
As far as secondary cost avoidance is concerned, no-fault schemes are 
also desirable because the risk of iatrogenic injuries is spread broadly within 
the health care industry. Since most no-fault plans are mandatory social 
insurance, the extent of risk spreading under no-fault schemes is likely to be 
greater than that under the FLIS. Moreover, no-fault plans are intended to 
provide compensation for the victim’s losses rather than to offer those in need 
a minimum level of subsistence.89 Thus, no-fault schemes are more directed at 
reducing secondary losses resulting from adverse events than social security. 
In terms of tertiary cost avoidance, comprehensive no-fault schemes, 
similar to first-party insurance and social security, would entail lower 
administrative costs than the tort system. Under no-fault schemes, legal and 
litigation costs and the cost of determining fault could be avoided. Hence, in a 
single case, the administrative costs of no-fault schemes tend to be lower than 
those of the tort system. Admittedly, total administrative costs under no-fault 
schemes may be greater, given that the number of claims would rise 
substantially after a shift from fault towards no-fault. Nevertheless, the 
increase in total administrative costs might well be justified by the 
 
86 Weiler et al. 1993, pp. 148-149. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See infra Chapter 11, Section 4.1. 
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considerable reduction in total secondary costs since more victims would be 
compensated more quickly.  
4. THEORIES OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
4.1. THE RATIONALE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
Broadly speaking, “social security law” and “social security systems” or 
“agencies” can be understood to mean regulations set and maintained by the 
state, and schemes or agencies which are state-controlled, and which carry 
out in whatever manner the task of granting benefits on the basis of personal 
injuries.90  
The rationale behind social security is the “doctrine or belief that the 
government should provide a minimum level of economic security and social 
welfare for citizens and their families.”91 Social security systems began to 
develop in the West in the 19th century, first for workers and then for other 
parts of the population.92 The main model was Bismarck's social insurance 
legislation in Germany, which provided that a state agency funded by 
employers and employees jointly was intended to offer benefits to employees 
once they suffered work-related injuries or become old.93 Gradually, it 
became widely recognised that to provide citizens with social security against 
the risks of life should be the primary task of the modern welfare state.94 
Today, various social security programs are growing fast in many developing 
nations worldwide.95 
Although both social security and compensation funds are no-fault 
schemes, they still differ significantly in two ways. First, social security 
schemes are mainly intended to provide a limited compensation for the 
protected persons in need of help, while compensation funds are meant to 
provide victims with fair and efficient compensation as a substitute for tort 
liability. Second, social security funds are mainly financed by the protected 
persons according to their income and partly subsidised by the state, whereas 
compensation funds are primarily financed according to potential liable 
parties’ accident-proneness (and sometimes also subsidised by the state). 
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Thus, compensation funds are designed to achieve both the goal of 
compensation and that of deterrence.  
In Europe, for instance, no country seems to employ only a single and 
comprehensive social security program to cover all kinds of personal injury 
risks.96 Many countries have a very complicated system of social security, 
consisting of various single schemes.97 For example, the Netherlands has a 
very extensive social security system that “provides the general population 
with modest financial protection against various risks of life, e.g., sickness or 
disability, unemployment, death of breadwinner, old age and cost of 
children.”98 However, other schemes such as employees insurance co-exist 
with the national insurance scheme.99 
A social security scheme is usually operated subject to three basic 
requirements:100 first, there should be a state organised insurance scheme; 
second, the claimant should belong to the protected group of people; and 
third, the claimant often has to contribute to the social security fund. In a 
pure social insurance scheme, the insured claimants have to contribute to the 
fund fully.101 Sometimes, however, an entirely state financed scheme through 
taxation where the protected persons do not have to contribute to the fund 
does exist.102 In the majority of the cases, social security schemes are co-
funded by both citizens and the state.103 If first-party insurance coverage is 
made compulsory, then the effect is “more or less the same as under a social 
insurance scheme with full contributions of the covered group.”104 In this 
respect, social security could be and sometimes is replaced by private 
insurance.105 
Social security law is intended to provide financial support for “the 
weakest in society, whether or not their position results from accident or 
illness.”106 The pre-requisite for joining a social security scheme is normally 
low and the amount of compensation is usually limited.107 Hence, social 
security is more “Existenzsicherung,”108 aiming at providing a source of 
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livelihood. Social security normally covers a wide range of risks of life, such 
as old age, disability, sickness, maternity, work injury and unemployment.109 
Obviously, not all of these risks are related to accidents. Social security 
benefits for personal injury are “only a part (although an important one) of all 
benefits granted under the heading of social security.”110 In order to draw a 
comparison between tort law and social security, the focus will be on 
personal injury losses resulting from accidents, since “tort law traditionally is 
limited to the situation whereby personal injury is the result of a wrongful act 
following an accident caused by a third party.”111 In many countries, social 
security plays a leading role in compensating damage caused by medical 
malpractice.112 Social security may cover the costs of additional medical care 
and loss of earnings, no matter what has caused these losses.113 
4.2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
TORT LIABILITY 
Social security differs from tort liability in the requirements and scope of 
compensation, the rationale, and basic goals:114 
- Requirements of compensation. Both tort liability and social security 
require that the claimant has suffered some personal injuries. Besides 
damage, tort liability has much stricter requirements than social 
security. In order for fault-based tort liability to be established, the 
claimant still has to prove that the injury he/she suffered was due to 
fault on the part of the defendant. Hence, fault and causation are 
essential elements for e.g. medical malpractice liability. In contrast, fault 
is not required under social security schemes. Causation is not required 
under non-causal social insurance schemes (general social insurance), 
but it is a requirement of causal social insurance schemes (e.g. for work-
related injuries). Therefore, causation is relevant in the sense that “the 
damage of the bodily impaired person must be linked to the insured risk 
through a chain of causation.”115 
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- Scope of compensation. Tort law is intended to provide full 
compensation, including recovery for non-pecuniary losses. However, 
social security is not directly relevant to the financial loss of the victim 
but often to the income earned by the victim, which generally excludes 
coverage for non-pecuniary damages. Hence, social security is meant to 
“provide the necessary help in a situation of need.”116 In principle, tort 
damages are reduced by contributory negligence on the part of the 
victim, while social security benefits are not affected by contributory 
negligence. 
- Rationale. Social security is aimed at promoting solidarity between 
citizens and protecting those “who are otherwise – due to hardship or 
other occurrences – at risk of being reduced to a life of need and 
poverty.”117 In contrast, tort law is not intended to promote solidarity 
between injurers and victims. Sometimes, there is solidarity between all 
the insured injurers under (liability) insurance. However, this is only a 
way of risk spreading, which is based on risk differentiation instead of 
income dependence solidarity. 
- Basic goals. The primary goal of tort law as understood by economists is 
to prevent accidents (deterrence),118 whereas social security is mainly 
used to provide (limited) compensation for protected claimants. 
4.3. INTERPLAY BETWEEN SOCIAL SECURITY AND TORT 
LIABILITY 
4.3.1. Compensation Models 
Supposing tort liability and social security are complete alternatives to each 
other, two ideal models of reaching the goals of both deterrence and 
compensation through either social security or tort law could be designed as 
follows:119 
- Safety regulation + social security. If secondary cost avoidance were the 
only goal, social security seems to be the most appealing instrument in 
that “it allows for just the degree of risk spreading or deep pocket we 
 
116 Magnus 2003b, p. 286. 
117 Magnus 2003b, p. 279. 
118 Lawyers may disagree and they generally hold that the primary function of tort law is 
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want and permits us to achieve it in a remarkably inexpensive way.”120 
Then, it would be most efficient if a general social insurance funded by 
taxation and covering all accident risks could be established.121 
However, secondary cost avoidance is not the only goal, and primary 
cost avoidance is of equal importance. Ideally, if social security could 
provide adequate compensation, then it would be unnecessary for 
victims to claim compensation through tort law. Some instruments 
other than tort law should be employed to guarantee that those risk-
creators take sufficient precautions. Hence, it is argued that safety 
regulation serves the goal of deterrence in the absence of tort law. 
- Tort liability + insurance.122 If primary cost avoidance were the sole 
goal, then tort liability would be efficient since it could ex ante induce 
risk-creators to invest in precautions. However, to reduce secondary 
costs through risk spreading is also socially desirable from an ex post 
perspective. Tort law alone is not so effective at broad loss spreading. 
Hence, liability insurance and first-party insurance may be employed to 
spread accident risks among the insured injurers or victims. 
4.3.2. Combined Use in Practice 
In practice, however, to replace social security completely by tort liability or 
vice versa is virtually unrealistic. On the one hand, tort liability is often 
indispensable in that it is sometimes difficult to use ex ante safety regulation 
to control risky behaviour effectively and social security benefits are often 
rather limited. Hence, in the absence of a tort-liability-insurance system, 
safety regulation may fail to generate sufficient incentives to take precautions 
and social security may not be able to provide adequate compensation.  
On the other hand, social security is not absolutely replaceable because 
it can achieve wider risk spreading at less expenses than the tort system. 
Under the tort-liability-insurance system, tort litigation and risk 
differentiation under third-party insurance incur larger administrative costs 
than first-party insurance. Potential victims may also lack enough incentives 
to purchase first-party insurance. In addition, social security is also intended 
to promote other important goals such as social solidarity, which is outside 
the ambit of tort law.  
It follows from the above analysis that tort liability and social security 
may co-exist and affect each other to a certain extent in practice.123 
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Comparative studies also show that except New Zealand, no other country 
has implemented a comprehensive social security scheme that is intended to 
replace the traditional tort system.124 What is often found in many legal 
systems is “a partial replacement of tort law through social security law.”125 
Then, how do legal systems handle the situation where part of tort 
damages is also recoverable under social security schemes? There are basically 
two tendencies. On the one hand, some legal systems such as England and 
Wales and the Netherlands choose to leave tort liability fully intact, subject to 
the collateral source set-off rule – the part of damages that is already covered 
by social security schemes should be deducted from total tort damages.126 
Then, a right of recourse must be granted to social security agencies so that 
tortfeasors have to contribute to the schemes.127 On the other hand, some 
legal systems such as France, Greece, Italy, Austria, and Germany decide to 
abolish tort law in the field of occupational accidents and diseases because the 
privileged tortfeasor has paid for being immune.128 
In cases where tort damages and social security benefits overlap, it may 
be socially efficient to grant a right of recourse to social security agencies. As 
a general rule, three goals should be borne in mind in order for the joint use 
of tort liability and social security to be optimal:129 first, victims should be 
fully compensated – either over-compensation or under-compensation should 
be avoided; second, tortfeasors should not be subsidised in the form of paying 
less than full compensation; and third, administrative costs should be 
minimised.  
Against these benchmarks, the combination of the collateral source 
set-off rule and a right of recourse or subrogation is efficient. On the one 
hand, the victim will get full compensation, consisting of benefits received 
from social security schemes and properly reduced tort damages from the 
tortfeasor. There will be neither over-compensation nor under-compensation. 
On the other hand, the tortfeasor will have to pay part of the damages to the 
victim and the remaining part to social security agencies. Hence, there will be 
neither under-deterrence nor over-deterrence.  
The foregoing analysis shows that the joint use of tort liability and 
social security is not only practically inevitable but also socially optimal as 
long as the collateral source set-off rule and a right of recourse are employed 
in combination as well. Both the goals of compensation and deterrence can be 
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achieved. Victims will seek “the best of both worlds” within tort law: “they 
seek the low threshold for compensation of social security, to be combined 
with full compensation under tort law.”130 For instance, social security 
benefits are relatively high, so that victims only need to receive compensation 
for the top of their income (which is not covered by social security) and for 
non-pecuniary loss.131 Tort law thus becomes a “luxury” system!132 With the 
expansion of social security benefits, secondary accident costs could be 
further reduced while deterrent incentives could be kept intact. The other 
way around, it is expected that “if the government withdrew from the 
compensation of personal injury via social security, victims would be forced 
to make an increasing use of tort law and insurance to meet this same goal.”133 
5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON NO-FAULT 
COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN PRACTICE 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, there are five legal systems that have implemented a 
comprehensive NFCS for personal injuries in general or iatrogenic injuries in 
particular for some time: New Zealand and four Scandinavian countries – 
Sweden, Finland, Norway and Denmark.  
New Zealand was the first country in the world that established a 
comprehensive NFCS for personal injuries in general in 1974. New Zealand’s 
NFCS (hereinafter NZ-NFCS) is based on an insurance model that provides 
coverage for all victims of accidents without resorting to the fault-based tort 
system. The NZ-NFCS’s model was proposed by the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry, which produced the well-known Woodhouse Report,134 named after 
its chairman, Mr. Justice Woodhouse. In the Report, the Commission came to 
the conclusion that tort law does not have a deterrent effect and the 
negligence action is a form of lottery.135 Hence, the Commission 
recommended that the tort system should be replaced by “a unified and 
comprehensive scheme of accident prevention, rehabilitation, and 
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compensation which will avoid the disadvantages of the present processes.”136 
This scheme must be guided by five principles: community responsibility, 
comprehensive entitlement, complete rehabilitation, real compensation, and 
administrative efficiency.137  
New Zealand’s legislature accepted this recommendation and enacted 
the Accident Compensation Act 1972 (hereinafter NZ Act 1972), which took 
effect in 1974. After 1974, the NZ Act 1972 has undergone several major 
amendments in 1982, 1992, 1998, and 2001.138 Compensation for iatrogenic 
injuries has been covered since the NZ Act 1982. In 2005, a significant 
amendment was made by the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Compensation Amendment Act 2005 (hereinafter NZ Amendment Act 2005) 
to the NZ Act 2001 concerning the definition of medical injury. The latest 
major amendment to the NZ Act 2001 was the Accident Compensation 
Amendment Act 2010.139 
The Scandinavian countries have also developed NFCSs since the 
1970s.140 Scandinavian NFCSs differ from NZ NFCS in that while the former 
only apply to injuries in the health care sector the latter provides cover for all 
kinds of personal injuries.141 Sweden was the first Scandinavian country that 
established a patient insurance for treatment-related injury in 1975.142 A 
similar patient insurance scheme was introduced in Finland in 1984, in 
Norway in 1988, and in Denmark in 1992.143 Currently, Scandinavian NFCSs 
are governed by patient injury acts as follows: 
- Sweden: Patient Injury Act 1996144 (hereinafter Swedish PIA); 
- Finland: Patient Injury Act 1986145 (hereinafter Finish PIA); 
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- Norway: Patient Injury Act 2001146 (hereinafter Norwegian PIA); 
- Denmark: Law on the Right to Complain and Receive Compensation 
within the Health Service 2010147 (hereinafter Danish KEL). 
The remainder of this section primarily examines the core features of these 
NFCSs and reviews some relevant empirical data (Section 5.2). Thereafter, it 
will evaluate these NFCSs in terms of Calabresi’s primary, secondary and 
tertiary costs (Section 5.3).  
5.2. CORE FEATURES OF THE NFCS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
5.2.1. Eligibility 
5.2.1.1. New Zealand 
Defining treatment injury. In New Zealand, the original notion of 
compensable adverse events was medical misadventure. NZ Act 1982 Section 
2 provided that personal injury by accident includes “medical, surgical, 
dental, or first aid misadventure.” However, NZ Act 1982 itself had not 
clarified what medical misadventure means. Nevertheless, courts soon 
developed a two-limb test – either medical negligence or medical mishap.148 
Negligence is generally regarded as misadventure.149 It normally includes 
cases such as “insufficient or wrong treatment, failure to inform, misdiagnosis, 
misrepresentation (innocent or fraudulent) or administrative 
shortcomings.”150 Medical mishap is defined as a “quite unforeseeable adverse 
consequence of treatment which had been properly administered and did not 
involve negligence.”151 The two-limb approach was confirmed in Child v. 
Hillock.152 There is a need to distinguish patients who are eligible for 
 
145 Potilasvahinkolaki [Patient Injury Act] No. 585, July 25, 1986 (Fin.). 
146 Lov om erstatning ved pasientskader mv. (Pasientskadeloven) [Patient Injury Act] No. 53, 
June 15, 2001 (Nor.). 
147 Lov om klage- og erstatningsadgang inden for sundhedsvæsenet [Law on the Right to 
Complain and Receive Compensation within the Health Service] No. 706, June 25, 2010 
(Den.). 
148 ACC v. Auckland Hosp. Bd. [1980] 2 NZLR 748 (HC), 751; Bridgeman v. ACC [1993] 
NZAR 199 (HC). 
149 Green v. Matheson [1989] 3 NZLR 564 (CA), 572-573. 
150 Todd 2013, p. 293. 
151 Id. See also ACC v. Auckland Hosp. Bd. [1980] 2 NZLR 748 (HC), 751. 
152 Child v. Hillock [1994] 2 NZLR 65, 72 (CA). 
 
 
424 Intersentia 
Part II. Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
compensation and those who are not. Thus, medical misadventure should be 
unexpected or “accident-like.”153 In Section 5(1) of NZ Amendment Act 1993, 
medical misadventure was interpreted as including medical error and medical 
mishap. “Medical error” was defined as meaning medical negligence, and 
“medical mishap” as meaning an adverse consequence of properly 
administered treatment that was “rare” and “severe.”154 The original NZ Act 
2001 followed the preceding definition of medical misadventure. A 
complication was considered to be rare if it does not occur in more than 1% 
of cases.155 An injury was said to be severe only if it results in dying, 
hospitalisation for more than 14 days or serious physical handicap.156 
This notion of medical misadventure was criticised as unsatisfactory 
for two reasons. First, it is rather anomalous for patients to prove a medical 
error in the context of a no-fault scheme.157 This notion of medical errors will 
lead to the same kinds of difficulties under the tort system and incurs 
considerable administrative costs and delay.158 Second, the notion of the 
medical mishap is also “confusing and arbitrary,” which often bears “little 
relationship to the circumstances of the patient, resulting in claimants 
unfairly missing out on cover.”159 It was recommended that the notion of 
medical misadventure be abandoned and all unintended injuries in the 
treatment process should be compensable.160 In other words, “all adverse 
medical events, whether or not preventable, provided they were unintended 
or, on another formulation, outside the expected and likely range of 
consequences of treatment” are coverable.161 For this reason, NZ Amendment 
Act 2005 employs the new notion of “treatment injury” to replace “medical 
misadventure.”162 The primary purpose of this shift is to remove any 
requirement of fault.163 It is hoped as well that providers would be induced to 
“cooperate in the claims process” and promote better reporting, creating “a 
climate of learning” and protect public safety.164 
Treatment injury is defined as personal injury that is (a) suffered by a 
patient, (b) caused by treatment, and (c) not a necessary part, or ordinary 
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consequence, of the treatment, given (i) the patient’s underlying condition, 
and (ii) the clinical knowledge at the time of the treatment.165 Treatment 
injury does not include personal injury that is (a) wholly or substantially 
caused by a patient’s underlying condition, (b) solely attributable to a 
resource allocation decision, or (c) a result of a patient unreasonably 
withholding or delaying their consent to undergo treatment.166 The fact that 
treatment did not achieve a desired result does not of itself constitute 
treatment injury.167 Coverage for infection is extended to secondary 
victims.168 Treatment intervention may include (a) the giving of treatment, 
(b) a diagnosis of a condition, (c) a decision on the treatment to be provided 
(including a decision not to provide treatment), (d) failure or delay in 
providing treatment, (e) obtaining or failing to obtain a person’s consent to 
treatment, (f) the provision of prophylaxis, (g) the failure of any equipment 
used as part of the treatment process, and (h) the application of any support 
systems used by the organisation responsible for providing the treatment.169 
It is evident from the foregoing description that the notion of 
“treatment injury” has abolished any reference to either a “medical mishap” 
or a “medical error.”170 Nevertheless, the concept of treatment injury can be 
understood in the light of updated notions of mishap and error. As far as 
mishap is concerned, there is no coverage for personal injury that is a 
necessary part or ordinary consequence of treatment, e.g. a surgical incision 
during an operation.171 Are all recognised but unwanted side effects a 
necessary part or ordinary consequence of treatment? The Accident 
Compensation Corporation (hereinafter ACC) maintains that known 
complications may be compensable.172 Ultimately, the court should determine 
whether complications are not “necessary” or “ordinary.”173 In this regard, the 
amended NZ Act 2001 “has reverted from detailed definition back to judicial 
discretion.”174 
Regarding error, the injury should not be wholly or substantially 
attributable to the patient’s underlying condition.175 Supposing there is a 
failure to treat and the patient’s condition gets worse, or treatment does not 
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alleviate a condition, is the continuing injury due to the treatment or the 
underlying condition? In New Zealand, it is currently necessary to examine 
the causal potency of the underlying condition relative to that of treatment.176 
The claimant has to show that “the health professional should have treated or 
should have treated differently” and this is equivalent with proving the fault 
on the part of the professional.177 In other words, that desired results are not 
achieved does not make it a treatment injury, unless a wrong treatment is 
given. Therefore, the notion of negligence is still hidden in the operation of 
NZ-NFCS. As Todd put it, “While negligence is not formally required … it 
necessarily re-appears in deciding whether treatment injury can be shown to 
exist.”178 
Treatment injury claims in practice. Before 2005, there were about 
3,000 medical misadventure claims each year, of which 86% were mishap-
related and 14% error-related.179 These claims constituted only a small 
proportion (0.05% in 2003) of all accident injuries but took much longer than 
the average to resolve.180 After 2005, there was a dramatic surge in the 
number of claims (1,434 treatment injury claims in 2004-05, 2,846 in 2005-
06, 3,974 in 2006-07, 5,472 in 2008-09), and a small decrease to 5,210 in 2009-
10.181 In contrast, the total number of no-fault accident claims has risen 
slowly during the same period.182 There was a doubling of the acceptance rate, 
70.6% were declined in 2004-05, whereas only 35.5% were denied in 2008-
09.183 It takes a short average time for a claim to be resolved after 2005: from 
about 5 months before 2005 to 37 days in 2009.184 
Based on the preceding data, Todd made three observations. First, the 
concepts of a mishap and an error are still inherent in the notion of treatment 
injury (“adverse events”).185 Second, it is highly likely that the surge in claims 
after 2005 is due to “the lowering of the threshold for what qualifies as a 
mishap.”186 It seems that the requirement of an unnecessary part or 
extraordinary consequence of treatment is less strict than that of a “rare” and 
“severe” mishap.187 Third, negligent error is still significant in establishing 
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treatment injury and “every case of negligent treatment will constitute 
treatment injury.”188 
Hence, although the amended NZ Act 2001 avoids making any 
reference to negligence, the actual working of the no-fault scheme still partly 
relies on the notion of negligence. Also, the court may find it difficult to 
decide whether an injury is not a necessary part, or ordinary consequence, of 
the treatment. Although the determination of this causation test is difficult, it 
is theoretically indispensable. As Todd rightly pointed out:189 
Medical injury frequently lies near the dividing line between accident and 
illness. For as long as the accident compensation scheme provides cover 
for accidents but not for illness (save for occupational disease), it will 
remain necessary to search for an unexpected accident or event which can 
separate a medical injury from ordinary treatment of an illness or disease. 
5.2.1.2. Scandinavia 
Scope of coverage. In contrast to NZ-NFCS where a unified notion of 
treatment injury is defined, the cover under the Scandinavian NFCSs is based 
on detailed lists of compensable and excluded injuries. Table 11.1 summarises 
the cover under the NFCSs in the four Scandinavian countries. 
The adverse consequence of treatment is the primary form of a 
compensable event. In the majority of the Scandinavian systems (Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark), the claim for compensation for iatrogenic injury is 
based on two requirements. First, the injury must occur in the course of or 
arise out of treatment. Second, the injury must be medically avoidable. In 
Norway, however, the avoidable aspect is not required, and any adverse event 
caused by failure when providing health care suffices. In Sweden, Finland, 
and Denmark, whether an injury is avoidable is determined against the test of 
the experienced specialist standard. The “experienced specialist” is based on 
an optimus vir (best man) standard, denoting “the best doctor in the 
particular field.”190 In contrast, under the negligence rule an injury would be 
attributable to the tortfeasor only if a reasonable man could avoid the injury 
in a similar situation.191  
Obviously, the level of care exercised by the best doctor is much 
greater than that exercised by the reasonable doctor. Suppose tort law 
adopted the best man as the standard of care to determine fault. If an injury 
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could be avoided only by the level of care taken by the best doctor, then 
doctors who are below the best would automatically be at fault in that they 
would never reach the best-man level of care.  
Table 11.1: Scandinavian No-Fault Compensation Systems: Cover192 
Sweden  
(Swedish PIA) 
Finland 
(Finnish PIA) 
Norway 
(Norwegian PIA) 
Denmark 
(Danish KEL) 
Injury resulting from: Injury resulting 
from: 
Injury resulting 
from: 
Injury resulting from: 
1. treatment, but only 
if avoidable by a 
different performance 
or by an alternative 
procedure done by an 
experienced specialist 
(§ 6, para. 1, item 1 & 
para.2) 
1. treatment, but 
only if avoidable by 
a different 
performance done 
by an experienced 
specialist (§ 2, para. 
1, item 1)  
1. treatment failure, 
even if no one can be 
blamed (§ 2, para. 1, 
item a)  
1. treatment, but only 
if avoidable by a 
different performance 
or by an alternative 
procedure done by an 
experienced specialist 
(§ 20, para. 1, items 1 
& 3)  
2. defects in 
equipment (§ 6, para. 
1, item 2)  
2. defects in 
equipment (§ 2, 
para. 1, item 2)  
2. failure of 
equipment (§ 2, para. 
1, item b)  
2. failure of equipment 
(§ 20, para. 1, item 2)  
3. an incorrect 
diagnosis that could 
be avoided by an 
experienced specialist 
(§ 6, para. 1, item 3 & 
para.2)  
– – 3. an incorrect 
diagnosis leading to 
failure in performing a 
chosen procedure or 
using apparatus (§ 21, 
para. 1)  
4. an infection that 
should not be 
reasonably tolerated 
(§ 6, para. 1, item 4 & 
para. 3)  
3. an infection that 
should not be 
reasonably 
tolerated by the 
patient (§ 2, para. 1, 
item 3)  
3. an infection that is 
not mainly due to 
the patient’s 
underlying condition 
(§ 2, para. 1, item c)  
4. infections or 
complications that 
should not be 
reasonably tolerated 
by the patient (§ 20, 
para. 1, item 4)  
5. premises-related 
accidents (e.g. a fire 
in the hospital) (§ 6, 
para. 1, item 5)  
4. premises-related 
accidents (§ 2, para. 
1, item 4), 
including a fire (§ 
2, para. 1, item 5)  
4. conditions that 
entail medical 
malpractice under 
tort law (§ 2, para. 1, 
item e) 
5. premises-related 
accidents (hospitals 
assumed to be at fault) 
(§ 21, para. 2)  
6. incorrect 
medication (not side-
effects) (§ 6, para. 1, 
item 6)  
5. incorrect 
medication (§ 2, 
para. 1, item 6)  
5. vaccination (§ 2, 
para. 1, item d)  
– 
 
192 Table 11.1 is based on Dute 2004, pp. 451-452, Table 1, with necessary updates.  
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– 6. unreasonable 
permanent and 
severe disability or 
death (§ 2, para. 1, 
item 7)  
6. particularly severe 
or particularly 
unexpected adverse 
events that should be 
considered as an 
unacceptable risk to 
the patient (§ 2, para. 
3)  
– 
Exclusions: Exclusions: Exclusions: Exclusions: 
1. a consequence of a 
necessary procedure 
without which 
patients would die or 
become severely 
disabled (§ 7, para. 1, 
item 1)  
– 1. injuries due to 
inadequate 
resources, if the 
distribution of 
resources has been 
prudent and business 
keeps a proper 
standard (§ 2, para. 
2)  
– 
2.side-effects of 
correct medication (§ 
7, para. 1, item 2)  
1. side-effects of 
correct medication 
(§ 2, para. 2)  
– 1. injuries resulting 
from medication (§ 21, 
para. 3) 
 
Under tort law, this result would effectively change the negligence rule into 
strict liability to all less than best doctors. Fault under traditional tort law is 
determined by answering the question whether the injury is avoidable by the 
reasonable man rather than by the best man. In this regard, although 
Scandinavian NFCSs employ the concept of avoidability to limit the scope of 
compensable adverse events, the notion of fault as defined under tort law 
does not play any role here and “the overall question is if the patient has 
received the treatment, which according to medical science and experience, 
would have been the best for him.”193 In Sweden, the test of avoidability 
appears less stringent because it is assessed “retroactively”194 rather than 
prospectively. Accordingly, an injury is still compensable if subsequent 
information after the treatment indicates that it was medically avoidable, 
although doctors did not have enough information to make the right decision 
before the treatment. 
The scope of compensation seems more extensive in Sweden and 
Denmark than in Finland in that an injury that can be avoided by an 
alternative treatment is compensable as well in the former. The “alternative 
treatment rule” provides that an injury would be compensable if it could have 
been avoided, on the basis of “a subsequent evaluation,” if the provider had 
chosen another available treatment measure that “would have satisfied the 
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need of treatment in a less hazardous way”195 or “would have been just as 
effective in treating the patient’s illness.”196 This alternative treatment rule is 
not a fault-based rule since it does not ex ante require that the provider 
should have chosen the alternative treatment measure.197 Hence, both 
information available at the time of the treatment and information that 
becomes available after the treatment are essential to the application of the 
alternative treatment rule with hindsight.198 Two points need to be 
emphasised: first, the alternative measure must have been available at the 
time of the treatment; and second, it the alternative measure requires 
superior skill, the doctor must refer the patient to a more skilful doctor.199 
In Sweden and Denmark, an incorrect diagnosis is singled out as a 
separate compensable event. Whether a diagnosis is correct or not is also 
determined by the experienced specialist standard. It is unclear whether 
Finland and Norway recognise this event as compensable. If we accepted that 
“examination, treatment or other similar action”200 and “providing health 
care”201 had already covered diagnosis, then there would be no reason why 
injury due to incorrect diagnosis should not be included under Finnish and 
Norwegian NFCSs.  
Not only injuries due to incorrect treatment behaviour (e.g. diagnosis, 
examination and surgery) are compensable, but injuries resulting from the 
failure of apparatus are coverable as well under all four Scandinavian NFCSs. 
Whereas Sweden and Finland employ the same test as under products 
liability (i.e. defects in equipment), Norway and Denmark adopt a more 
lenient test – merely malfunction or failure of any equipment suffices for 
claiming compensation. Hence, patients in Norway and Denmark may find it 
easier to obtain compensation for injury due to equipment than patients in 
Sweden and Finland. 
In addition to injury arising out of treatment or equipment failure, 
some other types of accidents occurring within the hospital may be 
compensable as well. In Sweden and Finland, an accident such as a fire at the 
hospital is recoverable. In Denmark and Norway, however, an accident 
occurring at the hospital is compensable only if the hospital may be liable 
under tort law. Thus, the notion of fault still plays a role in premises-related 
accidents under the Danish and Norwegian NFCSs.  
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Injury due to an infection is also singled out as a separate iatrogenic 
injury. However, no infection is compensable. In Sweden, Finland, and 
Denmark, an injury arising out of an infection is compensable only if it 
should not be reasonably tolerated by the patient. The reasonableness is 
normally tested against several factors as follows: (a) the predictability of the 
infection, (b) the degree of severity of the injury, (c) the nature or difficulty 
of the illness or impairment, or (d) the patient’s overall health.202 In Norway, 
although the preceding factors are not provided, it is still required that the 
infection is not mainly due to the patient’s underlying condition. These two 
tests are the two sides of the same coin. Indeed, an infection that is not 
primarily the result of the patient’s pre-existing condition should not be 
reasonably tolerated by the patient; and vice versa. Nonetheless, the former 
three systems provide for detailed factors against which the reasonableness 
can be assessed. 
Be that as it may, regarding the test of reasonableness, Norway 
remarkably has a general reasonableness rule for all types of iatrogenic 
injuries: 
Although there is no basis for liability under subsections, compensation 
may be granted exceptionally where there has been an adverse event that 
is particularly large or particularly unexpected, and which cannot be 
considered as the outcome of a risk that the patient must accept. Emphasis 
should be on whether there is adequate disclosure in advance.203 
Strikingly, Finland also has a similar general reasonableness rule but only for 
“permanent, severe illness or impairment, or death.”204  
It ought to be noted that the reasonableness rule under Scandinavian 
NFCSs has nothing to do with the notion of reasonable man under tort law. 
The former rule is intended to demarcate the risk that the patient must accept 
from the one that the patient should not accept, whereas the latter test is 
meant to determine whether the provider has breached the duty of care. The 
wording “reasonableness” here does not imply any notion of fault. 
Irrespective of whether the reasonableness rule applies only to injury due to 
an infection or to general iatrogenic injuries, the rationale behind this rule is 
that patients have to bear risks of their underlying conditions.205 Hence, “the 
 
202 Swedish PIA, § 6, para. 3; Finnish PIA§ 2, para. 1, item 3; Danish KEL, § 20, para. 1, item 
4. 
203 Norwegian PIA, § 2, para. 3. 
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more serious the initial disease, the more substantial complications must be 
accepted.”206 
As far as injury due to medication is concerned, both Sweden and 
Finland require that the injury is compensable only if the prescription or 
provision of pharmaceuticals is in contravention of regulations. However, 
Norway and Denmark do not have similar provisions concerning incorrect 
medication. Nevertheless, in Norway, injury resulting from vaccination is 
compensable no matter whether any regulation is violated. 
In addition to the foregoing compensable events, some events are 
explicitly excluded from the scope of compensation under Scandinavian 
NFCSs. In Sweden, injuries due to a consequence of a necessary procedure 
without which patients would die or become severely disabled are not 
compensable. In both Sweden and Finland, injuries resulting from side-effects 
of correct medication, and in Denmark, all injuries resulting from medication, 
are not coverable. In Norway, injuries due to inadequate resources, if the 
distribution of resources has been prudent and business keeps a proper 
standard, are not covered by the NFCS.  
Iatrogenic injury claims in practice. The number of claims and the 
compensation awarded annually has been increasing under some of the four 
Scandinavian NFCSs during these years. In Denmark, the number of claims 
rose from 5, 519 in 2008 to 7,489 in 2010, of which around 35.3% to 35.7% 
were successful.207 In Sweden, the number of claims increased from 9,000 in 
2005 to 12,000 in 2011, of which about 44% were successful.208 In Norway, 
the number of claims rose from 2,332 in 2003209 to 4,352 in 2010, of which 
roughly 44% were successful.210 However, in Finland, where the success rate 
was about 30%, there was a decline in 2009 and 2010 compared to previous 
years.211 Nonetheless, the number increased again from 6,696 in 2012, to 
7,659 in 2013 and 8,502 in 2014.212 
5.2.1.3. Comparison and Summary 
The eligibility of victimised patients for compensation is the primary feature 
that distinguishes an NFCS from the tort system. After examining the detailed 
requirements of compensation for iatrogenic injuries under both the NZ-
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NFCS and the Scandinavian NFCSs, we can see that the former appears more 
patient-friendly than the latter.  
First, regarding the definition of the compensable event, the current 
NZ Act 2001 provides that an injury caused by treatment is readily 
compensable unless it is a necessary part, or ordinary consequence of the 
treatment. In other words, many known complications, even if they are not 
rare or severe, are likely to be compensable under the NZ-NFCS. In contrast, 
in most Scandinavian systems, a special requirement of avoidability has to be 
satisfied. This stringent requirement is intended to limit compensable events 
to those that can be avoided by the experienced specialist (the best doctor). 
Thus, many known complications are not compensable in that even the best 
doctor cannot prevent it.  
Second, as far as the scope of compensable events is concerned, almost 
all the events enumerated under the Scandinavian NFCSs are also covered by 
the NZ-NFCS.213 Moreover, the NZ-NFCS provides the patient with 
compensation for injuries due to failure in obtaining informed consent, which 
does not seem to be a compensable event under the Scandinavian NFCSs.  
The preceding analysis may explain why currently the success rate 
under the NFCS is about 60% in New Zealand, while roughly only 40% in 
Scandinavia.  
5.2.2. Other Features 
5.2.2.1. Benefits 
Categories of benefits. The benefits granted by the NFCSs in both New 
Zealand and the four Scandinavian systems are summarised in Table 11.2. As 
far as the relationship between the NFCSs and tort law is concerned, in New 
Zealand and Denmark, to the extent injuries are covered by NZ Act 2001 and 
the Danish KEL, tort claims are not allowed.214  
 
213 See supra Chapter 11, Section 5.2.1.1. 
214 NZ Act 2001, Section 317(1); Danish KEL, § 26.  
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Table 11.2: No-Fault Compensation Systems: Scope of Benefits215 
New Zealand Sweden Finland Norway Denmark 
Only pecuniary 
losses: (NZ Act 
2001) 
In principle, 
applying law on 
tort damages 
(Swedish PIA, § 
8) 
In principle, 
applying law on 
tort damages 
(Finnish PIA, § 
3) 
In principle, 
applying law on 
tort damages 
(Norwegian 
PIA, § 4) 
In principle, 
applying law on 
tort damages 
(Danish KEL, § 
24, para. 1) 
1. expenses of 
treatment and 
rehabilitation 
(Section 69(1)(a)) 
1. medical costs 
and other 
necessary 
expenses 
(Swedish Tort 
Act, Chapter 5, 
§ 1, para. 1) 
1. medical costs 
and other costs 
(Finnish Tort 
Act, § 2) 
1. the damage 
suffered 
(Norwegian 
Damages Act, § 
3-1) 
1. recovery costs 
and other losses 
(Danish Damages 
Act, § 1, para. 1) 
2. earnings-
related 
compensation 
(Section 
69(1)(b)-(c)) 
2. loss of 
income 
(Swedish Tort 
Act, Chapter 5, 
§ 1, para. 2) 
2. loss of 
income 
(Finnish Tort 
Act, § 2) 
2. loss of future 
earnings 
(Norwegian 
Damages Act, § 
3-1) 
2. loss of 
earnings (Danish 
Damages Act, § 
1, para. 1 & § 2) 
3. lump sum 
compensation 
for permanent 
impairment 
(Section 
69(1)(d)) 
3. permanent 
disability 
(Swedish Tort 
Act, Chapter 5, 
§ 1, para. 3) 
3. invalidity 
and other 
permanent 
handicap 
(Finnish Tort 
Act, § 2) 
– 3. permanent 
injury (Danish 
Damages Act, § 
1, para. 2 & § 4) 
4. death benefits 
(Section 69(1)(e)) 
4. death 
benefits 
(Swedish Tort 
Act, Chapter 5, 
§ 2) 
4. death 
benefits 
(Finnish Tort 
Act, §§ 3-4a) 
3. death 
benefits 
(Norwegian 
Damages Act, § 
3-4) 
4. death benefits 
(Danish Damages 
Act, §§ 13-14) 
– 5. (temporary) 
pain and 
suffering 
(Swedish Tort 
Act, Chapter 5, 
§ 1, para. 3) 
5. pain and 
suffering 
(Finnish Tort 
Act, § 2) 
– 5. pain and 
suffering (capped 
to DKK 130 per 
day for a sick 
man; at most 
DKK 50,000 for a 
non-sick man) 
(Danish Damages 
Act, § 3) 
 
215 Table 11.2 is based on Dute 2004, p. 460, Table 2, with necessary updates. 
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Limitations: Limitations: Limitations: Limitations: Limitations: 
1. excluded in 
cases of wilfully 
self-inflicted 
personal injuries 
and suicide 
(Section 119) 
1. reduced only 
if the injured 
party 
intentionally or 
through gross 
negligence 
contributed to 
the harm 
(Swedish Tort 
Act, Chapter 6, 
§ 1) 
1. reduced only 
if the injured 
party acted 
wilfully or 
through 
negligence 
(Finnish PIA, § 
3) 
1. recovery for 
non-pecuniary 
losses is 
excluded 
(Norwegian 
PIA, § 4, para. 
1) 
1. reduced only 
if the patient 
contributed to 
the injury 
wilfully or 
through gross 
negligence 
(Danish KEL, § 
25) 
2. excluded in 
cases of some 
crimes or 
offenders 
(Sections 120-
122) 
2. deduction 
(one twentieth 
of the base 
amount be 
deducted) 
(Swedish PIA, § 
9) 
2. minor 
injuries are not 
compensable 
(Finnish PIA, § 
3) 
2. losses below 
10,000 crowns 
are not 
compensable 
(Norwegian 
PIA, § 4, para. 
1) 
2. compensation 
for loss of 
earnings and 
pain and 
suffering is 
excluded unless 
the injury was 
lasting more 
than a fixed 
period up to 
three months 
(Danish KEL, § 
24, para. 2) 
3. cover for non-
pecuniary losses 
are excluded 
unless it is 
mental injury (a 
clinically 
significant 
dysfunction) 
(Section 27) 
3. caps (at most 
1,000 times the 
base amount 
per event; 200 
times the base 
amount per 
injured patient 
per event) 
(Swedish PIA, § 
10) 
– – 3. injuries must 
exceed DKK 
10,000 (Danish 
KEL, § 24, para. 
2) 
4. exemplary 
damages 
excluded 
    
 
In New Zealand, is it argued that victims waive their right to tort claims in 
return for no-fault compensation.216 In Denmark, the rationale behind this 
arrangement is “to channel liability to the patient insurance.”217 Contrariwise, 
the other three Scandinavian systems allow patients to file an ordinary tort 
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claim as an alternative to the NFCSs.218 Be that as it may, very few patients 
choose to obtain compensation through the tort system due to the difficult 
burden of proof for loss, causation and fault.219 Patients already enjoy a 
considerably better position within the patient insurance scheme than under 
tort law.220  
Pecuniary losses are compensable in all the five legal systems surveyed, 
whereas non-pecuniary losses are only completely compensable under the 
Swedish and Finnish NFCSs. Under the NZ-NFCS, only mental injury, which 
is defined as a clinically significant behavioural, cognitive, or psychological 
dysfunction, is compensable. In other words, non-pecuniary losses without 
dysfunctional results (e.g. pain and suffering for a short period) are not 
recoverable. Cover for non-pecuniary losses is totally excluded under the 
Norwegian NFCS. In Denmark, compensation for pain and suffering is 
excluded unless the injury lasted more than a fixed period up to three 
months. Hence, patients seeking non-pecuniary losses are worse off in New 
Zealand and Denmark, since access to tort litigation is blocked under the 
NFCSs there.221 The other three systems seem less problematic since they 
allow patients to file tort claims as an alternative to the NFCSs.  
Regarding the amount of compensation, there are several types of 
limitations. One common form of limitation in all the surveyed systems 
except Norway is that the patient herself contributed to her injury 
intentionally or through gross negligence. In such a case, patients will lose 
their entitlement to compensation in New Zealand, while they will only be 
entitled to reduced compensation in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. 
Moreover, in New Zealand, a claim for compensation under the NFCS will be 
denied as well if a patient is involved in some crimes. 
Another form of limitation characteristic of all the four Scandinavian 
NFCSs is that compensation is normally deducted or capped. In Sweden, one 
twentieth of the base amount under the National Insurance Act, i.e. SEK 
2,225 in 2015,222 should be deducted from patient compensation when the 
amount is determined. In Finland, minor injuries are not compensable, 
although the Finish PIA does not provide for a figure for the deductible 
element. In contrast, the deductible is stipulated explicitly in other systems – 
10,000 crowns in Norway and DKK 10,000 in Denmark. Financial caps are 
also imposed on compensation in Sweden, where at most 1,000 times the base 
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amount could be granted per event, and 200 times the base amount per 
injured patient per event.  
Benefits actually paid. In New Zealand, the benefits paid out were 
increasing dramatically from $48.6m in 2004-05 to $56.5m in 2005-5006, 
$69.2m in 2006-07, $86.3m in 2007-08, $109.8m in 2008-09, and $106m in 
2009-10.223 A shift from compensating medical misadventure to compensating 
treatment injury was estimated to lead to an annual increase of $8.7m.224 The 
escalating costs of the treatment injury account dwarfed funding. The 
account deficit rose from $332.5 million in 2004-05 to $1.4 billion in 2009-
10.225 To sum up, the accident compensation in New Zealand is facing 
financial problems, which is “driven by years of significant increases in costs 
and increasing numbers of claims.”226 Todd explained that this difficulty 
reflects “a shift from ACC being a public insurance scheme to it becoming an 
extension of the welfare state.”227 
Available data in the Scandinavian systems showed the same trend. For 
instance, in Denmark, total compensation rose from 437.6 million DKR in 
2008 to 660.5 million DKR in 2010, with an average compensation of 183.56 
DKR for the period 2008-2010.228 In Norway, total annual compensation was 
818.4 million NKR in 2010, which was higher than that in Denmark.229 In 
Finland, indemnities paid altogether rose from €30,975m in 2009, to 
€32.645m in 2010, €32.972m in 2011, €34.596m in 2012, €38.853m in 2013, 
and €40.144m in 2014.230  
5.2.2.2. Procedures 
In New Zealand, the claimant may make a claim for cover for her treatment 
injury.231 The patient’s provider may lodge a claim on behalf of her with 
authorization.232 On receiving the claim for cover, the ACC must decide 
whether it accepts that the patient has cover and provide her with 
information about the role of the Health and Disability Commissioner 
(hereinafter HDC).233 The patient must make a claim within 12 months after 
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the later of the date that the injury was first considered by a registered health 
professional as a treatment injury.234 The ACC must make decisions in time 
and give reasons if it decides against the claimant.235 An appeal may be filed 
before the District Court.236  
In Sweden, all county councils and regions are insured under a 
common insurer, Landstingens Ömsesidiga Försäkringsbolag (hereinafter 
LÖF) (The County Council’s Mutual Insurance Company).237 An injured 
patient must make a claim within three years from learning that a claim could 
be made, and in any case within ten years from the time when the injury 
occurred.238 The LÖF in turn commissions the company Personskadereglering 
AB (PSR) to handle the claims for compensation.239 More than 90% of all 
patient injury claims are processed by the PSR.240 In addition, the 
Patientskadenämnden (Patient Claims Panel) (hereinafter PCP) is established 
to provide advisory opinions on matters concerning patient injury 
compensation, in order to “promote uniform and fair application” of the 
Swedish PIA.241 The PCP is composed of a chairman, three members 
representing patients’ interests, one medical expert, one specialist on medical 
care issues and one specialist on claims adjustment.242 Review by the PCP is 
free of charge and remains confidential.243 Once a patient is not satisfied with 
the decision of the LÖF, he/she can request that her claim be reviewed by the 
PCP.244 The PCP will process the claim and formulate a decision.245 The 
opinion of the PCP is advisory, which means that the LÖF is not obliged to 
comply with the opinion but this is almost always what happens.246 
In Finland, all insurance companies are entitled to provide patient 
insurance under the Finnish NFCS.247 All those insurance companies that 
issue patient insurance policies in Finland must be members of 
Potilasvakuutuskeskus (Finnish Patient Insurance Centre) (hereinafter 
PVK).248 PVK settles patient injury claims and may issue insurance on behalf 
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of its member companies.249 PVK also has to settle claims made to any 
member company that become bankrupt.250 In addition, PVK promotes 
patient safety through conducting research, collecting data, and making 
predictions.251 The claim should be presented to the PVK within three years 
since the injured patient learned or should have learned of the injury and the 
patient will in any case lose her entitlement to compensation if he/she makes 
the claims ten years after the adverse event.252 The Government appoints 
Potilasvahinkolautakunta (Patient Injuries Board) (hereinafter PVLTK) to 
issue recommendations for decisions on individual claims at the request of a 
claimant, the PVK, a provider or an insurer.253 Claims are processed by 
PVLTK in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (434/2003) and 
are free of charge.254 Decisions made by PVLTK are recommended decisions 
that are not subject to appeal.255 
In Norway, the Ministry of Health has established the Norsk 
Pasientskadeerstatning (Norwegian System of Patient Injury Compensation) 
(hereinafter NPE) to process claims from injured patients, the proceedings of 
which are free of charge.256 NPE investigates the matter and decides whether 
to grant the benefits.257 Compensation should be granted immediately after 
the case is settled.258 NPE’s decision can be appealed to Pasientskadenemnda 
(Patient Injury Compensation Board) (hereinafter PSN) within three weeks.259  
In Denmark, administrators of public hospitals, pre-hospital care, 
regional dental care, university schools of dentistry, and regions of a patient 
or where a privately practising provider is located should be liable to pay 
compensation.260 These potentially liable bodies may insure against patient 
injury claims.261 The annual cover amounts are determined by the Minister of 
the Interior and Health.262 However, the Government, Regional and 
district/city councils shall be exempt from the legal duty to insure against 
patient injury claims.263 In other words, they may choose to self-insure. 
 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Potilasvakuutuskeskus 2015. 
252 Finnish PIA, § 10. 
253 Finnish PIA, §§ 11-11a. 
254 Finnish PIA, §11b, paras. 4-5. 
255 Potilasvahinkolautakunta 2011. 
256 Norsk Pasientskadeerstatning 2014. 
257 Norwegian PIA, § 10. 
258 Norwegian PIA, § 13. 
259 Norwegian PIA, § 12. 
260 Danish KEL, § 29. 
261 Danish KEL, § 30, para. 1. 
262 Danish KEL, § 30, para. 3. 
263 Danish KEL, § 31. 
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“Patient insurance”264 companies and self-insuring regional and district/city 
councils have jointly set up Patienterstatningen (Patient Insurance 
Association) (hereinafter PEBL), the task of which is to help patients injured 
in connection with treatment.265 The PEBL will receive, elucidate and decide 
all compensation claims and may arrange for the district court to question 
witnesses.266 The relevant insurer, the Government or the self-insuring 
regional council or district/city councils should then pay out benefits on the 
basis of the PEBL’s decisions.267 An appeal may be lodged before the Patients’ 
Complaints Board of Appeal.268 
5.2.2.3. Financing 
In some systems surveyed, NFCSs are funded by general taxation. Under the 
NZ-NFCS, the Treatment Injury Account has not been funded by health care 
providers directly; rather, it is funded from the Earner’s and Non-Earners’ 
Accounts, which are ultimately financed by earners and general taxation.269 
In Norway, state, regional health authorities, counties and municipalities 
provide grants to the NPE to cover compensation for patient injuries caused 
by public health care providers.270 
In the other systems surveyed, NFCSs are funded by the health care 
industry. Under the Swedish NFCS, health care providers have to contribute 
to the patient insurance fund.271 The insurance policy is actually held by the 
regions, not by single doctors (enterprise liability).272 In Finland, health care 
providers are obliged to purchase patient insurance against liability under the 
NFCS.273 In Denmark, administrators of health care providers and regions of 
resident have to make contributions to the NFCS fund.274 Interestingly, 
although cover for injuries arising out of public health care is financed by the 
 
264 In the literature, “patient insurance” usually refers to first-party insurance, under which 
patients pay for premiums for their own benefit. However, “patient insurance” in the 
context of Denmark is actually a kind of “direct insurance,” under which the insured 
provider and the insurer can negotiate to provide coverage to victims of iatrogenic injuries 
directly. In other words, the provider pays for premiums for the benefit of patients.  
265 Patienterstatningen 2016. 
266 Danish KEL, § 33, paras. 1-2. 
267 Danish KEL, § 33, para. 3. 
268 Danish KEL, § 37. 
269 NZ Act 2001, Section 228(2). 
270 Norwegian PIA, § 7. 
271 Swedish PIA, § 12. 
272 Essinger 2009. 
273 Finnish PIA, § 4. 
274 Danish KEL, §§ 29-30. 
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government in Norway, private health care providers have to contribute to 
the NPE themselves.275  
Be that as it may, none of these systems has ever attempted to link the 
cost of a patient injury directly to a particular health care provider.276 Risk 
differentiation through experience rating does not apply to these NFCSs. 
5.2.2.4. Costs 
Costs in a single case. Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock gave four reasons to 
explain why the comprehensive NFCS is able to “reduce delays and 
administrative costs below levels” existing under the current tort system in a 
single case, as follows:277 
- The NFCS is likely to process claims more quickly and less costly than 
the current malpractice system does since the adversarial character of 
the tort system is avoided. 
- Periodic payments eliminate the delays and costs involved in the 
assessment of lump sum damages. 
- Restrictions imposed on or schedules applied to the evaluation of non-
pecuniary losses economises on administrative costs since these 
intangible losses are difficult to measure. 
- It is less burdensome to determine only causation than to determine 
both causation and fault. 
It should be noted that, regarding the last feature, some scholars did not 
believe that substituting causation for the negligence rule would significantly 
reduce administrative costs in that causation issues in medical cases per se are 
very complicated due to the patient’s pre-existing conditions.278 However, the 
Harvard Medical Practice Study Group reported that it is indeed less costly to 
evaluate causation than to determine negligence – only 14.2% of adverse 
events were found to involve close calls whereas 25.7% of negligent adverse 
events were considered close calls.279 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the NFCS saves greater 
administrative costs than does the fault-based malpractice system in a single 
claim. Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock reported that most claims for medical 
misadventure in New Zealand were paid without much delay and that 
 
275 Norwegian PIA, § 8. 
276 Essinger 2009. 
277 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, pp. 142-143. 
278 Keeton 1973, pp. 614-615; Havighurst 1975, pp. 1252-1253; Epstein 1978, pp. 260-262. 
279 Harvard Medical Practices Study 1990, Chapter 6, pp. 18 and 20. 
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“administrative costs accounted for less than 10% of total premium dollars 
collected” under the NZ-NFCS before 1992.280 This number seems rather 
stable even today. In 2009, the NZ-NFCS’s administrative costs equalled to 
13.4% of claims paid.281 In Sweden, about 14% to 17.5% of total insurance 
premiums were reported to be spent on administration.282 In contrast, about 
55%-60% of one premium dollar were due to administrative costs under the 
traditional malpractice system in the US.283 Recently, Essinger reported that 
in the US 72% of the premium is spent on legal services and administration, 
whereas only 28% of the premium is paid to the victimised patient.284 In the 
UK, about 45% of the compensation award was swallowed up in the 
administration of the tort system.285 In Sweden, about 58% of patient injury 
claims were resolved within five months of filing and 80% within seven 
months, whereas it took an average of 3 years to resolve a malpractice claim 
in the US.286 
The increased costs of shifting from fault towards no-fault. Some 
empirical evidence indicated that between 17% and 27.6% of all iatrogenic 
injuries were due to provider negligence and only between 6.25% and 8% of 
these negligently injured patients obtain any compensation through the tort 
system.287 Based on these data, Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock predicted that 
“no-fault patient compensation would be expected to compensate between 45 
and 94 times as many injured patients as does the existing tort system.”288  
That being said, it is possible for a comprehensive no-fault scheme to 
limit compensation for non-pecuniary losses (e.g. under the New Zealand 
Scheme) and deduct collateral benefits from other sources, or even introduce 
deductibles or co-insurance that “effectively restrict eligibility to only the 
most severely injured patients.”289 
5.3. EVALUATION 
As far as primary cost avoidance is concerned, efficiency entails that the 
incentives for health care providers to prevent medical malpractice should 
 
280 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 145. 
281 Todd 2013, p. 321. 
282 Hellner 1985, p. 705; Oldertz 1986, p. 655. 
283 Weiler 1991, p. 141. 
284 Essinger 2009. 
285 Cane 2006, p. 397. 
286 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 146. 
287 Mills 1978, pp. 362-263; Harvard Medical Practices Study 1990, Chapter 6, p. 1. 
288 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 143. 
289 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 144. 
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not be undermined. Hence, the expected accident costs should still be 
imposed on the risk creator or only those who actually contribute to the risk 
should contribute to the no-fault insurance fund. In New Zealand and 
Norway, however, expected accident costs are borne by the state rather than 
by the individual wrongdoer or the health care industry. In the absence of 
regulation, the incentives for providers to invest in expertise and care will be 
diluted. In contrast, in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, at least the accident 
costs are imposed on the health care industry. Since there is a lack of risk 
differentiation, the incentives for providers to take precautions may still be 
mitigated.  
Regarding secondary cost avoidance, all the preceding no-fault 
schemes are able to provide more victims of AEs with quick compensation. 
Many deductibles and caps are imposed in the four Scandinavian systems, 
which may be justified by the intention to help those who are severely 
injured to obtain more compensation. Although the New Zealand scheme 
does not impose similar deductibles or caps, it excludes compensation for 
non-pecuniary losses. Overall, these NFCSs are highly efficient at providing 
quick and relatively sufficient compensation to victims of AEs.  
When it comes to tertiary cost avoidance, it seems that claims under 
these no-fault schemes are resolved much faster than in the traditional 
malpractice system. Although the total number of compensable events may 
be much higher than medical malpractice claims, the tertiary costs incurred 
per claim would be lower under the NFCSs than under the tort system. In 
this regard, the NZ-NFCS appear more administratively efficient than its 
counterpart in the Scandinavian systems since the element of avoidability has 
been eliminated.  
Overall, we may find that comprehensive NFCSs are effective at 
compensating more injured patients more quickly than under the tort system 
without substantially increasing tertiary costs. However, one may still have 
concern for the reduced incentives for providers to excise care under these 
NFCSs.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 11 has examined theories and empirical evidence pertaining to 
various no-fault compensation schemes that cover iatrogenic injuries. In 
theory, both voluntary first-party patient insurance and no-fault 
compensation schemes are able to provide quick compensation to more 
victims without incurring too many tertiary costs when compared to the tort 
system. However, many of these alternative compensation schemes may 
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inevitably dilute incentives for providers to take optimal precautions due to a 
lack of causal link or risk differentiation. In addition, the joint use of tort 
liability and social security is not only practically inevitable but also socially 
desirable. 
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
On the one hand, this part is aimed at answering part of the second main 
research question – Are the current legal remedies for medical malpractice in 
China efficient when measured against economic benchmarks? (Sub-question 
(2-b)) Chapter 12 will evaluate the Chinese legal remedies for medical 
malpractice in the light of the economic benchmarks developed in Part Ⅱ.  
On the other hand, this part will also answer the third main research 
question – If the foregoing legal remedies in China are not efficiently 
structured, how can we improve them? Chapter 13 will summarise all major 
findings in the preceding chapters and try to formulate some policy 
recommendations concerning how to improve the Chinese legal remedies for 
medical malpractice.  
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 CHAPTER 12  
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Much legislative endeavour has been made to build a credible medical 
malpractice liability system in China. The system is very young. It was 
formally established in the second half of the 1980s, and has been drastically 
reformed twice since then.1 Voluminous literature regarding the Chinese 
medical malpractice liability reforms is currently available, most of which has 
attempted to evaluate the old and/or the current medical malpractice liability 
system from the perspective of legal doctrine.2 Some have focused on the 
medical malpractice law in action and tried to explain why medical dispute 
resolution in China is often associated with violent malpractice mobs.3 
However, none of these studies can tell us whether the Chinese medical 
 
1 See supra Chapter 3, Section 2. 
2 See e.g. Dai 2003 (discussing early development of the doctrine of informed consent in 
China); Harris & Wu 2005 (discussing the pros and cons of the AR-Medical Accidents 
1987, 2002); Ren & Wang 2004 (discussing the problems of the AR-Medical Accidents 
2002 and its impact on medical ethical principles); Xi & Yang 2011 (discussing the 
bifurcated medical negligence system in China for the period 2002-2010 and the 
legislative reform of medical liability in 2010); Wang & Oliphant 2012 (summarizing the 
history of medical liability in China from 1949 onwards and evaluating main provisions of 
the AR-Medical Accidents 1987, 2002 and the currently applicable Tort Law 2009); Zhu, 
Li & Li 2011 (discussing criminal penalties for medical malpractice); Ding 2012 (discussing 
and evaluating the old and the current medical negligence system in China from a legal 
doctrinal perspective); Zhao 2012 (discussing the doctrine of informed consent from the 
perspective of comparative law); Min & Peng 2013 (discussing the current status and legal 
treatment of medical disputes in China). 
3 See e.g. Liebman 2013 (arguing that “increased innovation and competence are not 
providing greater authority for the courts” and medical disputes “highlight largely 
unobserved trends in both law and governance in China, in particular state over-
responsiveness to individual grievances”). 
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malpractice liability system is efficient at preventing medical errors and 
compensating victims of medical malpractice or not. 
Be that as it may, a minority of studies have touched upon the medical 
malpractice issues in China from the perspective of law and economics. 
Several journal articles in Chinese have briefly introduced the classic model 
of tort liability and made some comments on how to improve the Chinese 
medical malpractice liability law.4 Two theses have explained the classic 
model of tort law in detail, applied the model to evaluate the sub-rules of 
Chinese medical malpractice law systematically and made some 
recommendations on how the current law might be improved.5 However, all 
these studies have only examined the medical malpractice law in the books 
without paying attention to the law in action. As was presented in Chapter 4, 
there are marked variations between the law in books and the law in action 
in the context of Chinese medical malpractice law. Hence, it is insufficient to 
evaluate the medical malpractice liability system without looking at the 
empirical evidence. 
One article published in English has attempted to evaluate the new 
Chinese medical malpractice law provided for in the Tort Law 2009 on the 
basis of some empirical evidence.6 This article deserves serious attention 
because its author Kearney strongly argued as follows, 
China’s new law is unlikely to cause any substantial decrease in the level 
of malpractice in the country. The Tort Liability Law is an inefficient 
model, the burden of which will be borne by under-funded hospitals and 
patients who are already under-served.7 
However, some empirical data, on the basis of which Kearney made this 
critical remark, were either too old (almost a decade ago)8 or reported 
anecdotally.9 This lack of updated empirical data on the functioning of the 
Chinese medical malpractice liability system may weaken several of 
Kearney’s remarks and predictions. 
 
4 See e.g. Liu, Fan & Lu 2003; Zhang 2004; Li 2005; Wang 2006; Li & Wang 2008; Wei & 
Wang 2011. 
5 Chen 2012 (a Master’s thesis); Yang, J. 2013 (a PhD thesis published as a monograph). 
6 Kearney 2012 (opining that the new Tort Law 2009 would fail to achieve its goals of 
efficient deterrence and fair compensation). 
7 Kearney 2012, p. 1077. 
8 One secondary source that Kearney relied heavily on was Harris & Wu 2005, which was 
over ten years ago.  
9 Remarkably, Kearney only cited some English news reports as the main source of 
empirical data. 
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On the basis of currently available empirical data,10 Chapter 12 is 
primarily intended to add to existing literature on the Chinese medical 
malpractice liability system with existing economic models and empirical 
evidence (from Chapter 7 to Chapter 10). Since so far China has not 
implemented any no-fault compensation fund for medical malpractice as 
addressed in Chapter 11, the desirability of adopting such a compensation 
fund will be discussed as a policy recommendation for China in Chapter 13. 
Hence, this chapter mainly focuses on the question of whether the tort 
system can achieve deterrence and compensation efficiently. Besides tort law, 
Chapter 12 also touches upon the efficiency of the regulatory quality 
assurance system, insurance, and social security in China, which was largely 
ignored by the existing studies. 
The structure of this Chapter is modelled on Dewees, Duff, and 
Trebilcock’s framework for empirical evaluations of tort law.11 Section 2 and 
Section 3 evaluate the efficiency of the Chinese medical tortious law in terms 
of prevention of medical errors and victim compensation respectively. Section 
4 and Section 5 evaluate the regulatory system and alternative compensation 
schemes respectively. Section 6 will discuss the impact of Yi Nao incidents on 
the Chinese malpractice system. The final Section 7 concludes. 
2. TORT LAW: PREVENTION (DETERRENCE) 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Based on Chapter 3 (substantive rules), Chapter 4 (empirical evidence on 
China), Chapter 7 (the economic model), and Chapter 8 (empirical evidence 
on the economic model and the updated model), this will evaluate the 
medical malpractice liability under Chinese tort law in terms of the 
prevention of medical errors (deterrence) in this Section. First of all, it will 
examine the Chinese medical malpractice liability system (both law in the 
books and law in action) in light of the (updated) economic model of tort law 
in Section 2.2. Then, it will address the issue of whether the Chinese medical 
malpractice liability system does or may produce the intended deterrent 
effect in Section 2.3. A summary will be made in Section 2.4. 
 
10 See supra Chapter 4. 
11 See generally Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996. 
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2.2. INPUT ANALYSIS 
2.2.1. Introduction 
This Section evaluates to what extent the actual medical malpractice system 
in China shows the structural features necessary for deterrence. In general, 
economic efficiency demands that health care providers should exercise 
patient-specific care and make investments in patient safety (expertise, 
training, equipment, system design, etc.) to the extent where the marginal 
cost of error prevention equals the marginal benefit of injury reduction.12 
Hence, liability and quantum rules (law of damages) should be optimally set 
(Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3), all meritorious claims should be filed and resolved 
correctly (Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5), expected accident costs should not be 
passed from health care providers on to others (Section 2.2.6), and health care 
providers should be able to respond to economic incentives appropriately 
(Section 2.2.7).13 A summary will be made in Section 2.2.8.  
2.2.2. Liability Rules 
2.2.2.1. Negligence versus Strict Liability 
As demonstrated before, it is highly likely that the negligence rule is fitter 
than strict liability for quality assurance in the health care sector.14 In this 
respect, the fault liability adopted by article 54 of the Tort Law 2009 is 
efficient.  
Since article 59 of the Tort Law imposes strict liability for medical 
products in hospitals, one may wonder whether article 59 is efficient or not. 
As a general rule, it seems wrong to impose liability on hospitals which 
cannot prevent the defects in medical products that are produced by 
manufacturers. However, article 59 grants hospitals a right of recourse against 
liable manufacturers. Hence, there will be no over-deterrence in that 
hospitals are not ultimately liable for damage due to defective medical 
products. Damages will be paid by liable manufacturers, who will be induced 
to take socially optimal precautions.  
In cases where manufacturers from whom medical products were 
purchased were insolvent, hospitals would have to bear the risk of not being 
able to exercise the right of recourse and might thus be over-deterred due to 
 
12 See supra Chapter 7, Section 2; Chapter 8, Section 3. 
13 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 97. 
14 See supra Chapter 7, Section 3.2.4. 
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article 59. Without article 59, however, victims would have to bear such a 
risk. One may ask whether it is better for hospitals or victims to bear such a 
risk. 
One important feature of treatment is that it involves both the 
techniques implemented by providers and the use of medical products. 
Therefore, any adverse event may be due to either provider negligence in the 
use of medical products or defects in medical products themselves, or both. 
Victims may be confronted with considerable information costs and may not 
know who should be sued. Compared to victims, hospitals are professional 
institutions and clearly have better information concerning the quality and 
the use of medical products than victims. That is to say, between hospitals 
and victims, the former are the least cost avoider and the best information 
provider. By imposing strict liability on hospitals, article 59 will induce 
hospitals not only to use equipment or administer pharmaceuticals properly, 
but also to select manufacturers very carefully. In this respect, article 59 is 
socially desirable as well. 
2.2.2.2. Standards of Care 
Technical malpractice. As demonstrated before, efficiency requires that the 
Learned Hand Rule should apply to medical malpractice liability cases in 
order to induce providers to make cost-justified investments in injury 
prevention.15 In theory, article 57 of the Tort Law 2009 establishes the 
reasonable doctor standard of care (“the duty of medical care corresponding 
to the then medical standard”) in China.16 In practice, however, the court 
usually defines the “medical standard” as statutory standards, standardised 
written treatment norms, and customary practices.17 Whether these 
standards, norms or customs can be regarded as the standards of care required 
of a reasonable doctor will be determined by expert testimony on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore, in China, the standard of care is determined in two 
steps. First, the court and expert witnesses will look for statutory standards or 
written norms published or recognised by the government and decide 
whether these regulatory standards contradict the reasonable doctor standard. 
Second, if there is no such regulatory standard, they will decide whether a 
customary practice conforms to the reasonable doctor standard.  
The preceding approach is theoretically efficient for two reasons. On 
the one hand, since many professional standards are already summarised and 
 
15 See supra Chapter 7, Section 3.3.1. 
16 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1. 
17 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.3.2. 
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published by statutes or clinical guidelines, it will save considerable 
administrative costs of the cost and benefit analysis if the court can rely on 
these regulatory standards.18 On the other, article 57 (the reasonable doctor 
standard) serves as a fail-safe device in the sense that when regulatory 
standards or customary practices deviate from the due care level, the court 
has a chance to adjust the standards. In theory, it seems that Chinese courts 
may apply the Learned Hand Rule to determine provider negligence. 
Some empirical evidence suggests that the standard of care in China 
may often be set higher than the optimal level because clinical expert 
witnesses, who are high-ranking doctors from high-level hospitals, tend to 
testify against those low-ranking doctors from low-level hospitals, which goes 
against the principle of “peer review.”19 However, this deviation from the 
economic model is caused by defects in the expert ascertainment system 
rather than by article 57 of the Tort Law 2009. 
Ethical malpractice. In practice, Chinese courts apply the “double-test 
standards” to information disclosure.20 Given the fact that the patient group is 
often heterogeneous, the specific patient should be allowed to play a role in 
what information ought to be disclosed and the information should reflect 
the cost and benefit confronted by each patient.21 In this way, the utility of 
patients can be maximised.22 However, to find out each patient’s subjective 
preference in detail may incur considerable transaction costs. Hence, to save 
tertiary costs, it may be desirable first to look at what a reasonable doctor 
would be willing to disclose and what a reasonable patient wants to know.23 
Then, attention should be paid to the particular preference of the specific 
patient.24 In this regard, the “double-test standard” of information disclosure 
is efficient. 
Regarding the types of ethical malpractice, some unfavourably 
commented that “these laws will not have much effect on maintaining the 
quality they strive to protect, and people who are harmed by them will 
receive no compensation.”25 In particular, article 61 (duty of medical record 
keeping)26 and article 63 (prohibiting unnecessary examinations)27 of the Tort 
 
18 Chen 2012, p. 16. 
19 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.3.2. 
20 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.3.3. 
21 Liu, Fan & Lu 2003, p. 379. 
22 Id. 
23 Yang, J. 2013, p. 94. 
24 Id. 
25 Kearney 2012, p. 1069. 
26 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 61: “A medical institution and its medical staff shall fill out 
and properly keep the hospital admission logs, medical treatment order slips, test reports, 
operation and anaesthesia records, pathology records, nurse care records, medical expenses 
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Law 2009 were heavily criticised, because “neither provision mentions 
financial liability for the violation.”28  
It is true that article 61 and article 63 have not mentioned 
compensation. However, it should be noted that Chapter VII of the Tort Law 
2009 (titled “Liability for Iatrogenic Injury”) is a complete system for medical 
malpractice issues, where article 54 serves as the general clause under which 
all fault-based medical torts can be subsumed.29 Also, article 58 plays a special 
role in transforming some categories of illegal acts into fault.30 
Hence, if a patient is injured due to unnecessary examinations 
conducted by the defendant-hospital, the defendant will be presumed to be at 
fault in accordance with article 58, sub-para. (1), and it will be held liable for 
the iatrogenic injury in light of article 54 if it cannot rebut the presumption 
of fault. 
In case the defendant-hospital conceals or refuses to provide medical 
records,31 or forges or tampers the records,32 the defendant will also be 
presumed to be at fault in light of article 58, sub-paras. (2) and (3) and it will 
have to pay compensation according to article 54.  
Hence, Kearney’s worry about the under-enforcement of article 61 and 
article 63 is unfounded. 
 
sheets and other medical history data according to the relevant provisions. Where a 
patient files a request for consulting or copying the medical history data in the preceding 
paragraph, the medical institution shall provide the data.” 
27 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 63: “A medical institution and its medical staff shall not 
conduct unnecessary examinations in violation of the procedures and standards for 
diagnosis and treatment.” 
28 Kearney 2012, p. 1069. 
29 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 54: “Where a patient sustains any harm during diagnosis and 
treatment, if the medical institution or any of its medical staff is at fault, the medical 
institution shall assume the compensatory liability.” 
30 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 58: “Under any of the following circumstances, a medical 
institution shall be presumed to be at fault for any harm caused to a patient: (1) violating a 
law, administrative regulation or rule, or any other provision on the procedures and 
standards for diagnosis and treatment; (2) concealing or refusing to provide the medical 
history data related to a dispute; or (3) forging, tampering or destroying any medical 
history data.” 
31 See e.g. Zhang v. Shang (China); Wang & Wang v. Ningxia Fourth Hospital (China); Yao 
v. Songshan Hospital & Ping an Insurance Co., Ltd (China); Zhang v. Employees Hospital 
(China). 
32 See e.g. Deng v. Anji Hospital (China); Ouyang v. Suzhou Hospital (China); Shan v. 
Shuanmiao Health Centre (China); Liu v. Gong’an Traditional Chinese Hospital (China). 
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2.2.2.3. Feasance versus Nonfeasance 
One of the essential reasons that the Tort Law 2009 may lead to under-
compensation is that patients who suffer iatrogenic injury due to physician 
inaction (non-feasance) may not be protected by the Law. One the one hand, 
the Law is “silent about what a physician’s obligation will be in the event that 
a person is harmed by physician inaction when the person cannot pay for 
treatment.”33 On the other, even if the Law did impose liability in case of 
physician inaction, plaintiffs would not be protected because it would be 
unlikely that they could afford litigation costs when they could not pay for 
medical bills.34 
It is true that the Tort Law has not said anything about “inaction.” 
However, this argument may be undermined by two reasons as follows.  
First, physician inaction normally leads to tort liability (and even 
administrative/criminal sanctions). China is largely a civil law country, where 
not only promulgated statutes matter but also dominant legal doctrines count. 
In China, it is a widely accepted doctrine that a tortious act can be done by 
either feasance or non-feasance.35 Non-feasance means that the tortfeasor 
breaches an affirmative duty to act, which is usually imposed by statutory 
provisions, professional codes of conduct or contracts.36 The law has already 
imposed an affirmative duty on providers to rescue and treat critically ill 
patients and providers must not refuse to admit such patients.37 Any provider 
who fails to fulfil this duty shall be subject to administrative punishments 
and/or criminal penalties.38 Some empirical evidence shows that providers 
rarely breach this statutory duty and as a result many public hospitals face the 
problem of unpaid medical bills.39 After the patient is admitted, any 
unreasonable failure to treat the patient after admitting her to the hospital 
may contravene the standard of care defined by article 57 and establish 
liability. Some local courts argued that the hospital’s refusal to provide 
treatment is only justified when the termination of the contract will not 
contravene humanitarianism, the patient refuses to pay for medical bills, and 
expert witnesses testify that the patient’s conditions have already met the 
standards for leaving the hospital.40  
 
33 Kearney 2012, p. 1064. 
34 Kearney 2012, pp. 1064-1065. 
35 See e.g. Wang, J. 2011, p. 5; Wang 2013, p. 44; Zhang 2013, p. 5. 
36 Ge & Yu 2014, pp. 164-166. 
37 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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Second, even when there are cases of physician inaction in practice, 
this problem should not be exaggerated. Some anecdotal evidence suggests 
that hospitals would suspend further treatment but would provide a 
minimum level of medical care if the patient refused to pay for medical bills.41 
Hence, it is likely that some poor patients may receive a reduced level of care 
in practice. That being said, these non-paying patient now only represent the 
minority. With the development of the social security schemes, currently 
more than 95% of the Chinese population are covered under the BMIS42 and 
more and more extremely poor patients are covered under the URMAS as 
well.43 It is expected that this problem of under-investment in care for non-
paying will be relieved with the development of the social security schemes. 
In any case, it is not appropriate for tort law to resolve this social problem.  
2.2.2.4. Causation and Proof Rules 
Causation. The Tort Law 2009 is silent on the definition of causation and 
issues of causal uncertainty. Nevertheless, the conditio sine qua non test for 
causation in fact and the adequacy test for causation in law, and proportional 
liability in case of severe uncertainty over factual causation that are adopted 
by Chinese courts are efficient.44  
Proof Rules. The reversal of the burden of proof regarding fault and 
causation that was once adopted by Chinese courts has been abandoned by 
the Tort Law 2009. Currently, the onus is in principle on the plaintiff to 
establish medical malpractice liability (article 54). The only exception is 
article 58 of the Law, which applies the presumption of fault in three limited 
scenarios.45  
The old reversal rule was widely criticised as being too harsh for 
health care providers, which ultimately led to defensive medicine.46 In cases 
where the defendant was not able to rebut the presumption of fault, the 
reversal rule would become strict liability. As demonstrated before, in the 
 
41 Iktsuarpok 2015; Today’s Headlines 2016. 
42 See supra Chapter 2, Section 3.3. 
43 See supra Chapter 5, Section 3.3.2.2. 
44 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.2; Chapter 4, Section 3.4; Chapter 7, Sections 3.4.1-
3.4.2. 
45 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 58: “Under any of the following circumstances, a medical 
institution shall be presumed to be at fault for any harm caused to a patient: (1) violating a 
law, administrative regulation or rule, or any other provision on the procedures and 
standards for diagnosis and treatment; (2) concealing or refusing to provide the medical 
history data related to a dispute; or (3) forging, tampering or destroying any medical 
history data.” 
46 Wang 2006, pp. 135-136; Chen 2012, pp. 25-27. 
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health care sector, negligence is more efficient than strict liability.47 Hence, 
the reversal rule is inefficient.  
Article 58 presumes fault in three factual scenarios, which are widely 
recognised as typical evidence of fault. This presumption rule is efficient in 
that it is intended to minimise litigation and error costs.48 
Some may argue that article 58 does not relieve the burden of proof 
imposed on the plaintiff since it is very difficult for the plaintiff to prove e.g. 
that the defendant has contravened any statutory standard or treatment norm 
in the first place.49 Also, the plaintiff has to discharge the burden of proving 
causation, which has not been presumed by article 58. 
This problem of inability to produce evidence in medical malpractice 
lawsuits can be resolved by the expert witness system. In almost all court 
cases, expert testimonies would be provided through the MATAS and/or the 
JAS.50 The very existence of the expert witness system dwarfs the importance 
of the burden of proof rules in that experts are supposed to give a definite 
opinion on whether medical malpractice liability can be established. Hence, 
the burden of proof rules actually matter insofar as who should pay medical 
ascertainment fees in advance is concerned. The party who bears the burden 
of proof should pay ascertainment fees in advance and the party who loses the 
case shall ultimately pay the fees. 
Therefore, the current burden of proof rules (article 54 and article 58) 
are designed efficiently. However, their advantage over the old reversal rule 
is greatly lessened by the expert witness system. 
2.2.2.5. A Contractual Waiver of or Alteration to Tort Liability? 
In China, any agreement that is intended to waive tort liability or vary the 
standard of care is null and void.51 Also, patients and public hospitals are not 
allowed to negotiate on service prices, which are set by the government. 
Hence, the contractual approach strongly recommended by Professor Richard 
Epstein52 does not seem to fit into the current legal and health care 
framework in China.  
However, whether China should employ Epstein’s proposal and 
change the legal and health care system accordingly is another question. As 
addressed before, due to severe information asymmetry and the loss of the 
 
47 See supra Section 2.2.2.1. 
48 Chen 2012, p. 28. 
49 See generally Wang 2010. 
50 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.6; Chapter 4, Section 3.2. 
51 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1. 
52 See supra Chapter 9, Section 2. 
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benefits of collective care generated by the malpractice system, the 
contractual approach seems inferior to statutorily defined medical 
malpractice liability.53  
2.2.3. Quantum Rules 
Some argued that the Tort Law 2009 will under-compensate victims of 
medical malpractice because it is “silent as to whether it affects the value of 
the compensation the courts will hand out” and it will not “bring about an 
increase in compensation” compared to the AR-Medical Accidents 2002.54 
However, this argument is unfounded for ignoring one of the most 
significant judicial interpretations for tort cases in China – the JI-Personal 
Injury 2003.55 Even in the period 2002-2009 when the compensation part of 
the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 was applicable, empirical evidence shows 
that the court would apply quantum rules defined by the AR-Medical 
Accidents in less than 10% of all medical malpractice cases.56 The court would 
apply the JI-Personal Injury 2003 in more than 90% of all medical 
malpractice cases before 2010 and only apply the JI-Personal Injury after 
2010.57 Since patients usually obtain more compensation under the JI-
Personal Injury than under the AR-Medical Accidents, it is baseless to claim 
that patients were systematically under-compensated from 2004 to 2009. 
After 2010, all courts in China now apply the JI-Personal Injury to medical 
malpractice cases. Hence, the advent of the Tort Law will increase victim 
compensation to some extent in that now 100% victims obtain compensation 
under the JI-Personal Injury. 
Efficient deterrence requires that compensation should be full – both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses should be compensable. While article 16 
of the Tort Law and the JI-Personal Injury are intended to provide quantum 
rules for calculating pecuniary damages (for medical expenses, lost earnings, 
permanent disability, wrongful death, etc.),58 article 24 of the Tort Law and 
the JI-Emotional Damage 2001 are meant to offer a legal basis for measuring 
non-pecuniary damages.59 As far as the category of compensation items is 
 
53 Id. This information problem may be relieved if health insurers, who have better 
information than patients, decide to step in and enter into a service contract with health 
care providers on behalf of patients (like the managed care system in many Western 
countries). However, this is currently not the case in China. 
54 Kearney 2012, p. 1065. 
55 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2. 
56 See supra Chapter 4, Section 2.4. 
57 Id. 
58 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2. 
59 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.3. 
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concerned, the Tort Law, supplemented with the preceding two judicial 
interpretations, providers fairly full compensation. The objective method of 
the calculation of damages for permanent disability and wrongful death60 can 
also be justified in terms of tertiary cost avoidance.61 
When it comes to compensation for permanent disability, death, or 
non-pecuniary losses, the JI-Personal Injury and the JI-Emotional Damage’s 
approach may lead to under-compensation and ultimately under-deterrence. 
As demonstrated before, the newly developed notion of “quality-adjusted life 
years” (QALYs) seems more complete than the traditional approach to the 
measure of compensation for wrongful death and pain and suffering.62 While 
the criteria for compensating for disability and death in China focus only on 
how much earnings the victim would lose in the future because of her 
disability or death, QALYs pay more attention to the value of lost quality of 
life in the light of the victim’s ex ante willingness to pay (WTP). If China 
adopted the approach of QALYs, compensation for disability, death, and pain 
and suffering would be highly likely to increase considerably compared to the 
current compensation regime, under which a cap of 20 years applies to 
compensation for disability and death63 and a cap of 50,000 yuan is imposed 
on non-pecuniary damages.64 
Hence, although the inception of the Tort Law 2009 produces an 
increase in compensation in comparison to the AR-Medical Accidents 2002, 
its silence on detailed quantum rules and the actual reliance on the JI-
Personal Injury 2003 mean that it will still lead to under-compensation in 
terms of the economic criteria of QALYs. Consequently, health care providers 
may systematically be under-deterred due to under-compensation. Be that as 
it may, the Tort Law’s role played in abolishing the AR-Medical Accidents 
should be welcomed. Also, its silence on detailed quantum rules makes it 
possible that the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) may raise compensation for 
fatal injury, death, and pain and suffering through new judicial 
interpretations in the future when the SPC sees fit. The QALY-approach can 
be a potentially desirable option for the SPC.  
In addition, the proportional apportionment rule that excludes non-
iatrogenic injury from the scope of liability and the collateral benefit set-off 
 
60 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2.2. 
61 See supra Chapter 7, Section 3.6.3.1. 
62 See supra Chapter 7, Sections 3.6.3.2 and 3.6.3.3. 
63 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2.3. 
64 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.3. 
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rule applying to social insurance employed by Chinese courts65 are efficient as 
well.66 
2.2.4. Claims Initiation 
Optimal deterrence entails that all negligent AEs can be detected, all 
negligently injured patients file claims, and no non-negligently injured 
patients file claims.67 Currently in China, however, data on the ratio of the 
number of medical malpractice claims initiated to the total number of 
negligent AEs are unavailable. Neither could such data be generated from the 
analysis of court decisions or semi-structured interviews.  
As mentioned before, where a medical error is severe or easily 
identifiable, the rate of claims initiation should not be extremely low, though 
it is far less than 100%.68 Data from the US show that about 3.3 to 10 
negligent AEs would lead to one initiated medical malpractice claim.69 The 
relatively low rate of claims initiation may be attributable to the problem of 
“claims consciousness” and high transaction costs.70 
Hence, the deterrent effect of tort law may be reduced due to the low 
rate of claims initiation.  
2.2.5. Claims Resolution 
Optimal deterrence requires that medical malpractice claims should be 
resolved accurately – all meritorious claims will be supported, and all non-
meritorious claims will be denied. Data from the US show that a plaintiff was 
roughly 2 to 8 times more likely to obtain compensation if the defendant had 
provided sub-standard care than if the defendant had not, which “should 
provide a significant deterrent effect, despite the high overall error rate in 
claiming.”71  
In general, however, detailed empirical evidence on the accuracy of 
claims disposition is currently unavailable. However, Chinese courts rely 
heavily on expert testimony to decide essential issues such as fault, causation, 
and scope of liability. The well-organised expert witness system in China may 
 
65 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.4.2; Chapter 5, Section 3.4. 
66 See supra Chapter 7, Section 3.6.3.D. 
67 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 99. 
68 See supra Chapter 6, Section 2.2.3.1. 
69 See supra Chapter 7, Section 2.3.1.2. 
70 See supra Chapter 6, Section 2.2.3.1. 
71 Danzon 2000, p. 1358. 
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help in guaranteeing the accuracy of claims disposition.72 Most of the US 
studies on the accuracy of claims resolution have also relied on peer review to 
determine whether a claim is meritorious or not. Hence, a speculative 
prediction is that most medical malpractice claims are resolved relatively 
accurately through litigation in China. 
That being said, one may still wonder whether the resolution of the 
remaining more than 80% medical malpractice claims that are settled out of 
court in China is accurate or not. It is often reported that, when facing Yi Nao 
incidents, hospitals would give in and pay some damages not because they are 
at fault but because they want to restore hospital order as quickly as 
possible.73 However, it is also possible that patients yield to a low amount of 
compensation even when they have meritorious claims because they are so 
poor that they cannot afford litigation and they desperately need quick 
compensation. Therefore, it is very difficult to judge whether or not 
victimised patients with meritorious claims are more likely to obtain 
compensation than patients with non-meritorious claims do. Overall, at least 
as far as medical malpractice claims resolved in court are concerned, the 
accuracy of claims resolution may not be extremely low in China. 
2.2.6. Medical Liability Insurance (MLI) 
In theory, MLI would not affect economic incentives faced by insured health 
care providers if explicit co-payment mechanisms and/or experience-rating 
were adopted.74 Currently, in China, cost externalisation by MLI is not a 
serious problem. On the one hand, medical liability insurance (MLI) is rather 
under-developed (covering less than 10% of all hospitals) for the time being.75 
Hence, the majority of Chinese hospitals still have to self-insure against 
medical malpractice liability. On the other hand, some local jurisdictions in 
China that have initiated MLI schemes do recognise the importance of 
experience-rating (e.g. in Shanghai and Nanjing) and co-payment (e.g. in 
Yunnan, Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Ningbo, and Nanjing).76  
 
72 See supra Chapter 6, Section 2.2.3.2. One may question whether these expert witnesses 
(essentially physicians) are so honest that they do not cover for their peers. In China, 
although clinical expert witnesses are often under suspicion of protecting their colleagues 
or peers simply because they belong to the same profession, there is currently no 
compelling evidence showing that they do so.  
73 Id. 
74 See supra Chapter 10, Section 4.2.4. 
75 See supra Chapter 6, Section 2.2.3.3. 
76 See supra Chapter 5, Section 2.3.8. 
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Since it will still take some years for China to develop MLI schemes 
nationwide, it is too early to say that economic incentives faced by Chinese 
health care providers will be diluted by MLI. Nevertheless, the three rounds 
of malpractice insurance crisis that occurred in the US should teach China a 
salutary lesson when developing its own MLI schemes.  
2.2.7. Defendant Responsiveness 
Given the fact that most medical errors are accidental rather than deliberate 
and are ultimately due to system failures instead of human errors, imposing 
liability exclusively on hospitals through EML is more efficient than 
individual physician liability.77  
Article 54 of the Tort Law 2009 defines the hospital as the sole 
defendant in medical malpractice litigation and thus imposes the costs of 
medical malpractice exclusively on the institutional provider, which is more 
efficient than physician liability. In some cases, however, medical malpractice 
may primarily be due to human errors. Will EML lead to under-deterrence in 
such cases where these negligent providers may escape liability? The answer 
is “No” for two reasons.  
On the one hand, as summarised before, based on recent empirical 
evidence on the causes of medical malpractice, most medical errors are 
accidental, and system failures account for a large proportion of these errors.78 
Hence, medical errors should be prevented at the institutional level, and 
hospitals should be induced to invest in staff training, medical equipment, 
technology, fail-safe systems, etc. optimally through EML.  
On the other hand, those providers who primarily contribute to a 
negligent AE are not necessarily under-deterred because of the 
implementation of EML. Since 2002, Chinese public hospitals have begun to 
have the authority to hire and fire (now at least 95% of) their medical staff 
members79 and may impose various internal sanctions (e.g. fines, and 
restrictions on promotion prospects and prescription privileges) on those staff 
members who cause negligent iatrogenic injuries to patients.80 Therefore, the 
possibility of imposing internal sanctions on negligent providers after 
hospitals pay compensation to victimised patients ensures that individual 
providers are still incentivized to exercise the optimal level of care. 
 
77 See supra Chapter 8, Section 3. 
78 See supra Chapter 8, Section 3.2.2. 
79 See supra Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
80 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.3.1. 
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For the reasons above, one can conclude that EML adopted by article 
54 of the Tort Law 2009 is largely efficient in terms of injury prevention. 
2.2.8. Summary 
Remarkably, many aspects of the Chinese medical malpractice system 
embody the features of efficiency. First, liability rules, including causation 
and proof rules, are largely optimally defined by either the Tort Law 2009 or 
Chinese courts. Second, the resolution of claims in litigation seems accurate 
with the help of expert witnesses. Third, economic incentives faced by 
Chinese health care providers do not seem to be so much diluted by MLI in 
China for the time being. Fourth, that EML places the locus of liability solely 
on hospitals and hospitals have full authority to monitor and sanction their 
staff members may help encourage optimal injury precautions at the 
organisational level. 
However, some problems plaguing the Chinese medical malpractice 
system may prevent it from achieving optimal deterrence. First, although 
compensation for disability and death has been increased by the Tort Law 
2009 in all medical malpractice cases, the amount of compensation is still 
greatly limited, which may result in under-deterrence. Second, the rate of 
claims initiation is still low which may also lead to under-deterrence.  
Overall, the new Chinese medical malpractice system seems well 
constituted to induce optimal injury prevention except for the quantum rules 
and barriers to lawsuits. The Chinese medical malpractice system may even 
appear more efficient than its US counterpart in that the latter does not have 
well-defined liability rules and has not adopted EML but has to face reduced 
economic incentives due to cost externalisation by malpractice insurance. 
2.3. OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
Data from the US show that the increased threat of malpractice liability 
results in defensive medicine81 and ultimately reduces the injury rate.82 The 
cost of the malpractice system can be justified by the benefit of injury 
reduction.83  
However, since the medical malpractice system in China is fairly 
young and few Chinese scholars pay attention to the deterrent effect of tort 
law, empirical statistical evidence on the impact of civil liability on medical 
 
81 See supra Chapter 8, Section 2.5. 
82 See supra Chapter 8, Section 2.6.2. 
83 Id. 
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practice and that of practice changes on the injury rate are currently 
unavailable. 
That being said, based on some direct surveys of and interviews with 
physicians, we know that defensive medicine (both PDM and NDM) is likely 
to be prevalent in China as well.84 Some of the defensive practices may be due 
to the increased threat of medical malpractice liability, but some of them may 
be explained by the epidemic of Yi Nao incidents and the pursuit of economic 
profits.85  
The next question is whether the empirical findings originating largely 
from the US can be directly transferred to China. This question should be 
answered on the basis of the differences and similarities between China and 
the US as far as legal remedies for medical malpractice and relevant social 
contexts are concerned.  
There are important differences in contexts. First, the US is a litigious 
society86 while China has a long tradition of resolving disputes through 
community mediation (People’s Mediation) out of court.87 Second, the US 
belongs to the common law world whereas China largely follows the 
Continental legal tradition. Third, administrative costs of the malpractice 
system in the US88 are much higher compared to those in China.89 Fourth, in 
the US physicians are self-regulated90 while in China the medical profession is 
regulated by the government directly.91 Fifth, medical liability insurance 
(MLI) in the US has been fully developed92 whereas MLI in China is still in 
the initial stages.93 Sixth, the American health care system looks better than 
the Chinese counterpart as far as the benefits that patients may enjoy are 
concerned.94 
Notwithstanding the above differences, there are at least two 
similarities. On the one hand, both China and the US adopted the fault-based 
tort liability to handle medical malpractice issues. On the other hand, victims 
 
84 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.9.1. 
85 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.9.2. 
86 See generally Howard 1987. 
87 Zeng 2009. 
88 See supra Chapter 8, Section 2.6.1. 
89 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.7.2. 
90 See supra Chapter 9, Section 6. 
91 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.4. 
92 See supra Chapter 10, Section 4.3. 
93 See supra Chapter 5, Section 2. 
94 After comparing health care systems in Europe, the US, and China, Rose concluded that 
health care systems in Europe are the good, the American health care system is the bad 
and the Chinese one is the ugly. See Rose 2011. 
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rely heavily on the tort system to obtain compensation in that they cannot 
obtain much compensation under social security schemes.  
When it comes to China, given the fact that there are differences in 
specific contexts, what can we still learn from these empirical findings from 
the US? One of the issues, of course, is that the evidence shows that 
stakeholders, especially physicians, react to incentives. Different liability 
regimes affect their behaviour, so tort law has a deterrent effect, which is of 
course relevant to China as well.  
Given the similarities between the Chinese malpractice system and its 
US counterpart, it is reasonable to predict that the Chinese one may also be 
efficient at reducing negligent iatrogenic injury. However, this is a very 
tentative conclusion which needs to be substantiated by future empirical 
studies conducted in China. 
2.4. SUMMARY 
As far as the input of the Chinese medical malpractice system (Tort Law 2009 
and law in action) is concerned, liability rules (standard of care, causation, 
and proof rules) and enterprise medical liability (EML) are efficient. The 
accuracy of claims resolution through litigation is relatively high, although 
patients may sometimes be either over-compensated (when hospitals give in 
to patients with non-meritorious claims for fear of Yi Nao incidents) or 
under-compensated (when extremely poor patients with meritorious claims 
yield to hospitals to obtain quick compensation) if they decide to resolve 
disputes through ADRs. Since medical liability insurance (MLI) is still in its 
initial stage in China, there are currently few worries about its adverse impact 
on economic incentives for health care providers to take precautions. And 
many MLI schemes that were recently initiated in some local jurisdictions in 
China have already adopted co-payment mechanisms or experience-rating.  
The only two factors that may lead to under-deterrence are a low rate 
of claims initiation and low levels of compensation for disability, death, and 
pain and suffering compared to the QALYs approach.  
When it comes to the output of the Chinese medical malpractice 
system, there is only some evidence showing that defensive medicine is 
prevalent and that the threat of medical malpractice liability partly 
contributes to this change in physician practice. However, there is currently 
no empirical evidence on the impact of the malpractice system on injury 
reduction. Data from the US show that the malpractice system is effective at 
cost-justified injury precaution. Since the Chinese medical malpractice system 
looks similar to its US counterpart in several respects, it is reasonable to 
predict that the former may be efficient in injury prevention as well. 
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Overall, the Chinese medical malpractice system has made substantial 
advances recently in terms of optimal deterrence. These advances would have 
been impossible without the advent of the Tort Law 2009 and the flexibility 
and creativity shown by Chinese courts in interpreting and applying legal 
rules. The Tort Law has repealed the inefficient reversal of the burden of 
proof rule and the quantum rules defined by the AR-Medical Accidents 2002 
that provided a lower level of compensation. Although the Tort Law is silent 
on causation issues, Chinese courts systematically apply proportional liability 
to medical malpractice cases where uncertainty over causation is 
considerable.  
3. TORT LAW: COMPENSATION 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In cases where AEs nonetheless occur, patients may suffer secondary costs – 
the social dislocation costs of the accident. According to Calabresi, the 
secondary goal of accident law is to reduce these dislocation costs through the 
deep-pocket approach and loss spreading.95 The deep-pocket approach entails 
that accident losses should be placed on those who are in the best position to 
(self-)insure against these losses.96 The EML approach adopted by article 54 of 
the Tort Law 2009 is more efficient than individual liability in that hospitals 
are more able than individual providers to self-insure against medical 
malpractice liability.97 
Regarding loss spreading, in addition to tort law, social insurance and 
private insurance may provide victims of medical malpractice with some 
compensation. In China, neither social insurance nor private insurance plays 
a significant role in compensating victims of medical malpractice On the one 
hand, not all Chinese residents are covered by social insurance, and the level 
of compensation provided by social insurance is limited. When people are 
old, totally disabled, or sick, they may enjoy social insurance benefits under 
the pension (BPIS)98 or health insurance schemes (BMIS).99 Extremely poor 
people may receive some state assistance.100 However, medical bills added 
 
95 See supra Chapter 10, Section 2. 
96 Id. 
97 See supra Chapter 10, Section 3.2. 
98 See supra Chapter 5, Section 3.3.3.1. 
99 See supra Chapter 5, Section 3.3.2.1. 
100 See supra Chapter 5, Section 3.3.2.2 and Section 3.3.3.2. 
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because of negligent AEs are excluded from the cover under the BMIS. Those 
victims of medical malpractice who are not approaching retirement, who are 
not totally disabled, and who are not extremely poor are unable to receive 
any benefit from social security schemes. Those who do receive some benefit 
from these schemes are far from being fully compensated, in that social 
security schemes are only meant to provide a minimum level of 
compensation. On the other hand, the role played by private insurance is 
rather limited. For instance, private health insurance only covered a small 
proportion (3.57%) of the whole population (almost 1.4 billion).101 Therefore, 
tort law still serves as the primary source of victim compensation in China. 
In China, any agreement that is intended to waive tort liability or vary 
the standard of care is null and void.102 Hence, where “exculpatory 
agreements are legally barred or practically impossible, defendants are 
effectively compelled to serve as a source of injury compensation” – “a 
scheme of compulsory insurance.”103  
The next several sections will examine whether the Chinese medical 
malpractice system is efficient in terms of secondary cost avoidance. 
3.2. BENEFIT LEVELS 
The insurance theory demonstrates that optimal compensation for damage 
should “reflect the insurance coverage against the accident that a rational, 
well-informed individual with a socially acceptable level of income would 
have bought.”104 In light of this insurance theory, the full compensation 
principle will lead to over-compensation and there should be no need to 
grant non-pecuniary damages.105 
Contrary to what was found in the US,106 tort compensation rules in 
China do not seem to pay considerably higher benefits than would be 
provided under optimal insurance. First, although dominant tort doctrines in 
China purport to employ the full compensation principle, the SPC de facto 
adopts limited compensation for negligently caused disability and wrongful 
death with a cap of 20 years.107 In addition, local courts tend to impose a cap 
of 50,000 yuan on non-pecuniary damages.108 Hence, it is hard to decide 
 
101 See supra Chapter 5, Section 3.2.1. 
102 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1. 
103 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 113. 
104 Shavell 1978, p. 37. 
105 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1. 
106 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 114. 
107 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2.3. 
108 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.3.2. 
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whether compensation for a particular iatrogenic injury under tort law will 
surely be excessive from the perspective of secondary cost avoidance. Second, 
although plaintiffs are able to receive non-pecuniary damages, these damages 
(not more than 50,000 yuan or about 7,500 US dollars109) are rather modest 
compared to some “multimillion-dollar damage awards involving significant 
payments for non-economic loss” in the US.110 Finally, since public health 
insurance benefits are effectively deducted from damages awards and only a 
minority of people in China purchase private insurance, the number of cases 
where victimised patients receive duplicate compensation is relatively low in 
China. For the reasons above, quantum rules in China do not seem to deviate 
very far from the insurance theory. 
That being said, from the perspective of primary cost avoidance, this 
low level of compensation is likely to lead to under-deterrence. 
3.3. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 
Although the benefit levels under the Chinese medical malpractice system 
may not contradict the insurance theory too much, the eligibility criteria are 
surely inappropriate. First, a rational consumer will tend to purchase 
insurance when it is relatively easy to receive benefits when the insured 
accident occurs. However, malpractice doctrines require that patients have to 
establish both fault and causation, which can be very difficult for most 
patients. Second, a rational consumer may insure only against severe losses,111 
while both minor and severe losses are recoverable under tort law. Data from 
the Gulou Court show that of all the 190 judgements with some awards, 
about 38.95% involved minor injuries and 14.21% emotional distress only.112  
Hence, a rational consumer’s willingness to buy a policy with the 
foregoing eligibility criteria may be relatively low.  
 
109 This was based the exchange rate of RMB to US dollars on August 14, 2016. 
110 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 114. 
111 Theoretically, only risk-averse consumers will purchase insurance because they prefer a 
certain small loss (premiums) to an uncertain large loss (accident harm). Risk attitudes 
depend upon the size of losses in relation to parties’ assets. Shavell 1987a, pp. 207-208. 
Hence, when consumers face severe losses, they are more likely to be risk-averse; 
conversely, whey they face minor losses, they are more likely to be risk-neutral. However, 
this is only a theoretical prediction. In the Netherlands, for example, many people may 
nonetheless voluntarily insure against minor risks such as dentist visits. But it may be 
another story in China where many people are not willing to insure against even major 
risks. That is one of the important reasons why the first-party insurance market is still 
under-developed in China. See supra Chapter 5, Section 3.2. 
112 See supra Chapter 4, Section 2.7. 
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3.4. CLAIMS DISPOSITION 
Optimal insurance requires that all eligible consumers should receive 
compensation promptly. However, the rate of claims initiation is relatively 
low.113 Moreover, due to high legal costs (litigation costs and attorney fees) 
and the difficulties created by the proof rules, compensation through the tort 
system is fairly slow (about 173 days)114 compared to compensation under 
private insurance schemes (not more than 30 days115), and many patients are 
forced to accept a lower level of compensation through settlement out of 
court (about 25% of what would otherwise have been payable in court).116 It 
is argued that “this settlement process operates in a highly regressive manner 
by placing the greatest pressure to settle on those with the fewest resources 
and the most severe injuries.”117 Hence, from the perspective of secondary 
cost avoidance, this problem of delayed compensation and under-
compensation is socially undesirable, although settlement out of court 
economises on tertiary costs. In addition, under-compensation will also lead 
to the problem of under-deterrence. 
3.5. ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
The Gulou Data show that for every 28.81 yuan damages, 1 yuan would be 
spent on litigation procedures,118 while in the US of one-dollar malpractice 
insurance premium, roughly 40 cents will be received by plaintiff-patients as 
compensation, about 40 cents will be spent on litigation costs and the 
remaining 20 cents are insurance overheads.119 In this regard, it seems that 
the burden of litigation costs on litigants in China is modest. However, the 
administrative costs of the medical malpractice system may still far exceed 
the insurance overheads in that malpractice litigation generates “substantial 
investigation costs and precludes the development of economies of scale in 
claims assessment.”120 
 
113 See supra Section 3.4. 
114 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.7.1. 
115 Insurance Law 2009 (China), art. 23. 
116 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.8.3. 
117 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 115. 
118 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.7.2. 
119 See supra Chapter 8, Section 2.6.1. 
120 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 116. 
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3.6. FINANCING 
In the US, it is claimed that the way in which the medical malpractice system 
is financed may be very regressive – “low-income patients in effect subsidise 
the insurance coverage of high-income patients” – since “all patients pay the 
same implicit insurance premium regardless of income while benefits are 
strongly influenced by income-related pecuniary losses.”121  
In China, however, this regressive effect should not be overstated. The 
main reason is that China adopts an abstract/objective approach to the 
calculation of damages for negligently caused disability and wrongful death, 
where the same criteria apply to all victims regardless of their income levels 
before the accident.122  
3.7. SUMMARY 
From the perspective of secondary cost avoidance, optimal compensation 
should reflect a rational consumer-patient’s hypothetical decision about the 
purchase of insurance. The medical malpractice system in China is not an 
efficient mechanism of optimal compensation in that eligibility criteria are 
too complex and restricted, many victims do not receive compensation or 
obtain a low level of compensation, and the payment is very slow. Although 
the Chinese medical malpractice system seems to have fewer problems than 
its US counterpart under which benefit levels are exceedingly high and the 
regressive effect is considerable, a rational consumer-patient may still be 
reluctant to purchase such an “insurance.” If available, insurance schemes 
should be more appropriate for compensating victims more promptly and 
sufficiently.123 
As far as primary cost avoidance is concerned, under-compensation 
may lead to the problem of under-deterrence.124 
When it comes to tertiary cost avoidance, the Chinese malpractice 
system incurs modest administrative costs, though these costs may still exceed 
insurance overheads.  
 
121 Dewees, Duff & Trebilcock 1996, p. 117. 
122 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2.1. 
123 See supra Chapter 10, Section 3.4. 
124 See also supra Section 2.2. 
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4. PENAL AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES: 
PREVENTION (DETERRENCE) 
Regulation can be justified as an instrument for the promotion of public 
interest, which is intended to remedy the four sources of market failure: 
asymmetric information, externalities, public goods, and market power.125 As 
far as medical quality assurance is concerned, asymmetric information and 
externalities seem more severe than market power.126 In the health care 
sector, regulation can be either the input control (licensing)127 and the output 
control (quality regulation).128 Output controls may consist of ex ante safety 
regulation and ex post regulation.129  
In order for licensing to be effective in ensuring competency, at least 
two conditions should be met. First, requirements for medical student 
education and training should be set based on the quality needs of the 
licensed profession.130 Second, there should be a mandatory periodic re-
evaluation of actual performance or continuing medical education (CME) that 
are directed at specific problems in practice to ensure subsequent 
competency.131 In China, taking five years of education at medical schools and 
passing the national exam for practising doctors are two essential 
prerequisites for obtaining a license. Recently, China initiated a nationwide 
mandatory scheme of the RSTR in order to provide residents with sufficient 
training in clinical practice.132 In theory, these medical education and training 
programmes should provide aspiring providers with incentives to invest 
sufficient time and effort in building professional competency at the 
beginning of their career. However, the RSTR may not be very effective in 
that evaluations of residents after training mainly take the form of 
examinations which focus on theoretical knowledge rather than on clinical 
techniques.133  
For output controls to be effective in quality assurance, regulatory 
standards should be well defined and effectively enforced.134 In China, many 
 
125 See supra Chapter 9, Section 3.2. 
126 Id. 
127 See supra Chapter 9, Section 4. 
128 See supra Chapter 9, Section 5. 
129 Id. 
130 See supra Chapter 9, Section 4.3.2. 
131 Id. 
132 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.2.2. 
133 Id. 
134 See supra Chapter 9, Section 5.2. 
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codes of conduct for health care providers are enacted by statutes, the 
violation of which may lead to administrative punishments (license 
suspension or revocation) and/or criminal penalties (imprisonment).135 These 
regulatory standards may be enforced either ex ante (before an AE occurs) or 
ex post (after an AE occurs). Since the medical profession in China is 
regulated directly by the government and it is very difficult for governmental 
officials to monitor provider behaviour easily and routinely, ex ante safety 
regulations may be enforced more through the peer review process – 
periodical doctor assessment (PDA). However, some evidence suggests that 
the PDA is not very effective at enhancing doctors’ expertise because in 
practice it focuses too much on theoretical knowledge and most doctors find 
it easy to pass the PDA.136 Ex post regulations rely heavily on the mandatory 
incident reporting system. Providers are required to report all medical 
quality-safety incidents (MQSI) to the public health authorities.137 However, 
empirical evidence shows that the rate of reporting MQSIs is exceedingly 
low.138 Therefore, both ex ante safety regulations and ex post regulations 
regarding medical quality assurance seem relatively under-enforced.  
Regulatory standards are enforced by penal or administrative 
sanctions, which should be optimally designed as well.139 In the light of 
efficiency, when a less severe sanction is sufficient to deter an unlawful act, it 
is unnecessary to impose a more severe sanction.140 License suspension should 
be sufficient to deter those providers who fail to maintain subsequent 
competency but their expertise can be enhanced.141 License revocation should 
be sufficient to deter those providers who fail to maintain subsequent 
expertise but also fail to enhance expertise after taking CME.142 Imprisonment 
should only be imposed on those who know they are systematically 
incompetent but still willfully choose to stay in the market, but who do not 
intend to murder patients (recklessness or dolus eventualis).143  
In China, in cases where a medical accident (an AE with obvious 
personal injury) occurs, the negligent provider may be subject to license 
suspension, license revocation, and/or imprisonment depending on the degree 
of negligence on the part of the provider and the seriousness of the 
 
135 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.2.1. 
136 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.2.2. 
137 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.3.1. 
138 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.3.2. 
139 See supra Chapter 9, Section 5.3. 
140 See supra Chapter 9, Section 5.4. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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consequences.144 The criteria for the Crime of Medical Accidents (CMA) – 
gross negligence (“seriously irresponsible”) – seem too broad, since many of 
those who cause serious AEs due to gross negligence may be doctors who are 
relatively competent but commit errors inadvertently145 and who can be 
sufficiently deterred by license revocation, together with medical malpractice 
liability. Hence, the imposition of the CMA, in addition to medical 
malpractice liability and licensing sanctions, on providers who (grossly) 
negligently cause injury or death to patients is highly likely to result in over-
deterrence. 
Economic theories demonstrate that ideally a low probability-high 
sanction enforcement strategy can economise on enforcement costs without 
diluting the deterrence effect.146 However, in order to generate marginal 
deterrence, sanctions should be increased along with the size of harm and 
most sanctions should be set less than maximal. Therefore, with a view to 
maintaining sufficient deterrence, the rate of detection and prosecution 
should not be too low. The under-enforcement of regulatory standards in the 
Chinese health care sector suggests that there may be under-deterrence. 
Nevertheless, this problem of under-deterrence may not be so severe. Since 
regulation and tort liability are jointly used in China, the two regimes may 
well complement each other in terms of medical quality assurance.147 
5. ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION 
MECHANISMS: COMPENSATION 
5.1. MEDICAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (MLI) 
In China, MLI is still developing and may become the primary source of 
compensation for iatrogenic injury in the near future.148 From the perspective 
of law and economics, MLI primarily serves to offer protection for risk-averse 
injurers whereas potential victims are only protected indirectly.149 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of victims, losses due to medical 
malpractice will be transferred from them to the negligent health care 
 
144 See supra Chapter 2, Section 4.3.2.1. 
145 See supra Chapter 8, Section 3.2.2. 
146 See supra Chapter 9, Section 5.3.2. 
147 See supra Chapter 9, Section 4 and Section 5. 
148 See supra Chapter 5, Section 2. 
149 See supra Chapter 10, Section 4.1. 
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provider and eventually spread to all the insured providers through the 
insurance mechanism (loss spreading).150 In this way, secondary costs 
resulting from negligent adverse events are reduced via the fault-liability-
insurance system (FLIS).151  
For MLI to be successful, it ought to be guaranteed that the risk of 
medical malpractice liability is insurable. The theoretical issues concerning 
the insurability of malpractice risks have been extensively discussed in 
Chapter 10.152 After examining the medical malpractice system and several 
MLI schemes in China, it can be found that the many aspects of the Chinese 
FLIS fit into these theories. First, most (five out of six) of the MLI schemes are 
claims-made with a view to tackling the long tail problem.153 Second, all of 
these six MLI schemes employ some solutions to resolve the problem of moral 
hazard. Caps on insurance benefits (under-insurance) are adopted by all, co-
insurance by one, deductibles by two, and experience-rating by two. Third, 
Chinese courts employ proportional liability to tackle causation uncertainty 
issues, which will not lead to a problem of un-insurability.154 Fourth, 
channelling of liability adopted by article 54 of the Tort Law 2009 (EML) will 
enhance rather than decrease the insurability of malpractice risks.155 Fifth, 
article 57 of the Tort Law (“the then medical standard”) excludes the 
possibility of retroactive liability, which will not lead to uninsurability.156  
Be that as it may, the current MLI schemes in China still face some 
problems. Although these MLI schemes claim to be compulsory, they lack the 
necessary sanctions to enforce this obligation. Hence, many low-risk hospitals 
do not purchase MLI or only purchase MLI for high-risk specialties, leading 
to the problem of adverse selection.157 Due to this problem, the premiums for 
MLI are often high and sometimes even higher than the total malpractice 
damages paid annually, which discourage many hospitals from purchasing 
MLI continually.158 
Overall, although many aspects of the Chinese FLIS fit into economic 
theories, the MLI schemes will not develop well unless the problem of 
adverse selection has been tackled. Risk differentiation (e.g. experience-
 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 See supra Chapter 10, Section 4. 
153 See supra Chapter 5, Section 2.3.8; Chapter 10, Section 2.3.4.2. 
154 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.4; Chapter 10, Section 4.2.5.1. 
155 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.1; Chapter 10, Section 4.2.5.2. 
156 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.2; Chapter 10, Section 4.2.5.3. 
157 Dong & Zhao 2015, p. 542. 
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rating)159 and compulsory MLI with effective enforcement mechanisms160 are 
clearly warranted. 
5.2. FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
In China, the first-party insurance that covers iatrogenic injuries is under-
developed. Hence, it is difficult to assess whether it is able to provide victims 
with adequate and quick compensation.  
Social security is developing rapidly and covers the majority of the 
population in China now. However, it only provides a minimum level of 
economic security. Hence, in practice, it is jointly used with tort law. The 
current combination of social security and tort law seems to over-compensate 
victims of medical malpractice because the law does not provide for the 
collateral source set-off rule and a right of recourse except for cases where 
public health insurance is involved.161 It is difficult to understand why the 
Social Insurance Law 2010 has provided for the collateral source set-off rule 
for claims under the BMIS while it has not mentioned this rule under the 
BPIS.162 Neither has the administrative assistance regime adopted this rule.163 
6. THE IMPACT OF YI NAO INCIDENTS ON THE 
MALPRACTICE SYSTEM 
The above analysis demonstrates that there is the problem of under-
compensation in the malpractice system in China due to the low rate of 
claims initiation and the low level of compensation. According to economic 
theories, under-compensation will lead to under-deterrence. In China, 
however, available evidence suggests that providers are often over-deterred 
and defensive medicine is prevalent. Why is that so?  
The primary reason, of course, is that there is great uncertainty over 
the standard of care and providers react by over-complying.  
The second reason may be that the regulatory and penal regimes 
provide physicians with additional deterrent incentives. However, the low 
rate of detection of those at fault and the under-enforcement of regulatory 
 
159 See supra Chapter 10, Section 4.2.4.3. 
160 See supra Chapter 10, Section 4.2.6. 
161 See supra Chapter 11, Section 4.3.2. 
162 See supra Chapter 5, Section 3.4. 
163 Id. 
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standards in the health care sector call into question the effectiveness of such 
alternative regimes. 
Another reason may be that, empirically speaking, Yi Nao incidents 
provide such additional deterrent incentives. In China, not only to the 
indirect risks of medical malpractice liability pose a threat (internal sanctions) 
to individual providers, but also the direct risks of getting involved in Yi Nao 
incidents generate a chill of fear. Although negligent providers do not have to 
appear in court as the defendant, they will directly face any potentially 
violent consequences of a Yi Nao incident triggered by a medical dispute. The 
threat of Yi Nao incidents even partly accounts for the epidemic of defensive 
medicine in China.  
That being said, this does not mean to say that Yi Nao incidents are 
socially desirable. Yi Nao incidents per se are illegal activities that incur 
considerable social costs. They should be banned beyond doubt. In the long 
run, when Yi Nao incidents are effectively dealt with by the police,164 this 
chilling effect generated by Yi Nao incidents may be considerably lessened or 
removed. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 12 has evaluated the entire Chinese legal remedies in relation to 
medical malpractice prevention and victim compensation from the 
perspective of law and economics. The primary purpose is to answer the 
question whether the Chinese medical malpractice liability system is efficient 
in terms of both deterrence and compensation. In addition, alternative 
regimes such as regulation and MLI have also been evaluated briefly in the 
light of economic theories. 
The main conclusion is that most aspects of the Chinese medical 
malpractice system are efficient in terms of injury prevention, except for 
under-compensation due to the caps on compensation for disability, death, 
and emotional distress and the low rate of claims initiation. However, 
Chinese health care providers may not be under-deterred when two factors 
are taken into account. First, uncertainty over the standard of care will 
 
164 Recently, China enacted the N-Crackdown on Yi Nao Incidents 2016 (China), and 
initiated a one-year crackdown on Yi Nao incidents from August 2016 to April 2017. The 
police are required to intervene and stop Yi Nao incidents as quickly as possible. Those Yi 
Nao mobs who assault providers or damage hospital facilities will be arrested and 
prosecuted promptly. It seems that it is now impossible for the police to act as onlookers 
when a Yi Nao incident occurs. However, it still remains to be seen whether the Yi Nao 
problem will be eliminated by the state crackdown in the future. 
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normally induce providers to over-comply. Second, the potential risk of being 
criminally charged with the CMA or being subject to license revocation poses 
some threats to providers. Hence, for the time being, it is unlikely that 
Chinese health care providers will be under-deterred. On the contrary, 
providers may be over-deterred as evidenced by the prevalence of defensive 
medicine. 
In addition, medical disputes are often associated with violent Yi Nao 
incidents, which may produce an unintended deterrent to providers. 
However, Yi Nao incidents are illegal and should be tackled by the police in 
the future. The effect of the elimination of Yi Nao incidents in the future on 
provider incentives still remains to be seen.  
From the perspective of optimal compensation, however, the Chinese 
medical malpractice system is inefficient mainly due to the complex and 
restricted eligibility criteria, a low rate of claims initiation, and systematic 
under-compensation through settlement out of court. 
The regulatory system of medical quality assurance may lead to under-
deterrence due to under-enforcement of regulatory standards. This problem 
may not be severe, since regulation and liability may complement each other 
as far as injury prevention is concerned. 
MLI is still in its preliminary stage in China. Although most local MLI 
schemes adopt co-payment mechanisms to tackle the problem of moral 
hazard, only a minority employ experience-rating. Hence, many of these local 
MLI schemes face the problem of adverse selection. Although most of these 
MLI schemes claim to be compulsory insurance, no law or regulation has ever 
provided a sanction to enforce this compulsory obligation to purchase MLI. 
Tort law and social security are jointly used in practice. Apart from the 
BMIS, other social security schemes may lead to over-compensation in that 
they have not employed the collateral source set-off rule.  
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CHAPTER 13 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to answer the following main research 
questions: 
(1) Are the current legal remedies for medical malpractice in China sound 
from the legal perspective? 
(2) Are these legal remedies also efficient when measured against economic 
benchmarks? 
(3) If not, how can we improve these systems? 
Chapter 1 has provided the background to this research, defined the above 
research questions and explained the research methods. Chapters 2 to 12 have 
answered the first two main research questions. The general conclusion is 
that although many aspects of the Chinese legal remedies for medical injury 
prevention and patient compensation are relatively effective and efficient, 
there is still plenty of room for improvement. Section 2 will summarise the 
main findings of the previous Chapters in the light of sub-questions derived 
from the first main research question. Policy recommendations for 
improvement (i.e. answers to the third main research question) will be made 
in Section 3. Although the topics covered by this thesis are extensive, the 
thesis has its limitations, which will be highlighted in Section 4. The final 
Section 5 will point out some directions for future research. 
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2. A SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
2.1. SUB-QUESTION 1-A: WHAT ARE THE LEGAL 
REMEDIES CURRENTLY AVAILABLE IN CHINA THAT 
ARE AIMED AT THE PREVENTION OF MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE AND VICTIM COMPENSATION? 
2.1.1. Introduction 
This sub-question has been answered in Part Ⅰ (Chapter 2 to Chapter 5). 
Although ex post compensation is essential to victims of medical malpractice, 
the avoidance of the victimisation in the first place is the best way to protect 
victims. Hence, not only legal instruments that are intended to provide 
victimised patients with compensation but also those that are meant to 
prevent medical malpractice (or medical errors) should be examined. 
China has established some legal remedies pertaining to medical 
malpractice prevention and victim compensation, which can be summarised 
as follows. 
2.1.2. Regulation 
The regulatory framework for the assurance of medical quality (or injury 
prevention) in China has been described in Chapter 2. Regulation is primarily 
concerned with injury prevention instead of victim compensation.  
In China, all health care services are provided by institutional 
providers (“medical institutions” including hospitals, health care centres, and 
clinics) for patients. Individual providers (doctors, nurses, pharmacists, 
technicians, etc.) are medical staff members employed by various medical 
institutions.  
The medical profession – both institutional and individual providers – 
is directly regulated by the government, mainly by the public health 
authorities. Both the health care input (entry into the medical profession) and 
the health care output (the quality of care) are controlled and monitored by 
the authorities.  
Both institutional and individual providers have to obtain a license 
from the authorities before they can practice medicine. If they practice 
without a license, they will be subject to administrative punishments and/or 
criminal penalties.  
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The authorities basically employ the command-and-control method to 
ensure the quality of care. Providers must comply with professional codes of 
conduct that are provided for by relevant laws, regulations, and medical-
technical norms. Violation of these codes of conduct will lead to 
administrative and/or criminal sanctions.  
In order to ensure subsequent expertise, hospital accreditation and 
periodical doctor assessment have been implemented.  
In addition, providers are supposed to report adverse incidents 
(MQSIs) to the authorities. In the light of the seriousness of the reported 
incident, the authorities may decide to employ regulatory threats rather than 
sanctions to induce hospital managers to make corrections.  
Since the medical profession in China is tightly controlled by the 
government, there is currently little room for self-regulation.  
2.1.3. The Medical Malpractice Liability System 
Chapter 3 has described the substantive system of private law compensation 
for iatrogenic injuries in China. The liability system is unique in that it is 
aimed at both deterrence and compensation.  
Although it is possible for victimised patients to claim compensation 
under either contract law or tort law, few patients choose the former because 
detailed quantum rules, medical expert ascertainment, and non-pecuniary 
damages are only available under the latter.  
The medical malpractice tort system was established in 1987 (AR-
Medical Accidents 1987) and was substantially reformed in 2002 (AR-Medical 
Accidents 2002) and 2009 (Tort Law 2009).  
The AR-Medical Accidents 1987 was abandoned because it only 
provided victims with an extremely limited scope of liability and level of 
compensation. The AR-Medical Accidents 2002 was replaced by the Tort Law 
in that the former’s scope of liability and level of compensation were still 
limited compared to the general civil law (Principles 1986 and relevant 
judicial interpretations).  
The current medical malpractice liability system is based on the Tort 
Law 2009, together with the JI-Emotional Damage 2001 and the JI-Personal 
Injury 2003. In general, China employs the fault-based enterprise medical 
liability (EML) to medical malpractice issues (article 54 Tort Law), where 
medical institutions are the sole defendant in medical malpractice litigation.  
Any fault on the part of medical staff members is directly considered as 
the medical institutions’ own fault.  
The current medical malpractice liability can be classified into 
technical malpractice (breach of standards of care regarding medical 
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techniques) and ethical malpractice (breach of standards of care regarding 
medical ethics).  
Ethical malpractice can be sub-divided into disclosure malpractice 
(breach of the duty of disclosing information and obtaining consent, article 55 
Tort Law), breach of confidence (article 62 Tort Law), and conducting 
unnecessary examinations (article 63 Tort Law).  
The standard of care regarding medical techniques is defined as the 
“then medical standard” (article 57 Tort Law).  
Regarding the burden of proof, the onus currently is in principle 
placed on the plaintiff-patient, although in the period 2002-2009 it was 
mainly placed on the defendant-hospital. However, in cases where the 
provider contravenes a regulatory standard, refuses to provide or forges 
medical records, the defendant will be presumed to be at fault (a rebuttable 
presumption).  
Besides technical malpractice and ethical malpractice, hospitals are 
strictly held liable for injury due to defects in medical products. After paying 
damages to victims, hospitals are entitled to have recourse to 
manufacturers/blood banks that are ultimately liable.  
The determination of fault and causation relies heavily on the two 
parallel expert witness systems – the MATAS (clinical experts organised by 
medical associations) and the JAS (forensic pathologists).  
Quantum rules (law of damages) are defined roughly by the Tort Law 
(article 16 and article 22) and specified in detail by the JI-Emotional Damage 
2001 and the JI-Personal Injury 2003. The measure of future damage due to 
disability or death is based on the abstract/standardised approach, i.e. the 
average annual earnings multiplied by a fixed period (usu. not more than 20 
years).  
2.1.4. Medical Liability Insurance (MLI) 
Chapter 5 has described the development of MLI in China. MLI is an 
insurance scheme, based on the medical malpractice liability system, that can 
provide victims with adequate compensation in cases where the defendant is 
insolvent. 
The current legal basis for MLI is article 65 and article 66 of the 
Insurance Law 2009. The insurer is allowed to pay benefits to the third-party 
victim. The victim is entitled to claim benefits directly from the insurer if the 
insured fails to make such a request in time. 
All necessary and reasonable costs of litigation or arbitration will be 
covered by the insurer as well. These rules apply to all types of liability 
insurance. 
There is currently no legal provision specifically intended for MLI. 
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2.1.5. First-Party Private Insurance 
Chapter 5 has also described the legal basis for first-party private insurance – 
the Insurance Law 2009. Patients may decide to purchase private health 
insurance or medical mishap insurance to insure against the risk of iatrogenic 
injury.  
2.1.6. Social Security Schemes 
In addition to MLI and first-party private insurance, some of the losses 
suffered by victims of medical malpractice may be covered under various 
social security schemes as depicted in Chapter 5.  
Social security is intended to provide a minimum level of 
compensation to the vulnerable groups.  
Added treatment costs due to medical malpractice may be covered 
under the public health insurance schemes (BMIS) or administrative 
assistance schemes for the poor.  
Consequential losses due to disability or death may be covered under 
the basic pension scheme or the administrative assistance schemes for the 
poor.  
2.2. SUB-QUESTION 1-B: ARE THESE REMEDIES SOUND 
ACCORDING TO LEGAL DOCTRINES? 
2.2.1. Introduction 
This sub-question has been answered in Part Ⅰ (Chapter 2, Chapter 4 to 
Chapter 6). The soundness (legal certainty, effectiveness, and fairness) of 
these legal remedies are assessed on the basis of traditional legal doctrines and 
currently available empirical evidence, part of which were first-hand data 
collected by the author (mainly presented in Chapter 4) and part which 
concerns findings of existing empirical studies. The results of the assessment 
are summarised as follows. 
2.2.2. Regulation 
Empirical evidence about the effectiveness of regulation has been addressed 
in Chapter 2.  
Overall, the effectiveness of the regulatory quality assurance system 
needs to be enhanced for five reasons. First, the licensing law is under-
enforced in rural and suburban areas. Second, the hospital accreditation 
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scheme has been suspended several times. Third, the PDA evaluates physician 
competency based on theoretical knowledge rather than actual performance 
and ethics. Fourth, adverse incidents (MQSIs) are considerably under-
reported. Fifth, regulatory threats do not generate any deterrent effect. 
2.2.3. The Medical Malpractice Liability System 
Chapter 4 has presented the results of the analysis of court decisions and 
semi-structured interviews, which are compared and contrasted with prior 
studies.  
The general conclusion is that although many aspects of the 
substantive medical malpractice liability law are undefined or unclear (e.g. 
the meaning of “the then medical standard,” standard of disclosure, causation 
issues, the applicability of equitable liability, the measure of non-pecuniary 
damages), Chinese courts have developed a consistent approach to these 
undefined or unclear aspects.  
For instance, they often interpret the “then medical standard” as 
written regulatory standards or customary practices if there are no such 
written standards. They employ the “double-test doctrine” to define the 
standard of information disclosure. They restrict the applicability of equitable 
liability only to cases where the patient is injured by substandard blood but 
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is at fault. They apply proportional 
liability to cases where uncertainty over causation is considerable.  
All these endeavours made by Chinese courts ensure that the 
substantive medical malpractice liability system is functioning well in dispute 
resolution through litigation.  
The medical malpractice system also plays a role in disputes resolved 
through negotiation and mediation out of court, since liability rules and 
quantum rules often serve as a useful starting point for bargaining between 
hospitals and patients.  
Hence, the Chinese medical malpractice liability system is relatively 
effective in practice. Be that as it may, its effectiveness needs to be improved 
in that the rate of claims initiation is low in practice.  
In addition, some features of the system may go against the principles 
of corrective justice. For instance, an abstract approach is adopted to the 
measure of compensation and some financial caps are imposed. The low rate 
of claims initiation also goes against corrective justice. 
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2.2.4. Medical Liability Insurance (MLI) 
MLI is rather under-developed in China, where only about 10% of all medical 
institutions purchase MLI policies. Six local MLI schemes have been 
described and compared in Chapter 5.  
Many of these schemes face the problem of a contraction of the 
market. Four reasons may explain this contraction. First, although many local 
MLI schemes require that at least public hospitals purchase MLI policies, it is 
difficult to enforce this obligation due to a lack of statutorily imposed 
sanctions. Second, large hospitals are not willing to purchase MLI policies 
because they prefer self-insurance to paying high MLI premiums and MLI 
insurers are unable to help resolve the problem of Yi Nao incidents. Third, 
some hospitals do not purchase MLI because they want to conceal medical 
accidents which may lead to administrative punishments and/or criminal 
penalties. Fourth, many insurance companies are not willing to sell MLI 
policies because of considerable uncertainty over legal standards for the 
period 2002-2009.  
The second and the fourth reasons may become less convincing for the 
time being in that Yi Nao incidents may have been reduced by the joint effort 
of the police crackdown and people’s mediation, and the Tort Law 2009 has 
already unified the substantive medical malpractice rules. Overall, the 
effectiveness of MLI is currently rather limited in China.  
2.2.5. First-Party Private Insurance 
Currently in China, first-party patient insurance is even less developed than 
MLI. Patients are often not willing to purchase either private health 
insurance or medical mishap insurance.  
2.2.6. Social Security Schemes 
Recently, China has made relatively successful endeavours to build a social 
security network for its population. Currently, about 95% of the population 
has been covered by the public health insurance (BMIS) and 80% by pension 
insurance (BPIS). The legal doctrine of subrogation applies under the BMIS 
but not under the BPIS. 
Extremely poor people are entitled to receive some benefits from the 
government via administrative assistance schemes.  
These schemes are relatively effective in practice but they only provide 
a minimum level of compensation for eligible residents. Hence, social security 
schemes in China may play a supplementary rather than an alternative role in 
compensating victims of medical malpractice compared to the tort system. 
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2.3. SUB-QUESTION 2-A: HOW SHOULD THE LEGAL 
REMEDIES BE STRUCTURED IN ORDER TO PREVENT 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND COMPENSATE 
VICTIMS FOR IATROGENIC INJURIES EFFICIENTLY IN 
THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC BENCHMARKS AND 
AVAILABLE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE? 
2.3.1. Introduction 
This sub-question can further be divided into two parts. First, how should 
legal remedies be designed in order to prevent medical errors (medical 
malpractice) efficiently? Second, how should legal remedies be structured in 
order to compensate victims for iatrogenic injuries efficiently? 
Answers provided by economists to these questions are normally based 
on Calabresi’s analytical framework. According to Calabresi, the principle 
function of accident law is to reduce the expected accident costs and the cost 
of precautions (“injury prevention”). The sum of these costs is often referred 
to as Calabresi’s primary costs. Also, Calabresi stressed the importance of 
secondary cost avoidance – in cases where accidents nonetheless occur 
victims should be compensated quickly and adequately in order to reduce the 
economic dislocation due to accidents. Moreover, the tertiary costs of 
administering the prevention and compensation systems should not exceed 
the benefits of injury prevention and victim compensation. Social welfare will 
be maximised when the sum of these three types of costs is minimised.  
The two legal instruments that are used to prevent iatrogenic injuries 
are the tort system (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) and regulation (Chapter 9). In 
contrast, some regard the contractual approach as the best way to maximise 
the welfare of patients (Chapter 9). 
Various legal instruments – tort law, liability insurance, self-insurance, 
first-party insurance, compensation funds, and social security – may be used 
to provide victims with compensation for iatrogenic injuries. Chapter 10 has 
examined tort law and those compensation mechanisms that are based on 
fault-based tort system (liability insurance and self-insurance). In contrast, 
Chapter 11 has addressed various no-fault compensation schemes – first-party 
insurance, compensation funds, and social security.  
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2.3.2. How Should Legal Remedies Be Designed in Order to Prevent Medical 
Errors (Medical Malpractice) Efficiently? 
2.3.2.1. Tort Law 
Economic theories and empirical studies on the deterrent effect of medical 
malpractice liability law have been addressed in Chapter 7 (theoretical 
models) and Chapter 8 (empirical evidence).  
Economic Theories. Chapter 7 has explained the unilateral accident 
model of tort law and applied the model to medical malpractice liability. As 
to the choice between negligence and strict liability, although the model 
predicts that strict liability is superior to negligence when activity levels are 
taken into account, concerns for other factors such as positive externalities 
generated by health care activities and insolvency risks suggest that we 
should be cautious about imposing strict liability.  
Regarding the standard of care, it is optimal to impose a higher level of 
due care on providers rather than on ordinary citizens and a uniform level of 
due care should be adopted for the same or similar group of providers in order 
to economise on tertiary costs. Uncertainty over the standard of care is likely 
to result in defensive medicine. One way to reduce this uncertainty is to rely 
on customary practices which are developed by the medical profession. 
Regulatory standards can also be referred to. A contravention of regulatory 
standards should automatically establish negligence, whereas compliance 
with regulatory standards should not automatically exclude a finding of 
negligence.  
When it comes to causation, in cases where it is uncertain whether the 
provider’s faulty treatment or other non-tortious factors (therapeutic risks or 
pre-existing conditions) have caused the patient’s injury, proportional 
liability is more efficient than the traditional threshold approach. As regards 
proof rules, a reversal of the burden of proof is akin to strict liability, which is 
socially undesirable when taking into account the considerable positive 
externalities generated by health care activities.  
Full compensation is essential to the deterrent effect of tort liability. In 
order to save tertiary costs, damages should be assessed objectively rather 
than subjectively. With a view to better assessing the value of a loss of life or 
pain and suffering, the QALY approach is highly recommended. While the 
collateral-source set-off rule should be applied to cases where part of damages 
are paid under social insurance, the collateral-source rule should be applied to 
cases where part of the damages is paid under private health. In light of the 
off-setting benefits rule, non-negligence iatrogenic injuries and non-
iatrogenic injuries should be excluded from the scope of liability.  
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Finally, a settlement that could mirror a court decision is socially 
desirable in that it saves tertiary costs. 
Empirical evidence. Chapter 8 has examined empirical evidence on the 
deterrent effect of the fault-based medical malpractice liability and discussed 
the modification of the classic model of medical malpractice liability in the 
light of new evidence pertaining to the causes of iatrogenic injuries. The 
general conclusion is that although the costs of the malpractice system are 
quite high, the huge deterrence benefits of reduced iatrogenic injuries are 
highly likely to pay for the expenses incurred by the malpractice system.  
Moreover, new empirical evidence supports the view that medical 
negligence is mostly accidental rather than deliberate and most medical 
errors can be better prevented at the institutional level instead of the 
individual level. The updated and empirically-grounded model of malpractice 
liability requires that health care providers should be induced to invest in 
both care and patient safety and the locus of liability should be placed on 
institutional providers alone. 
2.3.2.2. Regulation 
In the light of the public interest theory, regulation can be a legitimate 
instrument for the promotion of public interest. Regulation may be able to 
remedy the four sources of market failure: asymmetric information, 
externalities, public goods, and market power. In the context of health care, 
regulation can be either input control through licensing and output control 
through quality regulation.  
Licensing can be used to ensure service quality by resolving the 
problems of asymmetric information, externalities, and quality deterioration. 
Licensing may have several drawbacks, but at least it can be justified as 
serving the purpose of primary cost avoidance – ensuring the initial 
investment in professional competency – and constituting a useful 
complement to the tort system. 
Quality regulation can be either ex ante safety regulation based on 
rules before any accident occurs or ex post regulation based on standards after 
an accident occurs. While ex post regulation is indispensable as a “fail-safe” 
device against the failure of ex ante regulation, the latter should be 
encouraged, insofar as the conditions of patients and their responses to 
medications are homogeneous, in order to improve regulatory efficiency. 
Neither ex ante regulation nor ex post regulation is a perfect alternative to 
tort law. Hence, regulation and tort liability should be jointly used in 
practice.  
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We should be cautious about the criminalization of medical 
malpractice since the enforcement of imprisonment is highly costly and the 
social stigma attached to being criminally punished may persist even after 
being discharged from prison. Since most medical errors are committed 
inadvertently by relatively competent physicians, medical malpractice 
liability is sufficient to deter, and criminal penalties should not be imposed in 
the majority of the cases. In cases where the physician fails to maintain 
subsequent competency and also fails to enhance it after taking CME, her 
license should be revoked and criminal penalties are not warranted. Only in 
cases where the physician knows that he/she is systematically incompetent 
but still deliberately chooses to stay in the market, criminal penalties should 
be imposed to deter her from continuing medical practice.  
Neither direct governmental regulation alone nor self-regulation alone 
is socially desirable. The government may lack sufficient information to set 
regulatory standards and may be unable to enforce regulatory standards cost-
effectively. However, self-regulation also has its limitations such as rent-
seeking, limitations on market competition, and professional protectionism. 
From the perspective of public interest and primary cost avoidance, it would 
be more efficient if the two mechanisms could be optimally combined. 
Empirical evidence from North America shows that the rate of 
detection of non-complying providers is relatively low and regulators are 
often not willing to impose licensing sanctions. Under-enforcement of 
regulatory standards may lead to under-deterrence. 
In some common law systems (England and New Zealand), although 
the criterion for imposing criminal penalties on providers is gross negligence, 
empirical evidence shows that many, if not most, providers who were 
convicted of manslaughter merely committed errors due to ordinary 
negligence. As a notable example in Europe, a rise in criminal lawsuits was 
reported in Spain. The over-criminalization of medical malpractice may lead 
to over-deterrence. 
2.3.2.3. The Contractual Approach 
Proponents of the contractual approach criticise the traditional fault-based 
malpractice liability for it is an expensive “lottery” that has little deterrent 
benefits. Instead, they maintain that fully informed parties should be allowed 
to negotiate on the extent of liability by private contracts, for they know 
better than others what is best for themselves. However, their fundamental 
assumption that parties have perfect information concerning malpractice risks 
is directly challenged by many opponents because serious uncertainty about 
quality and information asymmetry are characteristic of the health care 
sector. 
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Moreover, opponents also raise objections to the contractual approach 
even when parties were fully informed. Patients would be systematically 
worse off if they opted out of statutory liability or varied the statutory 
standard of care. A patient would only care about her own best interests in a 
private contract. He/she would neglect the benefits of collective care to other 
patients and ignore learning and network benefits to providers. The 
availability of extensive social welfare provision in some legal remedies may 
render the contractual approach less attractive. 
2.3.3. How Should Legal Remedies Be Structured in Order to Compensate 
Victims for Iatrogenic Injuries Efficiently? 
2.3.3.1. Tort Law Per Se 
Traditional tort theorists, based on the notion of corrective justice, treat 
compensation (loss shifting) as the primary function of tort law. In contrast, 
economists normally stress the deterrence function of tort law.  
Tort law could be designed to reduce secondary costs if EML were 
employed. Two types of enterprise liability are available. The first type 
transfers losses to those who are most able to self-insure (or insure), while the 
second type spreads losses to consumers by treating the tort system as 
insurance.  
Although treating the tort system alone as an insurance regime does 
reduce some secondary costs, it achieves this goal at the expense of the goals 
of primary and tertiary cost avoidance.  
Hence, it may be better to employ EML in the sense that it better 
facilitates self-insurance.  
Tort damages could be determined in the light of the victim’s ex ante 
WTP, which takes into account both primary and secondary cost avoidance. 
2.3.3.2. Liability Insurance 
MLI can be used to reduce secondary accident costs in that it helps promote 
both inter-personal and inter-temporal loss spreading. The supply of MLI is 
possible in that insurers rely on the technique of pooling and the Law of 
Large Numbers.  
Informational problems – moral hazard and adverse selection – may 
have adverse implications for the MLI market. Moral hazard may dilute the 
insured’s incentives to take precautions.  
The first best solution for MLI may be ex post experience rating.  
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The second best solution may be deductibles or co-insurance. Adverse 
selection may lead to the breakdown of the MLI market.  
The common solution to moral hazard and adverse selection is risk 
differentiation, especially through experience rating.  
Regarding some liability sub-rules, the proportional approach in the 
case of causal uncertainty and channelling of liability under EML may 
enhance the insurability of MLI without adversely affecting the deterrent 
function of malpractice liability. In contrast, retroactive liability is inefficient 
regarding either deterrence or insurability. Caps on liability would not 
enhance insurability too much but they would lead to under-deterrence.  
Compulsory MLI may be warranted in three cases where potentially 
liable parties under-estimate the risk of malpractice liability, where 
potentially liable parties are judgement-proof, and where the risk of adverse 
selection is considerable.  
Recent evidence shows that the costs of malpractice claims are not the 
main cause of the crisis. The malpractice crisis is more an insurance crisis due 
to the underwriting cycle than a malpractice liability crisis. 
2.3.3.3. Self-Insurance 
Although self-insurance saves on tertiary costs, it is by and large inferior to 
market insurance, because it does not spread losses and hence cannot prevent 
insolvency risks given that losses due to medical malpractice are normally 
high.  
Nonetheless, self-insurance can be justified in cases where market 
insurance is too expensive or hardly available. In such a case, a combined use 
of self-insurance (against small losses) and market insurance (against large 
losses) may be socially optimal.  
However, regulation is needed to guarantee that the reserves set aside 
will be used to insure against potential malpractice risks. 
2.3.3.4. First-Party Insurance 
First-party patient insurance has advantages over the FLISs (FLIS) in terms of 
secondary and tertiary cost reduction. Under patient insurance, victimised 
patients could obtain much more extensive compensation and relatively more 
quickly. Patient insurance economises on tertiary costs more than the FLIS in 
that the former facilitates better risk-differentiation and avoids costly tort 
litigation procedures.  
However, the use of patient insurance alone is inefficient because it 
may dilute health care providers’ incentives to take precautions and increase 
primary accident costs dramatically.  
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Hence, it may be socially optimal to use patient insurance as a 
complement to the FLIS. On account of imperfect information and concerns 
for externalities, compulsory patient insurance may be warranted.  
2.3.3.5. Compensation Funds 
Under a general medical compensation fund, a sum of money will be 
established specifically for compensating eligible accident victims.  
In order for a compensation fund to be fair and efficient, it must meet 
three principles: (1) the incentives for health care providers to prevent 
medical malpractice should not be undermined; (2) the duty of contribution 
should also correspond with the extent to which the risk has been caused by 
the specific treatment or hospital; and (3) only those who actually contribute 
to the risk should contribute to the fund.  
Adverse events will become compensable iatrogenic injuries when 
they are more severe than expected, or when they represent the random 
manifestation of a serious low-probability risk inherent in a medically 
necessary method of treatment.  
In case of causal uncertainty, the proportional approach to causation 
may avoid either over-deterrence or under-deterrence.  
Empirical evidence shows that comprehensive NFCSs (e.g. in New 
Zealand, and Scandinavian countries) are effective at compensating a greater 
number of injured patients more quickly than under the tort system without 
substantially increasing tertiary costs.  
However, one may still have concern for the reduced incentives for 
providers to exercise care under these NFCSs. 
2.3.3.6. Social Security 
Social security is intended to provide a minimum level of economic security 
and social welfare for citizens and their families.  
A social security scheme is usually operated subject to three basic 
requirements: first, there should be a state organised insurance scheme; 
second, the claimant should belong to the protected group of people; and 
third, the claimant often has to contribute to the social security fund.  
Supposing tort liability and social security were completely alternative 
to each other. Then, two ideal models of reaching the goals of both 
deterrence and compensation through either social security or tort law could 
be designed as follows: (1) safety regulation + social security; and (2) tort 
liability + insurance.  
In practice, however, to replace social security completely by tort 
liability or vice versa is virtually unrealistic.  
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In cases where tort damages and social security benefits overlap, it may 
be socially efficient to grant a right of recourse to social security agencies. The 
combination of the collateral source set-off rule and a right of recourse is 
efficient. 
2.4. SUB-QUESTION 2-B: ARE THESE LEGAL REMEDIES 
FOR IATROGENIC INJURY PREVENTION AND 
PATIENT COMPENSATION IN CHINA EFFICIENT AS 
WELL? 
2.4.1. Legal Remedies for Injury Prevention 
2.4.1.1. The Medical Malpractice Liability System 
Many elements of the Chinese medical malpractice system are structured 
efficiently. First, it is primarily fault-based, except for medical products 
liability which is based on strict liability. Since health care activities generate 
considerable external benefits to society, it is more desirable to apply 
negligence to medical malpractice liability. The fault liability rule adopted by 
article 54 of the Tort Law is efficient. Second, article 57 adopts the objective 
reasonable doctor test (the “then medical standard”) as the standard of care 
regarding medical techniques. The reasonable doctor test is theoretically 
compatible with the economic notion of the optimal level of care. In practice, 
although regulatory standards or customary practices may be relied upon to 
determine fault, courts may disregard them if due care entails different 
standards. The “double-test doctrine” adopted by courts for the standard of 
information disclosure is also efficient. Third, as regards causal uncertainty, 
courts adopt the proportional approach to factual causation, which is 
efficient. Fourth, the reversal of the burden of proof rule, which is akin to 
strict liability, has been abandoned by the Tort Law. Fifth, damage due to 
non-tortious factors (pre-existing conditions or therapeutic risks) is excluded 
from the scope of liability, which is compatible with the re-stated negligence 
rule. Sixth, the collateral benefit set-off rule applying to cases where public 
health insurance (BMIS) is involved reduces tertiary costs due to dual 
compensation.  
However, some aspects of the medical malpractice systems may lead to 
under-deterrence. First, there are caps imposed on damages for disability, 
death or emotional distress which may cause under-compensation 
systematically compared to the QALY’s approach. Second, the rate of claims 
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initiation is relatively low due to the problem of claims consciousness or high 
transaction costs. 
That being said, two factors may enhance economic incentives for 
providers to take precautions. First, uncertainty over the standard of care may 
induce providers to over-comply. Second, the potential risk of being 
criminally charged with CMA or being subject to license revocation may pose 
some threat to providers. Hence, for the time being, it is unlikely that 
Chinese health care providers will be under-deterred too much. Instead, they 
may be over-deterred, evidenced by the epidemic of defensive medicine. In 
addition, medical disputes are often associated with violent Yi Nao incidents, 
which may generate an unintended deterrent to providers. However, these Yi 
Nao incidents are illegal activities which should be prevented.  
There is a want of empirical statistical studies in China on the impact 
of the threat of medical malpractice liability on the rate of iatrogenic injury 
directly. Since China’s input of the medical malpractice system appears 
similar to its US counterpart in many respects, we may, based upon the 
extensive empirical studies in the US, speculate that the Chinese medical 
malpractice system is likely to be effective at reducing iatrogenic injuries as 
well.  
2.4.1.2. Regulation 
The regulation of the medical profession in China faces the problem of under-
enforcement,1 which may lead to the problem of under-deterrence. This 
problem may not be so severe since the tort system also generates additional 
incentives for providers to take precautions. 
When it comes to the choice of sanctions, since license revocation has 
already proved sufficient to deter many negligent providers who are 
relatively competent, the CMA should be restricted to extreme cases where 
providers, who know they are systematically incompetent but still want to 
stay in the market, causes serious damage to patients (dolus eventualis).  
2.4.2. Legal Remedies for Victim Compensation 
2.4.2.1. The Medical Malpractice Compensation System 
From the perspective of secondary cost avoidance, the Chinese medical 
malpractice system exhibits some features of efficiency. First, it adopts EML 
(article 54 Tort Law) which places the locus of liability exclusively on 
 
1 See supra Section 2.2. 
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hospitals. This is efficient (the deep pocket approach) because it places 
accident losses on the party who is in the best position to self-insure against 
malpractice risks in that hospitals have more assets than individual providers. 
Second, benefit levels are relatively low because of the caps on compensation 
for disability, death, and pain and suffering, which may not deviate from the 
optimal compensation defined by the insurance theory. Third, claims 
disposition is relatively accurate because most decisions on fault and 
causation are based on expert testimonies (peer review). Fourth, the Chinese 
medical malpractice system incurs a relatively low size of administrative costs 
(28.81-yuan compensation to 1-yuan litigation costs) compared to its US 
counterpart (40-cent compensation to 40-cent litigation costs). Fifth, the 
Chinese medical malpractice system is not financed regressively since the 
same abstract criteria for compensation apply to all victims alike, which is 
different from its US counterpart where pecuniary losses are income-related. 
Be that as it may, the Chinese medical malpractice system is inefficient 
at optimal compensation in other aspects. First, the eligibility criteria (fault 
and causation) are too complex and restricted. It is difficult for eligible 
victims to obtain compensation easily and quickly. Second, many victims do 
not receive any compensation because they fail to file a claim or receive a low 
level of compensation through settlement out of court. Although the Chinese 
medical malpractice system has fewer problems than its US counterpart under 
which benefit levels are exceedingly high and the regressive effect is 
considerable, a rational consumer-patient may still be reluctant to purchase 
such an “insurance.” 
2.4.2.2. Medical Liability Insurance (MLI) 
After examining the medical malpractice system and several MLI schemes in 
China, it can be found that the many aspects of the Chinese FLIS fit into these 
theories. First, most (five out of six) of the MLI schemes are claims-made with 
a view to tackling the long tail problem. Second, all of these six MLI schemes 
employ some solutions to resolve the problem of moral hazard. Caps on 
insurance benefits (under-insurance) are adopted by all, co-insurance by one, 
deductibles by two, and experience-rating by two. Third, Chinese courts 
employ proportional liability to tackle causation uncertainty issues, which 
will not lead to a problem of uninsurability. Fourth, channelling of liability 
adopted by article 54 of the Tort Law 2009 (EML) will enhance rather than 
decrease the insurability of malpractice risks. Fifth, article 57 of the Tort Law 
(“the then medical standard”) excludes the possibility of retroactive liability, 
which will not lead to uninsurability.  
Be that as it may, the current MLI schemes in China still face some 
problems. Although these MLI schemes claim to be compulsory, they lack the 
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necessary sanctions to enforce this obligation. Hence, many hospitals do not 
purchase MLI or only purchase MLI for high-risk specialities, leading to the 
problem of adverse selection. Due to this problem, the premiums for MLI are 
often high and sometimes even higher than the total malpractice damages 
paid annually, and this discourages many hospitals from purchasing MLI 
continually. 
Overall, although many aspects of the Chinese FLIS fit into economic 
theories, the MLI schemes will not develop well unless the problem of 
adverse selection has been tackled. 
2.4.2.3. Social Security 
Social security only provides a minimum level of economic security in China. 
In practice, it is jointly used with the tort system. The current combination of 
social security and tort law may over-compensate victims of medical 
malpractice because the law does not provide for the collateral source set-off 
rule and a right of recourse except for cases where public health insurance is 
involved. Hence, victims of medical malpractice who suffer disability, or close 
relatives of deceased patients, may have dual compensation – full 
compensation from the defendant-hospital and benefits under the pension 
scheme or administrative assistance schemes.  
3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: HOW CAN  
WE IMPROVE THESE SYSTEMS? (MAIN 
QUESTION 3) 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
After summarizing the main findings of previous chapters, it is time to return 
to the second main research question – Are the current legal remedies for 
medical quality assurance and victim compensation in China efficient? The 
answer is yes and no. The answer is yes because many aspects of the Chinese 
legal remedies are likely to be efficient at deterrence and compensation. The 
answer is no in that some aspects of the systems are inefficient, which can be 
improved in the light of economic benchmarks discussed in Chapter 7 to 
Chapter 11.  
Hence, it is indeed necessary to answer the third main research 
question – “If not, how can we improve these legal remedies?” Some policy 
recommendations will be formulated in the light of two different approaches 
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– reforming the current remedies piecemeal (Section 3.2) or no-fault 
compensation schemes (Section 3.3) – and discuss their desirability in the 
context of China. 
3.2. REFORMING THE TORT AND RELEVANT SYSTEMS 
PIECEMEAL 
The first proposal is that China should continue to develop the fault-liability-
insurance system (FLIS). The FLIS consists of the medical malpractice tort 
system and MLI. While the former has developed in China since the 1980s, 
MLI is still in its experimental stage and currently under-developed. In order 
for the medical malpractice liability system to be more efficient, some 
reforms in the tort system and relevant legal remedies need to be introduced 
as follows: 
The standard of care. As far as technical malpractice is concerned, 
article 57 of the Tort Law 20092 should expressly define the standard of care 
in light of the reasonable doctor or the Learned Hand Rule3 instead of 
providing for an ambiguous term “the then medical standard.” In this regard, 
Article 7:453 of the Dutch BW (Civil Code) provides an interesting example, 
which reads: 
In providing the medical treatment, the care provider must observe the 
standards of a prudent care provider and, in doing so, he/she has to act in 
conformity with the responsibilities laid upon him by the professional 
standard for care providers. 
Although many Chinese courts in practice interpret the “then medical 
standard” as the reasonable doctor standard, which is in theory compatible 
with the Learned Hand Rule, two problems may arise. First, some courts may 
interpret the “then medical standard” as exclusively meaning regulatory 
standards or customary practice. Second, even when courts correctly 
interpret the “then medical standard” as the reasonable doctor standard, they 
may still fail to employ the cost and benefit analysis to determine the optimal 
level of care in a given case.  
Hence, it would be desirable if Chinese lawmakers could adopt the 
Learned Hand Rule definitely or the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) could 
 
2 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 57: “Where any medical staff member fails to fulfil the duty of 
medical care corresponding to the then medical standard and causes any harm to a patient, 
the medical institution shall assume the compensatory liability.” 
3 See supra Chapter 7, Section 3.3.1. 
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define it as the Learned Hand Rule in the forthcoming judicial interpretation. 
Perhaps the Learned Hand Rule should not only apply to the determination 
of medical malpractice but also to that of negligence in other fault-based 
torts. The definition of “negligence” provided for in the US Restatement 
(Third) of Torts serves as a useful example, which reads: 
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care 
under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining 
whether the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable 
likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable 
severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.4 
When it comes to disclosure malpractice, the “double-test doctrine” (the 
objective physician + the objective/subjective patient) that has been 
developed by some local courts should also be incorporated into article 55 of 
the Tort Law 2009 or into its judicial interpretations. 
Statutes, custom, and medical records. Article 58 of the Tort Law 20095 
should be modified. First, since statutory standards and treatment norms 
(published or recognised by the government) are often set at a minimum 
level, it is better to adopt the negligence per se rule – a violation of the 
statutory standard or treatment norm automatically leads to a finding of 
negligence. Hence, either the SPC should interpret the “presumption of fault” 
as an “irrebuttable presumption” or lawmakers should change the 
“presumption of fault” into the “conclusive evidence of fault.” Also, because 
these standards are probably set at the minimum level, article 58 should make 
it clear that compliance with a statutory standard or treatment norm does not 
preclude a finding of negligence.  
Second, article 58 has ignored “customary practice” (常规), which had 
been expressly employed as the standard of care in the AR-Medical Accidents 
1987, 2002. The current article 58, para. 1 only mentions statutory standards 
and treatment norms (诊疗规范) but is silent on how to deal with custom in 
the health care sector. Since the number of statutory standards and treatment 
norms is fairly limited and these written standards may be out of date rather 
quickly, health care providers often rely on medical custom to provide 
treatment services. In order to reduce uncertainty over negligence and save 
 
4 US Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm, § 3. 
5 Tort Law 2009 (China), art. 58: “Under any of the following circumstances, a medical 
institution shall be presumed to be at fault for any harm caused to a patient: (1) violating a 
statutory standard provided for by laws, administrative regulations, or rules, or a 
treatment norm; (2) concealing or refusing to provide the medical history data related to 
dispute; or (3) forging, tampering with, or destroying any medical history data.” 
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information costs, it is efficient for article 58 to provide that compliance with 
custom is prima facie evidence of non-negligence and departure from custom 
is prima facie evidence of negligence. Whether a particular custom is higher 
or lower than the optimal level of care should be decided on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Third, the last two sub-paragraphs of article 58 are concerned with the 
consequences of hiding or forging essential evidentiary documents in medical 
malpractice litigation – medical history data that record any information 
concerning the patient’s condition and the treatment procedures. Without 
these medical records, even expert witnesses will be unable to produce any 
evidence. Therefore, it is efficient to presume the defendant-hospital is at 
fault in such cases because it is less costly for the defendant to bear the 
burden of proving non-negligence. However, article 58 is defective because it 
has not mentioned the burden of proof regarding causation. If the defendant 
refuses to provide medical records or provides fake ones, it is impossible for 
the plaintiff to prove causation. Thus, article 58 should provide that medical 
malpractice liability (both fault and causation) be presumed to be established 
in cases where medical records are unavailable or not authentic. 
Causation. Lawmakers or the SPC should endorse local judicial 
practices in relation to the definition of causation6 and proportional liability7 
into the Tort Law or its judicial interpretations. 
Equitable liability. In practice, some courts apply equitable liability to 
medical products liability cases where neither the defendant nor the plaintiff 
is at fault. This practice cannot be justified from the perspective of 
prevention. It may be justified in terms of secondary cost avoidance since it is 
often believed that hospitals have much greater assets (deep pocket) than 
individual patients and hospitals can spread accident costs broadly through 
the price mechanism. However, applying equitable liability to medical 
malpractice cases may lead to some problems. First, public hospitals are not 
allowed to increase service prices freely. Second, many small-scale hospitals 
or clinics are not very rich. For instance, a health centre only earned about 
100,000 yuan annually in 2010.8 If a health centre faces one or two medical 
accidents, almost all the annual earnings will be paid to victimised patients. 
Third, if there are better ways of compensation that can achieve broader loss 
spreading such as social security or compensation funds, why should these 
losses due to non-negligent AEs only be apportioned between hospitals and 
patients. For these reasons, one can argue against the application of equitable 
 
6 See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.2. 
7 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3.4. 
8 Chen 2013, p. 35. 
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liability to medical malpractice cases. The Tort Law should clarify the scope 
of cases to which equitable liability shall apply.  
Expert evidence. Since the standard of care is measured against a 
reasonable doctor, it is justifiable to employ expert witnesses to produce 
testimony (peer review). The debate in China is not whether a regime of 
expert witnesses is warranted, but whether it is better to keep the two 
parallel systems – the MATAS and the JAS – unchanged or to find a way to 
merge them. From the perspective of legal certainty and efficiency, it is 
socially desirable if the two systems will be somehow merged in the future.9 
Quantum rules (law of damages). The goal of primary cost avoidance 
may conflict with that of secondary cost avoidance when it comes to the 
scope of compensation. While optimal deterrence requires full 
compensation,10 the insurance theory normally suggests that non-pecuniary 
losses should be excluded from the scope of compensation.11 In order to 
resolve this conflict, decoupled liability was proposed under which victimised 
patients obtain damages in the light of the insurance theory while the state 
imposes fines equal to the difference between full compensation and optimal 
compensation on the defendant.12 However, decoupled liability has been 
challenged by an approach under which non-pecuniary losses are 
compensable and should be measured by victims’ ex ante willingness to pay 
(WTP).13 
This ex ante WTP approach also applies to the measure of 
compensation for wrongful death, where recovery for loss of life should be 
measured on the basis of quality adjusted life years (QALYs). The QALY 
approach is applicable to compensation for disability as well. 
It is accepted that the foregoing ex ante WTP approach has not been 
accepted in other legal systems either. However, theoretically, this approach 
is more efficient than the “arbitrary” approach that is currently used in China. 
Hence, the efficiency of the Chinese medical malpractice system would be 
enhanced if China adopted this ex ante WTP approach to the measure of 
compensation for disability, death, and pain and suffering. 
Claims initiation. One of the important reasons that many victimised 
patients do not file a medical malpractice lawsuit is that legal costs (esp. 
attorney fees and expert ascertainment fees) are considerable and they simply 
cannot afford the costs. According to the Gulou Data, plaintiff-patients are 
 
9 See generally Xiao 2014. 
10 See supra Chapter 7, Section 3.6.2. 
11 See supra Chapter 10, Section 3.3.1. 
12 See supra Chapter 10, Section 3.3.2. 
13 Id. 
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not represented by lawyers in almost 40% of the medical malpractice cases.14 
Very few (2 out of 461) plaintiff-patients get legal aid free of charge, although 
China established a legal aid system in 2003.15 Hence, in order to help more 
victims of medical malpractice, especially those who are poor, to obtain 
attorney services, it may be desirable for China to lift the ban on charging 
contingency fees in medical malpractice claims. Although these poor victims 
may have to pay a significant portion of damages to their attorneys, it would 
be better than the case where they lose the lawsuit or never file a claim due 
to a lack of attorneys. In addition, more attorneys should be encouraged by 
the state to practise as public interest lawyers.16 
The rules on charging expert ascertainment fees should be changed in 
order to increase victims’ access to justice. It would be naïve to argue that 
litigation fees should be abolished or wholly subsidised by the state. Litigation 
fees, combined with the rule that the losing party bears all litigation fees (the 
rule of “losers pay all”), plays a significant role in tertiary cost avoidance 
through stopping frivolous lawsuits. However, litigation fees should not be set 
too high. Otherwise, victims would not file a claim and the deterrent effect of 
tort law would be undermined. Victims would only file a claim when the 
expected value of the legal claim (EVC) exceeds the filing costs (FC).17 
Therefore, at least two reforms on the ascertainment fees could be made. 
First, China could reduce the fees charged under the JAS. Currently, the fees 
charged under the MATAS (often 2,200 yuan) are about four to five times 
lower than under the JAS (often 10,000 yuan). There is no reason why 
clinical experts and forensic pathologists charge so differently when they 
actually do the same job. Since 2,200 yuan under the MATAS is already 
relatively high to most poor victims, 10,000 yuan is wholly unjustified, which 
may stop many victims from filing claims and may ultimately lead to under-
deterrence. Second, another method of increasing access to justice for the 
poor is that ascertainment fees “could be assigned on a sliding scale based on 
income.”18 
Regulation. The regulatory system of medical quality assurance is 
primarily confronted with a problem of under-enforcement. This may be 
largely because the medical profession is directly regulated by the 
government which lacks sufficient medical professional expertise and 
manpower to set efficient standards and conduct effective routine 
 
14 See supra Chapter 4, Section 2.2. 
15 AR-Legal Aid 2003 (China). 
16 Kearney 2012, p. 1068. 
17 Cooter & Ulen 2012, p. 390. 
18 Kearney 2012, p. 1068. 
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monitoring.19 China should pay more attention to the benefits of self-
regulation and adopt a mixed approach to the regulation of health care where 
both the government and the medical profession play a role in quality 
assurance.20 
The current criteria for imposing license sanctions or criminal 
penalties on negligent providers are ambiguous or too broad, which may go 
against the goal of marginal deterrence. Marginal deterrence requires that 
sanctions should rise with the size of harm and most sanctions should be less 
than maximal. It is suggested that license revocation only applies to those 
providers whose expertise cannot be enhanced even after taking CME and 
imprisonment; (CMA) only applies to those providers who know they are 
systematically incompetent but still wilfully choose to stay in the market to 
enjoy the benefit of being a licensed provider. The mens rea for establishing 
the CMA should be set as “recklessness” or “dolus eventualis” rather than a 
simple or gross negligence. 
Medical liability insurance (MLI). In China, MLI is still under-
developed due to the problem of adverse selection and the “compulsory” 
obligation to purchase MLI cannot be enforced by any legal sanctions. In 
order to tackle this problem, compulsory MLI is clearly warranted. 
Lawmakers (NPC and SC-NPC) or the State Council should enact national 
laws or administrative regulations to impose legal sanctions on hospitals who 
fail to purchase MLI and these law and regulations should be effectively 
enforced in practice. 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The new form of ADR for 
resolving medical malpractice claims – medical dispute people’s mediation 
(MDPM) – seems rather effective at settling a claim quickly. The MDPM 
should be encouraged if it may reduce the tension between patients and 
hospitals and may potentially reduce the frequency of Yi Nao incidents. The 
police should also stop Yi Nao incidents in time and prosecute those patients, 
their family members or professional mobs who intend to obtain 
compensation through coercive measures. 
Collateral source set-off and social security benefits. All kinds of social 
security benefits should be deducted from tort damages awards in order to 
reduce tertiary costs due to dual compensation. Hence, either lawmakers 
should add the collateral source set-off rule to the Tort Law or the SPC 
should provide for this rule in judicial interpretations. 
 
19 See supra Chapter 9, Section 6. 
20 Id. 
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3.3. NO-FAULT COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
Chapter 11 has introduced various no-fault compensation schemes such as 
first-party insurance, comprehensive compensation funds, and social security. 
Next there is a discussion of their desirability in the context of China as 
follows. 
First-party insurance. Although first-party insurance has a 
comparative advantage over third-party insurance in terms of saving tertiary 
costs, it should be used jointly with the FLIS in order to keep economic 
incentives for health care providers to take precautions.21 However, as 
discussed before, patients in China are often not willing to purchase 
voluntary first-party insurance to cover either medical bills or other losses 
caused by disability.22 Many of them may underestimate the risk of iatrogenic 
injuries due to imperfect information while the premiums for first-party 
insurance may not be low.23 In addition, uninsured patients may externalise 
their costs to society at large.24 Therefore, it may be desirable for China to 
introduce compulsory first-party insurance. Since patients may be more 
averse towards large risks than small risks, it would be optimal if compulsory 
first-party insurance covered only large risks of iatrogenic injuries.  
The problem is that some extremely poor patients may still find it 
difficult to afford the premiums. These patients should obtain assistance from 
the state under social security schemes (e.g. their premiums for the insurance 
would be paid by the state).  
Compensation funds. The above plan of reforming the FLIS piecemeal 
or the plan of using the FLIS and compulsory first-party insurance is still 
based on the fault-based tort system. Due to considerable tertiary costs and 
delays in compensation associated with the FLIS, one may wonder whether 
the tort system should be dispensed with, as least as far as medical 
malpractice liability is concerned, and establish a compensation fund to cover 
all iatrogenic injuries instead. However, this narrowly defined no-fault 
compensation scheme (NFCS) should not dilute economic incentives for 
health care providers to take precautions. Hence, compensation funds should 
be constructed on the basis of economic principles in order to provide fair 
and efficient compensation.25 Although current NFCSs implemented in New 
Zealand and Scandinavian countries are effective at compensating victims of 
 
21 See supra Chapter 11, Section 2.2. 
22 See supra Chapter 5, Section 3.2. 
23 Yang, J. 2013, p. 224. 
24 See supra Chapter 11, Section 2.4. 
25 See supra Chapter 11, Section 3.3. 
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AEs quickly and without significant administrative costs, they are ineffective 
at inducing health care providers to invest in treatment optimally. 
When taking into account the current tension between health care 
providers and patients in China, the NFCS seems extremely desirable since in 
most of the Yi Nao incidents what most patients care about is compensation 
rather than whether the hospital is at fault or not. This is also one of the 
reasons why many patients do not file a lawsuit because litigation procedures 
pay more attention to the merit of the claim (i.e. whether there are fault and 
causation) rather than what the patients need. When facing Yi Nao incidents, 
hospitals often give in to patients and pay a modest amount of 
“compensation” (buchang) irrespective of whether they are at fault. Thus, it 
seems that there is a great demand for the NFCS under which both hospitals 
and patients’ needs would be satisfied. Hence, an NFCS that provides 
extensive cover for iatrogenic injuries may help relieve the current tension 
between providers and patients and provide a quick, even if limited, remedy 
for victims of AEs.  
In order to maintain economic incentives for providers to take 
precautions, it is necessary that each hospital should contribute to the 
compensation fund and the premium should be experience-rated. In order to 
reduce secondary and tertiary costs, eligibility under the NFCS should be 
restricted to only the most severely injured patients and the benefits should 
be lower than tort damages awards. In addition, the effectiveness of 
regulation should be increased in order to provide additional deterrence.  
Some victims may still want to be compensated through the tort 
system. Hence, China may take the Swedish NFCS as the model and allow 
victims to choose between the tort system and the NFCS.  
Social security. China may also learn from New Zealand’s experience 
and adopt a comprehensive NFCS for all types of accidents. This would the 
most radical reform plan which has only been implemented in New Zealand. 
This radical plan may find itself confronted by massive opposition in the 
context of China. The first reason for the opposition is that bearing liability 
for damage that you cause to others is a traditional Chinese value which even 
has impressed American scholars such as Baker.26 China is in the process of 
building a credible legal system and making people accountable for their own 
wrongful actions. In this context, a radical no-fault plan is not likely to be 
accepted by Chinese government officials and citizens. Second, social security 
often spreads accident losses broadly and does not place accident costs on a 
specific group of people. The New Zealand model may dilute economic 
incentives for providers to take precautions significantly. This problem 
 
26 Baker 2005b, pp. 115-116. 
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cannot be easily tackled unless China will be able to enhance the 
effectiveness of its regulatory system of quality assurance. Third, if China 
adopted a special social security scheme for compensation of iatrogenic 
injuries that would place accidents costs on hospitals, this would soon become 
the compensation fund approach as discussed above.  
Since it is highly impractical if not impossible for China to adopt this 
radical social security reform, it may be desirable to keep the current social 
security system as a supplement to the FLIS or a special compensation fund 
that covers iatrogenic injuries.  
3.4. A COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENT REFORM PLANS 
After discussing the desirability of the foregoing reform plans, it seems that 
compulsory first-party insurance or no-fault plans such as the Swedish model 
could be employed by China to provide victimised patients with fair and 
efficient compensation. Piecemeal reforms on the FLIS will not be enough 
since victims of non-negligent iatrogenic injuries are not compensated. 
Especially when taking into consideration the epidemic of Yi Nao incidents, 
these dissatisfied patients may pose a great threat to public order and may 
induce providers to practice defensive medicine. Therefore, some no-fault 
schemes targeted at these patients may be a workable solution to the 
problems in the Chinese malpractice system. Whatever reform plan China 
chooses, economic incentives for providers to invest in treatment and patient 
safety optimally should not be undermined. 
4. LIMITATIONS 
This thesis is the first research that evaluates the Chinese legal remedies for 
medical malpractice prevention and victim compensation both from the 
perspective of law and economics and on the basis of empirical evidence. It 
has arrived at many new conclusions compared to prior studies. However, it 
still has its limitations, which are listed as follows. 
First, due to limited time and finances, firsthand empirical data 
collected for this research are restricted to court decisions and semi-
structured interviews. It is difficult to have access to hospital records or 
insurance claims records. Hence, firsthand data on medical malpractice claims 
settled out of court are unavailable. It follows that it is currently impossible to 
conduct any research into the impact of tort law on the rate of iatrogenic 
injuries. Therefore, any deterrent effect of the Chinese medical malpractice 
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system on primary cost reduction is a theoretical prediction based on 
empirical data from the US. 
Second, due to limited language skills, it is difficult to access foreign 
literature that is not written in English. Hence, when discussing no-fault 
schemes in Scandinavian countries, there was no access to recent data on the 
functioning of these schemes. It follows that any information presented in 
this thesis about these schemes may be out of date. 
Third, many conclusions of this thesis about China are based on 
economic theories that have been developed and tested empirically in the 
context of the United States. Although both countries rely on the fault-based 
medical malpractice system, they differ in many other aspects such as the 
health care system, social security system, insurance market, and traditional 
values. The transferability of the US experience to China needs to be further 
examined. 
5. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Directions for future research can be identified from prior discussions on 
policy recommendations and limitations. 
First, more empirical research should be conducted into the 
epidemiology of medical injury and its relationship with claims initiation. 
Currently, there are no large-scale studies on the frequency, severity, and 
causes of iatrogenic injury and the rate of initiated claims. Without these 
data, it is also impossible to measure the actual effect of tort law on injury 
reduction. 
Second, more attention should be paid to the notion of full 
compensation. Although losses due to disability or death are recoverable 
under the current Chinese tort law, compensation for these losses is 
groundlessly limited. For instance, the cap of 20 years is rather arbitrary. It 
may be interesting to see whether the ex ante WPT or QALY approach to the 
measure of compensation for disability, death or pain and suffering is 
desirable in the context of China. 
Third, although many Chinese scholars have discussed the desirability 
of implementing compulsory MLI, few have discussed the possibility of no-
fault schemes. In the discussion on policy recommendations, their feasibility 
for China has already been discussed. However, the discussion is rather short 
and more scholarly attention should to paid to this topic. 
Fourth, a prior assumption of this thesis is that if the Chinese legal 
system were effective and efficient at preventing medical errors (or quality 
assurance) and compensating victims of medical malpractice adequately, 
there would be a substantial reduction in medical disputes, AEs, violence 
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against doctors and Yi Nao incidents. This assumption should be tested 
empirically in the future when the input system concerning injury 
prevention and victim compensation in China will have been structured 
efficiently in theory and enforced effectively in practice. 
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SUMMARY 
This book examines the legal remedies for preventing medical errors and 
compensating victims of medical malpractice in China from the perspective of 
law and economics. Those legal remedies generally include, inter alia, tort 
liability, regulation, insurance and social security.  
After the Introduction (Chapter 1), Part I (Chapter 2 to Chapter 6) 
examines the legal remedies for medical quality assurance and victim 
compensation in China. Subsequently, Part II (Chapter 7 to Chapter 11) is 
primarily concerned with economic theories and relevant empirical evidence 
pertaining to medical malpractice and adverse events. Finally, Part III 
(Chapter 12 and Chapter 13) evaluates the legal remedies for medical quality 
assurance and victim compensation in China from the perspective of law and 
economics (Chapter 12) and tries to make a few concluding remarks and to 
formulate some policy recommendations (Chapter 13). The central thesis is 
that many aspects of the legal remedies in China are consistent with the 
economic model of accident law as far as primary accident cost avoidance is 
concerned, but they still need to be greatly improved when it comes to 
secondary accident cost avoidance. 
Overall, this book provides a thorough examination of the legal 
remedies for medical malpractice in China, especially taking into account the 
latest development in economic theories and new empirical findings. Hence, 
it will be of interest to legal and economic scholars, lawyers, insurers and 
policy makers responsible for ensuring the quality of medical care.  
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APPENDIX 1:  
LEGISLATION 
China1 
AR-BMI for Urban Employees 1998 (China) 
Decision on Establishing the Urban Employees' Basic Medical Insurance 
System 关于建立城镇职工基本医疗保险制度的决定 (Dec. 14, 1998). 
AR-BMI for Urban Residents 2007 (China) 
Guiding Opinions about the Pilot Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance 
关于开展城镇居民基本医疗保险试点的指导意见 (Jul. 10, 2007). 
AR- Five Guarantees 2006 (China) 
Regulations on the Work of Providing Five Guarantees 
农村五保供养工作条例 (Mar. 1, 2006). 
AR- General Practitioners 2011 (China) 
Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of the Regime of General Practitioners 
关于建立全科医生制度的指导意见 (Jul. 1, 2011). 
 
1 In this thesis, regarding the Constitution and national laws (法律) promulgated by the 
NPC and the SC-NPC, no letter has been prefixed to the abbreviations of the statutes. 
Other inferior and secondary statutes or policy documents have been prefixed with letters 
as follows: “AR-” stands for “administrative regulations” (行政法规) enacted by the State 
Council, “DR-” for “departmental/ministry rules” (部门规章) by ministries of the State 
Council, “LR-” for “local regulations” (地方性法规) by local people’s congresses, “GR-” for 
“local governmental rules” (地方政府规章) by local governments at or above the large-
municipality level, “N-” for non-enforceable “other normative legal documents” 
(其他规范性文件) by various state organs, “JI-” for “judicial interpretations” (司法解释) by 
the SPC, and “LJI-” for “local documents of a nature of judicial interpretations” 
(地方司法解释性文件) by local appellate courts.  
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Appendix 1 
AR-Government-Funded Medical Insurance 1952 (China) 
A Directive on the Implementation of the Government-Funded Medical 
Insurance System for all National Public Servants Working at Various Levels 
of the People’s Government, Political Parties, Societies and Affiliated Public 
Institutions 关于全国各级人民政府、党派、团体及所属事业单位的国家工 
作人员实行公费医疗预防的指示 (Feb. 26, 1951, amended Jan. 2, 1953). 
AR-Labour Insurance 1953 (China) 
Labour Insurance Regulations 劳动保险条例 (Jan. 2, 1953). 
AR-Legal Aid 2003 (China) 
Regulation on Legal Aid 法律援助条例 (Jul. 21, 2003). 
AR-Litigation Costs 2007 (China) 
Measures for Paying Litigation Costs 诉讼费用交纳办法 (Apr. 1, 2007). 
AR-Medical Accidents 1987 (China) 
Measures for the Handling of Medical Accidents医疗事故处理办法 (Jun. 29, 
1987). 
AR-Medical Accidents 2002 (China) 
Regulation on the Handling of Medical Accidents 医疗事故处理条例 (Sep. 1, 
2002). 
AR- Minimum Subsistence for Rural Residents 2007 (China) 
Notice on Establishing the System of Guaranteeing Minimum Subsistence for 
Rural Residents across the Nation 关于在全国建立农村最低生活保障制度的 
通知 (Jul. 11, 2007). 
AR-Minimum Subsistence for Urban Residents 1999 (China) 
Regulations on Guaranteeing Minimum Subsistence for City Residents 城市 
居民最低生活保障条例 (Oct. 1, 1999). 
AR-Medical Institutions 1994 (China) 
Regulations on the Administration of Medical Institutions 医疗机构管理条例 
(Sep. 1, 1994). 
AR-Nurses 2008 (China) 
Nurses Regulation 护士条例 (May 12, 2008). 
 Legislation 
Intersentia 573 
AR- Road Traffic Accidents 1991 (China) 
Measures for the Handling of Road Traffic Accidents 道路交通事故处理办法 
(Sep. 22, 1991, effective Jan. 1, 1992). 
AR- Social Assistance 2014 (China) 
Interim Measures for Social Assistance 社会救助暂行办法 (May 1, 2014). 
Civil Procedure Law 1982 (China) 
Civil Procedure Law (For Trial Implementation) 民事诉讼法(试行) (Oct. 1, 
1982). 
Civil Procedure Law 1991 (2012 Amendment) (China) 
Civil Procedure Law 民事诉讼法 (Apr. 9, 1991, amended Aug. 31, 2012). 
Constitution 2004 (China) 
The Constitution of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国宪法 
(Dec. 4, 1982, amended Mar. 14, 2004). 
Consumer Law 1993 (China) 
Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests 消费者权益保护法 
(Oct. 31, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 1994. 
Contract Law 1999 (China) 
Contract Law 合同法 (Oct. 1, 1999). 
Criminal Law 1997 (China) 
Criminal Law 刑法 (Oct. 1, 1997). 
Doctors Law 1998 (China) 
Law on Practising Doctors 执业医师法 (June 26, 1998, effective May 1, 1999). 
DR-Accident Ascertainment 2002 (China) 
Interim Measures for Medical Accident Technical Ascertainment 
医疗事故技术鉴定暂行办法 (Sep. 1, 2002). 
DR-Accreditation Expert Database 2011 (China) 
Measures for the Administration of Hospital Accreditation Expert Database 
(Trial) 医院评审专家库管理办法(试行) (Dec. 21, 2011). 
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DR-Administrative Dissuasion 2011 (China) 
Interim Measures for Medical Quality and Safety Dissuasion and 
Conversation System 医疗质量安全告诫谈话制度暂行办法 (Jan. 7, 2011). 
DR-Criteria for Medical Institutions 1994 (China) 
The Basic Criteria for Establishing Medical Institutions (Trial) 医疗机构基本 
标准(试行) (Sep. 2, 1994). 
DR- Designated Medical Institutions 1999 (China) 
Notice on the Promulgation of the Interim Measures for the Administration 
of Designated Medical Institutions under the Basic Medical Insurance for 
Urban Employees 关于印发城镇职工基本医疗保险定点医疗机构管理暂行 
办法的通知 (May 11, 1999). 
DR-Detailed Rules-Medical Institutions 2006 (China) 
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations on the 
Administration of Medical Institutions 医疗机构管理条例实施细则 (Sep. 1, 
1994, amended Dec. 1, 2006). 
DR-Disability Pension 2013 (China) 
Measures for the Administration of Disability Pension 伤残抚恤管理办法 
(Jul. 5, 2007, amended Jun. 27, 2013). 
DR- Doctors' Routine Assessment 2007 (China) 
Administrative Measures for Doctors' Routine Assessment 医师 
定期考核管理办法 (Feb. 9, 2007). 
DR-Draft-General Hospitals Ranking 1989 (China) 
Criteria for the Administration of General Hospitals Based on Their Rankings 
(Trial Draft) 综合医院分级管理标准(试行草案) (1989). 
DR-Employment Contracts in Public Institutions 2002 (China) 
Notice on Opinions on Implementing the Regime of Employment Contracts 
in Public Institutions on a Trial Basis 关于在事业单位试行人员聘用制度意 
见的通知 (Jul. 6, 2002). 
DR-Hospital Accreditation 1998 (China) 
Notice on the Hospital Accreditation 关于医院评审工作的通知 (Aug. 11, 
1998). 
DR-Hospital Accreditation 2011 (China) 
Interim Measures for Hospital Accreditation (Year 2011-2015) 
医院评审暂行办法(2011-2015年) (Sep. 21, 2011). 
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DR-Hospital Ranking 1989 (China) 
Measures for the Administration of Hospitals in Accordance with Their 
Ranking (Trial) 医院分级管理办法(试行) (Nov. 29, 1989). 
DR-Incident Reporting 2011 (China) 
Interim Provisions on the Reporting of Medical Quality Safety Incidents 医疗 
质量安全事件报告暂行规定 (Jan 14, 2011). 
DR-Increase in BMIUR & NRCMC Premiums 2014 (China) 
Notice on the Increase in BMIUR and NRCMC Premiums in 2014 关于提高 
2014年新型农村合作医疗和城镇居民基本医疗保险筹资标准的通知 (Apr. 
25, 2014). 
DR-Licensed Pharmacists 1999 (China) 
Interim Provisions on the Regime of Licensed Pharmacists 执业药师资格制 
度暂行规定 (Apr. 1, 1999). 
DR-Maintaining Order In Medical Institutions 2012 (China) 
Notice on Maintaining the Order in Medical Institutions 关于维护医疗机构 
秩序的通告 (Apr. 30, 2012). 
DR- Medical Assistance Funds 2013 (China) 
Measures for the Administration of the Urban-Rural Medical Assistance 
Funds 城乡医疗救助基金管理办法 (Dec. 23, 2013). 
DR- Medical Assistance System 2009 (China) 
Opinion on the Further Improvement of the Urban-Rural Medical Assistance 
System 关于进一步完善城乡医疗救助制度的意见 (Jun. 11, 2009). 
DR-MoH Report-Hospitals Running at a Loss 1981 (China) 
Report on the Question as to How to Resolve the Problem of Hospitals 
Running at a Loss 关于解决医疗赔本问题的报告 (Feb. 16, 1981). 
DR-Neo-Rural Cooperative 2003 (China) 
Opinions on Establishing the New-Type Rural Cooperative Medical System 
关于建立新型农村合作医疗制度的意见 (Jan. 10, 2003). 
DR-Nurse Examination 2010 (China) 
The Measures for the Nurse Practising Qualification Examination 护士执业 
资格考试办法 (Jul. 1, 2010). 
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DR-Prehospital Emergency Care 2013 (China) 
Measures for the Management of Prehospital Emergency Medical Care 院前 
医疗急救管理办法 (Feb. 1, 2014). 
DR-Promotion of the BMIUR 2016 (China) 
Notice on the Promotion of the Basic Medical Insurance for Urban Residents 
in 2016 关于做好2016年城镇居民基本医疗保险工作的通知 (Apr. 29, 2016). 
DR-Promotion of MLI 2007 (China) 
Notice on the Issues pertaining to the Promotion of Medical Liability 
Insurance 关于推动医疗责任保险有关问题的通知 (Jun. 21, 2007). 
DR- Sino-Foreign Medical Institutions 2000 (China) 
Interim Measures for the Administration of Sino-foreign Equity Joint and 
Cooperative Joint Medical Institutions 中外合资、合作医疗机构管理暂行办 
法 (Jul. 1, 2000). 
DR-Standardised Training of Residents 1993 (China) 
Pilot Measures for Standardised Training of Clinical Residents 临床住院医师 
规范化培训试行办法 (Feb. 17, 1993). 
DR-Standardised Training of Resident 2014 (China) 
Regulatory Measures for Standardised Training of Resident (Trial) 住院医师 
规范化培训管理办法(试行) (Aug. 22, 2014). 
DR-Unregistered Interns 2004 (China) 
Reply to the Question about Whether Unregistered Interns Who Have 
Already Obtained the Qualifications for Practising Doctors Are Allowed to 
Practice 关于取得医师资格但未经执业注册的人员开展医师执业活动有关 
问题的批复 (Jun. 3, 2004). 
Enterprise Income Tax Law 2007 (China) 
Enterprise Income Tax Law 企业所得税法 (Mar. 16, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 
2008). 
GR-Jiangsu Attorney Fees (China) 
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Measures for the 
Administration of Lawyers’ Fees in Jiangsu Province 江苏省《律师服务收费 
管理办法》实施细则 (Jan. 1, 2007). 
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GR-Jiangsu Criteria for Attorney Fees (China) 
Criteria for Attorney Fees in the Jiangsu Province 江苏省律师服务收费标准 
(Dec. 13, 2013). 
Insurance Law 1995 (China) 
Insurance Law 保险法 (Oct. 1, 1995). 
Insurance Law 2009 (China) 
Insurance Law 保险法 (Oct. 1, 2009). 
JI-Application of Tort Law 2010 (China) 
Notice on Certain Issues concerning the Application of the Tort Law 关于适 
用《侵权责任法》若干问题的通知 (Jun. 30, 2010). 
JI-Causes of Civil Action 2001 (China) 
Notice on Issuing the Provisions on Causes of Action in Civil Cases (Trial) 关 
于印发《民事案件案由规定(试行)》的通知 (Oct. 30, 2000). 
JI-Causes of Civil Action 2008 (China) 
Notice on Issuing the Provisions on Causes of Action in Civil Cases 关于印发 
《民事案件案由规定》的通知 (Apr. 1, 2008). 
JI-Causes of Civil Action 2011 (China) 
Notice on Issuing the Revised Provisions on Causes of Action in Civil Cases 
关于印发修改后的《民事案件案由规定》的通知 (Apr. 1, 2011). 
JI-Application of Civil Procedure Law 2015 (China) 
Interpretation on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China 关于适用《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》的解释 (Feb. 4, 
2015). 
JI-Criminal Filing Standards 2008 (China) 
Provisions (I) on the Standards for Filing Criminal Cases under the 
Jurisdiction of the Public Security Organs For Investigation and Prosecution 
关于公安机关管辖的刑事案件立案追诉标准的规定(一) (Jun. 25, 2008). 
JI-Emotional Damage 2001 (China) 
Interpretation of Several Issues regarding the Ascertainment of Compensation 
Liability for Emotional Damage in Civil Torts 关于确定民事侵权精神损害赔 
偿责任若干问题的解释 (Mar. 10, 2001). 
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JI-No Compensation Shall Be Granted 1964 (China) 
Official Reply to the Issue that Economic Compensation Shall not Be Granted 
in Handling Medical accidents Cases 关于处理医疗事故案件不应当判给经济 
补偿问题的批复 (Jan. 18, 1964). 
JI-Notice on Referring to the RHMA 2003 (China) 
Notice on Trying Civil Cases on Medical Disputes by Referring to the 
“Regulation on Handling Medical Malpractices” 关于参照《医疗事故处理条 
例》审理医疗纠纷民事案件的通知 (Jan. 6, 2003). 
JI-Personal Injury 2003 (China) 
Interpretation of Some Issues concerning the Application of Law for the Trial 
of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury 关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适 
用法律若干问题的解释 (Dec. 4, 2003, effective May 1, 2004). 
JI-Rules of Evidence 2001 (China) 
Some Provisions on Evidence in Civil Procedures 关于民事诉讼证据的若干 
规定(Dec. 21, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002). 
Judicial Ascertainment Administration 2005 (China) 
Decision on the Administration of Judicial Ascertainment 关于司法鉴定管理 
问题的决定 (Oct. 1, 2005). 
Labour Contract Law 2012 (China) 
Labour Contract Law 劳动合同法 (Jun. 29, 2007, amended Dec. 28, 2012). 
Law on Administrative Penalty 1996 (China) 
Law on Administrative Penalty 行政处罚法 (Oct. 1, 1996). 
LGR-Ningbo Medical Dispute Resolution 2007 (China) 
Interim Measures for Preventing and Handling Medical Disputes in Ningbo 
City 宁波市医疗纠纷预防与处置暂行办法 (Nov. 20, 2007, effective Mar. 1, 
2008). 
LGR-Yunnan Iatrogenic Injury Incidents 1998 (China) 
Provisions on the Handling of Iatrogenic Injury Incidents in the Yunnan 
Province 云南省医疗损害事件处理规定 (Oct. 15, 1988, effective Jan. 1, 
1999). 
LJI-Anhui Guide to Malpractice (2011) 
Guiding Opinions on Several Issues concerning the Trial of Medical Dispute 
Cases 关于审理医疗纠纷案件若干问题的指导意见 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
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LJI-Beijing Guide to Malpractice 2010 (China) 
Guiding Opinions on Several Issues concerning the Trial of Cases of Disputes 
over Compensation for Medical Injury (Trial) 关于审理医疗损害赔偿纠纷案 
件若干问题的指导意见(试行) (Nov. 18, 2010). 
LJI-Jiangsu Guide to Injury Ascertainment 2010 (China) 
Several Opinions on the Medical Injury Ascertainment Work (Trial) 关于医 
疗损害鉴定工作的若干意见(试行) (Oct. 11, 2010). 
LJI-Jiangsu Notice on Injury Ascertainment 2010 (China) 
Notice on the Proper Conduct of Medical Injury Ascertainment after the 
Coming into Force of the PRC Tort Liability Law 关于做好《中华人民共和 
国侵权责任法》实施后医疗损害鉴定工作的通知 (Jul. 9, 2010). 
LJI-Jiangsu Guide to Torts 2011 (China) 
A Trial Guide to the Trial of Cases of Compensation for Damage Caused by 
Torts 侵权损害赔偿案件审理指南 (2011). 
LJI-Shanghai Guide to Malpractice 2005 (China) 
Guide to the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Compensation for Injury Caused 
by Medical Malpractice 医疗过失赔偿纠纷案件办案指南 (2005). 
LJI-Xinjiang Guide to Malpractice (2011) 
Guiding Opinions on Several Issues concerning the Trial of Cases of 
Compensation for Medical Injury (Trial) 关于审理医疗损害赔偿案件若干问 
题的指导意见(试行) (Sep. 29, 2011). 
LJI-Zhejiang Guide to Malpractice (2010) 
Opinions on Several Issues concerning the Trial of Medical Dispute Cases 
(Trial) 关于审理医疗纠纷案件若干问题的意见(试行) (Jul. 1, 2010). 
LR-Jiangsu Legal Aid 2001 (China) 
Regulations on Legal Aid in the Jiangsu Province 江苏省法律援助条例 (Oct. 
1, 2001). 
LR-Jiangsu Legal Aid 2001 (2005 Amendment, China) 
Regulations on Legal Aid in the Jiangsu Province (2005 Amendment) 江苏省 
法律援助条例(2005年修订) (Dec. 1, 2005). 
N-Assistance for Non-Paying Emergencies 2013 (China) 
Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of the Regime of Assistance for Non-
Paying Emergencies 关于建立疾病应急救助制度的指导意见 (Feb. 22, 2013).  
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N-Beijing Medical Liability Insurance 2004 (China) 
Notice concerning the Enactment of the Opinions on Implementing Medical 
Liability Insurance in Beijing City 关于下发《北京市实施医疗责任保险的意 
见》的通知 (Sep. 1, 2004). 
N-Crackdown on Yi Nao Incidents 2016 (China) 
A Campaign for the Crackdown on Hospital Order-Related Crimes 关于严厉 
打击涉医违法犯罪专项行为方案 (Jun. 30, 2016). 
N-Criteria for Ascertaining the Degree of Disability 2005 (China) 
Criteria for Ascertaining the Degree of Disability (Trial) 人体损伤残疾程度鉴 
定标准(试行) (May 1, 2005). 
N-Deepening of Health Reform 2009 (China) 
Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Medical and Health Care System 
关于深化医药卫生体制改革的意见 (Mar. 17, 2009). 
N-Establishment of Standardised Training of Residents 2013 (China) 
Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of Standardised Training of Residents 
关于建立住院医师规范化培训制度的指导意见 (Dec. 31, 2013). 
N-Jiangsu Accident Ascertainment Fees 2002 (China) 
A Reply to the Criteria for Charging Medical Accident Technical 
Ascertainment 关于医疗事故技术鉴定等收费试行标准的批复 (Oct. 14, 
2002). 
N-Private Medical Institutions 2010 (China) 
Notice on the Opinions on Further Encouraging and Guiding the 
Establishment of Medical Institutions by Social Capital 关于进一步鼓励和引 
导社会资本举办医疗机构意见的通知 (Dec. 26, 2010). 
N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance 2002 (China) 
On the Reply to the Opinion on Implementing Medical Liability Insurance in 
Shanghai City 关于同意《关于本市实施医疗责任保险的意见》的批复 
(Aug. 23, 2002). 
N-Shanghai Medical Liability Insurance Implementation Schemes 2002 
(China) 
Implementation Schemes for Medical Accident Liability Insurance in 
Shanghai City 上海市医疗事故责任保险实施方案(试行) (Aug. 23, 2002). 
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N-Shenzhen Medical Professional Risk Insurance 2004 (China) 
Measures for Administrating Medical Professional Risk Insurance in 
Shenzhen City 深圳市医疗执业风险保险管理办法 (Jan. 8, 2004). 
Principles 1986 (China) 
General Principles of the Civil Law 民法通则 (Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 
1987). 
Public Security Administration Punishments Law 2006 (China) 
Public Security Administration Punishments Law 治安管理处罚法 (Mar. 1, 
2006). 
State Compensation Law 1994 (China) 
State Compensation Law 国家赔偿法 (May 12, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995). 
Social Insurance Law 2010 (China) 
Social Insurance Law 社会保险法 (Oct. 28, 2010, effective Jul. 1, 2011). 
Tort Law 2009 (China) 
Tort Law 侵权责任法 (Dec. 26, 2009, effective Jul. 1, 2010). 
People’s Mediation Law 2010 (China) 
People’s Mediation Law 人民调解法 (Aug. 28, 2010, effective Jan. 1, 2011). 
Product Quality Law 2000 (China) 
Product Quality Law 产品质量法 (Feb. 22, 1993, amended Jul. 8, 2000). 
Property Law 2007 (China) 
Property Law 物权法 (Oct. 1, 2007). 
Denmark 
Danish KEL: 
Lov om klageog erstatningsadgang inden for sundhedsvæsenet [Law on the 
Right to Complain and Receive Compensation within the Health Service] No. 
706, June 25, 2010 (Den.), translated by the Patienterstatningen. 
Danish Damages Act: 
Bekendtgørelse af lov om erstatningsansvar [Liability for Damages Act] No. 
885, September 20, 2005 (Den.), translated by the Patienterstatningen. 
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France 
French C. pén: 
Code pénal (Penal Code), translation at <www.legislationline.org/-
documents/section/criminal-codes/country/30> (Fr.). 
French Law 2002-303 of March 4 : 
Loi 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits malades et à la qualité du 
système de santé [Law 2002-303 of March 4, 2002 on Patients’ Rights and the 
Quality of the Health System], Journal Officiel de la Republique Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 5, 2002, p. 4118 (Fr.) 
Finland 
Finish PIA:  
Potilasvahinkolaki [Patient Injury Act] No. 585, July 25, 1986 (Fin.), 
translated by the Finnish Patient Insurance Centre. 
Finish Tort Act: 
Vahingonkorvauslaki [Tort Liability Act] No. 412, May 31, 1974 (Fin.), 
translated by the Finlex. 
Germany 
German StGB: 
Strafgesetzbuch (Penal Code), translation at <https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_stgb/index.html> (Ger.) 
Italy 
Italian C.p.: 
Codice penale (It.). 
Spain 
Spanish C.P.: 
Código Penal (Criminal Code) (Spain). 
The Netherlands 
Dutch BW: 
Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code) (established in 1992) (Neth.), translated in 
(Internet Site of Dutch Civil Law). 
New Zealand 
Code: NZ-HDC-CHDSCRR 1996 
The HDC Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers' Rights 
Regulation 1996 (N.Z.) 
 Legislation 
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NZ Act 1972:NZ-ACA 1972 
Accident Compensation Act 1972 (N.Z.). 
NZ Act 1982:NZ-ACA 1982 
Accident Compensation Act 1982 (N.Z.). 
NZ Amendment Act 1993:NZ-ARCIAA 1993 
Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Amendment Act 1993 
(N.Z.). 
NZ Act 2001:NZ-ACA 2001 
Accident Compensation Act 2001 (N.Z.). 
NZ-CA 1961: 
Crimes Act 1961 (N.Z.) 
NZ-CAA 1997: 
Crimes Amendment Act 1997 (N.Z.) 
NZ-CAA 2011: 
Crimes Amendment Act 2011 (N.Z.) 
NZ HDC Act 1994:NZ-HDCA 1994 
Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 (N.Z.). 
NZ-IPRCAA 2001: 
Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment Act 2001 
(N.Z.). 
NZ Amendment Act 2005:NZ-IPRCAA 2005 
Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Amendment Act 2005 
(N.Z.). 
Norway 
Norwegian PIA:  
Lov om erstatning ved pasientskader mv. (Pasientskadeloven) [Patient Injury 
Act] No. 53, June 15, 2001 (Nor.). 
Norwegian Damages Act: 
Lov om skadeserstatning (skadeserstatningsloven) [Damage Compensation 
Act] No. 26, June 13, 1969 (Nor.). 
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Sweden 
Swedish PIA:  
Patientskadelag [Patient Injuries Act] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 
1996:799) (Swed.), translated by Carl Espersson. 
Swedish Tort Act: 
Skadeståndslag [Tort Liability Act] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 
1972:207) (Swed.). 
The United States 
US Model Penal Code: 
Model Penal Code (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
US Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. Law Inst. 1979). 
US Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm: 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (Am. 
Law Inst. 2010). 
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APPENDIX 2:  
CASES 
China 
Chen v. Stomatological Hospital (China) 
Chen Bo v. Stomatological Hospital of Jiangsu Province 
陈博诉江苏省口腔医院, (on file with author) (Jiangsu Nanjing Gulou District 
People’s Court Dec. 12, 2003) (China) 
Children’s Hospital v. Pang et al. (China) 
Chongqing Medical University Affiliated Children’s Hospital v. Pang 
Kunchuan, Pang Haikuan & Chen Shiling 
重庆医科大学附属儿童医院诉庞坤川、庞海宽和陈石玲, (Chinalawinfo) 
(Chongqing Yuzhong District People’s Ct. 2009) (China). 
Chongqing Children’s Hospital v. Pang et al. (China) 
Chongqing Medical University Affiliated Children’s Hospital 
重庆医科大学附属儿童医院, (Chinalawinfo) (Chongqing Yuzhong District 
People’s Court 2009) (China). 
Deng v. Anji Hospital (China) 
Deng Moumou v. Anji County People’s Hospital 邓某某诉安吉县人民医院, 
(Chinalawinfo) (Zhejiang Huzhou Intermediate People’s Court 2015) (China). 
Feng & Xue v. Drum Tower Hospital (China) 
Feng Zenglin & Xue Huailan v. Nanjing Drum Tower Hospital 
冯增林、薛怀兰诉南京市鼓楼医院, (on file with author) (Jiangsu Nanjing 
Gulou District People's Court Dec. 14, 2006) (China). 
Gu v. Drum Tower Hosp. & Shanghai RAAS Co., Ltd. (China) 
Gu Yeqin v. Nanjing Drum Tower Hosp. & Shanghai RAAS Blood Products 
Co., Ltd. 顾业勤诉南京市鼓楼医院、上海莱士血制品有限公司, (on file with 
author) (Jiangsu Nanjing Gulou District People’s Court Dec. 16, 2005) (China). 
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He v. A Chongqing Hospital (China) 
He Mou Jia v. A Hospital in Chongqing City 何某甲诉重庆市某医院, 
(Chinalawinfo) (Chongqing the Fifth Intermediate People’s Court Jul. 24, 
2005) (China). 
Huang v. Chen (China) 
Huang Tujian v. Chen Longsheng 黄土坚诉陈龙生医疗事故损害赔偿纠纷案, 
(Chinalawinfo) (Guangdong High People's Court Jan. 19, 2015) (China). 
Li v. Shaoyang Hospital (China) 
Li Yinxian et al. v. Shaoyang Central Hospital 
李银先等与邵阳市中心医院医疗损害责任纠纷上诉案, (Chinalawinfo) 
(Hunan Shaoyang Intermediate People's Court Dec. 5, 2012) (China). 
Liang v. The Third Hospital et al. (China) 
Liang Haoming v. The Third Affiliated Hospital of Sun Yat-Sen University et 
al. 梁浩明诉中山大学附属第三医院等, (Caseshare) (Guangdong Guangzhou 
Intermediate People’s Court Dec. 20, 2010) (China). 
Liu v. Datong Clinic (China) 
Liu Ying v. Ürümchi New Urban District Datong Trade Firm Traditional 
Chinese Clinic 刘颖诉乌鲁木齐新市区大同贸易商行中医门诊部, (Chinalawinfo) 
(Ürümchi Intermediate People’s Court April 24, 1992) (China). 
Liu v. Pingdingshan Hospital (China) 
Liu Shuhua v. Pingdingshan Coal Mine Group 12 Hospital 
刘树华与平煤集团十二矿医院医疗过失损害赔偿纠纷案, (Chinalawinfo) 
(Pingdingshan Weidong District People's Court Apr. 20, 2009) (China). 
Liu v. Gong’an Traditional Chinese Hospital (China) 
Liu Liangrong v. Gong’an County Traditional Chinese Hospital 
刘良容诉公安县中医医院, (Chinalawinfo) (Hubei Gong’an County People’s 
Court 2014) (China). 
Lü v. Drum Tower Hospital (China) 
Lü Ruijin v. Nanjing Drum Tower Hospital & Renji Hospital of Shanghai 
Jiaotong University School of Medicine 
吕瑞今诉南京市鼓楼医院、上海交通大学医学院附属仁济医院, (on file 
with author) (Jiangsu Nanjing Gulou District People’s Court Jun. 11, 2006) 
(China). 
   Cases 
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Ouyang v. Suzhou Hospital (China) 
Ouyan Lanying v. Suzhou Municipal Hospital 欧阳兰英诉宿州市立医院, 
(Chinalawinfo) (Anhui Suzhou Yongqiao District People’s Court 2015) 
(China). 
Qi & Qi v. Stomatological Hospital (China) 
Qi Jianzhong & Qi Enxuan v. Stomatological Hosp. Jiangsu Province 
戚建中、戚恩瑄诉江苏省口腔医院, (on file with author) (Jiangsu Nanjing 
Gulou District People's Court Mar. 26, 2008) (China). 
Qian v. Zhongda Hospital (China) 
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APPENDIX 3:  
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
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Interview with Hu Xiaoxiang (胡晓翔) & Liu Junning (刘俊宁), Division 
Chiefs, Nanjing Health Bureau, Jiangsu Province, China (Aug. 30, 2013). 
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Interview with Yang Bingquan (杨冰泉), Associate Chief Physician, Zhongda 
Hospital at Southeast University, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China (Jul. 1, 
2014). 
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Interview with Gu Liubao (顾刘宝), Attending Doctor, Jiangsu Province 
Official Hospital, China (Jul. 1, 2014). 
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Interview with Yang Weimin (杨伟民), Office Director, Office for 
Reconciliation between Doctors and Patients, Zhongda Hospital at Southeast 
University, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China (Jul. 1, 2014). 
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Interview with Zhu Jian (朱建), Assoc. Chief Physician, Zhongda Hospital at 
Southeast University, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China (Jul. 1, 2014). 
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Interview with Ms. A (alias), Resident Doctor, Zhongda Hospital at Southeast 
University, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China (Jul. 2, 2014). 
Interview-2014-6 
Interview with Huo Mingdong (霍明东), Attending Doctor, Zhongda 
Hospital at Southeast University, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China (Jul. 2, 
2014). 
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Department, Nanjing Health Bureau, Jiangsu Province, China (Aug. 30, 2013). 
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Interview with Dai Qingkang (戴庆康), Assoc. Professor, Southeast 
University, Law School & Assistant to the President, Xuzhou Intermediate 
People’s Court, Nanjing & Xuzhou, China (Jan. 3, 2015). 
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Interview with Bai Xiuyan (白秀艳), Lawyer, DeHeng (TaiYuan) Law Offices, 
Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, China (Jan. 5, 2015). 
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Interview with Gu Yihua (顾益华), Lawyer, Jiangsu Jianxing Law Firm, 
Nantong, Jiangsu Province, China (Jan. 5, 2015). 
Interview-2015-4 
Interview with Zeng Fanlin (曾凡林), Lawyer, Hunan Jinzhou (Changde) 
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VALORISATION ADDENDUM 
1) What is the social relevance of your research results? 
The troubled relationship between doctors/hospitals and patients is a topical 
subject in China. In particular, Chinese doctors complain that they are under 
threat from violence. Violence against doctors is a worldwide problem. 
However, what is unique to China is that the nature of violence is extreme 
and part of the violent events is labeled as Yi Nao incidents. Many patients 
and their family members use violence or a threat of violence to coerce 
hospitals into paying compensation. They may also employ Yi Nao gangs to 
help them to carry out Yi Nao incidents. These groups would threaten and 
assault hospital personnel, damage facilities, and equipment, and disturb the 
normal activities of the hospital, which has been widely reported in both 
Chinese and English media. In addition to the costs of medical malpractice, 
those violent Yi Nao incidents incur considerable social costs.  
Various factors may account for the tension between doctors/hospitals 
and patients, such as deteriorating medical quality and ethics, bad 
communications between doctors and patients, low coverage of social 
security, and high medical bills. One of the causal factors that is pertinent to 
this thesis is that patients resort to Yi Nao incidents because they do not trust 
the legal remedies for medical malpractice in China. Hence, this thesis has 
explored what the legal remedies are in China, how good they are both from 
a legal perspective and from a law and economics perspective, and how we 
can improve them.  
The research results show that the Chinese legal remedies for 
preventing medical malpractice and compensating victims of medical 
malpractice need to be further improved, although many aspects of the 
remedies are in line with economic benchmarks. At the end of this thesis, 
several policy recommendations are proposed in order for optimal deterrence 
and compensation to be achieved. The wider social relevance of these results 
is that if health care providers would be induced to invest optimally in care 
and patient safety and victimised patients could obtain sufficient 
compensation quickly, more medical malpractice would be prevented in the 
first place and fewer serious medical disputes would arise. A decreased rate of 
medical malpractice, iatrogenic injury, medical disputes, and Yi Nao incidents 
would surely economise on social costs and thus enhance social welfare.  
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2) To who, in addition to the academic community, are your research results 
of interest and why? 
In additional to scholars, the research results of this thesis may be interesting 
to many other groups. First and foremost, policy recommendations proposed 
at the end of the thesis are of relevance for Chinese policy makers. In China, 
important decisions are generally made by the national legislature (NPC and 
SC-NPC) and sometimes by the central government (State Council). The legal 
remedies for medical malpractice have been changed several times and 
further reforms are still pending. If Chinese policy makers set the 
minimization of accident costs as a legitimate policy goal, then it would be 
helpful if they could take into account the policy recommendations that I put 
forward in my thesis. Overall, China should continue to improve the fault-
liability-insurance system (FLIS) in order to provide physicians with 
sufficient incentives to take precautions at the moment. Besides, in order to 
provide victims with fast and fair compensation, China may conduct some 
experiments in the no-fault compensation scheme (NFCS) in some local 
jurisdictions and strengthen quality regulation at the same time. Any further 
reform proposal should be based on a careful comparison between the FLIS 
and the NFCS.  
Also, this book may be of interest to businesses, especially liability 
insurance companies. China has reformed the medical malpractice liability 
regime drastically by enacting the new Tort Liability Law 2009. This book has 
examined not only how the law in books is written, but also how the law is 
applied in practice. The empirical data collected in this book should be able to 
help liability insurance companies, especially those from other countries, to 
assess the risk of medical malpractice in China and make informed decisions. 
In addition to policy makers and businesses, this book may be 
interesting to judges, especially those from other countries. In modern times, 
especially within the member states of the European Union, judges more 
frequently make references to foreign case-law or legal doctrines in their 
decisions. This book provides foreign judges with an interesting example of 
how Chinese judges handle medical malpractice issues. After all, the problem 
of medical malpractice is not unique to China. Besides, the detailed 
information summarised in this book on how to construct an efficiency-
oriented malpractice system may give judges fascinating insights into how to 
apply and interpret the law in a better way, irrespective of the particularity of 
jurisdictions.  
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3) Into which concrete products, services, processes, activities or commercial 
activities will your results be translated and shaped? 
First, the results of my research will be published into a book by the 
Intersentia in its EDLE series (devoted to Law and Economics). This book will 
be available for researchers, students and other readers who are interested in 
topics such as medical malpractice law, tort law, health care regulation and 
law and economics. By reading this book, they will have a clear 
understanding of the legal remedies for medical malpractice in China, the 
latest developments in economic theories concerning medical malpractice 
and extensive empirical evidence. 
Second, some parts of this thesis have already been published in law 
journals. For example, the Tsinghua China Law Review has published the 
article “Causal Uncertainty in Chinese Medical Malpractice Law – When 
Theories Meet Facts” in Volume 9, Number 1, 2016. In addition to this article, 
there is a plan to transform other parts of the thesis into articles in the near 
future. 
Third, during the period between 2012 and 2016, some preliminary 
results were presented at several conferences and workshops, such as the 
METRO Seminar Series, the Joint Seminar “The Future of Law and 
Economics” in Paris and the “Liability and Insurance” Workshop at the 20th 
Ius Commune Congress in 2015. Feedback from the audience greatly 
facilitated the improvement of my research.  
4) To what degree can your results be called innovative in respect to the 
existing range of products, services, processes, activities and commercial 
activities? 
This research is innovative in two aspects. On the one hand, it generates new 
empirical findings pertaining to how the medical malpractice regime actually 
works in China. For the purpose of examining how the law is working in 
practice, a total of 592 court decisions have been analyzed and some semi-
structured interviews conducted. These empirical data show that there is a 
gap between what the law says and what the law is applied in practice. 
Hence, it would be too superficial if only the substantive rules were 
addressed. On the other hand, it looks at the medical malpractice issue from 
the perspective of law and economics. Although the economic analysis of 
malpractice liability has been extensively carried out in the West, it is still 
relatively new to apply this approach to the analysis of the Chinese one. In 
particular, the book has summarised a lot of empirical evidence in favour of 
the deterrent effect of medical malpractice liability, which has laid a solid 
foundation for normative arguments. 
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5) How will these plans for valorization be shaped? What is the schedule, are 
there risks involved, what market opportunities are there and what are the 
costs involved? 
First, social media, such as newspapers and blogs, are wonderful platforms to 
make the research results accessible to a wider public audience. The general 
public will read those results and acquire a better understanding of various 
disputes over medical malpractice. Readers, who find law and economics 
theories convincing or unconvincing, may try to participate in the discussions 
and put forward their own opinions. 
Second, it may be helpful to provide legal advisers or commercial 
insurers with some handbooks or brochures, which include the introduction 
to the Chinese medical malpractice regime and major findings of this 
research. That is particularly important for international insurance companies 
who want to do businesses in China but who are unfamiliar with the Chinese 
legal system. 
Third, the key findings of this research will be spread to policy makers, 
judges, scholars and the public through various conferences and workshops. 
In addition to the presentations in Europe mentioned before, the research 
results are going to be presented on new occasions in China in the near 
future.  
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